9.0 Public Review Comments and Responses
9.0 PUBLIC REVIEW COMMENTS AND RESPONSES

Chapter 9 of this Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) presents the comments and responses to the NMD Deployment Draft EIS and the Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR) Supplement to the NMD Deployment Draft EIS made during their respective public comment periods. Section 9.1 provides the public review comments and responses to the NMD Deployment Draft EIS and Section 9.2 to the UEWR Supplement.

9.1 NMD DEPLOYMENT DRAFT EIS COMMENTS AND RESPONSES

The National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment Draft Environmental Impact Statement public review and comment period began on October 1, 1999 with publication of the Notice of Availability (NOA) in the Federal Register. The initial public comment period ended on November 15, 1999; however, at the request from the public the comment period was extended to January 19, 2000. Some comments were received after the ending date but were included in the review comments.

Copies of the Draft EIS were made available for public review at several locations within the region of influence of the proposed NMD program listed below. In addition, a copy of the Draft EIS was made available for public review on the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization’s NMD website.

Alaska
- Alaska Resource Library and Information Services, Anchorage
- Alaska State Library, Anchorage
- Anderson School Library, Anderson
- Delta Junction Library, Delta Junction
- Fairbanks North Star Borough Public Library, Fairbanks
- University of Alaska, Alaska Consortium Library, Anchorage
- University of Alaska, Fairbanks, Elmer E. Rasmuson Library, Fairbanks
- A. Holmes Johnson Memorial Library, Kodiak

North Dakota
- Cavalier County Library, Langdon
The following methods were used to notify the public of upcoming public hearing meetings:

- NOA announcement in the Federal Register
- Paid advertisements placed in local newspapers
- Media releases to newspapers, radio, and television

Seven public hearings on the Draft EIS were held between October 26 and November 9, 1999. Table 9.1-1 lists the locations and dates of these meetings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meeting Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Attendees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Langdon Activity Center, 516 10th Avenue, Langdon, North Dakota</td>
<td>October 26</td>
<td>6:00–8:00 p.m.</td>
<td>156</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civic Auditorium, 615 1st Avenue North, Grand Forks, North Dakota</td>
<td>October 27</td>
<td>6:00–8:00 p.m.</td>
<td>39</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carlson Community Activity Center, 2010 2nd Avenue, Fairbanks, Alaska</td>
<td>November 1</td>
<td>6:00–9:00 p.m.</td>
<td>128</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anderson School, 116 West 1st Street, Anderson, Alaska</td>
<td>November 2</td>
<td>7:00–9:00 p.m.</td>
<td>61</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delta High School, School Road, Delta Junction, Alaska</td>
<td>November 3</td>
<td>6:00–8:00 p.m.</td>
<td>200</td>
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<tr>
<td>West Coast International Inn, 3333 West International Airport Road Anchorage, Alaska</td>
<td>November 4</td>
<td>6:00–8:00 p.m.</td>
<td>71</td>
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<tr>
<td>Days Inn, 2000 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, Virginia</td>
<td>November 9</td>
<td>6:00–8:00 p.m.</td>
<td>24</td>
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</table>

During the initial hour of each public hearing, an informal information session was held to encourage the public to talk with project leaders and view exhibits. During this time, the public was encouraged to sign in at the registration desk, to complete a speaker’s card if they wanted to make a statement at the public hearing, and to complete an address form if they wanted to receive a copy of the Final EIS or its Executive Summary. A log of public and agency attendees was maintained for each hearing, although registration was not required. Fact sheets summarizing the NMD program were made available to all attendees. Copies of the comparison of alternatives environmental impact table...
were also made available to the public. Other handouts included a public hearing brochure, which provided instructions on how to be heard and how to get more information, written comment forms, and cards for commentor registration and document requests.

Following the information hour, the public was invited to attend the Public Hearing. The moderator began the formal presentation by explaining the format of the meeting, which included:

- Mr. Lewis Michaelson—Introduction
- Colonel Larry Bramlitt—National Missile Defense Program Office, described the NMD Program, proposed action and alternatives, and decision to be made
- Mr. David Hasley—U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, presented the findings of the Draft EIS
- Public Comment Session
- Mr. Michaelson—Closing Remarks

A transcript of the full text of each public hearing is included in section 9.1.3.

Public comments on the Draft EIS were received in several different ways. Public hearing attendees were invited to make formal statements, which were recorded by a court reporter at each meeting. A total of 87 individuals spoke at the public hearings, and their comments were documented in seven recorded transcripts. A list of the individuals who spoke at the public hearings, designated P-T-001 through P-T-087, and copies of the transcripts are included in section 9.1.3.1.

Written comments on the Draft EIS were received in various formats over the course of the public comment period. Initially, some prepared information was submitted to the moderator by speakers during each public hearing. In addition, written comment forms that were made available during registration were either returned at the conclusion of the public hearings or forwarded by mail. Finally, some individuals and several Federal, state, and local agencies submitted letters of comment. In these three forms, 110 written comments were received from individuals representing themselves or private and public organizations. A list of the individuals, including their organization or agency affiliation where applicable, and copies of their transmittals are included in section 9.1.1. Written comments are designated P-W-001 through P-W-110.

In addition to transcript and written comments, the public was encouraged to e-mail comments to a mailbox designated for receipt of public comments: nmdeis@smdc.army.mil or through the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization’s NMD web site. A total of 60 e-mails were received during the public comment. A list of the individuals who sent e-
Chapter 9—Public Review Comments and Responses

Emails and copies of the documents received are included in section 9.1.2.1. E-mail documents are designated P-E-001 through P-E-060.

Every transcript, written letter/comment, and email was reviewed as it was received. Each document was assigned a unique number and then was carefully reviewed to identify the environmental resource area and specific topic of individual comments and issues that were presented. Each of these identified issues was highlighted and numbered sequentially. For example, if the tenth speaker presented in a transcript document (P-T-010) provided comments on seven separate topics, those comments were numbered P-T-010.1 through P-T-010.7.

The process of responding to comments required reaching a thorough understanding of the issues being presented and then determining the appropriate action to be taken. However, the majority of comments received on the Draft EIS were declarative statements not requiring a direct response, but which did need to be noted in the context of overall public review. Most of the comments received were related to program issues such as treaty, system cost, potential threat, and system effectiveness. These general program-related comments are outside the scope of this EIS and required no revision to the EIS and no direct response, except to note the comments for the record (e.g., comment noted). Other comments identified corrections or new information that was directly included in the text of the Final EIS and noted below.

Some of comments posed questions about the methodologies, analyses, and conclusions for various environmental resource impacts and mitigations presented in the Draft EIS. For each of these comments, a specific response was prepared—occasionally requiring the acquisition of new data and the preparation of additional analyses. New information and analysis supporting or changing the conclusions of the Draft EIS were incorporated into the text of the Final EIS.

Section 9.1 of the Final EIS presents reproductions of all the original documents that were received during the public hearing comment period for the NMD Deployment Draft EIS and provides direct responses to issues included in those documents. The organization of section 9.1 provides a separate comment/response section for each of the three types of comment documents:

9.1.1 Written Comment Documents—Deployment EIS
  9.1.1.1 Written Comments
  9.1.1.2 Response to Written Comments

9.1.2 E-Mail Comment Documents—Deployment EIS
  9.1.2.1 E-Mail Comments
  9.1.2.2 Response to E-Mail Comments—Deployment EIS
9.1.3 Transcript Comment Documents

9.1.3.1 Transcript Comments

9.1.3.2 Response to Transcript Comments

The first table in each section provides an index of the names and assigned identification numbers of individuals who submitted comments on the Draft EIS. To follow comments and responses for a specific individual, find their commentor number (e.g., P-W-042, P-E-003, P-T-021) in the appropriate document list; locate their document with sequentially numbered comments; and, use the comment numbers to identify corresponding responses in the response table.

All documents and comments that were received during the public review period for the Draft EIS were treated equally regardless of the form or commentor. Each comment was carefully documented, thoroughly read and evaluated, and provided with a response. The National Environmental Policy Act requires the analysis of all reasonable alternatives to the Proposed Action. In accordance with Council on Environmental Quality guidelines, this EIS includes sufficient analysis to inform the public and decisionmakers of potential environmental impacts resulting from the preferred action and alternatives and to assist in the decisionmaking process.

9.1.1 WRITTEN COMMENT DOCUMENTS—NMD DEPLOYMENT DRAFT EIS

Individuals who commented on the Draft EIS in written form are listed in table 9.1.1-1 along with their respective commentor identification number. This number can be used to find the written document that was submitted and to locate the corresponding table on which responses to each comment are provided.

9.1.1.1 Written Comments

Exhibit 9.1.1-1 presents reproductions of the written comment documents that were received in response to the Draft EIS. Comment documents are identified by commentor ID number, and each statement or question that was categorized as addressing a separate environmental issue is designated with a sequential comment number.

9.1.1.2 Response to Written Comments

Table 9.1.1-2 presents the responses to comments to the Draft EIS that were received in written form. Responses to specific comments can be found by locating the corresponding commentor ID number and sequential comment number identifiers.
**Table 9.1.1-1: Public Comments on the Draft EIS (Written Documents)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commentor and Affiliation</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barbara J. Warner</td>
<td>P-W-001</td>
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<td>Larry Petri</td>
<td>P-W-002</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>P-W-003</td>
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<td>Duane Otto</td>
<td>P-W-004</td>
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<td>- Cavalier Rural Electric Cooperative</td>
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<td>Senator Kent Conrad</td>
<td>P-W-005</td>
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<tr>
<td>Representative Earl Pomeroy</td>
<td>P-W-006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Representative Robert Nowatzki</td>
<td>P-W-007</td>
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<td>Senator Kent Conrad</td>
<td>P-W-008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kathryn Becker</td>
<td>P-W-009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hal Gershman</td>
<td>P-W-010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Andy Warwick</td>
<td>P-W-011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rick Solie</td>
<td>P-W-012</td>
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<td>Carolyn Gray</td>
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<td>Gary Hutchinson</td>
<td>P-W-014</td>
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<td>David Williams</td>
<td>P-W-015</td>
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<td>Wally Powers</td>
<td>P-W-016</td>
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<td>- North Star Borough Economic Development Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>Don Gray</td>
<td>P-W-017</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bonnie Williams</td>
<td>P-W-018</td>
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<tr>
<td>- North Star Borough Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seth Yerrington</td>
<td>P-W-019</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brad White</td>
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<td>Jeff Cook</td>
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<td>Richard Napoleone</td>
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<td>- Mayor of Anderson</td>
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<td>Scott Miller</td>
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<td>Alfred Preston</td>
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<td>Donna Gardino</td>
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<td>Diana Farrar</td>
<td>P-W-026</td>
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<td>Rick Johnson</td>
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<td>Julie Welch</td>
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<td>Russell Bowdre</td>
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<td>Commentor and Affiliation</td>
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<tr>
<td>D. Darla</td>
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<td>P.R. Miller</td>
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<td>Soren Wuerth</td>
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<td>Fred Wood</td>
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<td>Richard Judge</td>
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<td>Roy Gilbertson</td>
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<td>Dennis Schlotfeld</td>
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<td>- Denali Transportation, Inc.</td>
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<td>Sid Childens</td>
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<td>Daniel H. Dinwoodie</td>
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<td>John Lyle</td>
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<td>Sue Walker</td>
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<td>Gilbert McIntyre</td>
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<td>David Loer</td>
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<td>- Minnkota Power Cooperative, Inc.</td>
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<td>Donna J. Gardino</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dan Beck - Delta/Greely Schools</td>
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<td>Robert L. Bright</td>
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<td>- Community and Economic Development City of Valdez, Alaska</td>
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<td>James Manitakos Jr.</td>
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<td>- SRI International</td>
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<td>Paul Knopp</td>
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<td>Duane L. Otto</td>
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<td>Senator Loren Leman</td>
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<td>Karen Button</td>
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<td>Robert H. Tilly, P.E.</td>
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### Table 9.1.1-1: Public Comments on the Draft EIS (Written Documents) (Continued)

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<td>Jeffery J. Creamer</td>
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<td>George H. Dufman</td>
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<td>- Town of Sandwich</td>
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<td>Michael Jones</td>
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<td>Janmarie Amend</td>
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<td>Kirk Hage</td>
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<td>Dale H. Young, J r.</td>
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<td>- Tok Chamber of Commerce</td>
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<td>Judith Schlebecker</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bruce K. Gagnon</td>
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<td>- Global Network Against Weapons &amp; Nuclear Power in Space</td>
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<td>Jeanne L. Hanson</td>
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<td>- National Marine Fisheries Service</td>
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<td>Physicians for Social Responsibility</td>
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<td>Mike Milligan</td>
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<td>Arjun Makhijani</td>
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<td>Christopher Paine, David Adelman</td>
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<td>Gabriel Scott</td>
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<td>- Cascadia Wildlands Project</td>
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<td>Charley Walton</td>
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<td>Anne Hanley</td>
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Table 9.1.1-1: Public Comments on the Draft EIS (Written Documents) (Continued)

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<td>Richard H. Loring, Sandra Lee Tompkins, Kathleen Nickerson Hardy  - Town of Sandwich, Board of Health</td>
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<td>Dan O’Neill  - Fairbanks Daily News-Miner</td>
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<td>Peter Schlesinger</td>
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<td>Richard and Sharon Judge  - Selectman, Town of Sandwich  - Cape Cod Coalition To Decommission PAVE PAWS</td>
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<td>Tape</td>
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<td>Miriam Paguin</td>
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<td>Alice Slater  - Global Resource Action Center for the Environment</td>
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<td>Sean McGuire</td>
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<td>Clinton Li... (unreadable)</td>
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<td>Bob Dubois</td>
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<td>Cynthia Cody  - U.S. EPA</td>
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<td>William Theuer</td>
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<td>Richard Hugus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anthony Verderese</td>
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</table>
If attendance is not possible, you may forward comments by mail to:

U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
ATTENTION: SMDC-EN-V (Ms. Julia Hudson)
PO Box 1580
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

National Missile Defense:
Forging America’s Shield

Sincerely,

Willie M. Lyons
Major General, USA
NMD Program Manager

Oct. 6, 1999

Dear Major General Lyons,

Since I am unable to attend any meetings here are my comments on the DEIS for the National Missile Defense deployment.

I gave the no action alternative. Already too much has been spent on defense that could have been better spent on projects that would promote peace such as agriculture, reforestation, education, and healthcare, instead of increasing war.

Sincerely,

Barbara A. Warner
Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Senator Kent Conrad

Statement in Support of National Missile Defense
October 26, 1999
BMD Field Hearing
Langdon, North Dakota

I regret that the Senate's schedule does not permit me to attend this evening's hearing in
person, and have asked my staff to read this statement expressing my strong support for
deployment of National Missile Defense (NMD) in North Dakota.

Earlier today in Washington I met with the Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization (BMDO), Lt. Gen. Ron Kadish, to communicate again my belief that we
need to be prepared before we are surprised by the "rogue state" ICBM threat, such as
from North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. I have been pleased to organize visits to Washington
by North Dakota community leaders in recent weeks, and would like to thank each of you
here this evening for taking the time to inform the BMDO representatives of your support
for NMD. Community support is an important part of the equation.

North Dakota also brings other vital assets to the table. We are the only treaty-compliant
deployment site under the ABM Treaty. Here in northeastern North Dakota, we have
existing infrastructure and active Air Force installations that can help support an NMD
system. North Dakota also offers excellent over-the-pole protection against missile
attacks, which is why our state hosted the Safeguard ABM system in the 1970s. North
Dakota has experience with missile defense, and would welcome NMD deployment.
Finally, the draft Environmental Impact Statement has found no major concerns with
deploying NMD in the Flickertail State.

Despite these assets, North Dakota faces an uphill fight on NMD. The ABM Treaty is
under fire. And, because a North Dakota site cannot reliably defend the western ends of
the Aleutian and Hawaiian Island chains against an attack from nearby North Korea, the
Administration has proposed a single site in Alaska. The State Department has said that
discussions with Moscow regarding a second site will be left to a later date.

As I recently told the President and his national security advisor, Sandy Berger, a single
site in Alaska is simply not adequate to meet our nation's NMD needs. We need sites in
both Alaska and North Dakota. We should be talking with the Russians at the outset
about the changes to the treaty necessary for two sites.

Based on briefings I have received, it is reasonable to expect that the ICBM threat will
evolve during the coming decade and render a single site in Alaska incapable of providing
reliable defensive coverage for all 50 states. In the event of a rogue state attack on our
country involving more than a half-dozen warheads, or use of moderately sophisticated
warhead technology, I am informed that the United States could be adequately defended
only with sites in both Alaska and North Dakota.

As I discussed with Gen. Kadish today, a single site in Alaska also could not provide the
shoot-look-shoot capability provided by a North Dakota site in the event of a strike
against Washington, D.C. from the Middle East. Unfortunately, this is a growing danger.
The National Intelligence Estimate released by the CIA on September 9 indicated that it is
entirely possible that Iran or Iraq could have ICBMs capable of hitting the United States
by the end of the coming decade. To protect our country — from the Aleutians to the
Florida Keys — we need two sites at the outset.

A second site also greatly enhances system survivability. With only one NMD site, our
nation could be rendered defenseless by a single attack or natural disaster that destroys
our NMD site. A second site provides a vital backup. It is also worth noting that a
North Dakota installation — situated in a geologically stable region here at the center of
the continent — would be less vulnerable to attack or earthquake damage than one in
Alaska.

Furthermore, deploying at two sites would provide valuable economies of scale and
growth potential.

For these three reasons — defensive coverage, survivability, and economies of scale — I
believe it would be in our nation's interest to pursue an initial NMD deployment at two
sites: North Dakota and Alaska.

At the very least, ABM Treaty negotiations ought to be delayed until the advantages of
two sites have been carefully studied in accordance with my amendment to the fiscal year
2000 Defense authorization bill. This amendment was recently signed into law.

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
I have also told the President that the Administration's apparent course of pursuing ABM Treaty amendments in stages will only make the negotiation process more hazardous. Two rounds of ABM Treaty negotiations would provide the Russians additional opportunities to extract concessions on other arms control fronts.

Finally, making a second site contingent upon completion of a second round of negotiations with the Russians is ill-advised in light of the three to five years of lead time needed for military construction and system deployment before an NMD site can be fully operational. Even a few years delay before or during negotiations regarding a second site, when added to system construction lead-time, could leave our country without the two-site capability it needs when a more advanced threat materializes in coming decade. The time to begin diplomatic work on a two-site deployment is now.

Deploying NMD in Alaska may well be necessary to counter the emerging North Korean missile threat to that state. However, having studied this issue in depth throughout my career in the Senate, it is my conviction that a single site in Alaska is simply not adequate to defend our country against the full range of threats it likely will face in the coming decade. We need sites in both North Dakota and Alaska at the outset.

I would again like to thank all those in attendance for being here tonight, and BMDO personnel for visiting our state again. I will continue to fight for NMD for North Dakota and the nation in the Senate, and would urge community members to contact me with their comments and suggestions on this important matter.

Again, thank you for allowing me to share with you my support for NMD.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE EARL POMEROY
BEFORE THE
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
LANGDON, NORTH DAKOTA
OCTOBER 26, 1999

Colonel Beaufaitt and distinguished officials from the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, welcome to North Dakota. We appreciate your being here today to hear our testimony on the draft environmental impact statement in preparation for the deployment of a national missile defense (NMD) system. You have an incredibly important task and we thank you for this opportunity to participate in the process.

Before I discuss the environmental impacts of NMD deployment in North Dakota, I would like to say a word about the level of support in this community for the United States military. Northeastern North Dakota has a proud history of hosting missions that are essential to our nation's security. From the air refueling wing and the former Moser-Mission at Grand Forks Air Force base, to the Cavalier Air Station, to the ABM site at Nekoma, northeastern North Dakota has always welcomed the military with open arms. We are here this evening to say that we want to be your host for a national missile defense system.

With respect to the environmental analysis, the draft environmental impact statement rightly concludes that there are no significant hurdles to overcome with respect to deployment in North Dakota. As the report states, NMD deployment in North Dakota would have no impact on threatened or endangered species. Likewise, once construction of the NMD system is complete, there should be little soil erosion from operation of the site. Regarding health and safety, the report notes that, in the unlikely event of a mishap, the danger to health and safety is greater in North Dakota than Alaska because the North Dakota site, although sparsely populated, is more densely populated than Alaska. It should be noted, however, that the absolute threat to health and safety of NMD deployment in North Dakota is extremely low.

As you further evaluate where to deploy a national missile defense system, the question of coverage must be considered. A single-site NMD system deployed in North Dakota provides coverage of all 50 states against a North Korean missile attack, with the exception of the western-most inhabited islands of Hawaii and the far western reaches of Alaskan Islands of Alaska. Importantly, a North Dakota site provides enhanced "shoot-down" capability for the entire continental United States with the possible exception of the Pacific Northwest — meaning that we could fire an interceptor, see it hit the target, and then fire another interceptor if necessary. Alaska, on the other hand, provides "shoot-down" capability only against U.S. territory west of the Mississippi River, leaving no coverage of the densely populated eastern United States. In sum, if only one site is chosen, the level of coverage favors North Dakota. In the alternative, a two-site architecture of North Dakota and Alaska would provide far better coverage than either site alone.

In summary, I want to thank you again for taking the time to come to North Dakota.

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Comment Sheet
for the
National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment
Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)

Thank you for attending this public hearing. Our purpose for hosting this meeting is to give you an opportunity to comment on issues analyzed in the NMD Deployment Draft EIS. Please use this sheet to comment on any issues that you feel should be clarified in the Final EIS for NMD deployment. To ensure that your comments are addressed in the Final EIS, your comments must be post-marked by November 15, 1999.

Date: 10-27-99

[Exhibit continued]

Senator Kent Conrad

Statement in Support of National Missile Defense

October 27, 1999

BMDO Field Hearing
Grand Forks, North Dakota

I regret that the Senate's schedule does not permit me to attend this evening's hearing in person, and have asked my staff to read this statement expressing my strong support for deployment of National Missile Defense (NMD) in North Dakota.

Yesterday in Washington the North Dakota Congressional delegation and community leaders from Grand Forks met with the Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), Lt. Gen. Ron Kadish, and the former BMDO Director, Gen. Lester L. Lyles, now Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force. During this meeting, I communicated again my belief that we need to be prepared before we are surprised by the "rogue state" ICBM threat, such as from North Korea, Iran, and Iraq.

I have been pleased to organize visits to Washington by several groups of North Dakota community leaders in recent weeks, and would like to thank each of you here this evening for taking the time to inform the BMDO representatives of your support for NMD. Community support is an important part of the equation.

North Dakota also brings other vital assets to the table. We are the only treaty-compliant deployment site under the ABM Treaty. Here in northeastern North Dakota, we have existing infrastructure and active Air Force installations, including Grand Forks AFB, that can help support an NMD system. North Dakota also offers excellent over-the-pole protection against missile attack, which is why our state hosted the Safeguard ABM system in the 1970s. North Dakota has experience with missile defense, and would welcome NMD deployment. Finally, the draft Environmental Impact Statement has found no major concerns with deploying NMD in North Dakota.

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Despite these assets, North Dakota faces an uphill fight on NMD. The ABM Treaty is under fire. And, because a North Dakota site cannot reliably defend the western ends of the Aleutian and Hawaiian Island chains against an attack from nearby North Korea, the Administration has proposed a single site in Alaska. The State Department has also said that negotiations with Moscow regarding a second site will be left to a later date.

As I recently told the President and his national security advisor, Sandy Berger, a single site in Alaska is simply not adequate to meet our nation’s NMD needs. We need sites in both Alaska and North Dakota. We should be talking with the Russians at the outset about the changes to the treaty necessary for two sites.

Based on briefings I have received, it is reasonable to expect that the ICBM threat will evolve sufficiently during the coming decade to render a single site in Alaska incapable of providing reliable defensive coverage for all 50 states. In the event of a rogue state attack on our country involving more than a half-dozen warheads, or use of moderately sophisticated warhead technology, I am informed that the United States could be adequately defended only with sites in both Alaska and North Dakota.

As I discussed with Gen. Kadish, a single site in Alaska also could not provide the shoot-to-look-shoot capability provided by a North Dakota site in the event of a strike against Washington, D.C. from the Middle East. Unfortunately, this is a growing danger. The National Intelligence Estimate released by the CIA on September 9 indicated that it is entirely possible that Iran or Iraq could have ICBMs capable of hitting the United States by the end of the coming decade. To protect our country — from the Aleutians to the Florida Keys — we need two sites at the outset.

A second site also greatly enhances system survivability. With only one NMD site, our nation could be rendered defenseless by a single attack or natural disaster that destroys our NMD site. A second site provides a militarily vital back-up. It is also worth noting that a North Dakota installation — situated in a geologically stable region here at the center of the continent — would be less vulnerable to attack or earthquake damage than one in Alaska.

Furthermore, deploying at two sites would provide valuable economies of scale and growth potential.

For these three reasons — defensive coverage, survivability, and economies of scale — I believe it would be in our nation’s interest to pursue an initial NMD deployment at two sites: North Dakota and Alaska.

At the very least, ABM Treaty negotiations ought to be delayed until the advantages of two sites have been carefully studied in accordance with my amendment to the fiscal year 2000 Defense authorization bill. This amendment was recently signed into law.

I have also told the President that the Administration’s apparent course of pursuing ABM Treaty amendments in two stages will only make the negotiation process more hazardous. Two rounds of ABM Treaty negotiations would provide the Russians additional opportunities to extract concessions on other arms control fronts.

Finally, making a second site contingent upon completion of a second round of negotiations with the Russians is ill-advised. In light of the three to five years of lead time needed for military construction and system deployment before an NMD site can be fully operational, even a few years delay before or during negotiations regarding a second site, when added to system construction lead-time, could leave our country without the two-site capability it needs when a more advanced threat materializes in coming decade. The time to begin diplomatic work on a two-site deployment is now.

Deploying NMD in Alaska may well be necessary to counter the emerging North Korean missile threat to that state. However, having studied this issue in depth throughout my career in the Senate, it is my conviction that a single site in Alaska is simply not adequate to defend our country against the full range of threats it likely will face in the coming decade. We need sites in both North Dakota and Alaska at the outset.

I would again like to thank all those in attendance for being here tonight, and BMDP personnel for visiting our state again. I will continue to fight for NMD for North Dakota and the nation in the Senate, and would urge community members to contact me with their comments and suggestions on this important matter.

Again, thank you for allowing me to share with you my support for NMD.
Comment Sheet for the National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)

Thank you for attending this public hearing. Our purpose for hosting this meeting is to give you an opportunity to comment on issues analyzed in the NMD Deployment Draft EIS. Please use this sheet to comment on any issues that you feel should be clarified in the Final EIS for NMD deployment. To ensure that your comments are addressed in the Final EIS, your comments must be postmarked by November 10, 1999.

Date: Oct. 28, 1999

Good evening,

I couldn't have tonight without writing a dissenting opinion. As a resident of Grand Forks, N.D., I am very concerned about the promotion and encouragement of the NMD Deployment here. My reasons are not technical (cost briefly opposed to its range of interdiction, ABM treaty rights, or environmental degradation or injustice) rather, my reasons are all about life—viable, healthy life. Currently, the state of N.M.D. is impending all of its missile sites and it is the best military option to occur here pre WW II. We don't need any more missile activity. We need to implement our own solution that believes in non-violence and non-violence to affect and...
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Date: 07 OCT 99

Please place form in the drop box or mail to:
SMDC-EN-V, Ms. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
PO Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

Harold A. "Hal" Gershman

October 27, 1999

Ballistic Missile Defense Organization

I am a Grand Forks businessman and would like to thank you for taking the time to come to Grand Forks, North Dakota for the EIS Hearing.

Being that Grand Forks, North Dakota is home to the Grand Forks Air Force Base, and was the base for a Minuteman Missile Wing, I believe that the environmental impacts of a missile defense system would be negligible. We have already supported missiles in our environment and continue to support the Grand Forks Air Force Base.

I would like to take this opportunity, however, to encourage the BMDO to strongly consider two sites for deployment of the National Missile Defense System. It appears to me after my trip to and briefing in Washington, D.C. (October 25-26) that Alaska alone will not offer the "shoot, look, shoot" protection for the east coast that a North Dakota site would offer. I understand that the Grand Forks, North Dakota site would not completely cover the entire 50 states since the outer Aleutian Islands in Alaska and the most westerly uninhabited islands of Hawaii are not covered. Therefore, two sites not only give us "shoot, look, shoot" capability on both coasts but also gives us complete coverage of all 50 states.

The United States administration is now negotiating to change the ABM Treaty to accommodate one site and will negotiate a second site at a later date. This according to Steve Andreasen of the National Security Council. I believe this is a mistake. As you know the Russians have no appetite to change the treaty at this point. My sense is that if that if they do agree to a change that they will have absolutely no appetite to renegotiate at a later date for a second site for missile defense. Therefore, I encourage your offices to encourage the administration to change focus and negotiate two sites concurrently; Alaska and Grand Forks, North Dakota.

A one-site missile defense system has a cost figure of $10.5 billion. To add a second system would probably cost an additional $2-2.5 billion since the bulk of the radar would already be established under the first defense system. For that reason it seems to me that the additional costs warrant having two sites for better coverage against a missile attack by a rogue nation such as North Korea from the west or Libya, Iran, or Iraq from the east.

HAPPY-HARRY'S BOTTLE SHOPS, INC.
DEGROSSEROS, INC.
GERSHMAN/TEAL, ESTPE, INC.
October 27, 1999
Page 2

I want to congratulate your office for a successful intercept on October 2 and wish you luck with the forthcoming tests.

Sincerely,
Hai Gerritsen

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)

I'm Andy Warwick. I'm a 56 year resident of Fairbanks. I served in the Legislature for four years, Commissioner of the Dept of Administration for two years, and nine years on the local school board. I'm a practicing CPA, and I'm also Chairman of the Board of Directors of the water and sewer utility serving Fairbanks.

My guess is most of the people you will hear tonight will be in support of this project. The truth is, the land in Alaska is controlled mostly by government. As a consequence, there is very little opportunity for private development. So when a project such as this comes along, we usually stumble over each other in support of it. We've made economic commitments to Fairbanks because Fairbanks is a good place to raise a family, and we like the lifestyle.

Fairbanks and the military have always gotten along well together. This is probably a product of 1) our financial dependence on the military, and 2) the fact that many of the military personnel who retire remain in Fairbanks. We have built modern schools on Ft. Wainwright and Eielson. There are numerous liaison committees functioning between Fairbanks and the military. We've used their ski hill for our alpine ski races, their runway for drag races and naturally many of us enjoy playing golf on the excellent Chena Bend Golf Course on Wainwright.

So if one of the criteria for this project to be built in the interior of Alaska is for the civilian and military communities to be compatible, we pass that test, for the military and civilian communities are very much intertwined.

Thank you,
Andy Warwick
Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
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Date: 11/1/99
1. Have you considered the effect of extreme cold on missile operation? Also, what precautions would be taken to minimize radioactive effects on missile sites?

Please place form in the drop box or mail to:
SMDC-EN-V, Ms. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missle Defense Command
PO Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

Commentor:
Name: Charles Gray
Street Address:
City, State:
Zip Code:

Comment Sheet for the National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)

Thank you for attending this public hearing. Our purpose for hosting this meeting is to give you an opportunity to comment on issues analyzed in the NMD Deployment Draft EIS. Please use this sheet to comment on any issues that you feel should be clarified in the Final EIS for NMD deployment. To ensure that your comments are addressed in the Final EIS, your comments must be post-marked by November 15, 1999.

Date: 11/1/99
2. I'm in favor of development of the NMD in the State of Alaska. Alaska has a history of working well with the military and I'm certain our State will again be a great partner with the US military in developing this important security system.

Please place form in the drop box or mail to:
SMDC-EN-V, Ms. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missle Defense Command
PO Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

Commentor:
Name: Barry Hutchinson
Street Address:
City, State:
Zip Code:
## Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)

### Comment Sheet for the National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)

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**Date:** 11/1/99

This is excellent and desperately Needed. Alaska is the best place for this system.

Please place form in the drop box or mail to:

SMDC-EN-V, Ms. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
PO Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

**Commenter:** David L. Wills

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**Comment Sheet for the National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)**

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**Date:** 11/1/99

**Commenter:** Daily Powers

Please place form in the drop box or mail to:

SMDC-EN-V, Ms. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
PO Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

**Commenter:** Daily Powers

---
Good Evening Gentlemen and Welcome to Fairbanks.

I would like to address the socioeconomic impacts of the possible location of the National Missile Defense System in Alaska emphasizing the impact on economic development opportunities. I wish to also address the opportunity cost of a “No Action Alternative” or not locating the defense system in Alaska. You have already heard from many speakers regarding the ability and willingness of Alaska to support the project if it is approved. If a “No Action Alternative” or Alaska is not selected there will be an opportunity cost in terms of economic development.

I am not promoting one location in Alaska over another. However, for obvious reasons, Ft. Greely would experience a greater adverse impact from not being selected. Ft. Greely’s Reduction in Force related to the Base Realignment and Closure will begin this July with the elimination of 54 civilian positions. Fifty-five more positions are scheduled for elimination in 2001. The Missile Defense Deployment may not provide relief for those being RIF’d but it would help fill the void in the community created by the base closure. Deployment at Ft. Greely would add momentum to Delta Junction’s ability to attract new industry to utilize the surplus property productively. The 800 bed medium security prison plan would use only a portion of the existing facilities. It will take time to utilize the rest of the facilities without some economic stimulus such as the National Missile Defense project. In the interim, Delta Junction and the businesses and infrastructure that supported Ft. Greely will be adversely affected.

Economic development will slow for the entire length of the economic food chain.

However, a decision to proceed with the Proposed Action and deployment of the Missile Defense system in Alaska will offer numerous economic development opportunities throughout the state.

The University of Alaska, Fairbanks has been a space grant university since 1991. The University owns & operates Poker Flat Research Range that has been operated by UAF’s Geophysical Institute since 1968. Poker Flat operations are funded under contract with NASA and is the world’s only scientific rocket launching facility owned by a university. UAF also has Cray super computing technology available for research and analysis and extensive researching capabilities. Placement of the NMD in the Interior would add momentum to growth and diversification of Alaska’s growing technology base.

Establishment of more high tech applications attracts complementary service industries needed to meet the rapidly changing environment. Rapid technological change and high security demands expeditious delivery of parts and equipment. Alaska’s strategic location and highly developed air transportation infrastructure would thrive in a high technology usage area. The NMD would add to this base of technological users and encourage growth in our logistical service industry.

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Alaska's population growth is lagging slightly behind the rest of the U.S. Of greater concern is that we are witnessing the loss of our younger work force between the ages of 20 and 34. While the population of Alaska grew 13 percent since 1990, there was a decline of 20 percent in this age group during the same period. This has been attributed to the declining number of high paying jobs in Alaska and greater opportunities in the Lower 48. Development of an economy that demands a greater level of professional skill would help curtail this brain drain from the state. Alaska needs more diversification, and the NMD system would provide a positive contribution to stem this trend. We cannot afford to let our labor pool evaporate.

It has been suggested that the bulk of the benefit of constructing the National Missile Defense system would not remain in Alaska. To quote a recent article “...the megabucks will head south to defense contractors in the states, like Boeing and Lockheed-Martin, who will build the hardware and write the computer programs”. I would not argue that point extensively but I would say that it's implied conclusion is much too simplistic. This is not a single phase project. It is complex, multi-phase, and would progress over several years with various levels of technical requirements. The defense contractors and prime contractors for the primary product will have many needs that can be met by Alaskan subcontractors. Local contractors have developed and proven their ability to provide complex project management. This will create opportunities for new associations and partnerships that may serve as a springboard for contracts in other venues. Likewise, small business and DBE set-asides afford new opportunities and experience for sub contractors to develop their Statement of Qualifications. I perceive active participation by Alaskan's throughout construction and that their participation would lead to contracts for post construction services. I know federal procurement practices promote opportunities for small business development and I'm sure this project will be consistent with other federal projects.

In summary I would just like to state that Alaska is perceived by many to be out of the mainstream and are not aware of its growing capabilities. However, the military and airline industry has recognized the strategic benefits of our location. We need to use that recognition as leverage to attract the attention of other industries to our great state.

We have much to offer in terms of opportunity and quality of life. You know from personal experience that many military personnel chose to stay or return to Alaska after completing their term of service. They like it here and are a resource available to Alaska and their previous employer.

We just want you to know that we appreciate the fact the military recognizes Alaska's strategic benefit. We also want you to know that we also recognize the strategic benefit of the military being located in Alaska. It's a symbiotic and synergistic relationship that we truly want to foster.
Comment Sheet for the National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)

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Date: Nov. 1, 1999

Conditions to implement the NMD fire elements, particularly installation in Alaska of GMTI, BMDC facilities and the Fiber optic cable line and the UEVR will enhance the Alaskan economic with federal resources originating outside the state. While the primary mission of the NMD may be to enhance defense for likely strategic threats, the remote possibility that it might be useful in national defense is supported by the certainty that expenditures of this expected magnitude should benefit our state's citizens, as contractors, subcontractors, laborers, merchants, how much of the total cost is expected to be spent in Alaska?

Please place form in the drop box or mail to:
SMDC-EN-V, Ms. Julia Hudson  
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command  
PO Box 1500  
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

Commentator:
Name: Don Gray
Street Address: ________________
City, State: ________________
Zip Code: ________________

Date: 11-1-99

Yes to System

Yes to Alaska

We need to be properly defended - All of the United States

Bonnie Willis

Member, Fairbanks North Star Borough Assembly

Please place form in the drop box or mail to:
SMDC-EN-V, Ms. Julia Hudson  
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command  
PO Box 1500  
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

Commentator:
Name: Bonnie Williams
Street Address: ________________
City, State: ________________
Zip Code: ________________

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Comment Sheet
for the

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Date: 11/1/99

I am a long time Alaska resident and a practicing architect and planner. I favor selection of Interior, Alaska (for construction of the proposed system) over particular selection of these sites. With existing rail service because use of rail transport for construction and demobilization of the construction effort would minimize impact on the highway system. Secondary, the use of the rail system would produce cost savings when compared to highway transport for heavy equipment and materials.

I also believe Alaska offers a superior strategic location for the system considering the most likely source of an attack.

Commentator:
Name: Seth W. Yeremynetz, AIA
Street Address:________________________________________
City, State:________________________________________
Zip Code:________________________________________

Please place form in the drop box or mail to:
SMDC-ENV, Ms. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
PO Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
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Date: 11/17/99

1. Please locate maximum deterrent
2. Have best air defense in world
3. No military transportation involved
4. State public
5. Bridges with railroads
6. U.S. Army Space and Nuclear Defense Command
7. Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

Commentator: Jess Cook

Please place form in the drop box or mail to:
SMDC-EN-V, Ms. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
PO Box 1520
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

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Date: 02/NOV 99

1. See attached

Commentator: Major Anderson

Please place form in the drop box or mail to:
SMDC-EN-V, Ms. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Nuclear Defense Command
PO Box 1520
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

Commentator: Richard V. Napoleone
Table of Contents

City of Anderson Resolution 99-07
in Support of Clear AFS as a Site for Elements of the
Proposed National Missile Defense System

Anderson, Yes!

Why locate National Missile Defense at
Clear Air Station, Alaska?

- Good Gravel, Yes!
- Land Quality, Yes!
- The Water, Yes, Yes!
- Yes, The Air is Good!
- Transportation & Accessiblity, Yes!
- The Area, Yes!

Testimonial: Why Anderson?
Written by Anne Paul, resident since 1978

Maps
- Figure 1 - City of Anderson Municipal Boundaries
- Figure 2 - Anderson Townsite Map
- Figure 3 - Future Land Use Map
- Figure 4 - Developed Land in Anderson Townsite

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
WHEREAS, Clear AFS is an integral part of the lives of most of the residents here and actually lies, in part, within the municipal boundaries of the City of Anderson, and

WHEREAS, the Anderson City Council and residents of Anderson believe in the concept of the need for a National Defense program, and

WHEREAS, Clear AFS reservation encompasses approximately 12,000 acres of which, only about 10% are currently being utilized for current station mission and activities, and

WHEREAS, the transportation infrastructure related to Clear AFS includes a spur of the Alaska Railroad, the George Parks Highway, and a 4000 foot asphalt paved runway which could easily be extended and widened as necessary, and

WHEREAS, the communication infrastructure related to Clear AFS includes the White Alice Site, a relatively unused fiber optic cable running between Fairbanks and Anchorage along the Alaska Railroad right-of-way, and the existing communication system in use for Clear's current mission, and

WHEREAS, Clear AFS has modernized 22.5 megawatt coal fired power plant currently in use, with the main supplier (Usibelli Coal Mine) a scant 25 miles away by rail, and

WHEREAS, the Alaska Power Intertie system actually crosses a portion of the Clear AFS reservation and would thus be easily available for connection to the Clear power grid, if deemed necessary, and

WHEREAS, the Clear AFS is underlain primarily by one of the largest gravel deposits in the world, providing for relative seismic stability, and

NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED THAT: The residents and the City Council members of Anderson strongly encourage careful consideration of Clear AFS as a site for one or more elements of the proposed National Missile Defense System.


RICHARD V. NAPOLEONE
Mayor

A.T.T.E.S.T

Darl C. McMannes, City Clerk
Good Gravel, Yes!

The Clear Air Force Station is undergoing primarily by one of the largest gravel deposits in the world, providing for relative seismic stability.

Industrial uses of the land in Anderson, a community developed for complementing Clear Air Force Station, is limited to a gravel pit operated by the City of Anderson.

Gravel from the pit, located to the south of the developed town site, is sold to local and regional users when other private sources are not available and generates revenue for the city.

"The gravel barrens located on Clear AS may be considered as unusual communities since they do not normally occur in central Alaska. While possessing unique plants, there is no evidence that gravel barrens provide critical habitat for wildlife," according to the Draft Environmental Impact Statement, published in September 1999 by National Missile Defense Team Joint Program Office, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command.

The sedimentary wedge is primarily composed of sandy gravel and is estimated to exceed several hundred feet.

Land Quality, Yes!

Less than 10% of Clear AS are wetlands, most of which occur along the channel of the Nenana River, according to the Draft Environmental Impact Statement. The statement adds that minimal impacts are expected to the area's vegetation, wildlife, and threatened or endangered species.

The Water, Yes, Yes!

The Alaska Range mountain drainage and the gravel base, the area around and including Clear Air Force Station boasts almost unlimited amounts of extremely high quality water.

The Impact Statement cites that there would be no change to water resources in the region.

Yes, the Air is Good!

"It would be within the base's air quality ROI. All other areas within the ROI are Class II for PSD determination purposes," says the Impact Statement, referring to regional air quality.

Radon levels were found to be well below the current U.S. EPA guidelines according to the Impact Statement.
Anderson, Yes!
Why locate National Missile Defense at Clear Air Station, Alaska?

Transportation & Accessibility, Yes!

The close proximity of the George Parks Highway, an air strip, and the river and rail transportation modes are some of the Anderson areas economic assets.

The transportation infrastructure related to Clear Air Force Station includes a spur of the Alaska Railroad, the Parks Highway, and a 4000 foot asphalt paved runway which could easily be extended and widened as necessary.

The Alaska Railroad passes through the municipality, intersecting the highway access road about one mile southeast of the town. All unloading spurs are located on Clear Air Station to receive coal from Healy for use at the Clear power plant.

Currently there is no rail freight or passenger service to Anderson, even though the train can be flagged down to pick up passengers. Freight is off-loaded in Fairbanks and trucked down the highway for delivery.

There is a 4,000 foot, 150 feet wide surfaced airstrip with heated parking available five miles south of town. It is owned by the State of Alaska. Airport improvements were made in 1995 for resurfacing, installation of electricity and radio controlled runway lights. The airport is utilized by private aircraft and is available for commercial air operations.

Although there are four modes of transportation, all located in close proximity to one another, only the Parks Highway is utilized for movement of goods and services to Anderson.

The other modes are either undeveloped or play a very minor role in the transportation and communication sector of the economy. However, future economic conditions may result in the city gaining a unique competitive advantage for being a major transportation center in the region.

The city is located six miles by access road from the highway, an easy, scenic 80 mile drive south of Fairbanks, and 262 miles north of Anchorage. The distance to points north of the highway could be cut by ten miles if a more direct access road were built across wetlands.

The Area, Yes!

Clear AS is an integral part of the lives of most of the residents in the Anderson area and actually lies, in part, within the municipal boundaries of the City of Anderson.

The municipal boundaries encompass approximately 44 square miles, nine of which are restricted to military use. The developed portion of the city of Anderson occupies less than a one-half square mile area six miles north of the Clear AS.

Base operations would continue to provide economic benefits according to the Impact Statement. Construction and operations, direct and indirect employment, and materials expenditures would provide economic benefit to surrounding communities retail sales and tax base, it adds. There also would be no impact on public services, according the Impact Statement.

Locate the National Missile Defense at Clear Air Station near Anderson, Alaska
Why live in Anderson?

Excerpts from an Essay Written in 1999 by Anne Paul, resident since 1978

Living in Anderson is an experience - a slice of Alaskan life that can offer the unbounded freedom to contribute to the community or the excuse to be swept along by events both local and global.

Why do I live in Anderson?

It is living in a community where everyone knows and cares about everyone else. The streets are safe and quiet, and I can send my children on errands to help them develop independence.

Life here is being able to picnic by the river, to build a cooking/camp fire, to set off fireworks.

It is the freedom to ride a snow machine or an ATV or a motor cycle or a bicycle on trails with common sense and ability as regulators.

It is having neighbors, but not too close and being independent.

It is having an occasional moose and her offspring wander into the yard and maybe sample the broccoli.

It is hearing the stories about "a bear on the edge of town". It reminds me that we are living pretty close to nature. It is gardening and having an abundance of produce to give away.

---

Why live in Anderson?

We have a good school in Anderson, where all the children are well known by the teachers, everyone can participate, and no one falls between the cracks. We are represented well by our young people. Youth often bring back a variety of trophies, athletic, academic championship and sportsmanship.

At school ball games, the Grizzlies always put on a good show, at concerts the young musicians continually show improvement, theatrical performances are always entertaining. School functions are times for socializing with neighbors whether or not they have children attending the school.

I like living in a community where former residents return to visit old friends and see how things have changed. For eleven years, the whole community has come out to welcome both visitors to our state and our Alaskan neighbors to the annual summer Bluegrass and Country Music Festival.

I like being able to be a leader in community and to attend social affairs when I think I have something to offer - and being a follower when there are others with greater inclination and ability.

I like our lighted streets that are paved enough to avoid potholes and dust. I like having a beautiful park and open space for walking and picnicking and gathering with friends and neighbors.

I like having taxes be just enough to provide those community amenities. I like having no property taxes to threaten my home ownership.

---
Why live in Anderson?

Anderson has the best water anywhere around.
I like having technology available when I want or need it - cable TV
- reliable power and telephone service - access to the internet.

Fairbanks, the nearest city
to the North of us, is close enough
to drive to just about any time I want
- to shop, to eat out,
- to enjoy cultural events.

I like being able to drive South a few miles to
Denali National Park - and enjoy
the seasonal treats
the area has to offer.

I like living in a small town where there's not constant pressure
to go - to hurry up - to participate.
Life goes a little slower.
I like not having to wait in line at the post office.

Living in Anderson means living in a community that is diverse - a place where my children learned to interact with people of all intellectual and social levels on a day to day basis. It is living in a community that accepts that people are not all alike in their gifts and their aspirations - that as much as we sometimes might like to impose our will on others, we wouldn't like them to impose theirs on us.

Why live in Anderson?

How does one cope with living in a small town?

Living in Anderson is easier if you plan ahead. Shopping for necessities is not a task to be undertaken daily in rural Alaska. Once a week is about as often I ever get to shop for groceries, and there are times in the winter that I only get to Fairbanks once in a month. Having a well-stocked pantry and freezer is a great help.

An Anderson resident needs to be more independent than someone who lives in a larger community. Being willing and able to trouble shoot and make minor repairs is a real advantage. Residents often help each other out - most have talents and equipment they can share.

It just requires a little more independence, a little more effort at organization, and a willingness to provide for your own entertainment. Small town living is not for everyone, though for me, the advantages of raising a family in Anderson have far outweighed the disadvantages.

Anderson is a neighborhood. Our neighbors are rich and poor, educated and uneducated, religious and atheist, healthy and sick, energetic and lazy, pompous and humble, old and young, and we are all the better for the variety. Our kids can walk to school. We know each other by name and reputation. We help each other in times of crisis. We allow each the independence and privacy he seeks.
Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Thank you for attending this public hearing. Our purpose for hosting this meeting is to give you an opportunity to comment on issues analyzed in the NMD Deployment Draft EIS. Please use this sheet to comment on any issues that you feel should be clarified in the Final EIS for NMD deployment. To ensure that your comments are addressed in the Final EIS, your comments must be post-marked by November 15, 1999.

Date: Nov 3-99

[Commentary]

I favor the location of the NMD in Delta, Delta needs the job & it's a good fit for this remote area with strong military presence & influence on the community.

Commentator:
Name: Scott K. Miller
Address: SMDC-EN-V, Ms. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
PO Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801
City, State: Zip Code:

Thank you for attending this public hearing. Our purpose for hosting this meeting is to give you an opportunity to comment on issues analyzed in the NMD Deployment Draft EIS. Please use this sheet to comment on any issues that you feel should be clarified in the Final EIS for NMD deployment. To ensure that your comments are addressed in the Final EIS, your comments must be post-marked by November 15, 1999.

Date: 3/15/99

We were a rather quiet group. It's the photomaton at Fort Huachuca today - with the President. We're ready to start construction.

Commentator:
Name: Alfred Preslors
Address: SMDC-EN-V, Ms. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
PO Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801
City, State: Zip Code:
Comment Sheet
for the
National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment
Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)

Thank you for attending this public hearing. Our purpose for hosting this meeting is to give you an opportunity to comment on issues analyzed in the NMD Deployment Draft EIS. Please use this sheet to comment on any issues that you feel should be clarified in the Final EIS for NMD deployment. To ensure that your comments are addressed in the Final EIS, your comments must be post-marked by November 15, 1999.

Date: 11/3/99

Thank you for keeping us informed.

I believe the NMD program is very compatible w/ Delta's future. Together, they can contribute to seine growth by deploying programs that could increase the workforce and quality of life in the area. Any costs, if shared, will be more easily burdened.

Please place form in the drop box or mail to:
SMDC-EN-V, Ms. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
PO Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

Commentator:
Name: Donna Goodwin
Street Address:__________________________
City, State:______________________________
Zip Code:______________________________

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)

Dear Mr. Smith:

Thank you for attending the public meeting. Our purpose for having this meeting is to discuss the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for the National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment.

P.M. 0.07

P.M. 0.18

P.M. 0.28

P.M. 0.37

P.M. 0.47

P.M. 0.57
My name is Russell Boudre and I’d like to welcome you to our community. We are proud to be a part of the military heritage of Alaska and would consider it a great privilege to be chosen as the site for the national missile defense of our country. We also recognize the strategic importance of our location for the defense of all of the fifty states of our nation. In light of the current world political upheavals and the loss of our confidential defense capabilities, we feel the implementation of this system is urgently needed.

Rudy Boudre

Comment Sheet for the National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)

Thank you for attending this public hearing. Our purpose for hosting this meeting is to give you an opportunity to comment on issues analyzed in the NMD Deployment Draft EIS. Please use this sheet to comment on any issues that you feel should be clarified in the Final EIS for NMD deployment. To ensure that your comments are addressed in the Final EIS, your comments must be post-marked by November 15, 1999.

Date: 2 Nov 99

When can we get started? This is an

Don't waste time here. 

Can you end this here?

Please place form in the drop box or mail to:
SMDC-EN-V, Mr. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
PO Box 1200
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

Commentator:
Name: 
Street Address: 
City, State: 
Zip Code: 

Comment Sheet P-W-029

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Comment Sheet  
for the  
National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment  
Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)

Thank you for attending this public hearing. Our purpose for hosting this meeting is to give you an opportunity to comment on issues analyzed in the NMD Deployment Draft EIS. Please use this sheet to comment on any issues that you feel should be clarified in the Final EIS for NMD deployment. To ensure that your comments are addressed in the Final EIS, your comments must be post-marked by November 15, 1999.

Date: 9-30-99
- Rep EIS. The Secret Annex 4 page is a very poor reproduction. Accuracy is crucial.  
- Neither Secret Annex 5 nor 6 is provided but a reproduction of Secret Annex 3 (Comment 2) is provided.  
- No Rep. of Exhibit 8-5 (in the 800 pages that are already attached that is?)
  - The text is not visible.  
  - Has a M-14-14 speed and a range of 150 miles.  
  - Optics are very good.  
  - These bullets are based on a missile from Russia.  
  - This is the probably cats

Please place form in the drop box or mail to:
SMDC-EN-V, Ms. Julia Hudson  
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command  
PO Box 1500  
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

Commentator:  
Name:  
Street Address:  
City, State:  
Zip Code:  

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Comment Sheet
for the
National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment
Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)

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Date: 11/4/99

POOR PUBLIC PROCESS!
PROBLEMS:
- LITTLE & INEFFECTIVE PUBLIC NOTICE
- NO DEIS AVAILABLE AT HEARING ON DEIS
- POOR LOCATION - OUT OF THE UNCOMMON

RECOMMENDATIONS:
- ANOTHER HEARING, WELL PUBLICISED, CONFERENCE LOCATION
- EXTEND PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD

Please place form in the drop box or mail to:
SMDC-EN-V, Ms. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
PO Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

Commenter: Soren Wuerth
Name:
Street Address:
City, State:
Zip Code:

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
• Good evening. I'm Senator Loren Leman. I am honored to represent the District G in west Anchorage which includes Elmendorf Airforce Base. I appreciate this opportunity to say a few words about Alaska's potential role in the Ballistic Missile Defense Program. As an elected official, engineer, and Alaska resident this issue concerns me deeply on professional, public policy and personal levels.

• Of the many factors addressed in the draft environmental impact statement, I'll briefly mention two: wetlands and the potential, however unlikely, of a chemical propellant leak.

• Last month I toured the Clear Air Station and Fort Greely sites under consideration. As an environmental engineer, I paid close attention to the wetlands and groundwater issues.

• My observations lead me to believe that Fort Greely is exceptionally well suited for a Ground Based Interceptor installation. The water table more than 175 feet deep, no wetlands would be disturbed, and this summer's wildfire has conveniently killed nearly every tree within miles. You might say that nature is leading the way.

• Additionally, there are no roads or buildings within the range of a potential chemical vapor leak.

• In contrast, a spill at the Grand Forks North Dakota location could potentially endanger users of, and I quote, "three commercial buildings, two churches, one residence and portions of US Highway 2" Volume 1, Executive Summary page es 15.

• From a number of perspectives, I believe that Alaska, and probably Fort Greely, stands out as being the best choice for the environment and for the nation.

• An important component of any public program is local support. While in Delta Junction I participated in a public...
meeting that included the discussion of the issue and was impressed by the active involvement of the community. Nearly one hundred area residents voiced their enthusiasm for an installation at Fort Greely.

- This is understandable. With the recent post closure, the community is in need of the jobs and economic development this program would bring. Fort Greely and the Ballistic Missile Defense Program are a good match.

- Noise concerns and archeological remains are important and worthy of our careful consideration. However, there is a larger question in the background; one that will profoundly affect the way Americans view the success of a Ballistic Missile Defense System.

- That is, which Americans should be protected? All, or some?

- Should the Department of Defense choose a site in the lower 48, both Alaska and Hawaii may be left vulnerable to a nuclear attack by a rogue nation.

- It is important to note that Alaska and Hawaii were precisely the areas attacked by Japanese forces in World War II. Both states support military installations that are critical to our first line of defense in the Pacific theater.

- Both states are geographically isolated and dangerously proximate to potential launch sites.

- Clearly, when the United States is threatened in the Pacific, it is Alaska and Hawaii that offer a potential aggressor the most tempting targets.

- Leaving these states undefended from a missile attack runs counter to our traditional military strategy in the Pacific and, in my view, would call into question the mission of the entire system.

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
• An Alaska installation is the only alternative that would truly protect our first line of defense and safeguard all Americans from nuclear terrorism.
• Thank you for listening to Alaskans.
Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Alaska's work force is highly skilled, experienced, and can get the job done.

All of us who worked on the Alaska Pipe Line really have only one thing to say to you: "Stand back and let us get to work."

STATE OF ALASKA
THE LEGISLATURE
1999

Source
CSIU 8/MLV 9am 5

Relating to a national ballistic missile defense system.

BE IT RESOLVED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA:

WHEREAS the collapse of the Soviet Union has rendered obsolete the treaty constraints and diplomatic understandings that limited the development and deployment of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems during the Cold War; and

WHEREAS the world has consequently witnessed during this decade an unprecedented proliferation of sophisticated military technology, including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and ballistic missiles; and

WHEREAS the United States has recognized that it currently has no means of protecting persons living in all 50 states from attack by these new threats and has initiated a program to develop and deploy a national ballistic missile defense system; and

WHEREAS four locations in Alaska are currently being considered as sites for deployment of the intercept vehicles for this system; and

WHEREAS each of these locations provides the unmatched military value of a strategic location from which persons living in all 50 states can be defended as required by the United States Constitution; and

WHEREAS, throughout Alaska's history as a territory and a state, Alaska's citizens

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
have been unwavering in their support of a strong national defense while warmly welcoming
the men and women of our armed forces stationed in Alaska; and

WHEREAS construction, operation, and maintenance of a high technology missile
defense system would require advanced labor skills; and

WHEREAS these high technology workers would increase Alaska’s human asset base
and provide a highly skilled labor force for use by private enterprise;

BE IT RESOLVED that the Twenty-First Alaska State Legislature calls upon the
President, as Commander In Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, to provide for
the common defense of our nation by selecting an Alaska site for the deployment of the
intercept vehicles for the national ballistic missile defense system; and be it

FURTHER RESOLVED that the Twenty-First Alaska State Legislature requests that,
in the development and operation of a national ballistic missile defense system in Alaska, the
Department of Defense provide adequate protection from any danger posed by the system to
local residents; and be it

FURTHER RESOLVED that the Twenty-First Alaska State Legislature strongly
encourages the Department of Defense to contract with Alaska businesses in the development,
construction, and operation of a national ballistic missile defense system in Alaska.

COPIES of this resolution shall be sent to the Honorable Bill Clinton, President of the
United States; the Honorable William Cohen, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Defense;
the Honorable Floyd D. Spence, Chair, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of
Representatives; the Honorable John Warner, Chair, Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
Senate; and to the Honourable Ted Stevens and the Honourable Frank Murkowski, U.S. Senators,
and the Honourable Don Young, U.S. Representative, members of the Alaska delegation in
Congress.

November 2, 1999

A private prison being developed by Delta Corrections Group is the anchor
tenant for Reuse of realigned Fort Greely. Our company has been told by
parties involved in the missile project that there is no conflict between our two
activities. We certainly concur. As a practical matter the prison will be
operational several years before (or if) a missile base is developed at Fort
Greely. We believe we will be very compatible neighbors.

I am available for any questions anyone of your staff may have about our
operation or relationship to the proposed missile installation.

Fred E. Wood, Project Manager

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Comment Sheet for the National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)

Thank you for attending this public hearing. Our purpose for hosting this meeting is to give you an opportunity to comment on issues analyzed in the NMD Deployment Draft EIS. Please use this sheet to comment on any issues that you feel should be clarified in the Final EIS for NMD deployment. To ensure that your comments are addressed in the Final EIS, your comments must be post-marked by November 15, 1999.

Date: 09 Nov 99

______________________________

Please place form in the drop box or mail to:
SMDC-EN-V, Ms. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
PO Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3501

Commentor:
Name: Richard Judge
Street Address: 4910 Neil Avenue
City, State: Huntsville, AL
Zip Code: 35805

TOWN OF SANDWICH
THE OLDEST TOWN ON CAPE COD
130 MAIN STREET
SANDWICH, MASSACHUSETTS 02533
TELEPHONE 508-898-9110
FAX 508-888-8852

November 5, 1999

F. Whyte Peters
Secretary of the Air Force
Pentagon Building
Room 4E671
Washington, DC 20330

Re: Request for Environmental Impact Statement for Cape Cod PAVE PAWS

Dear Secretary Peters:

The Town of Sandwich Board of Selectmen voted unanimously at its November 4, 1999 meeting to request that the United States Air Force file a full, site specific Environmental Impact Statement for the Cape Cod PAVE PAWS facility on the Massachusetts Military Reservation. This request is for the complete existing facility, not just the technical upgrades being proposed by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization.

The Selectmen and many local residents are concerned about several issues at the facility, particularly how normal operations affect public health and safety. In the interest of providing citizens with the most accurate information about PAVE PAWS, the Board believes an Environmental Impact Statement will help clarify exactly how the facility operates and address the public’s concerns. The Board recognizes the importance of Cape Cod PAVE PAWS for national defense purposes, but wants to ensure that the health and safety of local residents are also protected.

Thank you for your consideration of this request.

Sincerely yours,

George H. Dunham
Town Administrator

cc: Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
U. S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
Federal and State Legislative Delegation
Massachusetts Department of Public Health
Board of Health

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Welcome to the Friendly Frontier

With a long history of a military relationship at Fort Greely, the community of Delta Junction hopes to continue that spirit of cooperation with the National Missile Defense Organization.

Delta's roots with the military began with the lend-lease program during World War II when aircraft was shuttled from the United States to Russia in support of Russian aviators. Today, the tradition of teamwork to optimize Fort Greely has created new opportunities for the Delta region including seeking joint use of the Army Airfield.

Located at the junction of the Alaska and Richardson Highways, Delta Junction remains a primary transportation corridor for the State of Alaska. To enhance the transportation system, the Alaska Railroad will build a spur to Fort Greely if needed. Offering a wide variety of recreational opportunities from hiking to world class hunting and fishing, Delta Junction is truly an outdoor paradise. With the scenic backdrop of Mt. Hayes, Mt. Deborah, Mt. Moffit, Mt. Shand and Mt. Hess, Delta Junction is further blessed with the Delta River, Tanana River, the Clearwater River and Quartz Lake.

Pride, character and respect are qualities promoted in our youth activities. Established programs in State Champion High School Hockey, State Champion Youth Hockey, Softball, Little League, Soccer, Bowling, Swimming, Basketball, Volleyball, State Champion Rifle Team, Youth Court and other activities give our kids the chance to excel. In fact, very supportive of the youth, the community helped to send the Girls Softball Team to the National Finals in Alabama last year.

The Delta/Greeley School District boasts a first class Cyber School and recently was awarded a 3 million dollar grant to address the needs of our students. Local colleges permit residents to seek an associate's degree and further their education at the University of Alaska.

Although located in a wilderness paradise, Delta Junction offers medical, dental and other health care services to the community. Reliable electrical and power services are provided by Golden Valley Electric Association. In the past, military personnel have purchased homes in the area and we currently have a substantial number of retired military individuals in the community.

Delta Junction enjoys a rural atmosphere, with agricultural entities supplying fresh milk, barley, carrots, potatoes and other goods. Each summer, the Delta Fair hosts numerous events and competitions from the mud drag races, 4-H, quilting and blue ribbon pies.

The City of Delta Junction welcomes the National Missile Defense Organization to our home, we hope it will become your home too.

CITY OF DELTA JUNCTION
MAYOR ROY GILBERTSON
Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)

Denali Transportation, Inc.

November 2, 1999

SMDC-EN-V, Ms. Julia Hudson
US Army Space & Missile Defense Command
PO Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801


I am writing to submit testimony in favor of this very necessary defense project and encourage your staff to recommend locating this system in interior Alaska.

As a Board member of the Alaska Movers Association representing the moving and storage industry in interior Alaska I can assure you that we have adequate facilities, equipment and manpower to handle all moving and storage services that could be required for a project of this magnitude.

Between the Fairbanks agencies we share over 200,000 square feet of warehouse storage space, 150 units of power equipment and over 200 professionally trained packers, movers and warehouse personnel. Almost every major national moving and storage van line carrier is represented in Fairbanks. In the event your project is located in our area all of your personnel that require relocation to interior Alaska will be delighted with the modern, professional services that are available.

We in the moving and storage industry enjoy an excellent relationship with our military geuts in the state. Most military families who relocate here are surprised at the level of professionalism. In fact a large number have commented that the moving services they received in Fairbanks from the various local agents is the best they have ever experienced during their long careers in the US Air Force and/or the US Army.

Thank you and your staff very much for all the time and effort devoted to coming to Fairbanks and disseminating information and taking public comment regarding the proposed missile deployment. I was very impressed with the exhibits presented and very glad I attended and had many of my questions answered.

Sincerely,

Dennis Schloelfdt
Vice President
Comment Sheet for the National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)

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Date: 11/3/99

I am a Yupiit resident of Alaska. I favor a missile defense system based in interior Alaska. I am concerned about Alaska being used for both construction and operation. The operation of the Clear EW station really will show that Dept of Defense can operate in an environmentally sound fashion.

I believe that “talk” with the USSR is a non-issue since USSR does not exist any longer. Fragment of the former USSR does exist, it is Russia, but Russia is not the USSR. In any event, the safety of the American people including Alaska must be considered.

Please place form in the drop box or mail to:
SMDC-EN-V, Ms. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
PO Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

Commenter:
Name: Sid Childers
Street Address:
City, State:
Zip Code:

Comment Sheet for the National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)

Thank you for attending this public hearing. Our purpose for hosting this meeting is to give you an opportunity to comment on issues analyzed in the NMD Deployment Draft EIS. Please use this sheet to comment on any issues that you feel should be clarified in the Final EIS for NMD deployment. To ensure that your comments are addressed in the Final EIS, your comments must be post-marked by November 15, 1999.

Date: Nov 3, 1999

I would like to register my opposition to the NMD deployment in Alaska. This would represent the real ballistic missile treaty with Russia. The technology is the to end all wars with any missile. There are other defects in this plan. I would like to point out, the politicians and generals as well have had their communities in the interior of Alaska as fallout areas for many years and would consider national defense a much more serious matter. We are vulnerable to a more likely terrorist attack. In short I consider NMD plan as a more government push for Alaska as national defense.

Please place form in the drop box or mail to:
SMDC-EN-V, Ms. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
PO Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

Commenter:
Name: Daniel D. Dunwoody
Street Address:
City, State:
Zip Code:
Dear Mr. Hudson,

For the record, as an Alaskan, resident of 30 years, I do not approve of a missile defense system being built in Alaska or in N. Dakota.  With 20% of America's children classified as living below the poverty level, we have no business spending $ Billions on a questionable system which may not even work; a system which violates U.N. treaties; a system which will destroy our credibility worldwide; a system which will give us a false sense of security and may start another arms race.

No doubt, the powers that be (the officer, business and many people) wish this system developed and I have no doubt it will become a reality.  Unfortunately, I think it is morally, wrong and economically not justified.

Please add my name to the record, for what it's worth.

Sincerely, Sue

Sue Walker

November 4, 1999

U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
ATTENTION: SMDC-EN-V (Ms. Julia Hudson)
PO Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

Dear U.S. Army and Missile Defense Command:

The Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) examines the environmental impacts of the potential deployment of a land-based National Missile Defense (NMD) system. The EIS is incomplete, because it does not consider specific locations where the In-Flight Intercepter Communications System (IFICS) Data Terminals could be deployed. There could be 14 of these locations, yet the public is not given even one location. The public cannot fully participate in the EIS process, because the generic information is not adequate to the public process. A Supplemental DEIS should be issued with this information.

The EIS is also inadequate, because operational (wartime) launches from the Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) site are not evaluated in the EIS. “The purpose of the NMD program is defense of the United States against a threat of a limited strategic ballistic missile attack from a rogue nation.” (Ex-1). Therefore, actual operational use of the GBI should be analyzed in a Supplemental DEIS. The National Environmental Protection Act requires the impacts of a project to be evaluated.

Four out of five locations for the GBI would have unacceptable impacts on wetlands. This includes filling, draining, trenching and run off to the wetlands. The Federal government should be protecting our nation’s natural resources and not destroying them.

The X-Band Radar’s electromagnetic radiation levels would be below prescribed health based standards. However, many credible scientists have called the present standards into question for being too high. The Federal government should do a thorough study on the electromagnetic radiation standard for human health before any deployment.

The Fiber Optic Cable could interfere with community harvesters attempting to feed their families. The EIS acknowledges on ES-23 that, “...harvesters may be required to increase their effort by spending longer time to harvest and traveling to other areas.” It further admits that this “…may increase the risk to harvesters,” and cost them more to feed their families. The Federal government should be helping its citizens especially those who rely on subsistence methods. Nothing should be done that causes local people more effort and cost in putting food on the table for their families.

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Part of the NMD system is the Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR). This component is not evaluated in the present DEIS. It should go through its own EIS process. The NMD's DEIS is inadequate without this thorough analysis of the UEWR.

The United States would be a lot safer if it did not change the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The proposed alternative should not be deployed.

Sincerely,

Susan V. Walker

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
November 4, 1999

SMDC-EN-V, Ms. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
P.O. Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

Dear SMDC-EN-V,

Please accept these comments on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for the National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment.

Unfortunately, I have been unable to procure a copy of the DEIS, but I assume that one of the alternatives considered is the “No Action” alternative. I urge you to select it.

The military has a long and sordid history of pollution in Alaska and I want no more of it. I have no doubt that you have in mind certain “remediation” procedures or “mitigation” plans for reducing pollution and minimizing the environmental impact of this system. But the best remediation and mitigation procedures are quite simply to not build the system at all.

Those are my comments on the DEIS. Now we will move into the “considerable objection” portion of my letter.

The rationale for deployment of this system has been explained to me as follows: the United States needs to protect itself against so-called “rogue nations.” A few weeks ago, the U.S. Senate refused to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. And now the U.S. is embarking on a missile defense system that will no doubt lead to arms escalation worldwide and is contrary to the 1972 ABM treaty with the former Soviet Union – the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament. I would suggest that the United States is the rogue nation here.

Finally, in the public hearing held in Fairbanks, Alaska on Monday, November 1, 1999, there was a TV monitor with approximately two minutes of footage being replayed over and over. The footage was of a test of this NMD system held in October 1999. It was my understanding that the purpose of the hearing was to solicit public input on the DEIS – something that had nothing to do with footage of the test or its results. The hearing was to evaluate the potential environmental impacts if the system is deployed. Instead, the public was offered a slick commercial that showed that the system actually works (at least in one test). If the test had been a dismal failure would the video have been shown? I believe it was unacceptable to employ this heavy-handed tactic in order to build support for the system, especially when the purpose of the hearing was to examine an entirely different topic (the DEIS).

Sincerely,

Ross Coen
Comment Sheet
for the
National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment
Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)

Thank you for attending this public hearing. Our purpose for hosting this meeting is to
give you an opportunity to comment on issues analyzed in the NMD Draft Deployment
EIS. Please use this sheet to comment on any issues that you feel should be clarified
in the Final EIS for NMD deployment. To ensure that your comments are addressed in
the Final EIS, your comments must be post-marked by November 15, 1999.

Date: November 5, 1999

As President & CEO of Minot Power Cooperative in
the wholesale power supplier in eastern North
Dakota, I have been authorized to submit the
strong support for placement of a NMD
facility in northeastern North Dakota. Our
Cooperative has facilities (generation and
transmission) in the proposed site locations in Minot, Bismarck, & Grand Forks. We
were the first to propose the concept of a NMD
system and have been proponents of this
effort. Our electric distribution systems are ready and able to furnish low cost electricity
to your facilities if located in North Dakota.

Please place form in the drop
box or mail to:
SMDC-EN, Ms. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
PO Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

Comment: David Loer

Comment Sheet for NMD Deployment EIS:
November 5, 1999

Overall, it appears that NMD deployment would have minimal environmental impacts and thus a
rather benign effect on the Delta region. This makes it a rather "clean" industry for the area, one
compatible with its environment and one I support.

However, my concerns stem from the possible deployment of both NMD and other base reuse
options. If a site is developed on the base in addition to NMD (and we have repeatedly been
told the two are not mutually exclusive), I believe the influx of this number of people will
negatively impact the environment and tax the existing limited infrastructure of the City. For
example, housing is limited in the area and the community would need time and funds to develop
additional infrastructure to adequately support both projects. Additional services such as fire,
police protection, landfill and sewage systems would need to be developed as well.

The City has been working hard to develop a base reuse but I believe only one of the "large
anchor tenant" type projects is necessary to be consistent with the vision of Delta in 10
-20 years. Additional business development can occur as a result of the "anchor tenant's
presence" as indicated in the EIS and preliminary plans for prison development. But, we cannot
sacrifice quality of life issues for economic development. Thus, if it is a perfect world with clear
choices and no timing conflicts, I believe NMD deployment is environmentally and economically
the preferred "anchor tenant" for Fort Greely. It is cleaner and better meets the value and vision I
see for Delta/Greely in the long-term. It is far less controversial, provides better paying
employment opportunities, makes excellent use of one of our greatest assets (extensive raw,
uninhabited land) and does not saddle the City with extensive asbestos and lead-based paint
cleanup necessary to convert the cantonment area to a prison area.

In my opinion, to minimize environmental impacts, only one large project should be developed at
Fort Greely and my preference is the deployment of NMD. The sooner the City can know this
is to occur, the sooner they can begin planning and upgrading necessary infrastructure to meet
the demands of the project and cease work on the less attractive alternative reuse option of a
private prison which may have negative environmental effects that have yet to be quantified.

Thank you for this opportunity.

Commentator: Donna J. Gardin

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Community and Economic Development

November 5, 1999

SMDC-EN-V, Ms. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
P.O. Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

Re: National Missile Defense EIS Comments

Dear Ms. Hudson:

The City of Valdez is very supportive of the location of Delta Junction, Alaska (Fort Greely) for the National Missile Defense System. We feel this location is by far the best for the program.

In addition, the Fort Greely site offers already in place infrastructure and therefore low site development costs. Easy and cost effective shipping of components to Fort Greely is readily available from Valdez, the northern-most ice free port to interior Alaska, and then up the Richardson Highway, a distance of only 250 miles.

Thank you for this opportunity to comment on this important project.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Robert L. Bright
Director

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
November 5, 1999

U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
Attention: SMDC-EN-V (Ms. Julia Hudson)
P.O. Box 1590
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

Dear Ms. Hudson:

I have carefully reviewed the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for National Missile Defense Deployment, September 1999, and offer the following comments:

1. The Draft EIS cites the American National Standards Institute / Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (ANSI/IEEE) C95.1 1992 standard for human exposure to electromagnetic radiation (EMR). That standard has been updated by the C95.1 1999 standard recently issued by ANSI/IEEE. The updated standard should be used for the EIS analysis.

2. The calculation in §4.3.4.7 of the Draft EIS of maximum permissible exposure (MPE) to EMR in uncontrolled environments is incorrect. The Draft EIS states that the MPE is 6.33 mW/cm². The proper calculation is given below:

   \[
   \text{Frequency (MHz)} / 1,500 = \text{MPE (mW/cm}^2\text{)}
   \]

   or

   \[
   8,000 / 1,500 = 5.33 \text{ mW/cm}^2.
   \]

   This change will affect the safe distance reported in the EIS.

3. The Draft EIS analysis of EMR is limited to exposure of the public in areas outside the secure zone around the radars. An analysis of occupational exposure of workers within the controlled area should be included. The correct MPE for controlled environments (see Table 1 of the ANSI/IEEE C95.1 1999 standard) should be used in that analysis.

4. The Draft EIS analysis fails to examine the health and safety implications of exposure to peak-power levels. The ANSI/IEEE C95.1 1999 standard (and the earlier C95.1 1992 standard) includes MPEs for peak-power exposure in §4.1, Table 1, footnote (g), and §4.1, Table 2, footnote (g). The rationale for peak-power MPEs is explained in §6.9 of the ANSI/IEEE C95.1 1999 standard. The expected peak level of EMR emitted by the X-band radar should be calculated and compared to the peak-power MPEs given in the ANSI/IEEE standard.

5. The first full paragraph on page 4-348 of the Draft EIS (§4.2.4.7) states that additive exposure to RFR emitted by the proposed X-band radar and other emitters may exceed the appropriate MPE, but this is not a concern because the MPE incorporates a safety factor. This is not a correct interpretation of the ANSI/IEEE standards. The proper method for analyzing exposure to EMR from multiple sources is given in Annex D of the ANSI/IEEE C95.1 1999 standard and should be used to analyze additive exposure to EMR.

I request that the Draft EIS be recirculated for public review and comment after it is revised to eliminate the inaccuracies and omissions noted above. Thank you for providing a copy of the Draft EIS and considering these comments.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

James Mantakos
Program Manager
SRI International

Cc: NMD file

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
October 23, 1999

U. S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
Attention: SMDC-EN-V (Ms. Julie Hudson)
P.O. Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

Dear Ms. Hudson:

As President of Deltana Community Corporation (DCC) in Delta, Alaska, I am writing to advise you of our board's unanimous support for placing the Ballistic Missile Defense Program at Fort Greely, Alaska. I have attached a resolution of such support.

DCC is a non-profit community corporation that represents more than 70% of the Delta Junction area. The board of DCC is elected by those living outside the City of Delta Junction and includes the residents of Fort Greely. In the absence of any local government (no borough, county or other local government), DCC provides community services to the Delta area by facilitating state and federal programs and providing a voice for the majority of those living in the area.

We believe this program is an excellent use of one of our greatest assets. The vast undeveloped landmass and rural location lends itself to minimizing environmental impacts. Health and safety risks are minimal as well. A recent large wildfire in the area will minimize future risk from fire for the BMD project. An upgrade and resurfacing of the Alaska Airfield would be consistent with future uses as defined by the draft Alaska Airfield Joint Use Master Plan. Visual sensitivity to the project is very low. There would be no land use conflicts. The socio-economic base of the area will greatly improve especially in light of the realignment of Fort Greely.

We hope that the BMD project will be deployed at Fort Greely, Alaska. Thank you for your consideration. If you have any questions, please contact me at 907/855-4150 or email me at doc@enix.net.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Paul Knopp, President
Deltana Community Corporation

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Cavalier Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.

October 24, 1999

Encl: 1-1

Mr. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
P.O. Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

Re: National Missile Defense Deployment

Greetings,

Cavalier Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc. (CREC) has provided reliable electric service to the thirty Minuteman III missile launch sites and one launch control center since their original installation in 1966 thru the present time when the sites are beginning to be "imploded".

CREC thru Minot Power Cooperative, Inc. our wholesale electric supplier has provided electric service to the ANW-RM site at Minot, ND from the time it was under construction in 1970 until it was scheduled for dismantling in 1978 and we continue to provide the single phase service to the RM Site following removal of the three-phase, 115KV line that terminates at the RM Site.

We have also provided three phase service to the NRS-1 and NRS-2 at Minot during construction and during operations up to the time the sites were disconnected.

The 115KV line remains intact to the RM site at Minot.

The NRS Site: one is less than one mile from the existing 115KV line that goes from Devil's Lake to Langdon.

This 115KV line from Langdon to Devil's Lake has weathered many storms and since it is basically located in a northeast to southeast direction it has withstood adverse weather very reliably. This line should provide a very reliable source of bulk power to the RM site and NRS-1.

CREC is ready and available to provide reliable electric service to the RM, NRS-1 and NRS-2 as it is necessary for construction and operation of these sites with minimal additional investment.

Yours truly,

Cavalier Rural Electric Coop., Inc
Richard Otto, Manager

"One of the Minot Power Systems -- We Put Value on the Line!"

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Comment Sheet for the National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)

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Date: 04 Nov 99

Please place form in the drop box or mail to:
SMDC-EN-V, Mr. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
P.O. Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

Commenter:
Name: Senator Robert Taylor
Street Address:
City, State: Anchorage, AK
Zip Code:

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
ALASKA'S MISSILE DEFENSE APPEAL: A MODEL FOR OTHER STATES

Baker Spring
Senior Policy Analyst

Common sense would dictate that any national missile defense (NMD) system developed for the United States should be designed to protect all U.S. territory against missile attack. The Clinton Administration, however, has proposed an NMD development and deployment plan that most likely will leave a large portion of the United States vulnerable to missile strikes.

The Administration's proposed NMD system is not likely to provide full coverage to U.S. territory because it is being designed in a way that conforms to the restrictions of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Last May, therefore, legislators in Alaska—alarmed at the prospect of being left vulnerable—adopted a resolution asking the federal government to provide Alaska with protection against such attacks on an equal basis with all other states.1

Legislators from Florida, Arizona, or Utah might be tempted to assume that only Alaska and Hawaii, being geographically isolated from the contiguous 48 states, would be outside the protective umbrella of the Clinton NMD system. Such an assumption, in most cases, would be wrong. Because of the requirements of the ABM Treaty, many other states also are likely to be left vulnerable. As a result, other state legislators should be prepared to follow Alaska's lead and adopt a similar resolution to help make sure that their states will be protected on an equal basis with all other states. While such resolutions do not have legal force over the federal government, they can carry much weight in reminding distant Washington policymakers of their responsibilities to the states. The Alaska resolution, which could serve as a model, demands that the federal government:

1. Provide protection against missile attack to all the people of the United States on an equal basis.
2. Include Alaska and Hawaii, and not just the 48 contiguous states, in all future assessments of the threat posed to the United States from missile attack.
3. Take the necessary steps—including deployment of a missile defense system—to ensure that Alaska is protected against the threats posed by foreign aggressors.
4. Recognize that the security of Alaska takes precedence over any international treaty or obligation.
5. Hold public hearings in Alaska to help the people of that state appreciate the extent of their vulnerability.

THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE PLAN

The NMD development and deployment plan now being implemented by the Clinton Administration includes a three-year development program that would allow a deployment decision by the year 2000 or sometime thereafter. A missile defense system could be deployed three years after this decision is made. Because of these three-year intervals, the Clinton proposal is frequently referred to as the "three-plus-three" plan. Significantly, however, the plan contains no explicit commitment to deploy an NMD system. Moreover, any system that is deployed almost certainly will leave vast portions of U.S. territory unprotected against missile strikes because of the Administration's determination to observe the requirements of the ABM Treaty, which imposes severe restrictions on what sort of NMD system the United States may develop and deploy.

The NMD system envisioned by the Clinton Administration is ground-based—the only kind allowed by the ABM Treaty. It would include up to 100 interceptors and would likely be located at Grand Forks, North Dakota, which the United States designated under the treaty and a 1974 protocol as its single ABM deployment site. The question that remains for Alaska, Hawaii, and a potential host of other states is whether such a system will be able to protect their territory. The answer provided by the Clinton Administration plan is that they will not be protected because the ABM Treaty specifically bars the deployment of an NMD system capable of providing coverage to all of the territory of the United States.

Alaska's understandable concern. The Alaska legislature's concern about Alaska's ongoing vulnerability to missile attack was prompted by a November 1995 intelligence community report on the missile threat that excluded threats to Alaska and Hawaii from consideration. The intelligence community prepared this report, known as a national intelligence estimate (NIE), as the basis of the Clinton Administration. The NIE determined that the U.S. would not face a missile threat from any Third World state for at least 15 years. Excluding Alaska and Hawaii from the estimate served to bypass an earlier assessment by then-Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch that territories in these two states

1 Senate Joint Resolution 30, "Defense of Alaska from Nuclear Attack." The Alaska Senate adopted the resolution on May 6, while the Alaska House adopted it on May 11.

2 For a summary version of the NIE, called the "President's Summary," see "Do We Need a Missile Defense System?" The Washington Times, May 14, 1996, p. A13. The intelligence community includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the intelligence arms of the military services, and other smaller agencies.
could be subject to attack by a North Korean missile, the Taepo Dong 2, by the end of this decade. The Clinton Administration's attempts to downplay the missile threat and to uphold the ABM Treaty convinced Alaska's legislators that it had set out on a path that would leave Alaskan territory vulnerable to the Taepo Dong 2. The first problem has to do with timing. Under the Administration's deployment plan, even if it provided coverage to Alaska, the United States would not be able to deploy an NMD system until after the estimated North Korean threat to Alaska materialized. But the question of timing is actually the less important of the problems posed by the Administration's NMD plan: The lack of coverage of the fully deployed system should be of even greater concern. Limits on the coverage of the deployed NMD system, as required by the ABM Treaty, will result in permanent vulnerability.

**THE ABM TREATY OBSTACLE**

With the Clinton Administration embarked on its three-plus-three plan, political leaders in Alaska and other states still need to be concerned that it is prepared to leave their territories permanently vulnerable to missile strikes. This concern arises even as the Administration prepares to provide protection to other portions of U.S. territory. The reason for this unwise approach can be found in the Administration's infatuation with the ABM Treaty. Article I of the ABM Treaty commits the U.S. "not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of this Treaty."

Article II of the ABM Treaty, as amended by a 1974 protocol, allows the deployment of a single site of up to 100 ground-based interceptors at the national capital area or a field of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Under the treaty, the United States designated its site as the ICBM field in North Dakota. The United States constructed such a system in the 1970s, but mothballed it shortly after it became operational. The Clinton Administration's three-plus-three plan is designed to deploy a more technologically advanced system at the North Dakota site, but under the requirements of Article I, this system's defensive coverage cannot extend beyond the region where the ICBMs are deployed. As a result, the Administration's requirement that the deployment be "treaty compliant" means that virtually all U.S. territory outside the northern portions of the Midwest will remain vulnerable to missile attack under the three-plus-three plan. The Clinton Administration, moreover, continues to mislead the American people about its plans. The Administration has directed the program manager of the NMD system, Brigadier General Joseph Costanzo, to design a ground-based system that, despite the restrictions of the ABM Treaty, can meet the demanding technological task of providing protection to all 50 states. General Costanzo has acknowledged, however, that the Clinton Administration has made no commitment to him that it will relax the strictures of Article I and allow the deployment of a system capable of protecting all U.S. territory. Thus, the Administration is instructing the military to design an NMD system that its own policy toward the ABM Treaty will bar it from deploying. The only alternatives would be (1) to deploy a system that leaves the territories of the vast majority of states vulnerable to missile strikes or (2) to deploy no NMD system at all.

**CONCLUSION**

Recognizing that the ABM Treaty poses an insurmountable obstacle to providing adequate missile protection for Alaska, the state's legislators passed a resolution reminding the federal government of its obligation to protect all 50 states. The resolution states explicitly that Alaska's safety and security take priority over any international treaty or obligation. Further, it expresses the view that the President should take whatever action is required to ensure that Alaska is defended against limited missile attack. By implication, this provision asks the federal government to modify or jeopdrize the ABM Treaty.

Given the present situation, other state legislators would be well-advised to use Alaska's resolution as a model for similar resolutions demanding that the federal government provide their states with protection against missile attack. As long as the ABM Treaty obstacle remains, there is little prospect that the federal government will field an effective NMD system that provides protection to all U.S. territory.

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### Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
APPENDIX

SPONSOR SUBSTITUTE FOR SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 30
IN THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
TWENTIETH LEGISLATURE—FIRST SESSION

BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE BY REQUEST

Introduced: 5/2/97
Referred: Judiciary

A RESOLUTION

Relating to the defense of Alaska from offensive nuclear attack.

BE IT RESOLVED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA:

WHEREAS Alaska is the 49th state to enter the federal union of the United States of America and is entitled to all of the rights, privileges, and obligations that the union affords and requires; and

WHEREAS Alaska possesses natural resources, including energy, minerals, and human resources, vital to the prosperity and national security of the United States; and

WHEREAS the people of Alaska are conscious of the state’s remote northern location and proximity to Northeast Asia and the Eurasian land mass, and of how that unique location places the state in a more vulnerable position than other states with regard to missiles that could be launched in Asia and Europe; and

WHEREAS the people of Alaska recognize the changing nature of the international political structure and the evolution and proliferation of missile delivery systems and weapons of mass destruction as foreign states seek the military means to deter the power of the United States in international affairs; and

WHEREAS there is a growing threat to Alaska by potential aggressors in these nations and in rogue nations that are seeking nuclear weapons capability and that have sponsored international terrorism; and

WHEREAS a National Intelligence Estimate to assess missile threats to the United States left Alaska and Hawaii out of the assessment and estimate; and

WHEREAS one of the primary reasons for joining the Union of the United States of America was to gain security for the people of Alaska and for the common regulation of foreign affairs on the basis of an equitable membership in the United States federation; and

WHEREAS the United States plans to field a national missile defense, perhaps as early as 2003; this national missile defense plan will provide only a fragile defense for Alaska, the state most likely to be threatened by new missile powers that are emerging in Northeast Asia;

BE IT RESOLVED that the Alaska Legislature respectfully requests the President of the United States to take all actions necessary, within the considerable limits of the resources of the United States, to protect on an equal basis all peoples and resources of this great Union from threat of missile attack regardless of the physical location of the member state; and be it

FURTHER RESOLVED that the Alaska State Legislature respectfully requests that Alaska be included in every National Intelligence Estimate conducted by the United States joint intelligence agencies; and be it

FURTHER RESOLVED that the Alaska State Legislature respectfully requests the President of the United States to include Alaska and Hawaii, not just the contiguous 48 states, in every National Intelligence Estimate of missile threats to the United States; and be it

FURTHER RESOLVED that the Alaska State Legislature urges the United States government to take necessary measures to ensure that Alaska is protected against foreseeable threat, nuclear and otherwise, posed by foreign aggressors, including deployment of a ballistic missile defense system to protect Alaska; and be it

FURTHER RESOLVED that the Alaska State Legislature conveys to the President of the United States expectations that Alaska’s safety and security take priority over any international treaty or obligation and that the President take whatever action is necessary to ensure that Alaska can be defended against limited missile attacks with the same degree of assurance as that provided to all other states; and be it

FURTHER RESOLVED that the Alaska State Legislature respectfully requests that the appropriate Congressional committees hold hearings in Alaska that include defense experts and administration officials to help Alaskans understand their risks, their level of security, and Alaska’s vulnerability.

COPYES of this resolution shall be sent to the Honorable Bill Clinton, President of the United States; the Honorable Al Gore, Jr., Vice President of the United States and President of the U.S. Senate; the Honorable Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives; the Honorable Ted Stevens, Chair of the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations; the Honorable Bob Livingston, Chair of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations; the Honorable Strom Thurmond, Chair of the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services; the Honorable Floyd Spence, Chair of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on National Security; and to the Honorable Frank Murkowski, U.S. Senator, and the Honorable Don Young, U.S. Representative, members of the Alaska delegation in Congress.

HERITAGE STUDIES ON LINE

Heritage Foundation studies are available electronically at several online locations. On the Internet, The Heritage Foundation's home page on the World Wide Web is www.heritage.org. Bookmark this site and visit us daily for the latest information.

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Comment Sheet
for the

Thank you for attending this public hearing. Our purpose for hosting this meeting is to give you an opportunity to comment on issues analyzed in the NMD Deployment Draft EIS. Please use this sheet to comment on any issues that you feel should be clarified in the Final EIS for NMD deployment. To ensure that your comments are addressed in the Final EIS, your comments must be post-marked by November 15, 1999.

Date: 04 NOV 99

Please place form in the drop box or mail to:
SMDC-EN-V, Ms. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
PO Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

Commentator:
Name: Senator Loren Leman
Street Address:
City, State: Anchorage, AK
Zip Code:

- Good evening, I'm Senator Loren Leman. I am honored to represent the District G in west Anchorage which includes Elmendorf Airforce Base. I appreciate this opportunity to say a few words about Alaska's potential role in the Ballistic Missile Defense Program. As an elected official, engineer, and Alaska resident this issue concerns me deeply on professional, public policy and personal levels.

- Of the many factors addressed in the draft environmental impact statement, I'll briefly mention two: wetlands and the potential, however unlikely, of a chemical propellant leak.

- Last month I toured the Clear Air Station and Fort Greely sites under consideration. As an environmental engineer, I paid close attention to the wetlands and groundwater issues.

- My observations lead me to believe that Fort Greely is exceptionally well suited for a Ground Based Interceptor

Senator Loren Leman

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
installation. The water table, more than 175 feet deep, no wetlands would be disturbed, and this summer’s wildfire has conveniently killed nearly every tree within miles. You might say that nature is leading the way.

- Additionally, there are no roads or buildings within the range of a potential chemical vapor leak.
- In contrast, a spill at the Grand Forks, North Dakota location could potentially endanger users of, and I quote, “three commercial buildings, two churches, one residence and portions of US Highway 2” Volume 1, Executive Summary page ss 15.
- From a number of perspectives, I believe that Alaska, and probably Fort Greely, stands out as being the best choice for the environment and for the nation.

- An important component of any public program is local support. While in Delta Junction I participated in a public meeting that included the discussion of the issue and was impressed by the active involvement of the community. Nearly one hundred area residents voiced their enthusiasm for an installation at Fort Greely.
- This is understandable. With the recent post closure, the community is in need of the jobs and economic development this program would bring. Fort Greely and the Ballistic Missile Defense Program are a good match.
- Noise concerns and archeological remains are important and worthy of our careful consideration. However, there is a larger question in the background; one that will profoundly affect the way Americans view the success of a Ballistic Missile Defense System.
- That is, which Americans should be protected? All, or some?
• Should the Department of Defense choose a site in the lower 48, both Alaska and Hawaii may be left vulnerable to a nuclear attack by a rogue nation.

• It is important to note that Alaska and Hawaii were precisely the areas attacked by Japanese forces in World War II. Both states support military installations that are critical to our first line of defense in the Pacific theater.

• Both states are geographically isolated and dangerously proximate to potential launch sites.

• Clearly, when the United States is threatened in the Pacific, it is Alaska and Hawaii that offer a potential aggressor the most tempting targets.

• Leaving these states undefended from a missile attack runs counter to our traditional military strategy in the Pacific and, in my view, would call into question the mission of the entire system.

• An Alaska installation is the only alternative that would truly protect our first line of defense and safeguard all Americans from nuclear terrorism.

• Thank you for listening to Alaskans.

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Comment Sheet for the National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)

Thank you for attending this public hearing. Our purpose for hosting this meeting is to give you an opportunity to comment on issues analyzed in the NMD Deployment Draft EIS. Please use this sheet to comment on any issues that you feel should be clarified in the Final EIS for NMD deployment. To ensure that your comments are addressed in the Final EIS, your comments must be post-marked by November 15, 1999.

Date: 04/November/99

Comment:

See Attachment

Please place form in the drop box or mail to:
SMDC-ENV, Ms. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
PO Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

Commentator:
Name: Karen Button

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)

Comment Sheet for the National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)

Thank you for attending this public hearing. Our purpose for hosting this meeting is to give you an opportunity to comment on issues analyzed in the NMD Deployment Draft EIS. Please use this sheet to comment on any issues that you feel should be clarified in the Final EIS for NMD deployment. To ensure that your comments are addressed in the Final EIS, your comments must be post-marked by November 15, 1999.

Date: Nov. 4, 1999

Clear AS will be an ideal site for the NMD elements. Soil conditions will support facilities required. Water source is excellent and about 2 miles from the planned surface railroad siding is existing as well as an airport and highway transportation system. Clear AS has a water and sewer system in place not far from the proposed site. The site, therefore, needs no new development or population increase. Clear AS is in a remote location, far from large population centers, is well suited for minimum cost construction of an established military site. Recommend Clear AS be selected.

Please place forms in the drop box or mail to:

SMDC-EN-4, Ms. Julie Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
PO Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3901

Name: Robert H. Tilly, PE

City, State: ____________
Zip Code: ____________

1. Request a copy of the Final EIS be sent to: ____________
November 4, 1999

U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
Attention: SMDC-EN-V (Ms. Julia Hudson)
P.O. Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3081

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Referenced is your letter dated September 22, 1999 requesting comments on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for the National Missile Defense deployment.

The Department's Divisions of Environmental Engineering, Water Quality and Waste Management have reviewed the DEIS. We have two comments:

1. On page 3-20, the sulfur oxides standards indicated in the table are applicable to coal conversion facilities. The sulfur oxides standards applicable to other facilities are:
   - Annual: 660 g/m² (0.023 ppm)
   - 24-hour: 260 g/m² (0.009 ppm)
   - 1-hour: 715 g/m² (0.273 ppm)

2. Also on page 3-20, there are no North Dakota ambient air quality standards for reduced sulfur and ammonia.

If you have any questions, feel free to contact us at 701-328-5150.

Sincerely,

Francis J. Schmidt, Chief
Environmental Health Section

SMDC-EN-V, Ms Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defence Command
Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3081

Dear Ms. Hudson,

I am writing on behalf of the Missile Defense System being placed in Interior Alaska.

It is my understanding that if the system was located in North Dakota, it would not protect either Alaska or Hawaii even though both of these states have a large military presence. I feel that this would be a serious mistake due to the strategic location these states occupy. I feel that when all the factors are taken into account, interior Alaska will become the best possible location for the system.

Sincerely,

Scott Vaughn

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Comment Sheet for the National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)

Thank you for attending this public hearing. Our purpose for hosting this meeting is to give you an opportunity to comment on issues analyzed in the NMD Deployment Draft EIS. Please use this sheet to comment on any issues that you feel should be clarified in the Final EIS for NMD deployment. To ensure that your comments are addressed in the Final EIS, your comments must be post-marked by November 15, 1993.

Date: Nov 5, 1993

I feel that the NMD should be based in Alaska so that there is not currently a vacuum for the U.S. Oil resources in the Pacific Northwest, and also it would be a much needed boost to the local economy.

Comment Sheet for the National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)

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TOWN OF SANDWICH
THE OLDEST TOWN ON CAPE COD
132 MAIN STREET
SANDWICH, MASSACHUSETTS 02563
TELEPHONE 508-888-0930
FAX 508-888-0955

November 5, 1999

F. Whitten Peters
Secretary of the Air Force
Pentagon Building
Room 4E871
Washington, DC 20330

Re: Request for Environmental Impact Statement for Cape Cod PAVE PAWS

Dear Secretary Peters:

The Town of Sandwich Board of Selectmen voted unanimously at its November 4, 1999 meeting to request that the United States Air Force file a full, site specific Environmental Impact Statement for the Cape Cod PAVE PAWS facility on the Massachusetts Military Reservation. This request is for the complete existing facility, not just the technical upgrades being proposed by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization.

The Selectmen and many local residents are concerned about several issues at the facility, particularly how normal operations affect public health and safety. In the interest of providing citizens with the most accurate information about PAVE PAWS, the Board believes an Environmental Impact Statement will help clarify exactly how the facility operates and address the public's concerns. The Board recognizes the importance of Cape Cod PAVE PAWS for national defense purposes, but wants to ensure that the health and safety of local residents are also protected.

Thank you for your consideration of this request.

Sincerely yours,

George H. Dunham
Town Administrator

CC: Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
Federal and State Legislative Delegation
Massachusetts Department of Public Health Board of Health

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
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The draft EIS states on page 4-165 that the ESQD's for GBI's at either site on Clear AS would fall within the base boundary. This statement seems to be inconsistent with Fig. 2.4.1-1, which shows the base boundary within about 100 meters of the east corner of site B. This 100-meter distance is much less than ESQD of 479 meters given on page 4-162. Fig. 2.4.1-1 also shows Alaska Railroad tracks going within about 100 meters of site B and a potential housing site that seems to be within the south corner of site B. Section 4.3.1.6.1.1 should contain a figure showing silo locations with ESQD circles for site B.

The draft EIS states on page 4-173 that the ESQD's for GBI deployment at Grand Forks AFB would fall within the base boundary. However, Fig. 2.4.1-4 shows that parts of the borders of both potential GBI sites are the base boundary. In addition, the south border of the Weapons Storage Area potential GBI site is within about 100 meters of U.S. highway 2 and, within about 300 meters of the west border of this site, is Elsor Ln. and several unidentified structures. Section 4.3.1.6.2.1 should contain figures showing silo locations with ESQD circles for both sites.

On page 4-175, the draft EIS acknowledges that the ESQD's for GBI deployment would exceed the base boundaries on the Missile Site Radar. This seems to be confirmed by Fig. 2.4.1-5 although the explanation key for this figure does not indicate how the ESQD box boundaries are denoted. Section 4.3.1.6.2.2 should contain a figure showing silo locations with ESQD circles for the potential GBI site.

Please send me a copy of the final EIS at the address below.

Michael Jones
Dept. of Physics & Astronomy
Univ. of Hawaii

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Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Dear Mr. Hudson,

I am responding to the publication of announcements of public hearing for the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for deployment of an NMD system in the Washington, DC, area. I have received the 1991-1995 strategic assessments of NMD and have reviewed them. I have also been familiar with the goals of the Strategic Defense Initiative program. I am aware of the issues involved, and as a strategic analyst, I have been involved in the development of strategic alternatives for defense since the冷战 era. I believe that the options available to us are numerous, and we should consider all possible alternatives before making a decision.

The Department of Defense in the years since the end of the Cold War has developed a new strategy in response to the evolving threats. I believe that we need to be aware of the threats and be prepared to respond to them. The Strategic Defense Initiative is designed to provide a layered defense to protect our interests.

I am concerned with the potential for an NMD deployment. I believe that it is important to consider all possible alternatives before making a decision.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
China 'not a threat'

Former President George Bush says China poses no threat to the United States if relations between the two are handled well.

Asked on "Fox News Sunday" if China is a threat, Mr. Bush — who served as ambassador to China in the 1970s — replied with a firm "no."

"It's a threat if we mishandle the relationship, but it's not a threat," Mr. Bush said.

"China is not seeking hegemony. I see no evidence, and I'd like one person who's a critic of China on the Republican right or the Democratic left to tell me why they think they're seeking hegemony," he added.

*Greg Pierce can be reached at 202/636-3285 or by e-mail at pierce@twinmail.com*
November 8, 1999

TOK CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

Main Street Alaska

U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
P.O. Box 1580
Huntsville, AL 35807-1580

REF: Nat'l. Missile Defense sites/Ak. Ft. Greely and/or Clear A.F.B.

To Whom It May Concern:

The Tok Chamber of Commerce would like to take this opportunity to express our support for Missile Defense site to be situated here in Interior Alaska.

We are quite concerned that if said site is located in the lower-48, Alaska and Hawaii are left unprotected, as we understand it. Given our natural resources that could eventually be very important to the lower-48 if it were to come to war, it seems to be the only reasonable site to pick.

We have been told that it will be very expensive, no matter the site, but given the alternative, what choice is there than to build such a system. There is nothing wrong with the old motto, even in this day and age, of "NE PREPARED".

Our membership of thirty-six local businesses strongly urge you to choose Alaska as the site for this program.

Yours truly,

Dale R. Young, Jr.
President

November 9, 1999

Dear Ms. Hudson et al:

I am a concerned citizen of Sandwich, MA who would like to request a full site-specific Environmental Impact Statement for the existing PAVE PAWS at NMR, not limited to the upgrades. Although PAVE PAWS has been in operation 20 years, there has never been enough research on the effects of the microwave radiation output on human health. As you may or may not know, Cape Cod has a very high incidence of cancer and has a growing population. In my view, a full Environmental Impact Statement is a necessity. Please pass this letter to anyone involved in the decision making process for PAVE PAWS. Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Judith Schlebecker

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
November 10, 1999

Ms. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space & Missile Defense Command
Attn: SMDC-EN-V
PO Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807

Dear Ms. Hudson:

Our organization is writing in order to comment on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the National Missile Defense (NMD) program. It is our understanding that the Pentagon will be making a recommendation to the president prior to June 2000 on the early deployment question.

We have the following comments:

1) The NMD system is not needed. There is no realistic threat. The attempt to create fear and hysteria about “rogue” states attacking the U.S. is an empty effort to sell the program to the public. No nation like North Korea or Iraq would attack the U.S. with nuclear weapons knowing full well that the U.S. would overwhelmingly retaliate against their nation.

2) NMD is not about defense. In fact, NMD is a Trojan horse, a way for the Pentagon and aerospace industry to get permission to put weapons into space while making it look like they are “defending” the American people. The U.S. Space Command, in their Vision for 2020, clearly spells out the U.S. intention to “control and dominate” space. At this very moment TRW, Boeing and Lockheed Martin are working on the space-based laser which will be a follow-on technology to NMD giving the U.S. “offensive” weapons in space. NMD is the first step in a return to Star Wars.

3) NMD is a waste of money. The Pentagon has already wasted over $120 billion on Star Wars development and the NMD program will only be more welfare for the aerospace corporations. These hard earned tax dollars of ours need to be used for other human and environmental needs.

4) NMD won’t work. Anyone that truly wanted to attack the U.S. would find much cheaper and more effective means of delivering ways of doing it. Suitcase or car bombs, cruise missiles and the like would not be deterred by NMD. Decoys on missiles or other counter measures would make NMD useless.

5) NMD will violate international treaties. Russia is already strongly reacting to NMD by rightly claiming that deployment of the system will violate the 1972 ABM Treaty. The United Nations passed a resolution on November 1, 1999 calling for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. By a vote of 138-0 (with the U.S. and Israel abstaining) the U.N. clearly showed that international concern is mounting to keep space protected from warfare. The U.N. Outer Space Treaty of 1967 outlaws the movement of war into space.

6) NMD will help to increase space pollution. Just days ago NASA was forced to move the international space station to a higher orbit in order to avoid being hit by a piece of space junk. If we allow the testing and deployment of space weapons systems we will create massive amounts of space junk that will, in the words of Apollo astronaut Edgar Mitchell, “Make it impossible for us to get off the planet”. Space must be viewed as an environment that needs to be protected from excessive contamination. The Pentagon is polluting the next.

7) NMD is destabilizing. In recent days Russia has tested new missiles that they say they will deploy if NMD is approved. India, China and other powers have said they will respond with new offensive systems if the U.S. moves forward with NMD. Thus, we will be creating a new arms race. We wonder if the U.S. is intentionally trying to create this new instability as a rational for deployment of NMD. Either way, NMD deployment is dangerous and insane.

I can assure you that our organization will be working with groups and people all over the world to ensure that we do not put weapons into space. NMD is just the first step in a colossal evil plan to move the arms race into space. This must be resisted. We’ve seen enough warfare on this earth. We do not need to extend this bad seed into space.

In peace,

Bruce K. Gagnon
Coordinator

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
mammals and Essential Fish Habitat (EFH).

Impacts to anadromous fish and EFH in freshwater streams can occur during spawning, incubation and juvenile life stages. Impacts during construction and operation of facilities, or installation of cable across streams can be caused by sedimentation of spawning grounds, removal of riparian vegetation, filling wetlands, altering hydrology, hazardous waste, and stormwater input.

Impacts to marine fish and EFH could be caused by installation of the fiber optic cable. The 2,232 mile long cable installation has the potential to impact shellfish, finfish, nearshore and offshore submerged aquatic vegetation, shellfish beds, and the benthic community. There is a possibility of fishery gear (longline, pot, trawl, etc.) snagging the cable resulting in loss of gear or damage to the cable.

Recommendations

The Affected Environment section did not include anadromous and resident fish occurrence in the site descriptions. This is needed to properly analyze impacts to fisheries from construction, operation of facilities, installing cable and cumulative impacts. Please include complete anadromous fish usage for inland sites in the Affected Environment section. The Environmental Consequences section should include potential impacts to anadromous fish and habitat and avoidance or mitigation measures to avoid these impacts.

To assist in our final review, please incorporate the Essential Fish Habitat (EFH) assessment (submitted to NMFS on May 25, 1999) in the final EIS. The EFH assessment section should be clearly labeled. Please expand the document to include potential affects to anadromous fish in freshwater habitats, and mitigation measures, as noted in the above paragraph. The mitigation section for marine waters should also be expanded before we make our final recommendations.

Preliminary bottom survey results and potential routes should be shared and discussed with NMFS and the North Pacific Fisheries Management Council. Placement of the cable should avoid to the greatest extent practicable, sensitive habitat areas such as submerged aquatic vegetation and seafloor beds.

In order to determine what habitats the cable is crossing and assess the effect upon those habitats, NMFS recommends the cable laying operation is filmed at the point of cable contact, or plow insertion at the bottom substrate. In order to identify species of flora and/or fauna the camera should record color pictures, have enough light to discern details, and be aimed so that items in front of the plow can be identified. The video should be recorded with the time, depth and location burned into a corner of the film. A copy of the video should be sent to NMFS. The information will be useful in determining habitats affected and potential impacts for the second redundant line, if installed.

Mitigation for fishing activities should include timing to avoid areas where fishing openers are occurring. Coordination should be done with the North Pacific Fisheries Council.

In order to minimize impacts to nearshore habitat, cable landfalls should be directionally bored.

Avoiding trenching in beach fringes, intertidal, and subtidal zones. The exact boring distance would be determined by a site specific survey when final locations are determined.

In order to minimize impacts to stream and riparian areas, cable crossings across anadromous streams should be directionally bored, with no surface disturbance within 100 feet of ordinary high water on each side of the stream.

Page 3-49, Paragraph 4
Kelp and eelgrass. Please add: Eelgrass beds also provide food and rearing habitat for juvenile groundfish and salmon.

Page 3-79, Paragraph 3
Add: Essential Fish Habitat (EFH) includes all life history stages of each managed species and includes those waters and substrate necessary to fish for spawning, breeding, feeding, or growth to maturity.

Page 3-103, Paragraph 4
Please replace the paragraph with the following:

There are five stocks of beluga whales in Alaska. Of these, four are western Bering Sea stocks and one is the Cook Inlet stock. The Cook Inlet stock is distributed throughout upper Cook Inlet in the spring and summer and is thought to be distributed in lower Cook Inlet and on the northern Gulf of Alaska during the fall and winter.

The Cook Inlet beluga whale stock is presently listed as a candidate species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). On March 3, 1999, NMFS was petitioned under the ESA to list the Cook Inlet beluga whale stock as endangered. NMFS will issue an ESA determination by April 2000. On October 19, 1999, NMFS proposed to designate the Cook Inlet beluga whale stock as depleted under the Marine Mammal Protection Act. The four beluga whale stocks in the Bering Sea are neither listed under the ESA nor being reviewed to be designated as a depleted, threatened, or endangered species.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment. We look forward to working with you as the project progresses. Please contact Daniel J. Vos of the NMFS staff at 907-271-1006 if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Jeanne L. Hanson
Field Office Supervisor
Habitat Conservation Division

cc: USFWS, EPA, ADGC, ADFG, ADEC - Anchorage
    ADEC, ADFG, USFWS - Fairbanks
    Applicant

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Written Comment on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement on National Missile Defense Deployment  
November 12, 1999

President Clinton has announced he will decide whether to deploy a national missile defense in June or July 2000. According to the President, that decision will be based on four factors: the readiness of the technology, the impact on arms control and relations with Russia, the cost effectiveness, and the threat. On each of these counts, the case for deployment is weak at best.

1. The technology is unproven, and cannot be shown to be reliable or effective by next summer’s scheduled decision.

2. Unless Russia agrees to modify it, deployment would violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, a move that could unravel the entire nuclear non-proliferation regime and substantially increase the nuclear threat to the United States.

3. The cost of the system is unclear and likely to spiral upwards far beyond the $10.5 billion the Clinton Administration has budgeted over the next five years. The system cannot be shown to be effective and reliable under the current budget and deployment schedule.

4. The low-risk threat cited as justification for deployment, particularly North Korea’s small and untested long-range missile arsenal, does not warrant the damage U.S. missile defense would wreak on relations with Russia and China.

Each of these factors is reviewed below in more detail.

1. The readiness of the technology: Unproven by next summer, and by 2005

By next June, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization will have conducted only three intercept tests of the proposed national missile defense system. Nineteen such tests are scheduled before the first limited system is scheduled to go online, in late 2005. The first intercept attempt, on October 2, hit its target. However, this was only a test of the “kill vehicle,” the last component that destroys the incoming warhead. The booster rocket, the radars, and the integrated management system were not tested. In fact, only one of the first three tests will involve the complete system, and all three will use surrogate parts, not the actual components.

So few tests cannot show the system to be reliable and effective by next summer’s scheduled deployment decision. Even by 2005, when the system is scheduled to finish its initial deployment, the additional tests cannot prove this highly complex system to be reliable against real-world threats. For example, the Patriot, adopted from an anti-aircraft missile system, achieved a perfect test record, hitting its target in all 17 of its intercept attempts. However, when used in the field during the Gulf War, it failed dramatically.

2. The effect on arms control: Increasing nuclear dangers

The Clinton Administration is currently discussing with Russia modifications to the ABM Treaty that would allow the U.S. to deploy a “limited” national missile defense. Both Clinton Administration and Russian officials have repeatedly stated that the ABM Treaty remains the “cornerstone of strategic stability.” To date, Russia has opposed all changes to the ABM Treaty and declared that U.S. withdrawal from it or insistence on changes would end the START process that is reducing strategic nuclear arsenals. This would leave Russia with 6,000 warheads that could hit the United States, many ready for launch within 15 minutes of a decision to attack. China already perceives that U.S. efforts to build a missile defense are intended to weaken the Chinese deterrence. China’s current arsenal is around 20 long-range, single warhead missiles. However, it is in a slow modernization program to build longer-range missiles with multiple warheads. China would likely react to U.S. deployment of a missile defense by increasing the number of its arsenals and the pace of its improvements. Evidence of China’s response to U.S. talk of abrogating the ABM Treaty is already developing, with Reuters reporting on October 25 that China recently added $9.7 billion to its defense budget to improve its nuclear arsenal.

3. Cost Effectiveness: Unsubstantiated

In January 1999, the Clinton Administration added $6.6 billion for procurement to its five-year plans for national missile defense, creating a $10.5 billion total budget. However, most estimates expect even the small initial system envisioned in that budget would cost far more. The General Accounting Office estimated that it would cost $18 to $28 billion to deploy a small system. This merely adds to the over $60 billion spent since President Ronald Reagan launched his Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983, money that has not led to the deployment of a single effective system. It will take far more testing, and substantially increased budgets, to deploy a system that can be shown to be reliable and effective.

4. The Threat: Does not warrant rushed early deployment

The proposed national missile defense system is being developed in an attempt to respond to the potential threat from a so-called rogue states, specifically North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. North Korea, which has of these three by far the most advanced capability, recently agreed to halt its missile flight test program while negotiating with the United States. It has not tested a missile capable of hitting the United States with a nuclear warhead.

On Iran, experts are divided on whether it will be able to field a missile that could threaten the U.S. within the next decade, Iran is under severe international sanctions that effectively hinder it from developing any new missiles. Neither country would be able to field an intercontinental missile if the decision to deploy is delayed until the missile defense technology is shown to be effective.

Conclusion

Postponing the decision to deploy a national missile defense is an extremely low-risk course of action. Put simply, deploying a national missile defense MAY slightly reduce the low risk of a catastrophic attack on the U.S. carried out by a very few nuclear-armed missiles. That is true IF it proves capable of effectively intercepting incoming warheads. However, it WILL increase the risk of massive attack carried out with hundreds or thousands of such missiles that will destroy the United States entirely, along with much of the globe.

Position Support

The following organizations are strongly opposed to the proposed deployment of a national missile defense and therefore submit these comments jointly.

Jeffrey R. Richardson  
Executive Director  
Alaska Center for the Environment

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**Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)**
Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)

Pamela Miller  
Program Director  
Alaska Community Action on Toxics

Jenifer Ellington  
Director  
DC Statehood Green Party

Alice Slater  
Executive Director  
Global Resource Action Center for the Environment (GRACE)

John Burnoughs  
Executive Director  
Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy

James E. Vann  
Co-Chair of National Committee for Independent Political Action  
Oakland Tenants Union

Kathy Thornton, RSM  
National Coordinator  
NETWORK, A National Catholic Social Justice Lobby

Gordon Clark  
Executive Director  
Peace Action

Mavis Belside  
Director  
The Peace Farm

Marion Hancock  
Coordinator  
The Peace Foundation, New Zealand

Carol Jahnow  
Executive Director  
Peace Resource Center of San Diego

Robert K. Musil, Ph.D.  
Executive Director  
Physicians for Social Responsibility

Jonathan Parfrey  
Executive Director  
Physicians for Social Responsibility - Los Angeles

James K. Wyerman  
Executive Director  
20/20 Vision

Lee Vander Laan  
Executive Director  
Veterans for Peace

Jacqueline Cabasso  
Executive Director  
Western States Legal Foundation

Susan Shier  
Executive Director  
Women's Action for New Directions

Megan Hutching  
National Secretary  
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Aotearoa

Edith Villarino  
National Legislative Director  
Women's Strike for Peace

For questions regarding this group statement, please contact Stephen Young of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers or Jean Wade of the Disarmament Clearinghouse.
November 8, 1999

U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
PO Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807
Attn: Ms. Julia Hudson

Dear Ms. Hudson,

At a recent meeting in Delta Junction your organization was seeking public input into their draft environmental impact statement. I did not speak at that meeting but did submit a written comment. It is my wish to expand on that comment. Please understand that this is my opinion as an individual.

While I support our governments placing a missile defense system on the site at Ft. Greely I do have grave concerns. Chief among them is your organization's continuing position that a prison re-use is compatible with also placing a missile defense base here. Were the projects ten years apart they could be possible. Coming as they will within two years of each other our community cannot bear the influx of that number of people and their needs. The prison footprint contains many of the recreational facilities that support the current base population. Those businesses may be duplicated downtown in time. That will not help the prison construction crews, prison employees, or any of your people. While Delta has been a great place to live I do not feel myself that we are short in some areas. They are:

1. Housing—even utilizing base housing with both projects there will simply not be enough housing.
2. Educational facilities—both projects will tax or over tax existing facilities.
3. Medical—have a very small clinic here that handles local medical needs and needs from as far away as Tikc. Again a system that will be over taxed.
4. Recreational—Without the prison footprint our community boasts no theatre, bowling alley, wood shop, or frame shop. We do have a very small workforce salon and a library.

I realize that a decision will not be made on the final deployment of this system until next June/July. It would help our community greatly if you could do two things. One would be to commit to building the missile site at Ft. Greely as soon as possible. The other would be to immediately take the clear and reasonable position that a prison re-use is just NOT compatible with the missile defense site. Our community is being torn apart by divisive factions and uncertainty. Thank you for your attention.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Diane Kasile Ferrar

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Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
November 10, 1999

SMDC EN-V, Ms. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
P.O. Box 1500
Huntsville, Alabama 35807-3801

Dear Ms. Hudson:

We wholeheartedly support the development of a national missile deployment system for the United States and would welcome such a site within Alaska. Additionally, we at the Alaska Railroad are prepared to provide whatever support we can to achieve this goal.

The purpose of this letter is two-fold. The first is to respond to the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) regarding the National Missile Defense Deployment and the second is to provide background on the capabilities of the Alaska Railroad.

I would like to correct the record as it relates to Chapter 3.12, Transportation, in the draft EIS. The map on page 3-351, Figure 3.12-1 does not show the Alaska Railroad rail line extension from Fairbanks to Eielson AFB. The rail line was constructed in the 1940’s for the specific purpose of providing logistical support of transporting materials and equipment for that military installation. The Railroad has been providing the transportation of coal for power generation and heat to Eielson AFB since the extension of the line.

In the Conference Report for Appropriations for the Defense Department which was passed by Congress this past October 1999 (copy attached), a provision was included which directs the Corps of Engineers to study the feasibility of realigning that portion of the rail line from Fairbanks to North Pole to improve the overall safety and efficiency of the rail corridor. Should that realignment occur, it would eliminate 25 rail/highway crossings.

As to the background of the Alaska Railroad, it was constructed by the U.S. Government in the early 1900’s and is now owned by the State of Alaska. It is operated as an independent corporation, managed by a seven member Board of Directors, appointed by the Governor of Alaska. We operate year round freight and passenger services and have rail right of way onto the properties of Clear AFB, Fort Wainwright and Eielson AFB within the interior of Alaska, in addition to rail access onto Elmendorf AFB and Fort Richardson in Anchorage. We own and operate two deep water, ice free ports year round in both Seward and Whittier. Freight from the lower 48 states is transported via rail barge from Seattle and Prince Rupert, B.C. and off-loaded at our port in Whittier.

The Alaska Railroad has a long history of providing support to the Department of Defense for military logistics. During WW II, the Department of Defense assumed control and operation of the Alaska Railroad for the war effort. The Railroad owns and operates the major transportation corridor through the major population centers of Alaska which extends from the Ports of Seward and Whittier in south central Alaska through the city of Anchorage and the military bases of Elmendorf and Fort Richardson to the interior of the State connecting the military installations of Clear AFB, near Nenana and Fort Wainwright in Fairbanks and Eielson AFB in North Pole.

Should the Department of Defense choose Fort Greely as a missile deployment site, extension of the rail line from Eielson AFB to that site would be approximately 80 miles. Extension of a rail line to Fort Greely would provide additional transportation options to the military for movement of equipment and materials and ultimately enhance military logistics. Refined fuel products from the Williams North Pole Refinery and military equipment and materials could be shipped directly to the site via rail line.

Additionally, fiber optic cable traverses our entire rail corridor from Fairbanks to Seward and connects with the submarine cable to the lower 48 states and the Orient. Extension of the fiber optic line along the rail route to a site at Fort Greely could also be accomplished.

The Railroad continues to provide logistical support to the military on a routine basis by moving equipment and materials for military exercises on a regular basis. In addition, we have been providing the transportation of coal to Clear AFB, Eielson AFB and Fort Wainwright for a number of years.

Other benefits for a missile site in Alaska would improve the economic stability of some of these smaller cities and spur resource development for those areas that have large mineral deposits.

We appreciate the opportunity to respond and if additional information is required or you have questions relating to the information I have provided on the Railroad, please do not hesitate to contact me directly. I can be reached at 907/265-2403.

Sincerely,

Governor Bill Sheffield
President & Chief Executive Officer

Enclosure
Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
November 14, 1999

Ms. Julia Hudson
SMDC - EN - V
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
P.O. Box 1940
Huntsville, Alabama 35807-3801
356-495-4927 fax 955-5074

Re: National Missile Defense Draft V1

Dear Ms. Hudson,

As a resident of Kodiak, I am concerned over the limited reference given to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 in the NMD DEIS. Using one of the largest islands in the United States has meant that Kodiak has always had a maritime culture and economy. Various commercial fisheries have been both positive and negative impacts from commercial fishing in the Russian Far East.

Positive impacts have been characterized by lesser catches, (early 1990's) or access to Russian fishing grounds by Kodiak fishing vessels. These arrangements have been venomous at best.

Negative impacts although mainly from Russian crab and salmon being dumped on Japanese markets that Kodiak is highly dependent on.

Given the present discomfort that the Russian government has been expressing over the NMD impacts to the 1972 ABM, I think that it's important to say that the NMD can easily have measurable negative impacts on the Kodiak economy. These could be either from punitive policies from the Russian government, or from unintentional impacts from commerce going elsewhere. ECONOMIC IMPACTS TO COASTAL ALASKA DUE TO NMD DEPLOYMENT OVER THE 1972 ABM TREATY LIMIT TO AN INCREASE IN THE DEBT IN.

I also feel that the strategic importance of Alaskan communities such as Kodiak, which has a primary supply of crab for the Northern Pacific Theatre, goes up two with the dismantling of the 1972 ABM Treaty. I would defer, at this time, to your judgement as to whether or not the NMD should address such complicated issues.

I must convey to you that the document is very readable, and easy to use even for a layperson such as myself. I also appreciate the speed with which the document was sent to me.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment.

Sincerely,

Mike Milligan

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Ms. Julia Hudson SMDC - EN - V  
November 15, 1999  
Page 2

Military and Veterans Affairs has substantially increased manpower investments in National Missile Defense planning as well as coordination with state and federal agencies.

General Oates has assigned his Senior Army Advisor, Colonel Scott Marcy, to be his lead planner to integrate Department of Defense and U.S. Army National Missile Defense programs for Alaska. This will help to maintain awareness for Alaska and to provide the Alaska perspective on development, deployment, and operational matters.

Finally, I applaud your outreach efforts and urge your continued dialogue. I think your NMD program office and the Corps of Engineers Alaska District for exercising Alaska preferences in full force, and planning recent business opportunity fairs in Anchorage and Fairbanks. This event gave potential Alaska contractors a chance to meet with the lead systems integrator and major contractors to look at the requirements and timelines to bid work.

I am enclosing technical comments from our state agencies for your use in developing a Final National Environmental Policy Act document. Thank you again for this opportunity for Alaska to comment. Please contact Project Analyst Rex Blauer of the Division of Governmental Coordination (907) 465-8791 or Adjutant General Oates at (907) 428-6903, if we may be of any further assistance as this project develops.

Sincerely,

Tony Knowles  
Governor

Encl.

cc: The Honorable Ted Stevens, U.S. Senate  
The Honorable Frank Murkowski, U.S. Senate  
The Honorable Don Young, U.S. House of Representatives  
Michele Brown, Commissioner, Department of Environmental Conservation  
Adjutant General Phillip E. Oates, Department of Military and Veterans Affairs  
Joseph Perkins, Commissioner, Dept of Transportation and Public Facilities  
Frank Rose, Commissioner, Department of Fish and Game  
Deborah Sedwick, Commissioner, Dept of Community and Economic Development  
John Shively, Commissioner, Department of Natural Resources

November 15, 1999

Ms. Julia Hudson SMDC - EN - V  
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command  
106 Wynn Drive  
Huntsville AL 35805

SUBJECT: STATE OF ALASKA TECHNICAL COMMENTS - NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM DEPLOYMENT DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

Dear Ms. Hudson:

The Office of the Governor, Division of Governmental Coordination (DGC) is currently coordinating the State's review of your Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for potential future deployment of a National Missile Defense System (NMD) in Alaska.

On January 15, 1999, we submitted scoping comments to you which included information on potential State of Alaska permitting requirements for the NMD system. We wish to reiterate the information in that letter and incorporate it by reference herein.

Except for a brief statement in Appendix G (Consistency Determination required by ACPM), the DEIS does not include a section regarding permits required by State agencies. In the FEIS, we suggest the use of a table or figure that depicts the types of State of Alaska permits needed by agency and the project timetable for the activity to which the authorization applies.

In addition, DGC has developed the following additional technical clarifications and comments based on comments from various State agencies as indicated:

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Alaska Coastal Management Program/Coastal Zone Management Act

Activities and associated State approvals for sites within Alaska's coastal zone would also be reviewed according to state procedures for consistency with the Coastal Zone Management Act/Alaska Coastal Management Program (ACMP). In particular, NMD elements at Eurekson Air Station on Shemya Island, and the location of redundant fiber-optic cable lines - both on- and off-shore within the coastal zone - will require separate consistency review coordinated through this office. We are working with your office to determine whether sufficient information for these consistency reviews will be available to include full documentation in the final NEPA document, or in a subsequent stand-alone document. We anticipate conducting those reviews as more site-specific information becomes available.

Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation

To reiterate scoping comments, the following DEC authorizations may be required:

1. Coordination in any contaminated site clean-up
2. Air Quality construction permit
3. Air Quality operating permits Storm Water General Permit
4. Engineered plans must be reviewed and approved for waste water disposal system
5. Dewatering of the site during construction requires authorization under a statewide general permit
6. Disposal of solid waste (municipal, industrial, construction or demolition) may require either a general or site specific permit
7. Engineered plans must be reviewed and approved for drinking water systems
8. Food service permit
9. Installation of underground fuel storage tanks requires Department notification, registration, and installation by a certified tank installer
10. An oil discharge contingency plan (AS 46.04.030) and proof of financial responsibility (AS 46.04.040) is required for storage of more than 10,000 barrels
11. An oil storage facility of more than 10,000 barrels is required to meet federal SPCC requirements

Alaska Department of Natural Resources

The DEIS confirms that the major NMD facility sites are all on federal land and do not require land leases from the State. Siting of ancillary and support activities, including remote data terminal sites, fiber optic communications/data cables, and possibly, gravel sources for site and access route construction, have not yet been determined by DOD. Any of these facilities proposed to be located on state land would require DNR authorization. In scoping, we informed you that DNR would process rights-of-way, leases, or materials sale contracts, as applicable, for these various activities. To clarify the information provided in the scoping letter, please note the following information:

Materials contracts would be processed for gravel sites. Rights-of-way would be processed when DOD requires a right to cross state land but a full ownership interest in the land is not necessary. When something more than a revocable Right-of-Way permit is needed, DNR would process a lease application from DOD to dispose of state interest to DOD. While both Rights-of-Way and lease disposals are subject to public notice, comment and review, a disposal would require a more specific determination process. DOD may wish to consider this when evaluating sites for ancillary facilities, land management interests, and permitting/construction schedules.

Additionally, any proposed use of state water will require either a Temporary Water Use Permit or a Water Right depending on the volume and duration of the proposed water use.

Alaska Department of Fish and Game

1. If additional fiber optic cable line is necessary on the mainland of Alaska, Fish Habitat Permits from the Alaska Department of Fish and Game (PDFG) may be required. A review of the proposed route of that aspect of the project will determine if Fish Habitat Permits are needed. Directional drilling may be requested if the proposed route involves crossing anadromous fish streams.

2. In Section 3.4 BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES, 3.4.1 Alaska installations 3.4.1.1 Clear AS - Biological Resources. Wildlife. The ADF&G would like to see the following sentence added and noted in this section: The Nenana River, which runs the entire length of the western boundary of Clear AS, is a designated anadromous fish streams Chinook Salmon, and Coho Salmon, as well as many species of resident fish such as catfish.

3. Subsistence: The ADF&G Subsistence Division generally concurs with this DEIS assessment that the project will not significantly impact subsistence uses in the affected geographic areas. The Division recommends that Department of Defense work with the division to fully inform affected subsistence communities - on an ongoing basis - about activities associated with this project that might occur nearby, or in areas communities

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
### NMD DEIS

#### November 15, 1999

**4**

Use for harvesting resources. We also recommend that the descriptive sections on subsistence in Volume I be rewritten to more accurately portray historic subsistence patterns among the interior Athabaskans along the middle and lower Tanana River. Specifically, DFG recommends the following clarifications for the Subsistence Section of the DEIS:

**Volume I**

Page 3-427, Subsistence 2nd paragraph: In order to be factually accurate, the second sentence should be rewritten to read, "However, in 1989, the Alaska Supreme Court ruled that the rural preference in state statute was unconstitutional." The fourth sentence should specify that subsistence hunting on federal public lands under the federal subsistence regulations is permitted in the two places noted.

Pages 3-427 to 3-428, Subsistence Areas: This brief section should be more specific in order to accurately portray the historical subsistence economies of Athabaskan Indians who resided near what is now the Clear Air Station, Eielson Air Force Base, the Yukon Training Area, and Fort Greely.

Page 3-429, Eielson AFB: The meaning of the first sentence of this section is unclear. What was eliminated by historic development in the region? Did you mean development of the Chena Band or of its historic range? This statement also appears in Section 3.16.3, Yukon Training Area. Also, to whom are the fishing, hunting, and trapping permits issued that are listed in the second paragraph?

Page 3-430, Fort Greely: If "the native village of Dot Lake" is going to be described, first paragraph on this page should also acknowledge the other Dot Lake community that consists primarily of non-Native households living nearby along the Alaska Highway.

The final sentence of the third paragraph states that "employment opportunities in and around the Fort Greely area seems to infer that "those communities" have little dependence on subsistence harvesting. To which communities is reference being made?

**Volume 2**

Sections 4.2.15, 4.3.1.14, 4.3.3.11, and 4.3.4.15. Environmental Consequences: Subsistence.

Some reviewers might question whether mere reference to ANILCA Section 810 evaluations for the same or similar geographic locations in other military EIS documents is sufficient, or if more detailed analyses should be presented in this plan.

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**Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)**
Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
various means of risk reductions and the interaction between the risks of WMD use if the United States makes a decision to deploy NMD.

If a PEIS is not done, then the comments made should, at a minimum be incorporated into this EIS process. Since this Draft EIS is so fundamentally incomplete, it would be preferable to discard it and begin over. This new draft should include alternatives to NMD EIS as well as environmental and health risks that have not been considered in the current Draft EIS. Since several crucial alternatives and many important risks have not been discussed, the present Draft EIS cannot be modified to produce a Final EIS and ROE which the public had a reasonable chance of reviewing the relevant alternatives, risks, and impacts.

Detailed Comments and Recommendations

1. The Draft NMD EIS is premature

This Draft EIS is premature because it must first be preceded by a PEIS on NMD risks and various approaches to addressing them. The Draft EIS on NMD deployment cannot properly address the environmental impacts outside of that framework. Even a small increase in the probability of an attack using weapons of mass destruction by non-missile means of delivery resulting from NMD deployment could cause a huge increase in the estimate of potential damage and hence risk to the United States. Therefore, an NMD EIS cannot properly assess the environmental consequences of a decision to deploy NMD outside that context. A PEIS on ways to address risks from weapons of mass destruction is therefore needed. (We call this WMD PEIS for short in these comments.) The WMD PEIS would address the relative impact of and interactions between various ways of addressing WMD risks.

Many different increases in risk of deviation by weapons of mass destruction need to be analyzed before the specific issues in the Draft EIS become relevant. For instance, the deployment of NMD may make it more likely that a potential attacker might use a ship or truck for an attack. The National Intelligence Council considers this type of attack to be less difficult than one using missiles:

"Although non-missile means of delivering WMD do not provide the same prestige or degree of deterrence and coercive diplomacy associated with an ICBM, such options are of significant concern. Countries that deploy new delivery options might use them to make an attack more likely.

"Are less expensive than developing and producing ICBMs."

"Can be more effective than existing ICBMs that have not completed rigorous testing and validation programs.

"Probability would be more accurate than assessing ICBMs over the next 15 years."

"Probability would be more accurate than assessing biological warfare agents than a ballistic missile.

As a second example, there are sufficient grounds to believe that a NMD may create a new arms race with China and/or Russia (see Section 3 below on US strategic posture and NMD). Such a response from China and/or Russia may in turn trigger a counter response from the United States. Therefore, a static assessment of a NMD deployment of the type carried out in the Draft EIS is clearly insufficient to characterize the environmental risks both from added production and deployment as well as from increased risk of possible use arising from increasing tensions. A WMD PEIS that

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Evaluates the net changes in vulnerability of the US public to harm as a result of a decision to deploy NMD is needed. Specifically, the risks to the United States posed by increasing Russian-Chinese military cooperation precipitated by a decision to deploy NMD should be analyzed.

Three categories of potential harm need to be examined in a WMD PEIS:

- The environmental impacts on the United States arising from the production and testing aspects of a renewed arms race with Russia and/or China that may be triggered by a NMD deployment;
- The net change in risk of a nuclear war by accident or miscalculation arising from responses to a US NMD deployment (including possible cancellation of arms reduction programs and other US-Russian and US-Chinese cooperation and possible increases in Russian-Chinese cooperation);
- The net change in threats between different categories of weapons of mass destruction and different means of their delivery as a result of a decision to deploy NMD.

Recommendation: The Draft EIS should be shelved as premature until a thorough WMD PEIS is completed. Such a PEIS should assess the various threats of weapons of mass destruction faced by the United States and the potential various alternative preventive, defensive, and risk reduction responses that are possible. A WMD PEIS should also consider the effect of one type of action on other risks. In view of the interaction between threats, risks, and the measures of defense that might be taken, EIS's in specific areas should be undertaken only when a WMD PEIS is complete and a Record of Decision on the WMD PEIS has been published. If a WMD PEIS is not done, a new Draft EIS that includes the various critical environmental risks discussed above (and below) should be prepared for public comment.

2. The Draft EIS does not consider the plausible alternatives to NMD deployment

The Draft EIS considers only NMD deployment and a "no action" alternative. This does not represent the full range of alternatives of dealing with WMD threats from states or non-state parties that now have few (if any) such weapons and are the main unannounced users for NMD deployment. The NATO-Yugoslavia conflict of 1999 showed that it is possible to destroy a large range of targets with non-nuclear precision-guided munitions. This Draft EIS has not considered whether this alternative would be more or less harmful than NMD deployment. Of course, this alternative would carry its own risks, such as those arising from dispersal of nuclear, biological, or chemical agents, if attempts were made to destroy manufacturing facilities or the weapons themselves (as distinct from the delivery systems).

Another alternative to NMD deployment is the internationalization of preventive diplomacy through implementation of existing treaties, notably the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Article VI of the NPT, as interpreted by the World Court, requires the nuclear weapons states to negotiate and carry out complete nuclear disarmament in all its aspects. Some of those aspects would be:

- Extensive and intensive verification, including internationally mandated inspections of sites suspected of manufacturing weapons of mass destruction or their delivery systems;
- Actions to destroy WMD, including systems for their delivery, such as those undertaken during the 1991-92 United Nations inspections of Iraq.

Global cooperation on a process of complete nuclear disarmament would make cheating and evasion much more difficult, reducing risks of attack and the consequences should one be carried out. It would deepen international cooperation to detect cheating and to find and destroy WMD systems made or deployed in violation of international agreements. For instance, implementation of complete nuclear disarmament, required by Article VI of the NPT, could be completed within a 15-year period. While there are also other possible routes to nuclear disarmament, a 15-year disarmament scenario would be a useful frame of reference for analyzing plausible alternatives to NMD deployment, given the National Intelligence Council's analysis of missile and non-missile threats quoted above. A disarmament approach would allow more intensive and thorough use of multilateral means of prevention and of destruction of clandestine WMD stocks (as was demonstrated during the 1991-92 UN inspections of Iraq).

Moreover, given the likely adverse reaction of Russia and/or China and possibly other powers, a US decision to deploy NMD is likely to result in making nuclear disarmament impossible for the foreseeable future. Hence, the nuclear disarmament alternative and the NMD deployment alternative may be mutually exclusive and must both be considered in any reasonable environmental evaluation of risk.

A third alternative to NMD deployment would be to strengthen safeguards in the absence of a specific path to nuclear disarmament. For instance, this could involve safeguards agreements and procedures outside of the framework of the NPT but inside that of the UN Security Council. The United Nations inspections and destruction of WMD stocks in Iraq during 1991-98 and the US agreement with North Korea illustrate this alternative. The relative efficiency and environmental impact of this approach to safeguards compared to a disarmament approach should be assessed.

Recommendation:

At least three alternatives to an effectiveness of NMD deployment in whether the US public and the environment should be assessed in the EIS and compared for their overall environmental impact with NMD deployment and the no-action alternative. They are:

- Unilateral or multilateral use of non-nuclear precision guided munitions for destruction or delivery systems of weapons of mass destruction (and/or the weapons themselves);
• preventive measures, notably implementation of universal disarmament for weapons of mass destruction, accompanied by a regime of inspections and multilateral action for destruction of stocks of WMD and their delivery systems.
• strengthened safeguards, inspection and destruction of clandestine WMD stocks outside of the context of nuclear disarmament.

3. The Draft EIS does not consider the potential Impact of NMD deployment on the US-North Korean agreement

The US-North Korean agreement currently being implemented puts restraints on North Korean missile development and prohibits North Korean nuclear weapons development. It provides for on-site inspections. This agreement has the support of other regional powers, including China. The impact of NMD deployment on the North Korean agreement should be assessed in the EIS. Specifically, the assessment should include the increase in risk from further indigenous North Korean missile development and from possible Chinese assistance to North Korea due to breakdown of US-Chinese cooperation.

Recommendation:
The EIS should fully evaluate the potential increase in risk from North Korean missiles resulting from NMD deployment and the potential effect of that increase on the size and scope of the NMD system.

4. The Draft EIS does not consider the environmental impact of NMD deployment relative to political-legal timing of the decision

The environmental impact and risks of a US decision to deploy NMD are likely to depend greatly on the timing of that decision. The various timing possibilities in relation to US treaty obligations are:
• Before or after agreement with Russia on changes to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
• Before or after agreement with European NATO allies about NMD deployment
• Before or after implementation of the nuclear disarmament clause of the NPT which requires complete nuclear disarmament.

The most severe increase in the risk of nuclear war, as well as impacts of a new arms race, are likely to occur if there is a deployment prior to agreement with Russia regarding the modification of the ABM Treaty. These increases in risk would not only come from Russian or Chinese responses, but could also involve a range of European actions. For instance, it is possible that Germany might decide to increase nuclear weapons capability due to the lower relative security for Europe implied by an NMD

5. The Draft EIS does not consider the impact of NMD deployment on US Strategic Posture

The United States strategic posture includes the option of using nuclear weapons first. The current US strategic arsenal is generally configured in capable of a counterforce attack. Much of it can be launched within a few minutes of the order to do so. A first-strike counterforce attack would have a greater possibility of success, and would be viewed as having a greater possibility of success, if the attacker possessed an NMD system to destroy the remainder of the adversary's missiles after launch. Since the effectiveness of NMD systems increases as the number of an adversary's nuclear missiles and warheads decreases, potential adversaries are likely to consider NMD deployment as an

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
offensive weapon so long as there is not complete and verified nuclear disarmament or at least complete and verified removal of all warheads from their delivery systems.

The risks of an arms race in the context of NMD deployment depend on the strategic posture of the United States and the verifiability of that posture by other nuclear weapons states. For instance, if all nuclear weapons were de-alerted by removing the warheads from their delivery systems and storing them under multilateral monitoring, the risks of deployment would be different than those technically inherent in a first strike or launch on warning posture.

Recommendation:
The EIS should evaluate the risks of a decision to deploy NMD in the context of a first strike or launch-on-warning posture compared to a state of complete nuclear disarmament or a posture in which complete verified multilateral de-alerting has been carried out by removing all warheads from their delivery systems.

6. The Draft EIS does not consider the timing of the NMD deployment decision in relation to technical maturity of the system

The NMD system is currently under development. For instance, actual tests of the booster and kill vehicle together are not due to take place until about 2003. The Draft EIS acknowledges that technical maturity will be a factor in decision-making. But it does not take into account the fact that a decision to deploy prematurely could have far different environmental impacts than a decision to deploy a system that has been thoroughly tested. In the former case, there may be increased risks from:

- larger environmental impacts from testing and production and possibly deployment activities, since manufactured or deployed devices may have to be discarded or modified;
- potentially larger risks of attack by both missile and non-missile means;
- all the arms race penalties and other political and military risks discussed above without the anticipated benefits claimed for the NMD.

Recommendation:
Given the problems in development recently cited by the Pentagon’s independent panel as well as by many other analysts, the large differential environmental and risk impact of the timing of a decision to deploy in relation to various degrees of technical maturity of the program should be carefully analyzed in the Draft EIS.

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NRDC is a national non-profit membership environmental organization with offices in Washington, D.C., New York City, San Francisco and Los Angeles. NRDC has a nationwide membership of over 400,000 individuals. NRDC’s activities include maintaining and enhancing environmental quality and monitoring federal agency actions to ensure that federal statutes enacted to protect human health and the environment are fully and properly implemented. Since its inception in 1970, NRDC has sought to improve the environmental, health, and safety conditions at and surrounding Defense Department sites and nuclear facilities operated by the Department of Energy (DOE) and commercial nuclear facilities licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and their predecessor agencies.

The DEIS Does Not Evaluate All Reasonable Alternatives for the NMD Program

Given that consideration and comparison of reasonable alternatives constitutes the very heart of the EIS process, the failure of this DEIS to consider any - much less "all reasonable" - alternatives for meeting the purpose and need for the proposed action must be considered a crippling deficiency that must remedied. This failure is all the more apparent given that the broad stated purpose of the National Missile Defense Program - "defense of the United States against a threat of a limited strategic ballistic missile attack from a rogue nation" - could reasonably be accomplished by deployment of a variety of defense technologies in a variety of system configurations, ranging from cooperative monitoring to ensure non-deployment of a...
Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
II. The DEIS Fails to Provide Meaningful Comparisons Between the Prospective Environmental Impacts of Reasonable Alternative Configurations for Ground-Based NMD System Deployment, and Therefore Fails to Identify the System Configuration(s) with the Least Environmental Impacts.

The DEIS generally analyzes the various environmental, socioeconomic, and cultural resource issues for each land under consideration for deployment of 100 Ground-Based Interceptors ("GBI"), a Battle Management, Command and Control Center ("BMCC"), and an X-Band radar installation. However, the DEIS fails (1) to provide any kind of useful comparative assessment of the relative environmental strengths or weaknesses of these sites to support their assigned functions with minimal environmental impacts; (2) to identify, much less analyze, the aggregate and cumulative environmental impacts arising from the siting and operation of 14 or more In-flight Interceptor Communication System ("IFICS") Data Terminals; (3) to identify adequately the impacts from the land withdrawals and routing of thousands of kilometers of fiber optic cable; and (4) to compare the full range of reasonable deployment configurations to permit identification of those with the least environmental impacts. In other words, the DEIS does not do what an EIS is required to do by law: provide meaningful and timely input into the government’s decision-making process such that the agency proposing the action can identify alternatives for achieving its mission that minimize harmful impacts on the human environment.

Except for general air quality data, very little hard data are provided in the DEIS that would permit this type of relative assessment. Most impacts are described in a narrative form, which makes such relative assessments very cumbersome, and the one tabulation of impacts provided, Table 2.7, is largely narrative in structure as well. The DEIS should contain tables that describe the different environmental impacts in quantitative terms, including effects on air quality, acreage and types of wetlands impacted, area of land that will be disturbed, impacts on local population, number and populations of endangered or threatened species potentially affected, number of historic sites altered, quantity of hazardous materials and solid wastes that will be stored and/or disposed of at the site, water resource demands, and major risks and critical groups associated with each facility. This individual site data must then be assembled into various technically and fiscally achievable (and therefore "reasonable") system deployment configurations to identify the environmentally preferable deployment alternatives.

Without more quantitative comparative information, the DEIS represents little more than a partial compendium of information on the potential impacts at the individual sites that provides little means to evaluate the relative merits of one ground deployment plan over another. In addition, the Department must be careful to ensure that it is using a proper baseline for its no-action alternative. Because a number of the deployment sites being considered are either partially decommissioned or being considered for decommissioning, the status quo may not be the appropriate measure for the no-action alternative, as "no action" could mean closure and restoration to a "green fields" condition, not continuance of current activities.

III. The DEIS Improperly Segments the Various Elements of the NMD Program

The DEIS notes that it is tiered from the Ballistic Missile Defense Final Programmatic EIS (1994); however, in the absence of a supplemental EIS, the 1994 Programmatic EIS is outdated because of subsequent major changes in the NMD program. The Department also acknowledges that a number of other environmental assessments have been conducted as part of the NMD program, which include the following: (1) Overview Environmental Assessment for the Space Based Infrared System (1996); (2) the Environmental Assessment for the Integration, Assembly, Test, and Checkout of National Missile Defense Components at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama (1999); (3) Environmental Assessment for Booster Verification Test at Vandenberg AFB, California (1999); (4) Record of Environmental Consideration for Infrastructure Modernization and Test Facilities Construction in Support of NMD GBI Booster Verification/Integrated Flight Test at Meck Island (1999); and (5) the Environmental Assessment for Additional Facilities at the National Missile Defense Ground-Based Interceptor Development and Integration Laboratory, Huntsville, Alabama (1999). All but one of these environmental assessments was completed in the last year, and each is inextricably associated with the NMD program and the administration’s decision on whether to deploy an NMD system.

In the absence of an updated Programmatic EIS, each of these environmental assessments should have been incorporated into the NMD EIS. Otherwise, as acknowledged by established NEPA case law, decisions regarding NMD deployment cannot be based on an accurate and complete understanding of the full range of connected and cumulative environmental impacts that are associated with the broader NMD program. For example, deployment of the full $8 billion constellation of SBIRS satellites — an intrinsic component of any NMD system seeking to track dispersed warheads in space for midcourse intercept — entails numerous space launches which have a discernible degrading effect on the earth’s protective ozone layer. The 1994 Programmatic EIS, which explored the environmental impacts of various alternative concepts then proposed for research and development, is not an adequate document under which to tier any of these environmental analyses, as the objectives, structure, and data available on the NMD program have fundamentally changed since the early 1990s. In attempting to overcome the deficiencies of the existing Programmatic EIS, the Department has structured the DEIS to function both as an EIS, in evaluating specific site-level impacts, and as a broader programmatic assessment of the NMD program, with respect, for example, to what ground-based sites are going to be utilized. The end result is a study that does neither adequately.

The Department’s division and separate assessment of different elements of the NMD program are arbitrary at best; for example, the Department completely omits any assessment of the impacts from the maintenance of the GBIs. Established case law precludes such segmentation of government actions. When evaluating the impacts of a government program, all reasonably foreseeable environmental impacts must be evaluated together to enable the decision-maker to assess fully the impacts of the proposed government action. The Department’s segmented approach to evaluating the environmental impacts of the NMD program is therefore contrary to established law and impedes proper environmental review of the different elements of the NMD program.
The Department has also segmented its analysis of the NMD program at a more general level. Under current plans, the deployment considered in the DEIS is just the first stage of a three-part program that would substantially enlarge the number of sites, supporting infrastructure, radar installations, and missiles. In addition to incorporating the current program elements omitted from the DEIS, the Department must include “all reasonably foreseeable” impacts from the full three-stage NMD program that it is contemplating. Since the bases used under the proposed initial phase of the NMD program will necessarily influence deployment decisions in its later stages, and vice versa, it is essential that the Department include an analysis of all stages of the NMD program in the DEIS. Otherwise, the environmental impacts analysis will be arbitrarily foreshortened and potentially important impacts will be omitted.

III. The DEIS Fails to Consider the Impacts of Potential Accidents at NMD Facilities

The NMD program necessarily involves working with and managing thousands of pounds of hazardous and explosive materials. Each missile will contain 28,000-42,500 pounds of solid fuel and 20-35 pounds of highly-explosive and chemically toxic liquid propellant. The NMD facilities will also require use of other hazardous materials ranging from jet fuel to solvents to large battery arrays. The environmental risks from these activities could be severe because several of the ground bases being considered would require disrupting and working in environmentally sensitive areas in some of the most pristine and ecologically valuable wilderness regions remaining in the United States, including the Alaska Maritime National Wildlife Refuge.

The Department, despite the hazardous nature of the materials and equipment it will be working with and maintaining, fails to evaluate adequately the potential impacts from accidents that could occur at the bases being considered or during transport of missiles to them, which could be significant given that there will be about 50 initial flights and 20 flights annually for maintenance purposes. While the Department provides some generic estimates of environmental releases and the likelihood of certain accidents, such as an accident during transportation of the GBIs, no site-level data on the impacts of a major accident – particularly ecological – are included in the DEIS. This oversight is of particular significance because the ground-bases being considered are located in profoundly different local environments, which raise fundamentally different environmental risks.

It is therefore essential that the Department provide direct and systematic estimates of the environmental effects of a major release into the environment of hazardous materials (such as jet fuel), an explosion of a missile during transport, and an explosion of a missile once it is transferred to an NMD site. All other reasonably foreseeable accident scenarios must also be analyzed at a site-specific level. Without more detailed assessments, the EIS provides little basis for the Department to distinguish between the sites it is considering, thereby largely eliminating the utility of the DEIS in informing the Department’s decision-making process.

Christopher E. Prince
Senior Research Associate

David E. Adelman
Project Attorney

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)

among other sectors of the population.

36. This project has adverse impacts on subsistence resources. The DEIS doesn’t seem to take these impacts seriously. Please do a better job in the DEIS.

In conclusion, it appears that the BMDG has chosen to circumvent the evaluation of environmental impacts required by federal law. The DEIS is a confusing document, thick on words but thin on substance. An EIS must be a substantive document. NEPA is not an annoying formality but a critical part of how decisions are made.

I hope to see a good-faith effort in the future.

Thank you for thoughtfully considering these comments.

Gabriel Scott

Alaska Representative
Cascadia Wildlands Project
Comment Sheet for the National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)

Thank you for attending this public hearing. Our purpose for hosting this meeting is to give you an opportunity to comment on issues analyzed in the NMD Deployment Draft EIS. Please use this sheet to comment on any issues that you feel should be clarified in the Final EIS for NMD deployment. To ensure that your comments are addressed in the Final EIS, your comments must be post-marked by November 15, 1999.

Date: 11-10-99

Dear Ms. Hudson,

Your proposal to put the new missile defense system at Delta Junction, Fairbanks, Alaska, is a good one. It is a good step forward in protecting our country. It also means that the people of Alaska will have a good place to work and live. I am sure that the people of Alaska will support this project.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Charley L. Walton

Please place form in the drop box or mail to:

SMDC-EN-V, Ms. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
PO Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

Comment Number

P-W-078

P-W-079

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
November 09, 1999
F. Whitten Peters
Secretary of the Air Force
Pentagon Building
Room 4E171
Washington, DC 20350

RE: Request for Environmental Impact Statement for Cape Cod PAVE PAWS

Dear Secretary Peters:

The Town of Sandwich Board of Health voted unanimously at their November 08, 1999 meeting to request the United States Air Force file a site specific environmental impact statement for the Cape Cod PAVE PAWS Facility, Flat Rock Hill Road, Bourne, Massachusetts on the Massachusetts Military Reservation. Specifically, this request is for the proposed modernization of the facility.

The Board bases this request on public health and environmental concerns associated with the facility in the interest of providing the citizens of the Cape and the surrounding communities the most accurate information about PAVE PAWS. The Board believes the environmental impact statement must clarify health and environmental impacts associated with the operation of the facility.

The Board recognizes the importance Cape Cod PAVE PAWS is for national defense purposes, but wants to ensure that the health and safety of local residents is also protected.

Thank you for your consideration of this request.

Very truly yours,

Richard H. Loring, Chairman

Sandra Lee Tompkins

Kathleen Nakerson Hardy

cc: Ballistic Missile Defense Organization

U. S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command

Federal and State Legislative Delegation

Massachusetts Department of Public Health

(bh-ltrs.wps/paww.wps)
Missile meeting distracted with decoys

Instead, imagine an honest chat about real issues

Teachers who cover propaganda techniques could not have been present at the missile meeting because they were not invited. The meeting, funded by the Pentagon, was sponsored by the U.S. government and did not have any independent observers present. The goal was to educate the public about the importance of missile defense and to promote the deployment of new weapons systems.

Another reality technique evident at the Pentagon's open house was the decision to limit the debate to a narrow and relatively narrow set of issues. The press and the Pentagon's mouthpiece were not allowed to discuss the broader implications of the program, which would have included the impact on international relations and the potential for escalation of conflicts. The Pentagon's press representatives were instructed to limit their comments to the immediate benefits of the program, such as increased security and job creation.

The meeting was also controlled by the organizers, who did not allow for questions from the audience. The attendees were not allowed to bring cameras or record any of the discussions, which limited the ability of the public to have a clear understanding of the issues being discussed.

In conclusion, the missile meeting was a misrepresentation of the real issues at hand. The focus on narrow, factual information and the absence of debate and criticism were designed to create a favorable impression of the missile defense program, while ignoring the broader implications and potential drawbacks.

[Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)]
Taz ties and Loony Tunes

Stevens' missile system is being designed by experience.

A recent news item says that Ted Stevens wants his Taz to be the target for his name on the Senate floor. He wears his hand-drawn Taz tie when he addresses the floor because he likes to give the impression that he is a Teutonic defender of national missile-defense systems.

That's because it's what this fantastically expensive project is about. The idea, which has been around in one form or another since the 1960s, is to build an anti-ballistic system that can shoot down incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles automatically. This system is intended to intercept one of these missiles. Each would be a launching site somewhere between 20,000 and 30,000 miles.

However, it will be months before the system is ready to be tested. First, it must pass the challenging test of actually working. After that, it must pass a hard test of being deployable. It is only then that the system can be deployed in real-world situations.

In the meantime, the system is being tested in the real world. This is the Department of Defense's mission. The system is being tested in the real world. This is the Department of Defense's mission.

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Here comes the Pentagon

Conservatives can walk the talk at missile hearings

Two years ago a team of Pentagon officials lectured in Fairbanks and Anchorage on the strategic missile defense system to be based either in Alaska or North Dakota. The movie was a video showing either 20 years ago was a specter of war; some say a Spectre. There were fancy display boards with globe photos and charts, all tended by well-spoken majors and colonels who held these latest versions of their War. There were even fighter jets, placed on a flight deck, sloshing casually at tables. God knows why. Antimissile missiles are not exactly flown by pilots.

Whatever the official sense of transmitting all this grandiose stuff is from the Ballistic Missile Defense Office to Homer — actually, it was borne by the "spokesman" Colonel John R. Peters, when the darkness is engaged in a new roundabout, a grandiose defense on a public basis, one of the opening groups of the main conference (and the Pentagon) is given all the power to be fed, the federal government — a huge sum of trained professionals, speculations, professionally produced graphics, slick charts and maps, free air transportation and expenses... if not a plane, pilots to use as props at public meetings... while not a plane, pilots to shift for itself.

At the Carlson Center meeting, I wrote a column from the conference show of the presentations and so on, the opportunity at any one of the presentations to be heard by the gathered citizens. People could then write antimissile columns. But these are simply held by the Pentagon, and only re-issued months later, in summary language by the propogandists and buried in a fast environment.

These words draw a sharp response from a lieutenant colonel from the National Missile Defense Team: "Mr. O'Neill implied that the proponents would build the permanent component and make them available for public review. That is simply not true. All comments will be a part of the manuscript and then available for public review."

He was referring to the draft environmental impact study which actually comes out in September. I just received a copy. Digging through the thousands of pages, I couldn't find the public comments. Only a single paragraph of summary language was depicted in the proponents' draft. I asked the content person and asked where the public comments could be found. "We just kept them on file for our own records," she said. "Those will not be published." Then I asked the lieutenant colonel's enthusiastic assertion that they would be published, "Well, he's retired."

"If you don't have a plan for public review, the public will never see them!"

The public will be left to guess what is in the draft environmental impact study, which actually comes out in September. I just received a copy. Digging through the thousands of pages, I couldn't find the public comments. Only a single paragraph of summary language was depicted in the proponents' draft. I asked the content person and asked where the public comments could be found. "We just kept them on file for our own records," she said. "Those will not be published." Then I asked the lieutenant colonel's enthusiastic assertion that they would be published, "Well, he's retired."

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"If you don't have a plan for public review, the public will never see them!"
Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Is missile defense system justified for national security?

Scientist sees national missile defense system as a mistake.

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Comment Sheet for the National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)

Thank you for attending this public hearing. Our purpose for hosting this meeting is to give you an opportunity to comment on issues analyzed in the NMD Deployment Draft EIS. Please use this sheet to comment on any issues that you feel should be clarified in the Final EIS for NMD deployment. To ensure that your comments are addressed in the Final EIS, your comments must be postmarked by November 15, 1997.

Date: November 14, 1997

To whom it may concern:

I submit the following attached comments for the Draft EIS for the National Missile Defense Deployment.

See attached comments.

Please place form in the drop box or mail to:

SMDG-ENV-V, Ms. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
PG Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

Commentator: Peter Schlesinger
Name:
City, State:
Zip Code:

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
November 14, 1999

US Army Space and Missile Defense Command
Attention: SMDC-EN-V (Ms. Julia Hudson)
PO Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

To Whom It May Concern:

The letter is to officially comment on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for the National Missile Defense Deployment (September 1999).

I'll be brief. There are unexplained elevated rates of cancers on Cape Cod. There is ample evidence in peer-reviewed press that electromagnetic radiation is associated with changes in human tissue at the cellular level, which are not measured by the IEEE thermally-based standard employed to characterize hazard to human or animal health. The precautionary principle is being urged in all industrial facilities of Cape Cod where hazardous emissions are potentially viable, and upgrades and additions are proposed.

The EIS prepared for the Cape Cod PAVE PAWS facility more than twenty years ago foretold of all sorts of problems, yet by the time it was written, the facility was virtually in place. To date, Cape Codders have not had ample time to assess PAVE PAWS' contribution to the regional cancer dilemma. An extension of the comment period for this EIS is warranted. Public hearings ought to be held to hear from and educate the public.

Additionally, I call for the preparation of a full site-specific EIS to be prepared for the Cape Cod PAVE PAWS site and the proposed computer facility upgrade proposed.

I moved my family here 7 years ago. At that time, my wife asked me whether we were safe from the emissions of the PAVE PAWS radar facility, not more than a mile due west of my house. I put a lot of effort into trying to find out the answer. I visited the site, I researched the literature to the best of my ability. I found the old EIS and read it, and I've attended a talk given by the PAVE PAWS public affairs attaché. I tried to assure her fears, but to date, I cannot tell her for sure whether the fears of the old EIS were unfounded. Indeed, I cannot find anyone in the military or civilian community who really knows whether the facility is safe. A full EIS should be mandated for this site's upgrade to its computing facilities and indeed any extension to its purported 20-year mission, which by my calculation is over.

I look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

Peter Schlesinger

Comment Sheet
for the
National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment
Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)

Thank you for attending this public hearing. Our purpose for hosting this meeting is to give you an opportunity to comment on issues analyzed in the NMD Deployment Draft EIS. Please use this sheet to comment on any issues that you feel should be clarified in the Final EIS for NMD deployment. To ensure that your comments are addressed in the Final EIS, your comments must be postmarked by November 15, 1999.

Date: November 14, 1999
To whom it may concern: Please submit the attached comments, letters, and documents for the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the National Missile Defense Deployment. These are to be added to our orbital testimony given on November 9, 1999 at the initial public hearing in Arlington, Virginia.

Please place form in the drop box or mail to:
SMDC-EN-V, Ms. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
PO Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

Commentator:
Name: Richard Starnes Judge
Street Address:
City, State: ___ ______
Zip Code: ___
November 14, 1999

Richard and Sharon Judge

U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command

Attn: SMDC-EN-V (Ms. Julia Hudson)
P.O. Box 1500

Huntsville, Alabama 35807-3801

RE: COMMENTS ON THE NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE DEPLOYMENT
DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (EIS)

Dear U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command:

Please include the following written comments and attached letters in the Final Environmental Impact Statement for the National Missile Defense Deployment, in addition to our verbal testimony given at the NMD public hearing at the Days Inn, Arlington, Virginia on November 9, 1999.

REQUEST FOR 30-DAY EXTENSION OF PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD

We are formally requesting a 30-day extension of the public comment period for the Draft EIS for the National Missile Defense Deployment. The public on Cape Cod was never notified of the release of the DEIS. Although the DEIS focuses primarily on sites in S. Dakota and Alaska, there are some sections specific to the PAVE PAWS Early Warning Radar on Cape Cod. A press release was sent out from the Joint Program Office (JPO) on the Massachusetts Military Reservation (MMR), on November 8, 1999, to the selectmen representatives of the Senior Management Board only (see attached press release).

We were given the wrong internet address by the BMDO public affairs representative at PAVE PAWS. When we finally got the correct internet address for the BMDO, we had great difficulty navigating to the draft EIS screen.

When calling the U.S. Space and Missile Defense Command, it was difficult for Cape Cod citizens to get a live person in order to request a copy of the DEIS.

THE EIS PROCESS IS DEFICIENT

We believe the EIS process is deficient in regards to the proposed upgrades to the PAVE PAWS Early Warning Radar on Cape Cod as the public cannot fully participate in the EIS process. Section 10.5 regarding the scoping process states that, “a total of seven public scoping meetings in December 1998 were held in communities perceived to be affected by the NMD program.” It is unacceptable that no formal scoping meetings, on the public record, were held for the Cape Cod community.

The Air Force and BMDO were well aware of the opposition to the continued operation of the PAVE PAWSs on Cape Cod. The meeting on February 16, 1999 at the Sandwich High School, hosted by the Massachusetts Department of Public Health, was heavily attended by representatives of the Air Force and JPO on MMR. It is important to note that all were monitors and none represented the PAVE PAWS facility. We are aware of at least one conference call and one meeting this summer where officials from the JPO on MMR met up at the Pentagon to discuss PAVE PAWS and community issues.

Despite the fact that Cape Cod citizens are calling for PAVE PAWS to be decommissioned and moved to an unpopulated site, (as was the case with the PAVE PAWS in Texas this past year), BMDO representatives from the Pentagon chose to announce the proposed upgrades to PAVE PAWS at an “invitation only” meeting on September 21, 1999, at the JPO on MMR. It is unacceptable that the public is being left out of the process.

Although we have been told that a supplement to the DEIS is being prepared for the proposed upgrades to PAVE PAWS on MMR, this falls far short of what the people of Cape Cod expect and deserve. A supplement is not adequate. Last week, the Sandwich Board of Selectmen and Board of Health, at their regularly scheduled meetings, voted unanimously to send a letter to Secretary of the Air Force, F. Whitten Peters, requesting that a full site-specific Environmental Impact Statement be prepared for the existing PAVE PAWS facilities on Cape Cod, including, but not limited to upgrades proposed by both the Air Force and the BMDO. No changes should be made to the existing PAVE PAWS facility, or the approximately 87 acre PAVE PAWS site on MMR until a full site-specific EIS, as described above, is completed. This will ensure that the public can fully participate in the decision making process in a legal and meaningful way. Ultimately, it must be up to the citizens of Cape Cod to decide what level of risk is acceptable to the population and environment.

BRIEF HISTORY

Twenty years ago when PAVE PAWS went online, the Cape Cod community was told it would be a "short term use of the environment" and would operate for 10-20 years. Residents did not find out about PAVE PAWS until construction was underway. Residents filed a lawsuit forcing the Air Force to prepare an EIS. This document was outdated, is incomplete and unconvincing. The Air Force concluded that the long term chronic effects of exposure to pulse modulated microwave radiation were unknown at that time. Several urgent requests were documented in the EIS:

1. That there be continuous Cape-wide monitoring of radiation levels;
2. That an epidemiological study begin from the moment the power was turned on at PAVE PAWS;
3. That the public be notified if there was ever an upgrade at PAVE PAWS.

Twenty years later, none of these things have been done despite the fact that Cape Cod has some of the highest rates of cancer in the state and other potentially related health issues that remain unexplained. Any future "study" of PAVE PAWS must be retrospective.

THE DRAFT EIS IS DEFICIENT:

The DEIS did not evaluate all community and environmental issues involved with the existing Early Warning Radar on Cape Cod or the upgrades proposed by the BMDO. Both the No-Action and the Proposed Action Alternatives would result in the continued operation of the PAVE PAWS on Cape Cod. ES I.3 states, "If the initial decision made is not to deploy, the NMD program would use the time to enhance the existing technologies of the various system elements. The NMD program would also have the option to add new elements if and as they are developed. For the potential sites. For the potential sites being considered for NMD deployment, the No-Action Alternative would be a continuation of activities currently occurring or planned at those locations."

The fact that the footprint and maximum power output will not change does not adequately address community and environmental concerns. There are not enough details regarding the hardware and software modifications (which would affect the beam/radiation characteristics) and certain interior changes that are proposed. Section 2.2.5 states, "These modifications to the radar are still under development. Once the details of the radar upgrades are defined, separate site-specific environmental analysis, as required, would be performed. What type of environmental analysis would be done, and required by who? The facility has been upgraded in the past without adequate environmental review. There are not enough details about proposed power plant modifications, fiber optic cable modifications and the role PAVE PAWS would play in the NMD Testing, Training and Exercise Capability. The PAVE PAWS on Cape Cod should go through its own full site-specific EIS process discussed above, so that the public can participate fully in the decision making process in a legal and meaningful way.

The DEIS is vague about supplemental site-specific environmental analysis for NMD elements whose sites have not been identified yet (i.e. IFCS, X-Band FIBER OPTIC CABLE LINE). ES I.5. states, "In addition, as the operational requirements are refined, other regions may be identified. Since specific sites have not been identified, a general programmatic description of the types of impacts that could be expected from deployment are included within this EIS. Once specific sites are identified, supplemental site-specific environmental analysis, as required, would be performed based on this initial analysis in this EIS."

Our question is: What type of environmental analysis and required by who? The public cannot fully participate in the EIS because the programmatic information is not adequate to the public process. A supplemental DEIS should be prepared for the IFCS data terminus, the X-Band...

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
November 09, 1999
F. Whitten Peters
Secretary of the Air Force
Pentagon Building
Room 4E871
Washington, DC 20330

RE: Request for Environmental Impact Statement for Cape Cod PAVE PAWS

Dear Secretary Peters:

The Town of Sandwich Board of Health voted unanimously at their November 08, 1999 meeting to request the United States Air Force Site Specific environmental impact statement for the Cape Cod PAVE PAWS Facility, Flat Rock Hill Road, Bourne, Massachusetts on the Massachusetts Military Reservation. Specifically, this request is for the proposed modernization of the facility.

The Board bases this request on public health and environmental concerns associated with the facility in the interest of providing the citizens of the Cape and the surrounding communities the most accurate information about PAVE PAWS. The Board believes the environmental impact statement must clarify health and environmental impacts associated with the operation of the facility.

The Board recognizes the importance Cape Cod PAVE PAWS is for national defense purposes, but wants to ensure that the health and safety of local residents is also protected.

November 09, 1999
Richard H. Loring, Chairman

Sandra Lee Tompkins

Kathleen Nickerson Hardy

cc: Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
U. S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
Federal and State Legislative Delegation
Massachusetts Department of Public Health

(90-krs.wps/ppawz.wps)
Comment Sheet
for the
National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment
Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)

Thank you for attending this public hearing. Our purpose for hosting this meeting is to
give you an opportunity to comment on issues analyzed in the NMD Deployment Draft
EIS. Please use this sheet to comment on any issues that you feel should be clarified
in the Final EIS for NMD deployment. To ensure that your comments are addressed in
the Final EIS, your comments must be post-marked by November 15, 1999.

Date: Nov 14, 1999

As an Alaskan of 38 yr. residency, it is
tempting to the casual reasons of $ and
jobs for Alaskans to support the missile
defense deployment. However, national and global
interests must prevail. After listening to a
discussion of both pros and cons of deployment,
I must conclude that deployment would be both
detrimental to the nation and the global
community. U.S. taxpayers would be sending a
tragedy amount for a defense system of dubious
merit and since the deployment would violate previous
international arms limitation agreements.

Comment Number
P-W-086

Please place form in the drop
box or mail to:
SMDC-EN-V, Ms. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
PO Box 1900
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

Commenter:
Name:
Tape:
Street Address:
City, State:
Zip Code:

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Comment Sheet
for the
National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment
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Thank you for attending this public hearing. Our purpose for hosting this meeting is to
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in the Final EIS for NMD deployment. To ensure that your comments are addressed in
the Final EIS, your comments must be post-marked by November 15, 1999.

Date: 11/12/99

Please see attached documents.

Also Defense Dept. 40-page report of independent panel to Congress,

Please place form in the drop box or mail to:
SMDC-ENV, Ms. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
PO Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

Commentator:
Name: Richard K. Horrocks - Sec. Dir.
Street Address: 1500, Huntsville, AL
City, State: 35807-3801
Zip Code:

UPDATE

November 1999

Missile Defense Going Ballistic or Berserk?

Clinton would give the green light to deployment of this system:
• What is the threat?
• What would be the cost?
• What would be the impact on U.S. - Russian nuclear arms reductions?
• Would the system really work?

So far the suggested answer to the first question is that the threat might be from a rogue state (e.g., North Korea, Iran or Iraq).
The S&O estimated last year that NMD proposals at that time would cost from $18-4 billion to $26-4 billion. The Brookings Institute has estimated that the US has spent over $120 billion on all forms of missile defense work since the 1950s (and what real defense has resulted as far)?

Such a system as NMD is not permitted by the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and it could hinder progress on START II strategic nuclear arms reductions.

When it comes to answering the question about the feasibility of such a system, the proof would be in the pudding. In other words, the workability of NMD could only be determined by exhaustive testing. A related question would be: Could the NMD be fooled or made impicable by ingenious methods by any theoretical enemy?

Here is where we need an expert to help in determining if building such a system would really contribute to our national defense...whether it would be just another paid barrel/bomber, like the F-22, etc...propelled by any non-existent enemy?

For this reason, Donald C. Whitmore has been invited to come to Alaska.

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
NMD is a complete waste of valuable taxpayer money. Already, the Pentagon has wasted over $120 billion on Star Wars development and the NMD program, which will serve to pump up aerospace corporations, and detract resources from other more crucial social development issues.

NMD will violate international treaties, and will harm U.S. foreign relations. Russia is already reacting strongly to NMD by rightly claiming that deployment of the system will violate the 1972 ABM Treaty. The United Nations passed a resolution on November 1, 1999 calling for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, resulting in a vote of 138-0 (with the U.S. and Israel abstaining). This clearly shows that international concern is mounting to keep space protected from warfare. The U.N. Outer Space Treaty of 1967 also outlaws the movement of war into space.

NMD will increase space pollution. Recently, NASA was forced to move the international space station to a higher orbit in order to avoid being hit by a piece of space junk. If we allow the testing and deployment of space weapons systems we will create massive amounts of space junk that will, in the words of Apollo astronaut Edgar Mitchell, "make it impossible for us to get off the planet". We cannot and must not do what we have already done to the earth – make it the victim of our evil, polluting ways.

Please refrain from moving the arms race into space. This will achieve nothing but worldwide harm.

Sincerely,

Alice Slater
President

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
To whom it may concern:

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the proposed missile defense system. I am opposed to this proposal for two reasons:

1) Building any missile defense system, such as the one proposed, would undo years of progress and may make worse the cold war. In addition to violating the US-Soviet ABM treaty, building this system would call into question international faithfulness and intention to demilitarize all other treaties.

2) A missile defense system would create a state of fear, making the primary target for any strike launched against it the ultimate environment to combat any arms race.

Thank you!

Karyn Fisk

P-W-090

P-W-091

November 14, 1999

President Bill Clinton
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear President Clinton:

I strongly oppose the designing and implementing of a ballistic missile defense system, whether in North Dakota or in Alaska.

From my point of view, this particular nation would be a violation of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, which, in particular, is the only arms control agreement that has eliminated nuclear weapons on both sides.

The U.S. is the only nation now to possess a nuclear weapon, which makes us a prime candidate to be therogue nation in the world.

We need to concentrate on arms reduction, all the arms in the world, and eventually to get to zero. There is a reason why we know it. A world without nuclear weapons and the risk of an arms race is a step forward.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

P-W-091

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
To whom it may concern,

I am writing today to express my total opposition to the missile defence system both in concept and practice. It's threatening the basic foundations of the treaties that give the little stability that we have, and that is an environmental impact. Let's avoid a new arms race. Let's not waste billions more. Let's focus on working with other nuclear powers to lessen the tension not snub our nose at other nuclear powers. We are going to be less safe much less safe if this missile defence system is pushed forward.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
Dear Mr. Clinton,

I am strongly opposed to the deployment of the Anti-Missile System.

a) It violates the oldest and most successful treaty we have with the Russians.

b) It only reduces the most minuscule threat, while creating a new one to prevent arms transfers from being smuggled into our country or territorial waters.

c) The system is statistically impossible due to pathetically inadequate tracking.

d) It is destabilizing as Russia is threatening to respond, and Russia, China, will be induced to cooperate against us.

e) We already have a nuclear deterrent. No country would launch a ballistic missile against us from their home soil without the probability of retaliation at our hands. This strategy is as effective as ever.

Please take a stand against this misguided effort!

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Hans Meier
To Whom it may Concern:  
cc: President Clinton

I am writing in opposition to the proposed missile defense system in Interior Alaska. I believe that in this day and age we should be reducing defense spending, not increasing it. I feel that having this missile defense system in Alaska is an unnecessary expense.

In addition, I am opposed to further disturbing sensitive areas in Interior Alaska already affected with the debris of military training.

Thank you for your time...  

Sally Andersen

Dear Mr. Clinton,

I am writing to express my concern about the proposed missile defense system in Interior Alaska. I believe that we should be reducing defense spending, not increasing it. I feel that having this system in Alaska is unnecessary.

In addition, I am opposed to further disturbing sensitive areas in Interior Alaska already affected with the debris of military training.

Thank you for your time...  

Sally Andersen
To Whom It May Concern:

I oppose the construction of a new missile defense system in Alaska.

I do not believe that expensive untested military projects are the best way to protect freedom and world peace. (I say untested because many early tests have failed.)

Second, I do not care to see America's most beautiful state made into a priority military target. We are working very hard to keep Alaska special, being bombed would, quite literally, put a dent in our efforts.

Thank you for this opportunity to comment.

Amy Marsh

November 14, 1999

To Whom It May Concern:

I am opposed to the proposal to base a nuclear defense system in interior Alaska. First of all, it is unrealistic to think that this defense system would work in this day and age.

The United Nations is opposed to placing a defense system in interior Alaska, Russia and China are opposed to the placing of this system anywhere. By way this system we will be setting the tone.

Also, if a group of people wants to launch a nuclear strike on the United States they would first try to take out this proposed system. An attack on this system would instantly degrade the environment.

Sincerely,

Paul Crew

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
To Whom It May Concern:

Respecting the Ballistic Missile System for Defense and Alaska:

I urge you to oppose the process and I urge you to oppose Alaska as a potential target.

Ballistic Missile System is a symbol of destruction and a symbol of insecurity. It does not represent peace or the ability to communicate non-weapon.

I believe our voices are strong and more powerful than yours.

I personally do not want to get divided or realized as a result of the missile system or any other Alaska. Put it in your hometown and see how vulnerable you feel.

Sincerely, Laurel Drews

November 14, 1999

Sincerely,

Nancy Fresco

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
President Bill Clinton
White House, Washington DC
Nov 14, 1997

Dear Mr. President,

I am opposed to the Ballistic System Defense... being placed in Alaska. In a 52 year residence in Alaska... I remember the amount of money spent in the BMD defense system based along the northern Alaska coast to defend us from Soviet attack during the Cold War. Alaska was such an issue. The only attacks on us of the installations that I am aware of was by a polar bear that invaded one of them.

I am old enough to remember the French曼西人 Lisbon to repel a possible attack by Germany. Hitler's troops rolled right around them to conquer Holland, Belgium and then France.

This same proposal was made in America to repel a possible attack by Hitler's troops. Hitler's troops rolled right around them to conquer Holland, Belgium, and then France.

The same proposal is made today. This proposal is the present use of the BMD by construction companies. The rest of us feel that placing a BMD defense system be made on our target. It is a step away from a possible attack and less probable than a 52 year residence of the coast from a polar bear or by biological weapon.

Respectfully,

[Signature]

[Handwritten note]

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
To whom it may concern,

President Clinton,

To the point, I can't help but believe that we, as the public, have already gone through a major mega billion dollar fiasco in the form of Star Wars. I have realized that we need to get down that road again. The proposed 1.1 billion dollar Missile Defense System (better known as 'Star Wars') is just another drain on American taxpayers' dollars and is doomed to failure once the dust settles on it. That's it.

Yours truly,

John R. Schairer
Comment Sheet
for the
National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment
Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)

Thank you for attending this public hearing. Our purpose for hosting this meeting is to
give you an opportunity to comment on issues analyzed in the NMD Deployment Draft
EIS. Please use this sheet to comment on any issues that you feel should be clarified
in the Final EIS for NMD deployment. To ensure that your comments are addressed in
the Final EIS, your comments must be post-marked by November 15, 1999.

Date: 11-17-99

[Handwritten: I am writing on behalf of the
[Missile Defense System Review placed
in Alaska. All work on Alaska is finished.
The best facilities, both sites, were considered
freely and clear those facilities and the infrastructure
and excellent transportation systems
inhabitants and other communities of Interior
Alaska are home to many thousands of the
construction workers who would be glad to take
part in the challenge of this great project.]

[Handwritten form]

Please place form in the drop box or mail to:
SMDC-EN-V, Ms. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
PO Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

Commenter: Bob Dubois
Name: Bob Dubois
Street Address: 
City, State: 
Zip Code: 

[Handwritten: United States Environmental Protection Agency
999 18th Street, Suite 500
Denver, CO 80202-2646
http://www.epa.gov/region8]

November 15, 1999

Ref: SEPR-EP
Ms. Julia Hudson
SMDC-EN-V
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
P.O. Box 1500
Huntsville, Alabama 35807-3801

Re: National Missile Defense Deployment (NMD)
DEIS Review No. 990045

Dear Ms. Hudson:

In accordance with our responsibilities under the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) and Section 309 of the Clean Air Act, the Region VIII and X of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) has reviewed the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for
the National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment, dated September 1999. We offer the following
concerns and comments for your consideration as you complete the Final Environmental Impact
Statement (FES). EPA's primary concern from reviewing the DEIS are increasing protection of
human health and minimizing impacts to wetlands and other sensitive ecosystems. Our
comments are listed below.

The NMD system consists of five major land based facilities which will be constructed in
North Dakota and/or Alaska. The five components listed below are analyzed in the EIS with five
potentially sites in Alaska and six potential locations and North Dakota. The space based
detection system and upgrading of the existing radar systems are not included in the DEIS.
- Ground-based interceptor (GBI) with up to 100 missile sites in one launch facility in North
  Dakota or Alaska, or 100 each in both ND and AK, including support and processing
  facilities.
- Battle Management Command and Control (BMCC)
- Falcon Interceptor Communications System (FICS); approximately 14 sites (new sites
  possibly), transmitters and receivers, and electrical equipment.
- X-Band Radar (XBR), radar antenna
- Fiber-Optics Cable

General Comments
1. The decisions that will be based on the EIS need to be clarified. Pages 5-6 and 1-2 identify
the decision as only whether or not to deploy the NMD system. However, the EIS is written
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<td>2</td>
<td>Biological Resources</td>
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<td>4. For wetlands in North Dakota, all of the possible missile and control sites are at existing military facilities that have experienced wetland disturbance in the past. The DEIS identifies existing wetlands (most are constructed ditches or ponds) and says that their loss will be mitigated but fails to provide details. The EIS states that, when final site selections are made, a 404 permit for the wetlands will be sought and will include development of a mitigation plan at that time. However, we recommend that the potential mitigation plans (Section 3 of Executive Order 11990) be addressed in the FEIS, particularly, within the context of recent floods in the Red River Basin. Some of the flooding has been attributed to extensive wetland drainage. The wetland mitigation ratio discussion should also address the time between wetland destruction and the creation of a fully functioning replacement wetland, and the possibility that mitigation may not be completely successful necessitating additional mitigation needs. The mitigation plan should incorporate provisions for protecting created and existing wetlands from increased storm water runoff both during construction and after construction. Measures to manage storm water should consider both the quantity and quality of the water.</td>
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<td>Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste Management</td>
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<td>5. Regarding the potential wetlands impacts associated with sites in Alaska: Should the Army choose to locate a GBI facility in Alaska we recommend that the Fort Greely site be used because there would be no impacts to wetlands.</td>
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<td>Health and Safety</td>
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<td>6. The final EIS should take into consideration the ongoing investigation of known and/or potential releases of hazardous substances under CERCLA/SARA authorities at the SRMSC, RSL No. 1-4, and Cavalier Air Station. The findings of the ongoing CERCLA Preliminary Assessment and Site Investigation should be considered in developing plans for these facilities.</td>
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<td>7. It should be noted that EPA Region 8 has determined that previous environmental investigations discussed under the Installation Restoration Program (IRP) sections on pages 3-214, and 3-210 are incomplete and have not followed the CERCLA assessment process.</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>8. Several of the GBI locations (Clear Air Station-Site A, Grand Forks AFB and Missile Site Radar) have insufficient buffers to protect human health from the liquid propellents discharges. We recommend that those sites be avoided unless additional mitigation measures can be implemented to protect human health in the unlikely event that the liquid propellents pollutants are discharged.</td>
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<td>9. For electromagnetic radiation, EPA has indicated that the FCC that levels less than or equal to 1 mwatt/cm2 are appropriate safety levels for the general population from non-ionizing</td>
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radiation emitting devices. These levels are 5-10 times less than those proposed by IEEE, National Council Radiation Protection, and the Army's EIS. Since the proposed levels are for acute heating (microwave) effects and not for chronic biological effects, EPA's (now FCC's) exposure limits at 47 CFR 1.1310) proposed levels should be utilized at the property fence line to ensure adequate present and future health protection to the general public. We recommend that the fence line be moved back to achieve the proposed level.

10. It is difficult to determine the magnitude of risk to human health and wildlife from the X-Band Radar facility. It is apparent from section 2.2.42 on page 2-16 that the X-Band Radar will not operate all the time. However, there is no information on the duration of electro-magnetic radiation from the X-Band Radar. For example, are operations expected to be only 1 to 2 times a year for 15 minutes or is it more likely that the facility will operate for 24 hours a day, several days a month throughout the year. A discussion of how often the X-Band Radar will be operating during a normal year should be added to Section 4.3.4.7. — Health and Safety.

11. Table 3-8-1 on page 3-224 appears to have inaccuracies in the column labeled “Power Density” (the 10 should be a 1). We also recommend including the FCC criteria for protecting human health from electro-magnetic radiation of 1 milliwatts per square centimeters for frequencies between 1500-100,000 megahertz.

**Water Resources**

12. The DEIS describes developing storm water pollution prevention plans for construction. We recommend that these plans be expanded to include sediment and other pollutants control measures throughout operations. Storm water control measures can include detention areas such as constructed wetlands or ponds for runoff from those facilities with large amount of impervious area. Storm water detention areas are particular important for facilities located in the Red River Basin.

13. The final EIS should also explain how the generic design of the Interceptor Silo will protect ground water. Will any of pollutants from the missile silos drain into ground water? For example, page 2-6, last paragraph, discusses the monitoring system that will be installed on the GBI canisters to determine if leakage is excessive. The FEIS should describe the impacts to ground water for both “acceptable” and “unacceptable” levels of leakage or spills.

Based on the procedures EPA uses to evaluate the potential effects of proposed actions and the adequacy of the information in the DEIS, the environmental analysis for the National Missile Defense Deployment will be listed in the Federal Register in the category EC-2. This means that the review has identified environmental impacts that should be avoided in order to fully protect the environment, and the DEIS does not contain sufficient information to thoroughly assess environmental impacts that should be avoided to fully protect the environment. Enclosed is a summary of EPA’s rating definitions.

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**Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)**

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We appreciate your interest in our comments. Please contact Dana Allen at (303) 312-0670 or Bill Ryan at (206) 353-8561 if you have any questions about these comments.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Cynthia Cody
Chief, NEPA Unit
Office of Ecosystems Protection and Remediation

Enclosure
EPA EIS RATINGS

Section 109 of the Clean Air Act requires the EPA to review and comment in writing on environmental impact statements (EIS). It is EPA's policy to rate draft EIS summarizing EPA's level of concern and follow-up with the lead agency. The rating is in two parts: the first letter is the rating of the environmental impact of the action (Ratings: LO, EC, EO or EU). The second part of the rating is the adequacy of the information in the EIS document (Ratings: 1, 2 or 3).

SUMMARY OF EIS RATING DEFINITIONS AND FOLLOW-UP ACTION *

Environmental Impact of the Action

LO—Lack of Objections
The EPA review has not identified any potential environmental impacts requiring substantive changes to the proposal. The review may have disclosed opportunities for application of mitigation measures that could be accomplished with no more than minor changes to the proposal.

EC—Environmental Concerns
The EIA review has identified environmental impacts that should be avoided in order to fully protect the environment. Corrective measures may require changes to the preferred alternative or application of abatement measures that can reduce the environmental impact. EPA would like to work with the lead agency to reduce these impacts.

EO—Environmental Objections
The EPA review has identified significant environmental impacts that must be avoided in order to provide adequate protection for the environment. Corrective measures may require substantial changes to the preferred alternative or consideration of other project alternatives (including the no action alternative or a new alternative). EPA intends to work with the lead agency to reduce these impacts.

EU—Environmentally Unacceptable
The EPA review has identified adverse environmental impacts that are of sufficient magnitude that they are unacceptable from the standpoint of public health, welfare or environmental quality. EPA intends to work with the lead agency to reduce these impacts. If the unacceptable impacts are not corrected at the final EIS stage, this proposal will be recommended for referral to the CEQ.

Adequacy of the Impact Statement

Category 1 -- Adequate
EPA believes the draft EIS adequately sets forth the environmental impact(s) of the preferred alternative and those of the alternatives reasonably available to the project or action. No further analysis or data collection is necessary, but the reviewer may suggest the addition of clarifying language or information.

Category 2 -- Insufficient Information
The draft EIS does not contain sufficient information for EPA to fully assess environmental impacts that should be avoided in order to fully protect the environment, or the EPA reviewer has identified new reasonably available alternatives that are outside the spectrum of alternatives analyzed in the draft EIS, which could reduce the environmental impacts of the action. The identified additional information, data, analyses, or discussion should be included in the final EIS.

Category 3 -- Inadequate
EPA does not believe that the draft EIS adequately assesses potentially significant environmental impacts of the action, or the EPA reviewer has identified new, reasonably available alternatives that are outside the spectrum of alternatives analyzed in the draft EIS, which should be included in order to reduce the potentially significant environmental impacts. EPA believes that the identified additional information, data, analyses, or discussions are of such a magnitude that they should have full public review at a draft status. EPA does not believe that the draft EIS is adequate for the purposes of the NEPA and/or Section 109 review, and thus should be formally revised and made available for public comment in a supplemental or revised draft EIS. On the basis of the potential significant impacts involved, this proposal could be a candidate for referral to the CEQ.


Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
3. National Environmental Policy Act regulations direct agencies to "rigorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives" (40 CFR 1502.14). The Draft EIS does not provide a complete array of reasonable alternatives. The document essentially provides "no build" and "build" alternatives. It is likely there are other alternatives that could address the purpose and need as described in the Draft EIS. Alternatives to the NMDD need to be explored in the document.

Specific Comments

Alaska Elements

The Draft EIS estimates deployment of the Ground-Based Interceptor and the Battle Management Command and Control (BMCC) components in the interior of Alaska will require approximately 600 acres of land. Although the majority of the three potential sites selected in the interior of Alaska would consist of upland habitats, approximately 142 acres of wetlands could be impacted at Clear Air Station and 113 acres of wetlands would be impacted at the Yukon Training Area, Eielson Air Force Base. Fort Greely is the only proposed site that does not include wetlands.

Although the habitats on Clear Air Station and the Yukon Training Area are not considered "high value" as fish and wildlife habitats and are abundant throughout the interior of Alaska, such areas do have value as habitat, particularly for several State "Species of Special Concern." The olive-sided flycatcher (Contopus 1utulatus), gray-cheeked thrush (Catharus minimus), Townsend's warbler (Dendroica townsendi), and the blackpoll warbler (Dendroica striata) are designated by the Alaska Department of Fish and Game as Species of Special Concern. A Species of Special Concern is defined as any species or subspecies of fish and wildlife native to the State of Alaska which has declined in abundance or is vulnerable to a significant decline due to low numbers, restricted distribution, dependence on limited habitat resources, or sensitivity to environmental disturbance. The gray-cheeked thrush and the blackpoll warbler prefer forest habitats. All of the species have been observed on the Yukon Training Area and most have been observed on Clear Air Station and Fort Greely.

We believe construction of the NMDD on any of the three sites in the interior of Alaska would have unavoidable impacts to wildlife, largely through the loss of habitat, increased traffic and other human activity, and the impacts associated with gravel mining, which will be needed in large quantities for construction. If a "build" alternative is selected, the impacts associated with each of the Alaska sites need to be analyzed more carefully. To the degree possible, the development of the system should strive to minimize environmental impacts, including impacts to fish and wildlife. To this end, we recommend wetland loss be avoided and construction occur as much as possible on previously disturbed sites. Based on our preliminary assessment, we...
believe the Fort Greely site, if developed, would result in the fewest impacts to wildlife. Much of the proposed Fort Greely site has been previously disturbed, and as mentioned above, the site does not include wetlands.

North Dakota Elements

Under the proposed action, construction activities associated with the Ordinance Training-5 (OT-5) area alternative could cause impacts to approximately 20 acres of wetlands. We would prefer an alternative that does not include wetlands, but offers the Department of Defense (DOD) technical assistance to mitigate these impacts and reminds DOD that a Section 404 permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers may be required if you propose to drain or place fill material into these wetlands.

The project's fiber optic cable line could pose the most significant impact to biological resources in North Dakota. The document states (page 23-13) that "...minimal impact to vegetation, wildlife, threatened and endangered species are anticipated from the fiber optic cable deployment." In northeastern North Dakota, some of the only remaining wildlife habitat is found along the roadways where the cable would be placed. Page 3-121 states that "...wildlife is sparse within the right-of-way area along the roadway corridor, as there is little or no habitat for nesting and foraging." Although these ribbons of habitat make up only a small fraction of the land surface, researchers have found them to be highly productive nesting sites for more than 40 types of birds and animals that nest on the ground or in low vegetation. These public lands are often the only remaining nesting cover in an area. This is particularly the case in northeastern North Dakota. Timing of the construction to allow for nesting, and restoration of the habitat following construction, will provide for wildlife use and continued habitat suitability. In North Dakota, the likelihood is high that the installation of the fiber optic line will impact wetland resources. Once an actual route is established, the FWS is available to assist the DOD with a mitigation plan to address these wetland losses.

Please contact Ken Havran in the Office of Environmental Policy and Compliance at (202) 288-7116 with questions concerning these comments. We appreciate the opportunity to review and comment on this important draft EIS and hope that our comments are helpful.

Sincerely,

Willie R. Taylor
Director
Office of Environmental Policy and Compliance

Comment Sheet for the National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)

Thank you for attending this public hearing. Our purpose for hosting this meeting is to give you an opportunity to comment on issues analyzed in the NMD Deployment Draft EIS. Please use this sheet to comment on any issues that you feel should be clarified in the Final EIS for NMD deployment. To ensure that your comments are addressed in the Final EIS, your comments must be post-marked by November 15, 1999.

Date: Dec 1, 1999

Should fiber optic networks be laid in SW Alaska? It would be desirable for communication to the region to have access to these networks. We recognize such networks can literally be the cornerstone of new enterprises. New potential for commercial and personal communication to be available if there is opportunity for sharing of these valuable communication resources. Thank you for consideration of my suggestion.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Please place form in the drop box or mail to:
SMDC-EN-V, Ms. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
PO Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

Commentator:
Name:

Street Address:

City, State:

Zip Code:

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
December 6, 1999

Richard Hugus

U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
Attn: SMDC-EN-V (Ms. Julia Hudson)
P.O. Box 1500
Huntsville, Alabama 35807-3801

RE: PAVE PAWS

U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command:

I am writing as a resident of Cape Cod, Massachusetts to request that an Environmental Impact Statement and Environmental Impact Report (EIS/EIR) be prepared for the Precision Acquisition Vehicle Entry Phased Array Warning System (PAVE PAWS) facility at the Massachusetts Military Reservation. The Draft EIS for the overall National Missile Defense Program does not address concerns of Cape Cod residents specific to the PAVE PAWS site here. A full EIS/EIR must be conducted for this facility, not limited to the proposed upgrade.

I have significant concerns about the health effects of radiation from PAVE PAWS, its location on land which has been recently designated as open space for the protection of the Upper Cape Cod water supply, and its future mission in the new missile defense program. Since the facility was built twenty-one years ago there has been a large increase in the surrounding population, without a thorough understanding of the effects on this population of high intensity radiation it generates. I believe the facility is inappropriate for this area and that it should be decommissioned immediately.

Richard Hugus
cc: F. Whitten Peters, Secretary of the Air Force
    Senator Edward Kennedy
    Governor Paul Cellucci

Anthony Verderese
7 Shakerhouse Road
Sandwich, MA 02563

U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
Attn: SMDC-EN-V (Ms. Julia Hudson)
P.O. Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

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Sincerely

Anthony Verderese
cc: F. Whitten Peters, Secretary of the Air Force
    Senator Edward Kennedy
    Governor Paul Cellucci
    Senator John F. Kerry

Exhibit 9.1.1-1: Reproductions of Written Comment Documents (Continued)
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<th>Section</th>
<th>RESPONSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barbara J. Warner</td>
<td>P-W-001.1</td>
<td>Program 1.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larry Petri</td>
<td>P-W-002.1</td>
<td>Program 2.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>In the event the NMD system is deployed, the system could remain operational as long as a threat exists to the United States from ballistic missiles. Construction of the system would take approximately 5 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>P-W-003.1</td>
<td>Program 2.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>The NMD system is not related to the Minuteman missiles being dismantled as part of the realignment at Grand Forks AFB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duane Otto – Cavalier Rural Electric Cooperative</td>
<td>P-W-004.1</td>
<td>Utilities 4.3.1.11</td>
<td></td>
<td>Comment noted. The analysis conducted for the EIS determined that power to the sites in North Dakota is adequate for the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senator Kent Conrad</td>
<td>P-W-005.1</td>
<td>Program 1.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-005.2</td>
<td>Program 1.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>For planning purposes the EIS analyzes the option of NMD deployment at two GBI sites, one site in Alaska and one site in North Dakota.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative Earl Pomeroy</td>
<td>P-W-006.1</td>
<td>Biological, Geology and Soils, Health and Safety 4.3.1.2, 4.3.1.4, 4.3.1.6, 4.3.4.3, 4.3.4.5, 4.3.4.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-006.2</td>
<td>Program 2.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>For planning purposes the EIS analyzes the option of NMD deployment at two GBI sites, one site in Alaska and one site in North Dakota.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative Robert Nowatzki</td>
<td>P-W-007</td>
<td>Program 1.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senator Kent Conrad</td>
<td>P-W-008.1</td>
<td>Program 1.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-008.2</td>
<td>Alternatives 2.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>For planning purposes the EIS analyzes the option of NMD deployment at two GBI sites, one site in Alaska and one site in North Dakota.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kathryn Becker</td>
<td>P-W-009.1</td>
<td>Program 1.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hal Gershman</td>
<td>P-W-010.1</td>
<td>All All</td>
<td></td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-010.2</td>
<td>Alternatives 2.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>For planning purposes the EIS analyzes the option of NMD deployment at two GBI sites, one site in Alaska and one site in North Dakota.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andy Warwick</td>
<td>P-W-011.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics 4.3.1.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>It was determined that the existing socioeconomic infrastructure (housing, schools, hospitals) in Alaska is adequate to support the NMD system. The NMD system would provide an economic benefit to the surrounding communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rick Solie</td>
<td>P-W-012.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics 4.3.1.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentor and Affiliation</td>
<td>Comment Number</td>
<td>Resource Area</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carolyn Gray</td>
<td>P-W-013.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The effects of the cold on the NMD system will be part of the design process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-013.2</td>
<td>Geology and Soils</td>
<td>4.3.1.4</td>
<td>The EIS addresses the potential for earthquakes in the State of Alaska. The NMD facilities will be designed taking into account the potential for earthquakes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gary Hutchinson</td>
<td>P-W-014.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Williams</td>
<td>P-W-015.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wally Powers - North Star Borough Economic Development Commission</td>
<td>P-W-016.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.19</td>
<td>Analysis in the EIS shows that the NMD system would provide a beneficial economic impact to the Fort Greely area if selected as a GBI site. In addition, the analysis within the EIS has determined that the proposed prison at Fort Greely would be compatible with the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-016.2</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.19</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-016.3</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.19</td>
<td>The socioeconomics section of the EIS provides the analysis of the economic benefit to the State of Alaska from the potential deployment of the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Gray</td>
<td>P-W-017.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.19</td>
<td>The socioeconomics section of the EIS provides the analysis of the economic benefit to the State of Alaska from the potential deployment of the NMD system. This analysis includes expenditures in the State of Alaska from both construction and operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonnie Williams – North Star Borough Assembly</td>
<td>P-W-018.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seth Yerrington</td>
<td>P-W-019.1</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>4.3.1.10</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brad White</td>
<td>P-W-020.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>The socioeconomics section of the EIS provides the analysis of the economic benefit to the State of Alaska from the potential deployment of the NMD system. This analysis includes expenditures in the State of Alaska from both construction and operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeff Cook</td>
<td>P-W-021.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-021.2</td>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>4.3.1.11</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-021.3</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>4.3.1.10</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-021.4</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Napoleone – Mayor of Anderson</td>
<td>P-W-022.1</td>
<td>Geology and Soils</td>
<td>3.6, 4.3.1.4</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentor and Affiliation</td>
<td>Comment Number</td>
<td>Resource Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-W-022.2</td>
<td>Biological Resources, Water Resources, Air Quality</td>
<td>4.3.1.1, 4.3.1.2, 4.3.1.12</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-022.3</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>3.12, 4.3.1.10</td>
<td>The transportation infrastructure around Clear AFS is addressed in the EIS. There are no plans to increase the length of the runway at Clear Airport as part of the NMD program.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scott Miller</td>
<td>P-W-023.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfred Preston</td>
<td>P-W-024.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donna Gardino</td>
<td>P-W-025.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diana Farrar</td>
<td>P-W-026.1</td>
<td>Land Use</td>
<td>4.3.1.7</td>
<td>The analysis within the EIS has determined that the proposed prison is compatible with potential deployment of the NMD system at Fort Greely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-026.2</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Potential cumulative impacts to the socioeconomic environment with both the proposed prison and NMD deployment were analyzed within the EIS. Results of the analysis determined that the existing socioeconomic infrastructure is adequate for both the prison and the NMD system.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rick Johnson - Delta Junction City Council</td>
<td>P-W-027.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julie Welch</td>
<td>P-W-028.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russell Bowdre</td>
<td>P-W-029.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
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<tr>
<td>D. Darla</td>
<td>P-W-030.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.R. Miller</td>
<td>P-W-031.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>The census data is the official government source for population data. In addition, the census provides a consistent approach to the environmental analysis between the different locations under study. The Southeast Fairbanks Census Area includes Big Delta, Delta Junction, Fort Greely, and the areas immediately surrounding these communities likely to be affected by NMD deployment. Minimal socioeconomic impact would be expected outside this census area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-031.2</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-031.3</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>The projected expenditures of the NMD system in the State of Alaska are addressed in the socioeconomics section.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-031.4</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soren Wuerth</td>
<td>P-W-032.1</td>
<td>Public Participation</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>The Draft EIS was provided to those requesting copies during the scoping process. The initial scoping process was announced by local media (newspapers and television) as well as ads being placed in the local newspapers. The public hearings were announced similar to that of the public scoping meetings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-032.2</td>
<td>Public Participation</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>The Draft EIS was provided to those requesting copies during the scoping process. In addition, copies of the Draft EIS could have been requested at the public hearings and would be sent out within a few days. The Executive Summary of the Draft EIS was available upon request at the public hearings.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentor and Affiliation</td>
<td>Comment Number</td>
<td>Resource Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-W-032.3 Public Participation</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-032.4 Public Participation</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>The public hearing process for the NMD Draft EIS followed the National Environmental Policy Act guidelines.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senator Loren Leman</td>
<td>P-W-033.1 Biological Resources</td>
<td>4.3.1.2</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-033.2 Health and Safety</td>
<td>4.3.1.6</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>P-W-033.3 Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-033.4 Noise, Cultural Resources</td>
<td>4.3.1.3, 4.3.1.8</td>
<td>Noise and cultural resources were analyzed within the EIS and no significant issues were identified. The archaeological survey completed at Fort Greely determined that no archaeological resources exist within the potential NMD deployment area.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-033.5 Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>P-W-034.1 Public Participation</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>The results of the Draft EIS were provided to local, state, and Federal government agencies as well as Native American organizations as part of the government to government coordination.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-034.2 Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Issues related to the location of the threat are outside the scope of this EIS. Sites analyzed in Alaska provide for maximum system performance.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-034.3 Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-034.4 Subsistence</td>
<td>4.3.1.14</td>
<td>Potential impacts to subsistence resources and uses were addressed in the EIS. It was determined that no significant impact would occur to subsistence from potential NMD deployment in Alaska.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-034.5 Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste Management</td>
<td>4.3.1.5</td>
<td>Potential impacts from hazardous materials use and the generation of hazardous waste from the NMD system were analyzed within the EIS. No impacts from the use of hazardous materials or the generation of hazardous waste were noted at any deployment location.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-34.6 Health and Safety</td>
<td>4.3.1.6</td>
<td>Potential impacts from accidental releases of hazardous materials from the NMD system were analyzed within the EIS. As noted in the EIS, the probability of an accident is remote. If an accident were to occur there would be little risk to the public.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senator Tim Kelly</td>
<td>P-W-035.1 Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fred Wood</td>
<td>P-W-036.1 Land Use</td>
<td>4.3.1.7</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Judge - Selectman, Town of Sandwich</td>
<td>P-W-037.1 Scope of the EIS</td>
<td>1.6, Appendix H</td>
<td>A Supplement to the NMD Deployment Draft EIS analyzed the potential NMD upgrades to the PAVE PAWS radars. The Air Force has announced that they will prepare an EIS analyzing the modernization, maintenance, and sustainment of operations of the PAVE PAWS radars.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentor and Affiliation</td>
<td>Comment Number</td>
<td>Resource Area</td>
<td>Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>Roy Gilbertson - Mayor Delta Junction</td>
<td>P-W-038.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dennis Schlotfeldt - Denali Transportation, Inc.</td>
<td>P-W-039.1</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>4.3.1.10</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sid Childens</td>
<td>P-W-040.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel H. Dinwoodie</td>
<td>P-W-041.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Lyle</td>
<td>P-W-041.2</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sue Walker</td>
<td>P-W-043.1</td>
<td>Scope of the EIS</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>The IFICS Data Terminal design and performance regions are still under study; therefore, the locations have not been finalized. As stated in the Draft EIS, once the design and locations have been determined the appropriate National Environmental Policy Act documentation will be completed. The Draft EIS does provide a programmatic analysis of the potential impacts from an IFICS Data Terminal to provide the decisionmaker with enough information on the potential impacts from deployment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-043.2</td>
<td>Scope of the EIS</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>As indicated in the EIS, the interceptors would only be launched from the GBI site in defense of the nation in the event of a ballistic missile attack. The environmental impacts of wartime operations are highly speculative and are not susceptible to meaningful analysis in an EIS. Such an analysis also would have no decisional significance given the obvious catastrophic impacts of a ballistic missile attack involving nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-043.3</td>
<td>Biological Resources</td>
<td>4.3.1.2</td>
<td>Potential impacts to wetlands were analyzed in the EIS. The NMD program will coordinate any potential impacts to wetlands with the appropriate regulatory agency prior to the start of construction. If required, potential impacts to any wetlands would be mitigated as required by the appropriate state and Federal agencies. The EIS does discuss the potential mitigation measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-043.4</td>
<td>Health and Safety</td>
<td>4.3.4.7</td>
<td>The potential impact of electromagnetic radiation has been analyzed in the Draft EIS. The analysis is based on the American National Standards Institute/Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers standards. The exposure limits established by the American National Standards Institute/Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers are a consensus safety standard developed by representatives of physicians, scientific communities, industry, Government Agencies, and the public. Potential exposure to electromagnetic radiation from the XBR would be below the American National Standards Institute/Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers guidelines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-043.5</td>
<td>Subsistence</td>
<td>4.3.5</td>
<td>As analyzed in the Draft EIS, the potential impact to subsistence harvesters from laying the fiber optic cable would be short-term and only occur during the initial cable laying process. Prior to the fiber optic cable laying process, the NMD program would work with the local community to avoid potential conflicts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9.1.1-2: Responses to Written Comments (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commentor and Affiliation</th>
<th>Comment Number</th>
<th>Resource Area</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-043.6</td>
<td>Scope of the EIS</td>
<td>1.6, Appendix H</td>
<td>A Supplement to the NMD Deployment Draft EIS analyzed the potential NMD upgrades to the PAVE PAWS radars. The Air Force has announced that they will prepare an EIS analyzing the modernization, maintenance, and sustainment of operations of the PAVE PAWS radars.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-043.7</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilbert McIntyre</td>
<td>P-W-044.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ross Coen</td>
<td>P-W-045.1</td>
<td>Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste Management</td>
<td>4.3.1.5, 4.3.4.6</td>
<td>Potential impacts to hazardous materials use and hazardous waste generation have been analyzed in the EIS. Appropriate plans would be in place to minimize any potential release of these substances into the environment. In addition, all appropriate Federal, state, and local regulations would be followed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-045.2</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael N. Friborg</td>
<td>P-W-045.3</td>
<td>Public Participation</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Loer - Minnkota Power Cooperative, Inc.</td>
<td>P-W- 47.1</td>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>4.3.1.11, 4.3.4.12</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donna J. Gardino</td>
<td>P-W-048.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Potential cumulative impacts to the socioeconomic environment with both the proposed prison and NMD deployment were analyzed within the EIS. Results of the analysis determined that the existing socioeconomic infrastructure is adequate for both the prison and the NMD system. Total employment numbers if both were implemented would be lower than when Fort Greely was fully operational.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-048.2</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dan Beck - Delta/Greely Schools</td>
<td>P-W-049.1</td>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>4.3.1.11</td>
<td>Comment noted. The utilities at Fort Greely are adequate for the proposed NMD program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-049.2</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentor and Affiliation</td>
<td>Comment Number</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert L. Bright – Community and Economic Development City of Valdez, Alaska</td>
<td>P-W-050.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Manitakos Jr. – SRI International</td>
<td>P-W-051.1</td>
<td>Health and Safety</td>
<td>4.3.4.7</td>
<td>The updated standard will be referenced in the next version of the EIS, but this does not change the analysis because the thresholds identified did not change from the 1992 version to the 1999 version of the American National Standards Institute/Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers C95.1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-051.2</td>
<td>Health and Safety</td>
<td>4.3.4.7</td>
<td>The XBR does not operate at 8,000 MHz. The maximum permissible exposure was based upon the operating frequencies of the XBR. Also, as the frequency decreases, the averaging time for exposure increases. Simulations have been performed for other standards, even standards down to 1 mW/cm² over 30 minutes, and in all cases the XBR has not exceeded the American National Standards Institute/Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers standards outside of 150 meters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-051.3</td>
<td>Health and Safety</td>
<td>4.3.4.7</td>
<td>The Draft EIS considers the worst case thresholds for both controlled and uncontrolled environments. The thresholds identified were more stringent for the uncontrolled environment, and they were applied in the analysis. In addition, the appropriate safety measures (e.g., software controls, keep out areas) would be in place in the controlled environment to ensure worker exposure is below prescribed safety standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-051.4</td>
<td>Health and Safety</td>
<td>4.3.4.7</td>
<td>The XBR does not exceed the peak-power maximum permissible exposure of 100kV/m at any time. This will be incorporated into the next version of the EIS.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| | P-W-051.5 | Health and Safety | 4.3.4.7 | The exposure calculation for multiple sources is as follows:  
\[
\sum (df \cdot E_i^2)/MPE_i^2 \leq 1
\]
where,  
- \(df\) = duty factor  
- \(E\) = electric field strength (V/m)  
- \(MPE\) = maximum permissible exposure (V/m)  
The environmental transmitters around the XBR do not significantly contribute to the exposure calculations for multiple sources. Therefore, the cumulative environment will not exceed the American National Standards Institute/Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers thresholds based upon the recommendation of the American National Standards Institute/Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers C95.1 1999 Annex D. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commentor and Affiliation</th>
<th>Comment Number</th>
<th>Resource Area</th>
<th>Section</th>
<th>RESPONSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paul Knopp - Deltana Community Corporation</td>
<td>P-W-052.1</td>
<td>Health and Safety, Land Use, Socioeconomic, Biological Resources</td>
<td>4.3.1.2, 4.3.1.6, 4.3.1.7, 4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duane L. Otto - Cavalier Rural Electric</td>
<td>P-W-053.1</td>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>4.3.1.11, 4.3.1.12</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative, Inc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senator Robin Taylor</td>
<td>P-W-054.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-054.2 Program</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-054.3 Program</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>For planning purposes the EIS analyzes the option of NMD deployment at two GBI sites, one site in Alaska and one site in North Dakota.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-054.4 Program</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senator Loren Leman</td>
<td>P-W-055</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>See responses to written comments P-W-033.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karen Button</td>
<td>P-W-056.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-056.2 Environment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.0, 4.0</td>
<td>A description of the existing environment and potential impacts to that environment from deployment of the NMD system is provided in the EIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-056.3 Hazardous Materials and Hazardous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.3.1.5</td>
<td>The EIS analyzes potential impacts to hazardous waste management from deployment of the NMD system including existing site contamination that may be affected from NMD deployment. Other military site contamination and required remediation are outside the scope of this EIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste Management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert H. Tilly, P.E.</td>
<td>P-W-057.1</td>
<td>Geology and Soils, Transportation, Water Resources, Utilities, Socioeconomic</td>
<td>4.3.1.4, 4.1.3.9, 4.3.1.10, 4.3.1.11, 4.3.1.12</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 9.1.1-2: Responses to Written Comments (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commentor and Affiliation</th>
<th>Comment Number</th>
<th>Resource Area</th>
<th>Section</th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Francis J. Schwindt</td>
<td>P-W-058.1</td>
<td>Air Quality</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Text of the EIS has been revised to incorporate comment.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-058.2</td>
<td>Air Quality</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Text of the EIS has been revised to incorporate comment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scott Vaughn</td>
<td>P-W-059.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>For planning purposes the EIS analyzes the option of NMD deployment at two GBI sites, one site in Alaska and one site in North Dakota.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Jeffery J. Creamer</td>
<td>P-W-060.1</td>
<td>Program, Socioeconomics</td>
<td>1.0, 4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
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<tr>
<td>George H. Dufman</td>
<td>P-W-061.1</td>
<td>Scope of the EIS</td>
<td>1.6, Appendix H</td>
<td>A Supplement to the NMD Deployment Draft EIS analyzed the potential NMD upgrades to the PAVE PAWS radars. The Air Force has announced that they will prepare an EIS analyzing the modernization, maintenance, and sustainment of operations of the PAVE PAWS radars.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Michael Jones</td>
<td>P-W-062.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-062.2</td>
<td>Alternatives</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>NMD architecture has evolved since 1992. Section 2.5 addresses why only sites in Alaska and North Dakota were considered as potential deployment locations. The performance region for NMD GBI deployment was the northern half of Alaska; no other sites outside this region would meet all of the necessary system performance criteria, and therefore were not considered except for sites in North Dakota. Sites in North Dakota were selected based on their location within the 1972 ABM Treaty Deployment Area. This EIS includes analysis of the proposed NMD system. If other system requirements are defined that require expansion of the NMD system to other locations, then additional environmental analysis will be prepared as required.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-062.3</td>
<td>Health and Safety</td>
<td>4.3.16</td>
<td>The potential for an aircraft to have an accident during GBI transportation is no greater than any other commercial or military aircraft flight; therefore, the potential for an accident is considered remote.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-062.4</td>
<td>Health and Safety</td>
<td>4.3.16</td>
<td>The figures containing the general locations of the potential GBI sites include the area necessary for the missile silos and the explosive safety quantity distances. The silos would be located on each installation so that the explosive distances would be contained within the base boundary except for Missile Site Radar in North Dakota, which does not have enough land to contain these safety distances. However, existing safety easements at this site provide the required safety distances for NMD. No rail or major transportation corridors are within any safety distances. Appropriate Department of Defense safety criteria will be followed for on-base structures that may fall within the safety area. Figure 2.2.1-1 shows the basic GBI site layout including explosive safety quantity distances. This entire area should be contained within the 600-acre site depicted on the site location figures.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-062.5</td>
<td>Health and Safety</td>
<td>4.3.16</td>
<td>See response to written comment P-W-062.4. Figure 2.4.1-5 has been revised to show the base boundary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jannmarie Amend</td>
<td>P-W-063.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentor and Affiliation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kirk Hage</td>
<td>P-W-064.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dale H. Young, Jr. – Tok Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>P-W-065.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>For planning purposes the EIS analyzes the option of NMD deployment at two GBI sites, one site in Alaska and one site in North Dakota.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judith Schlebecker</td>
<td>P-W-066.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>A Supplement to the NMD Deployment Draft EIS analyzed the potential NMD upgrades to the PAVE PAWS radars. The Air Force has announced that they will prepare an EIS analyzing the modernization, maintenance, and sustainment of operations of the PAVE PAWS radars.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bruce K. Gagnon – Global Network Against Weapons &amp; Nuclear Power in Space</td>
<td>P-W-067.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeanne L. Hanson – National Marine Fisheries Service</td>
<td>P-W-067.2</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Operation of the NMD system during wartime which could cause space debris is outside the scope of this EIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-067.3</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physicians for Social Responsibility</td>
<td>P-W-068.1</td>
<td>Biological Resources</td>
<td>3.4, 4.3.1.2, 4.3.5.1</td>
<td>The text has been revised to include anadromous and resident fish occurrence at inland sites in the site description and the potential impacts to these species from NMD deployment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-068.2</td>
<td>Biological Resources</td>
<td>4.3.5.1</td>
<td>The text has been revised to include a separate discussion of potential impacts to Essential Fish Habitat. The section has been expanded to include a discussion of anadromous fish in freshwater habitat, and appropriate potential mitigation measures have been added.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-068.3</td>
<td>Biological Resources</td>
<td>4.3.5.1</td>
<td>The text has been revised to include the potential mitigation measures to the proposed fiber optic cable and other potential cable routes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-068.4</td>
<td>Biological Resources</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>Text has been revised to include recommended changes to the affected environment site descriptions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryan Schuetze</td>
<td>P-W-069.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-070.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Diana Farrar</td>
<td>P-W-071.1</td>
<td>Land Use</td>
<td>4.3.1.7</td>
<td>The analysis within the EIS determined that the proposed prison is compatible with potential deployment of the NMD system at Fort Greely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-071.2</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Potential cumulative impacts to the socioeconomic environment with both the proposed prison and NMD deployment were analyzed within the EIS. Results of the analysis determined that the existing socioeconomic infrastructure is adequate for both the prison and the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bill Sheffield – Alaska Railroad Corporation</td>
<td>P-W-072.1</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>Figure has been revised to include the rail line from Fairbanks to Eielson AFB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mike Milligan</td>
<td>P-W-073.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-073.2</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Potential economic impacts from Russian foreign policy are too speculative to permit realistic analysis in this EIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tony Knowles – Office of the Governor, Alaska</td>
<td>P-W-074.1</td>
<td>Permits Appendix I</td>
<td>Text has been revised to include a list of potential permits; however, it is too early in the planning process to put a project timetable to the permit process. The NMD Site Activation Group, along with the Alaska Corps of Engineers, is establishing permit requirements and timetables for the permit process as construction planning becomes more defined.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-074.2</td>
<td>Coastal Consistency Determination</td>
<td>Appendix G</td>
<td>The coastal consistency determination provided in appendix G is programmatic for the proposed fiber optic cable line. Once the exact alignment is determined a formal determination will be submitted. The coastal consistency determination for XBR activities proposed on Eareckson AS (Shemaya Island) in appendix G is based on site-specific information and is the formal determination provided for review. As stated in appendix G, the proposed activities on Eareckson AS have been determined to be consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the Alaska Coastal Management Program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-074.3</td>
<td>Permits Appendix I</td>
<td>Text has been revised to include provided permits.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-074.4</td>
<td>Geology and Soils, Land Use</td>
<td>4.3.1.4, 4.3.1.7</td>
<td>The Draft EIS notes that purchase of state-owned gravel resources would require a materials sale contract. The text has been revised in the Land Use section to include the potential need for Right-of-Way entry requirements from the State of Alaska.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-074.5</td>
<td>Biological Resources</td>
<td>4.3.5.1</td>
<td>The text of the EIS has been revised to include the potential need for a Fish Habitat Permit from the Alaska Department of Fish and Game.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-074.6</td>
<td>Biological Resources</td>
<td>3.4.1.1</td>
<td>The text of the EIS has been revised as recommended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-074.7</td>
<td>Subsistence</td>
<td>3.16, 4.2.15, 4.3.1.14</td>
<td>The NMD program has and will continue to coordinate with affected subsistence communities on proposed activities. The EIS text has been revised to include more information on the historic subsistence patterns among the interior Athapaskans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-074.8</td>
<td>Subsistence</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>The text of the EIS has been revised as recommended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-074.9</td>
<td>Subsistence</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>The text of the EIS has been revised to include more information on the native Athapaskans in the areas around Clear AFS, Fort Greely, Eielson AFB, and the Yukon Training Area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-074.10</td>
<td>Subsistence</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>The text of the EIS has been revised to better clarify the information in the subsistence discussion of Eielson AFB and the Yukon Training Area. Also, the text was clarified to show that recreational users were the primary people to whom the hunting, trapping, and fishing permits were issued.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-074.11</td>
<td>Subsistence</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>The text of the EIS has been revised to include the native and non-native community of Dot Lake.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentor and Affiliation</td>
<td>Comment Number</td>
<td>Resource Area</td>
<td>Section</td>
<td>RESPONSE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arjun Makhijani – Institute for Energy and Environmental Research</td>
<td>P-W-074.12</td>
<td>Subsistence</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>This sentence was slightly altered and moved to the middle of the next paragraph where its context seemed more appropriate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-074.13</td>
<td>Subsistence</td>
<td>4.2.15, 4.3.4.15, 4.3.1.14</td>
<td>The analysis conducted in the EIS was not entirely based on evaluations conducted in other military EIS documents. It only served as a baseline to which more analysis was conducted. The text has been revised to better reflect this analysis which goes beyond the information from the other military EIS documents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-074.14</td>
<td>Subsistence</td>
<td>4.2.15.4</td>
<td>The text of the EIS has been revised to correct the mistake.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christopher Paine, David Adelman – Natural Resources Defense Council</td>
<td>P-W-075-1</td>
<td>Scope of the EIS</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>Comment noted. The range of alternatives considered in the EIS is appropriate in light of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization’s statutorily-based objective to be ready to support the potential deployment of a land-based NMD system. An environmental analysis of matters such as the risks from weapons of mass destruction or approaches such as preemptive strikes on weapons of mass destruction facilities, increased international cooperation, or enhanced inspection regimes would be inherently speculative and unmanageable. Likewise, an environmental analysis of hypothetical impacts that an NMD deployment may have on U.S. relations with other nations or on the U.S. strategic posture is similarly impracticable and is outside the scope of the National Environmental Policy Act. Finally, as indicated in the EIS, assessment of the potential threat and technical maturity of the NMD elements will be factors considered in a decision whether to deploy the system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-076.1</td>
<td>Alternatives</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>The range of alternatives considered in the EIS is appropriate in light of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization’s statutorily-based objective to be ready to support the potential deployment of a land-based NMD system. An environmental analysis of matters such as cooperative monitoring, preemptive strikes, or massive retaliation would be inherently speculative and unmanageable. Analysis of a hypothetical boost phase system is likewise impracticable given current limitations of that technology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-076.2</td>
<td>Comparative Analysis</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>Table 2.7-1 sets out a summary of potential impacts and mitigations associated with the alternative sites. This is done in a side-by-side narrative tabular format to facilitate ease of comparison by the casual reader. However, as noted in chapter 4, the majority of impacts are associated with construction related to deployment of the NMD system, with relatively few impacts related to operation. In addition, these impacts are quite similar for most of the candidate sites, which does not provide clear environmental distinctions between the sites for most resource areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-076.3</td>
<td>Cumulative Impacts</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>Since the IFICS Data Terminals are geographically separated from each other, often by thousands of miles, no cumulative impacts are anticipated from siting of the IFICS Data Terminals themselves. While some new fiber optic cable will need to be laid over land, in most cases this will involve at most several kilometers of new cable lines to hook into the extensive existing fiber optic cable network in the United States. Chapters 3 and 4 include discussions, to extent possible, of areas in which new fiber optic lines may be installed, including extensive discussions of the potential ocean cable route to Shemya. Where possible, new cable lines would be routed using existing easements. New easements or rights-of-way would be obtained where necessary.</td>
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<td>Commentor and Affiliation</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-W-076.4</td>
<td>Environmental Consequences</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>Where it was considered useful, quantitative information was included in table 2.7-1. However, a conscious effort has been made in this EIS not to include excessive numerical information where statistics and figures are not as effective in conveying the environmental impacts as a descriptive narrative. For resource areas such as air, noise, socioeconomics, and transportation, where quantitative information is more meaningful, it is included in the text and tables in chapters 3 and 4. Information in the EIS was organized to correspond to the anticipated decisionmaking process, in that it allows consideration of the full array of alternative sites for each system element rather than being limited to a series of artificially constructed element configurations. The large geographical separation between major system elements, moreover, removes or reduces the potential for cumulative impacts from the existence of the separate elements.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-076.5</td>
<td>No-Action Alternative</td>
<td>2.0, 4.2</td>
<td>Potential cumulative impacts from the dismantlement or destruction of the Stanley R. Mickelsen SAFEGUARD Complex in North Dakota are addressed in chapter 4 of the EIS. Available information as to the uses of bases that will be decommissioned in whole or in part as a result of the Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) process is also included, along with available information concerning the reduction of personnel and disposition of facilities and real estate. The military departments, however, conduct separate National Environmental Policy Act analysis in support of their individual BRAC actions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-076.6</td>
<td>Scope of the EIS</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization completes National Environmental Policy Act documentation at appropriate times to support decisionmaking milestones for its programs. A summary of existing National Environmental Policy Act documents relating to the NMD program activities are included in section 1.6 of the Draft EIS. The 1999 documents noted in the comment were prepared in support of approved and currently ongoing NMD research and development activities such as rocket booster testing and ground based interceptor design. This EIS is being prepared to support potential deployment of the actual system to operational locations, which is distinct from research and development and which is still pending decision. While the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) would support NMD once it is deployed, it is an Air Force program, and its primary functionality is unrelated to NMD. For this reason, the Air Force is preparing separate National Environmental Policy Act documentation, as referenced in this EIS. Routine GBI maintenance and operations are discussed in chapter 4 of the EIS. Major missile maintenance activities would take place at an offsite integration facility. Since this facility would be geographically removed from the deployment site, the probability of any cumulative impacts is considered remote.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-076.7</td>
<td>Health and Safety</td>
<td>4.3.1.6</td>
<td>Accidents, either during transportation or at a deployed site, would not be expected to have significantly different environmental effects from site to site. In addition, most activities would occur on military installations, where air traffic and management of explosives occur on a regular basis. The Department of Defense routinely transports missiles and other explosives and has an excellent safety record. A catastrophic accident of the kind described is extremely remote and is adequately described in section 4.3.1.6. of the Draft EIS. The ground based interceptor missiles would not be deployed within the Alaska Maritime National Wildlife Refuge, since the candidate GBI sites are in the Alaska interior at Clear AFS, Fort Greely, and the Yukon Training Area near Eielson AFB.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabriel Scott – Cascadia Wildlands Project</td>
<td>P-W-077.1</td>
<td>Alternatives</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>As indicated in the EIS, the decision to be made is whether to deploy the NMD system and if a deployment decision is made where to deploy. The EIS analyzes various alternative locations for the NMD elements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentor and Affiliation</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-W-077.2</td>
<td>Cumulative Impacts</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>Only one radar would be deployed for NMD in either Alaska or North Dakota. Additionally, given the geographic separation distance between Alaska and North Dakota, no cumulative impacts to the environment in either region would occur from deployment in either state. Where there was the potential for multiple NMD elements to be deployed in the same geographic region, cumulative impacts were analyzed in the EIS.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-077.3</td>
<td>Scope of this EIS</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>Environmental analysis on the Upgraded Early Warning Radars has been included in the Final EIS. The location of the fiber optic cable has not been finalized. The EIS does include a programmatic analysis of the potential environmental impacts from laying the fiber optic cable. As noted in the EIS few environmental impacts would be expected from the fiber optic cable. Required infrastructure at the deployment sites was noted in the EIS and analyzed. The requirements for missile production and other facilities have not been finalized. The appropriate environmental analysis for activities at these facilities will be performed, as required. Since these locations would not occur within the same geographic region as the deployment sites, no cumulative impacts would occur.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-077.4</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-077.5</td>
<td>Alternatives</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>The EIS analyzes the potential impacts of both the No-action Alternative and the Proposed Action, which is to deploy a ground-based NMD system. The Proposed Action includes multiple alternatives to select from for each NMD element. The decision to select the No-action Alternative or Proposed Action would be based on the factors noted in the above response.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-077.6</td>
<td>Project Description</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>The EIS analyzes the current information for NMD deployment. If any significant changes to the program are made, the appropriate environmental documentation will be prepared, as required.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-077.7</td>
<td>Decommissioning and Disposal</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>The EIS provides a programmatic analysis of the potential impacts of decommissioning and disposal of the NMD system. Since disposal of the system may not occur for many years there may be advancements in disposal technology or changes in environmental regulations that can not be analyzed today. If the system is built and a disposal decision is made the appropriate environmental documentation will be performed, as required. Disposal of the system will follow all pertinent environmental regulations. NMD is developing pollution prevention plans to minimize the hazardous materials used in system deployment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-077.8</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Continued testing of the NMD system under the No-Action Alternative has been addressed in the 1994 Ballistic Missile Defense Programmatic EIS. In addition, other National Environmental Policy Act documentation analyzing NMD testing is summarized in section 1.6.1 of this EIS.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-077.9</td>
<td>Biological Resources</td>
<td>4.3.1.2, 4.3.4.3</td>
<td>Potential impacts to biological resources from NMD deployment were analyzed in the EIS.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-077.10</td>
<td>Alternatives, Land Use</td>
<td>2.0, 3.9.1.2, 4.3.4.8</td>
<td>Shemya Island was selected as an alternative because it maximized system performance and had already been developed by the military. As noted in the EIS few environmental impacts would occur from deployment of the XBR at Shemya Island. In addition, NMD has been coordinating with the NMFS and the USFWS on potential impacts to threatened and endangered species. No impacts to threatened or endangered species were identified. As analyzed in the EIS, the NMD program would be consistent with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the USFWS and the Air Force for operation of Shemya Island. Consistent with the existence and operation of the defense facilities, the use of the lands by the Air Force shall be in accordance with the use of the island as a national wildlife refuge according to the MOU. The Air Force is authorized use of the island in the interest of national defense. The NMD program is consulting with the USFWS.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-077.11</td>
<td>Biological Resources</td>
<td>3.4.1.2</td>
<td>The text has been revised to more clearly state that 30 acres of land would be disturbed. In addition, the text has been revised to more adequately describe the region of influence.</td>
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<td>Commentor and Affiliation</td>
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<td>P-W-077.12</td>
<td></td>
<td>Biological Resources</td>
<td>4.3.4.3.1</td>
<td>The EIS analyzes the potential impacts to threatened and endangered species that may occur on Shemya Island and the surrounding waters. No impacts to any listed species were noted from construction or operation of the XBR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-077.13</td>
<td></td>
<td>Biological Resources</td>
<td>4.3.4.3.1</td>
<td>Potential sites on Sheyma Island were reviewed. Because of various facilities, operational, and environmental constraints the only viable location was the one analyzed in the EIS. Analysis has indicated that minimal impact to bird species would occur from deployment of the XBR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-077.14</td>
<td></td>
<td>Biological Resources</td>
<td>4.3.4.3.1</td>
<td>The potential impacts to bird species were analyzed in the EIS. The results of the analysis determined that there would be no bird or wildlife mortality as a result of the XBR. Potential impacts were compared to the existing COBRA DANE radar currently operating on Eareckson AS. The COBRA DANE radar operates in a frequency with a greater potential to harm wildlife, yet the USFWS has not noted any wildlife mortality as a result of its operation; therefore, no impacts to wildlife would be expected from the XBR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-077.15</td>
<td></td>
<td>Biological Resources</td>
<td>4.3.4.3.1</td>
<td>As noted above, no bird mortality is expected from operation of the XBR. For a bird or other wildlife to be affected, they would have to be in the main beam for prolonged periods of time. Since the main beam is not stationary and in continuous motion, and birds would also be in motion, it is unlikely that a bird would be in the main beam for long periods of time. In addition, the main beam would not be pointed toward the ground, so no wildlife on the ground would be impacted by the main beam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-077.16</td>
<td></td>
<td>Biological Resources</td>
<td>4.3.4.3.1</td>
<td>As noted in the EIS, no short or long-term effects to wildlife would be expected from operation of the XBR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-077.17</td>
<td></td>
<td>Biological Resources</td>
<td>3.4.1.4</td>
<td>Text of the EIS has been revised for clarity regarding the June 1999 wildfire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-077.18</td>
<td></td>
<td>Biological Resources</td>
<td>3.4.1.4</td>
<td>The vegetation figures represent the predominant vegetation types found within the installations and do not reflect, in general, human disturbance, which is discussed in the text where applicable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-077.19</td>
<td></td>
<td>No-Action Alternative</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>The No-action Alternative for each potential NMD deployment location analyzes the environmental impacts of continued operation at the site and any potential future planned projects or activities independent of the Proposed Action. The affected environment provides a description of the past and current conditions of the environment at each potential location.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-077.20</td>
<td></td>
<td>Air Quality</td>
<td>4.3.1.1, 4.3.4.1</td>
<td>Potential impacts to air quality were noted in the EIS for each deployment location. As stated in the EIS, there would be no change to the current attainment status at any of the locations. In addition, no state or federal regulatory standards would be exceeded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-077.21</td>
<td></td>
<td>Biological Resources</td>
<td>4.3.1.2</td>
<td>The EIS text has been revised to provide a description of maintenance activities. These activities are associated with the upkeep of facilities that would be required of any building and grounds (e.g., painting, mowing, building repair).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-077.22</td>
<td></td>
<td>Environmental Resources</td>
<td>3.0, 4.0</td>
<td>The text of the EIS has been revised to better describe the ROI that is analyzed in the resource sections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-077.23</td>
<td></td>
<td>Biological Resources</td>
<td>3.4.1.4</td>
<td>The text of the EIS has been revised to say “migratory and resident birds.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-077.24</td>
<td></td>
<td>Biological Resources</td>
<td>4.3.1.2</td>
<td>Effects of security lighting are expected to be minimal as analyzed in the EIS. Consultation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Alaska Department of Fish and Game, and other applicable agencies on this and other concerns is ongoing to identify appropriate mitigation measures to minimize any impacts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-077.25</td>
<td></td>
<td>Environmental Resources</td>
<td>3.0, 4.0</td>
<td>Chapter 7.0 provides a detailed list of all references used in this EIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentor and Affiliation</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-W-077.26</td>
<td></td>
<td>Environmental Consequences</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>Cumulative impacts were addressed in this EIS in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act. Additional information has been added to those areas where cumulative impacts could be expected from past historical, current, and future activities. For NMD deployment these areas could include wetlands, wildlife habitat, and water resources. No impacts to the other resource areas would be expected that could result in short or long-term cumulative impacts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-077.27</td>
<td></td>
<td>Biological Resources</td>
<td>4.3.1.2, 4.3.4.3</td>
<td>Potential impacts of noise and human disturbance on wildlife were addressed in the EIS. Consultation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Alaska Department of Fish and Game, and other applicable agencies on this and other concerns is ongoing to identify appropriate mitigation measures to minimize any impacts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-077.28</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cumulative Impacts</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>The EIS analyzes the potential cumulative impacts of current and planned activities at all of the proposed NMD locations. None of the deployment locations would require the displacement of training activities to other locations that are not currently used for military training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-077.29</td>
<td></td>
<td>Biological Resources, Geology and Soils</td>
<td>4.3.1.2, 4.3.1.4</td>
<td>The EIS analyzes all known potential ground-disturbing activities including proposed roads.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-077.30</td>
<td></td>
<td>Geology and Soils</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>Detailed soil surveys were not available for all sites; however, other sources such as environmental management plans, biological surveys, and remediation activities were used to detail soil conditions at each site.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-077.31</td>
<td></td>
<td>Geology and Soils</td>
<td>4.3.1.4</td>
<td>The EIS addresses the potential for earthquakes at the potential deployment locations. Facilities would be designed taking into account the potential for earthquakes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-077.32</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste Management</td>
<td>4.3.1.5, 4.3.4.6</td>
<td>The EIS analyzes the use of hazardous materials and the generation of hazardous waste at all potential NMD deployment locations. The use and generation of these materials would be in compliance with appropriate regulations, therefore avoiding potential impacts from use and generation of these materials. In addition, potential credible accident scenarios are addressed in the health and safety section of the EIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-077.33</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste Management</td>
<td>4.3.1.5, 4.3.4.6</td>
<td>As noted in the EIS, the appropriate spill response plans would be developed to address any potential accidental release of hazardous materials or waste to the environment. Following the response plans would minimize impacts to the environment. Any spills that would occur would be remediated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-077.34</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste Management</td>
<td>4.3.1.5, 4.3.4.6</td>
<td>Herbicides would be used for ground maintenance activities. The types of pesticides as defined by the U.S. EPA include insecticides, herbicides, rodenticides, fungicides, nematicides, fumigants, and antimicrobials as well as some disinfectants; therefore, the EIS text addressing pesticides also includes the use of herbicides.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-077.35</td>
<td></td>
<td>Health and Safety</td>
<td>4.3.1.6</td>
<td>The EIS analyzed the potential for fires to affect the GBI deployment locations in those areas where there is a high potential. As noted in the EIS the Bureau of Land Management fire protection status levels around Fort Greely and the Yukon Training Area would be revised to ensure adequate fire protection of the GBI site. In addition, the appropriate firebreaks would be provided around the facilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-077.36</td>
<td></td>
<td>Health and Safety</td>
<td>4.3.1.6</td>
<td>As noted in the EIS, the potential of an aircraft accident is considered remote. In addition, the probability of an accident to occur so that the aircraft would land on the missile field is very low. Therefore, this scenario is not considered in the EIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-077.37</td>
<td></td>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>4.3.1.11, 4.3.4.12</td>
<td>The potential cumulative impact to utility usage on the military installation and in the surrounding communities was analyzed in the EIS. No cumulative utility impacts were noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentor and Affiliation</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-W-077.38 Subsistence</td>
<td></td>
<td>Subsistence</td>
<td>4.3.4.15, 4.3.1.14</td>
<td>Potential impacts to subsistence resources were analyzed in the EIS and no impacts were noted. Review and comment to the subsistence section were provided by the Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Subsistence Division (P-W-074). Although they generally concurred with our findings, they did provide recommended changes to the subsistence resource section. The text of the EIS has been revised to reflect these changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charley Walton</td>
<td>P-W-078.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pete Hallgren – Department of Economic Development, Delta Junction</td>
<td>P-W-079.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anne Hanley</td>
<td>P-W-080.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ron Rafson</td>
<td>P-W-081.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard H. Loring, Sandra Lee Tompkins, Kathleen Nickerson Hardy - Town of Sandwich, Board of Health</td>
<td>P-W-082.1</td>
<td>Scope of the EIS</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>A Supplement to the NMD Deployment Draft EIS analyzed the potential NMD upgrades to the PAVE PAWS radars. The Air Force has announced that they will prepare an EIS analyzing the modernization, maintenance, and sustainment of operations of the PAVE PAWS radars.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dan O’Neill – Fairbanks Daily News-Miner</td>
<td>P-W-083</td>
<td>Public Participation</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>Comment noted. Comments provided during the scoping period are used to identify the significant environmental issues related to a proposed action to assist in focusing the EIS. The National Environmental Policy Act does not require the publication of comments made during the scoping process. Draft EISs prepared for Federal agencies do not typically included the publication of comments made during the scoping process. All comments formally submitted during the Draft EIS review process will be included in the Final EIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Schlesinger</td>
<td>P-W-084</td>
<td>Scope of the EIS</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>A Supplement to the NMD Deployment Draft EIS analyzed the potential NMD upgrades to the PAVE PAWS radars. The Air Force has announced that they will prepare an EIS analyzing the modernization, maintenance, and sustainment of operations of the PAVE PAWS radars.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentor and Affiliation</td>
<td>Comment Number</td>
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<tr>
<td>Richard and Sharon Judge - Selectman, Town of Sandwich and Spokesperson, Cape Cod Coalition to Decommission PAVE PAWS, respectively</td>
<td>P-W-085.1</td>
<td>Public Participation</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>The public review period on the Draft EIS was extended to January 19, 2000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-085.2</td>
<td>Scope of the EIS</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>A Supplement to the NMD Deployment Draft EIS analyzed the potential NMD upgrades to the PAVE PAWS radars. The Air Force has announced that they will prepare an EIS analyzing the modernization, maintenance, and sustainment of operations of the PAVE PAWS radars.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-085.3</td>
<td>Scope of the EIS</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>The IFICS Data Terminal design and performance regions are still under study; therefore, the locations have not been finalized along with the fiber optic cable line. As stated in the Draft EIS, once the design and locations have been determined the appropriate National Environmental Policy Act documentation will be completed. The Draft EIS does provide a programmatic analysis of the potential impacts from an IFICS Data Terminal and the fiber optic cable to provide the decisionmaker with enough information on the potential impacts from deployment. Potential XBR deployment locations are analyzed in the EIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-085.4</td>
<td>Scope of the EIS</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>A Supplement to the NMD Deployment Draft EIS analyzed the potential NMD upgrades to the PAVE PAWS radars. The Air Force has announced that they will prepare an EIS analyzing the modernization, maintenance, and sustainment of operations of the PAVE PAWS radars.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tape</td>
<td>P-W-086.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miriam Paguin</td>
<td>P-W-087.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Heacock – Alaska IMPACT</td>
<td>P-W-088.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alice Slater – Global Resource Action Center for the Environment</td>
<td>P-W-089.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system. Effects of missile intercepts and associated debris during time of war is outside the scope of this EIS.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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### Table 9.1.1-2: Responses to Written Comments (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Comment Number</th>
<th>Resource Area</th>
<th>Section</th>
<th>RESPONSE</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kerynn Fisher</td>
<td>P-W-090.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celia Hunter</td>
<td>P-W-091.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sean McGuire</td>
<td>P-W-092.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clinton Li... (unreadable)</td>
<td>P-W-093.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kevin Maxwell</td>
<td>P-W-094.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bill Fuller</td>
<td>P-W-095.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sally Andersen</td>
<td>P-W-096.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leila Ryterski</td>
<td>P-W-097.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amy Marsh</td>
<td>P-W-098.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paul Greli</td>
<td>P-W-099.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Laurel Drews</td>
<td>P-W-100.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nancy Fresco</td>
<td>P-W-0101.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gerry Wood</td>
<td>P-W-102.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stu Pecler</td>
<td>P-W-103.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larry Landry</td>
<td>P-W-104.1</td>
<td>Scope of the EIS</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>As indicated in the EIS, the interceptors would only be launched from the GBI site in defense of the nation in the event of a ballistic missile attack. The environmental impacts of wartime operations are highly speculative and are not susceptible to meaningful analysis in an EIS. Such an analysis also would have no decisional significance given the obvious catastrophic impacts of a ballistic missile attack involving nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bob Dubois</td>
<td>P-W-105.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cynthia Cody - U.S. EPA</td>
<td>P-W-106.1</td>
<td>Decision to Be Made</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>As stated in section 1.4, the decision to be made is whether to deploy an NMD system. If the decision is to deploy, this decision would also include the selection of deployment sites from among the alternatives considered in this EIS (see table 1.4-1). The text of section 1.4 has been revised to state that the decision to make includes the selection of the sites analyzed in this EIS. The Department of Defense will forward its recommendations for NMD deployment to the administration who will make the ultimate decision regarding NMD deployment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-106.2</td>
<td>Cumulative Impacts</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>Additional information has been added to those areas where cumulative impacts could be expected from past historical, current, and future activities. For NMD deployment these areas could include wetlands, wildlife habitat, and water resources. No impacts to the other resource areas would be expected that could result in short or long-term cumulative impacts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-106.3</td>
<td>Mitigation Measures</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>The text has been revised where appropriate to include more detailed information on mitigation measures. Specifically, more detailed potential wetland mitigation measures have been provided. However, until the deployment sites are selected, the site design completed, and the permitting process is initiated with the appropriate agencies, the specific mitigation measures and ratio of any replacement wetlands, if required, can not be determined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-106.4</td>
<td>Biological Resources</td>
<td>4.3.1.2</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
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Table 9.1.1-2: Responses to Written Comments (Continued)

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<th>RESPONSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P-W-106.5 Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste Management</td>
<td>4.3.1.5</td>
<td>The EIS contains the latest information regarding potential hazardous substance sites located at all potential NMD deployment locations. Since many of the investigations/remediations are in progress, the actual stage of remediation when construction starts cannot be determined. As stated in the EIS, once sites have been selected and prior to construction, the NMD program will coordinate with the appropriate installation personnel to determine the status of any on-going investigation/remediation that could be impacted by NMD activities. Potential impacts to ongoing investigation/remediation would be minimized.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-106.6 Health and Safety</td>
<td>4.3.1.6</td>
<td>As stated in the EIS, with all of the multiple safeguards in place and previous Department of Defense experience in handling liquid propellants, the potential for a mishap is remote; however, to provide the decisionmaker with sufficient information to evaluate each location a potential catastrophic (and unlikely) event of an instantaneous spill of one of the propellants was analyzed to evaluate the magnitude of the potential consequences. For this event to happen, it would require a penetration (e.g., by a forklift or sharp object) of outer canister which the booster is placed, the booster casing, and then the propellant tank during shipping or transferring. The text of the EIS has been revised to reflect this fact. Once in the silo, this event should not occur. The only liquid propellant that could exceed established safety standards if a leak were to occur was nitrogen tetroxide (table 4.3.1.6-1). Even in this case, most public exposure could be mildly irritating to the eyes and nose and include coughing. As part of standard operating procedures, safety response plans will be written, including evacuation plans before deployment. Given the remote potential for a mishap and the safety plans that will be in place, no mitigation would be required.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-106.7 Health and Safety</td>
<td>4.3.4.7</td>
<td>Initial analysis evaluated both the American National Standards Institute/Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers standard of 6.33 milliwatts per square meter over a 9.5-minute period and the Federal Communication Commission standard of 1 milliwatt per square centimeter over a 30-minute period. The results of this analysis indicated the American National Standards Institute/Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers standard was more stringent because of the shorter averaging time, and therefore, it was used in the analysis. The evaluation indicated that the electromagnetic radiation from the proposed XBR would also be below the Federal Communication Commission standard at the 150-meter controlled area boundary. The analysis indicated that at the 150-meter controlled area boundary the levels would be 0.8 milliwatts per square centimeter averaged over 30 minutes. The text of the EIS has been revised to include this information.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-106.8 Health and Safety</td>
<td>4.3.4.7</td>
<td>The actual amount of time the XBR will operate has not been determined; however, it is expected with collateral missions such as tracking space debris and assisting in Space Shuttle flights, the XBR will operate much of the time. The text has been revised to include this information. Analysis within the EIS assumes the XBR is operating. As shown in the analysis with the XBR operating there would be no impacts to human health or the environment and no cumulative impacts from continued operation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-106.9 Health and Safety</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>The information in table 3.8-1 is from the American National Standards Institute/Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Table 2-Maximum Permissible Exposure for Uncontrolled Environments in section 4.1.2. The number “10” in the table is correct. Additionally, the XBR does not operate in the 15,000 to 300,000 megahertz range for which the correction is noted and therefore would not affect the analysis.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-106.10 Water Resources</td>
<td>4.3.1.12, 4.3.4.13</td>
<td>The Draft EIS currently states that “Following construction, the current Storm Water Pollution Prevention Plan (SWPPP) would be amended to define the methods and procedures for controlling the discharge of pollutants in the storm water runoff from the NMD facilities and would include Best Management Practices that would be implemented for the NMD facilities.” Your example control measures will be added to the text of the document.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-W-106.11 Water Resources</td>
<td>2.2.1.2</td>
<td>The text in section 2.2.1.2, page 2-6, will be modified to indicate that the monitoring system will detect leakage. There is no “acceptable level” of leakage. As indicated on page 2-8, in the description of the GBI at the deployment site, “At all times there would be a system monitoring the liquid propellants on the GBI for potential leaks. Any leaks detected would be remediated quickly.”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9.1.1-2: Responses to Written Comments (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commentor and Affiliation</th>
<th>Comment Number</th>
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<th>Section</th>
<th>RESPONSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>William R. Taylor - U.S. Department of the Interior</td>
<td>P-W-107.1</td>
<td>Biological Resources</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>The text of the EIS has been updated to note the change in status of the American peregrine falcon. As noted in the EIS, no impacts to American peregrine falcon would occur from NMD deployment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-107.2</td>
<td>Project Description</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>The Description of Proposed Action and Alternatives in section 2.0 of the EIS provides details of the proposed NMD system including proposed buildings and the approximate square footage and figures showing a basic design layout. For example, table 2.2.1-1 provides the proposed GBI facilities, approximately square footage, and the activities expected in each facility. In addition, figure 2.2.1-1 provides a conceptual layout of the GBI site including roads and parking areas around buildings. This detail is provided for each NMD element analyzed in the EIS. These basic designs would be applied to any deployment location.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-107.3</td>
<td>Alternatives</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>The NMD program will identify a Preferred Alternative in the Final EIS. For those elements addressed programmatically, such as the In-Flight Communications System Data Terminals, site specific environmental documentation will be prepared once final designs and alternative locations have been identified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-107.4</td>
<td>Alternatives</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>As indicated in the EIS, the decision to be made is whether to deploy the NMD system and if a deployment decision is made where to deploy. The EIS analyzes various alternative locations for the NMD elements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-107.5</td>
<td>Biological Resources</td>
<td>3.4, 4.2.3</td>
<td>The text of the EIS has been revised to include those state species of special concern identified and potential environmental impacts to those species. It is not anticipated that the NMD program would result in significant impacts to these species.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-107.6</td>
<td>Biological Resources</td>
<td>4.2.3</td>
<td>The text of the EIS has been revised to include more impact analysis to biological resources, including the development of potential wetland mitigations to minimize impacts. However, until the deployment sites are selected, the site design completed, and the permitting process is initiated with the appropriate agencies, the specific mitigation measures and ratio of any replacement wetlands, if required, can not be determined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-107.7</td>
<td>Biological Resources</td>
<td>4.2.3</td>
<td>Comment noted. The EIS states that prior to construction the appropriate wetland permits would be obtained. Additional potential wetland mitigation measures have been added to the Final EIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-W-107.8</td>
<td>Biological Resources</td>
<td>3.4, 4.3.5.2</td>
<td>Text of the EIS has been revised to include more detail and impact analysis on wildlife habitat and wetlands found along the roadways in North Dakota where the fiber optic cable could be placed. Once the final route is establish, there would be additional consultation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to mitigate any potential impacts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Theuer</td>
<td>P-W-108.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Hugus</td>
<td>P-W-109.1</td>
<td>Scope of the EIS</td>
<td>1.6, Appendix H</td>
<td>A Supplement to the NMD Deployment Draft EIS analyzed the potential NMD upgrades to the PAVE PAWS radars. The Air Force has announced that they will prepare an EIS analyzing the modernization, maintenance, and sustainment of operations of the PAVE PAWS radars.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthony Verderese</td>
<td>P-W-110.1</td>
<td>Scope of the EIS</td>
<td>1.6, Appendix H</td>
<td>A Supplement to the NMD Deployment Draft EIS analyzed the potential NMD upgrades to the PAVE PAWS radars. The Air Force has announced that they will prepare an EIS analyzing the modernization, maintenance, and sustainment of operations of the PAVE PAWS radars.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9.1.2 E-MAIL COMMENT DOCUMENTS—NMD DEPLOYMENT DRAFT EIS

Individuals who commented on the Draft EIS in e-mail form are listed in table 9.1.2-1 along with their respective commentor ID number. This number can be used to find the e-mail document that was submitted and to locate the corresponding table on which responses to each comment are provided.

9.1.2.1 E-Mail Comments

Exhibit 9.1.2-1 presents reproductions of the e-mail comment documents that were received in response to the Draft EIS. Comment documents are identified by commentor ID number, and each statement or question that was categorized as addressing a separate environmental issue is designated with a sequential comment number.

9.1.2.2 Response to E-Mail Comments

Table 9.1.2-2 presents the responses to substantive comments to the Draft EIS that were received in e-mail form. Responses to specific comments can be found by locating the corresponding commentor ID number and sequential comment number identifiers.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Commentor and Affiliation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Matthew Freeman</td>
<td>P-E-001</td>
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<tr>
<td>– Federal Aviation Administration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Meyer</td>
<td>P-E-002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karen Button</td>
<td>P-E-003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soren Wuerth</td>
<td>P-E-004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. and Mrs. Emanuel Karr</td>
<td>P-E-005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pamela Miller</td>
<td>P-E-006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Alaska Community Action on Toxins</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pamela Miller</td>
<td>P-E-007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Alaska Community Action on Toxins</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rion Schmidt</td>
<td>P-E-008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia Kilgore</td>
<td>P-E-009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dave Knight</td>
<td>P-E-010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annie O’Reilly</td>
<td>P-E-011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June Rusten</td>
<td>P-E-012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fern Katz</td>
<td>P-E-013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kay Stoner</td>
<td>P-E-014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamara Wolske</td>
<td>P-E-015</td>
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Table 9.1.2-1: Public Comments on the Draft EIS (E-Mail Documents) (Continued)

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marilyn Gayle Hoff</td>
<td>P-E-016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Sara Luther</td>
<td>P-E-017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pam Bruce</td>
<td>P-E-018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pam Bruce</td>
<td>P-E-019</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barbara Green</td>
<td>P-E-020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Bruce</td>
<td>P-E-021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Schlesinger</td>
<td>P-E-022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard and Sharon Judge</td>
<td>P-E-023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Selectman, Town of Sandwich and Spokesperson, Cape Cod Coalition to Decommission PAVE PAWS, respectively</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Leah Penniman</td>
<td>P-E-024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patricia Wulp</td>
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<tr>
<td>Patricia Bracey</td>
<td>P-E-026</td>
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<tr>
<td>Audrey J ordan Barnard</td>
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<td>Tanja Winter</td>
<td>P-E-028</td>
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<td>Stanley Jacobs</td>
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<td>Terri Middleton</td>
<td>P-E-030</td>
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<td>Joseph Rueter</td>
<td>P-E-031</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ann Heidenreich</td>
<td>P-E-032</td>
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<tr>
<td>Justin Mason</td>
<td>P-E-033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hatton Greer</td>
<td>P-E-034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandra and Steve Arnold-Ganey</td>
<td>P-E-035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trang Duong</td>
<td>P-E-036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim O’Connor</td>
<td>P-E-037</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joanna Reichhold</td>
<td>P-E-038</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cammisa Ray</td>
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<td>David Katz</td>
<td>P-E-040</td>
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<tr>
<td>Karen Button</td>
<td>P-E-041</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mark Luttrell</td>
<td>P-E-042</td>
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<td>Margaret Weitzmann</td>
<td>P-E-043</td>
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<td>Shaunti Kiehl</td>
<td>P-E-044</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>P-E-045</td>
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<tr>
<td>Geoff Holland</td>
<td>P-E-046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Director, Institute for Global Futures Research</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. David Klein</td>
<td>P-E-047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Welch</td>
<td>P-E-048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Deputy Chief, Fairbanks Police</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
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<tr>
<td>Nancy Booth</td>
<td>P-E-049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Kirsch</td>
<td>P-E-050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valerie Heinonen</td>
<td>P-E-051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Corporate Responsibility Representative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nick Drake</td>
<td>P-E-052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holly Gwinn Graham</td>
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<td>Carah Ong</td>
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<td>- Coordinator, Abolition 2000 Nuclear Age Peace Foundation</td>
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<td>Leila Ryterski</td>
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<td>- Coordinator, Abolition 2000 Nuclear Age Peace Foundation</td>
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<td>Alan Seegert</td>
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<td>Michael-Pierre Giraud</td>
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<td>Mary Saunders</td>
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<td>Stuart Paulson</td>
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David,

It was nice meeting you at the Delta Junction Public Hearing. Thank you for the opportunity to provide comments to the Draft Environmental Impact Statement.

Federal Aviation Administration Airports Division offers the following comments.

Page es-5, first incomplete sentence: 250 to 360 direct jobs. I find it difficult to understand where these jobs will be geographically. It would help to use a figure similar to ES-1 to describe where the jobs will be located.

Page es-19, Paragraph ES.1.6.2.4, second paragraph. The Airport Facilities Directory is called the Alaska Supplement.

Page es-19, Paragraph ES.1.6.2.4, third paragraph, first sentence, airport surveillance radar used as a mitigation measure. There is only an ATCBI-5 beacon only radar. It is installed on an airport surveillance radar (ASR) tower and ASR radar system. The primary radar electronics and sail was removed. The antenna speed was reduced from an ASR to ARSR (long range radar) sweep. The search range was extended from about 50-miles to 250-miles. I'm not sure the radar could be modified to accommodate a primary radar system with a slower RPM. Procuring a long range radar with primary search from a national prospective is difficult. Few national resources are available. Facilities similar to Shemya ATCBI-5 are located in Alaskan and the lower 48 including Deadhorse, Blikra Island, Middleton Island, and Red Table Mountain.

Page 2-26, Paragraph 2.4.1.2 Fort Greely, Alaska: upgrading the runway for cargo aircraft is part of the solution. However, a major element is missing here. For the airport to function as part of the NMD system, the airport should be conveyed or leased to a public organization to allow unrestricted public use, and delete the requirement for a civil landing permit. Increased traffic from Fairbanks, Anchorage, and direct flights from the lower 48 will occur. This will require additional apron space, and area to accommodate cargo, and passenger traffic. Civilian fueling facilities and aviation and passenger accommodations will be required. This is assuming the missiles are not transported directly to Allen Army Airfield. If the missiles are flown direct, the impacts to the airport will be much greater.

Page 4-220, Paragraph 4.3.1.10.1.2, Air Transportation; Same comment as above. I believe there will be impacts to air transportation in the Delta Junction area. It is unlikely visitors will all drive from Fairbanks.

Matt Freeman
FAA Airport Planner

Exhibit 9.1.2-1: Reproductions of E-Mail Comment Documents
I believe that the BMD is a waste of money, with over 100 billion spent with little or no results, except for the additional profits made by the contractors. The system has had no REAL tests, only those that gave the system the best chance of success. The building of the system will destabilize the nuclear test ban treaties as other powers have said they will respond with new offensive systems, the cheapest and best way to defeat any anti-missile system.

The US is ignoring the United Nations, as it called on Nov. 1 1999 to prevent an arms race in space. Only the US and its client state, Israel, abstained. Finally, the issue is not one that the people of the US want. Take away the campaign contributions of companies and the WELL PAYING JOBS offered to retired military officers, the program would be cancelled. Who is our enemy? Yesterday it was China and now, China is going to enter the WTO with American assistance. Thus, all the technology of the BMD system will be available to China and other nations, through, our system of "Free enterprise" as nations expand their activities in space. Just look at the recent problems with Hughes and its transfer of technology to China.

Rest assured that I will work to defeat this so-called BMD system on the above points, plus, the additional point that the system is too expensive for the American economy. As evidenced by the current proposal to cut 1% from the domestic budget.

Robert E. Meyer

(AM SENDING THESE VIA EMAIL BECAUSE IT WASN'T CLEAR TO ME THAT THEY WERE ACCEPTED THROUGH YOUR WEBSITE, SO YOU MAY END UP WITH TWO SETS OF COMMENTS FROM ME.)

15 November 99

To Whom It May Concern:

I am a lifelong resident of Alaska and have witnessed first-hand some of the U.S. military's debacles here. I am opposed to the proposed national missile defense system overall and do not want to see additional military installations in Alaska. Some of the reasons I am opposed directly correspond to the four factors being considered in the Draft EIS, others are not. I will begin with those not addressed in the DEIS.

It saddens me to report that there are about 650 known toxic sites in Alaska that are either active or inactive military sites. These sites are contributing to high cancer rates and have left soils so polluted in some areas that rural and village residents are unable to use them. For example, in the village of Galena residents were told not to plant gardens in the ground due to its high toxicity. It took villagers a number of years to even gain that much information since the military was not immediately forthcoming in detailing the location of toxic drum containers they had left behind. Once located, the community applied for an EPA grant so they could clean up the sites. It is clear to me that the military should have done this.

In another, more well-known example, Native Alaskans in Alaska's interior were purposely injected with a form of radiation approximately 25 years ago by the military. The reason? The Department of Defense wanted to know if radiation reacted the same in humans in arctic climates.

A third example is the nuclear testing done on Amchitka Island, also about 25 years ago. The public and the workers were lied to about this site when told that 1) the site would never leak and 2) that it was safe for the workers. Although enough information was gathered at that time to know radiation was indeed not safe, this was not shared. Now, many of those workers are dead from cancer. The list could go on. The sites and their outcome are well documented. Unfortunately, those who have suffered the worst from military presence are those who depend most on the land for its plentiful food, Alaska's native peoples. Many are fighting hard for the removal of these toxic sites. The U.S. military, clearly, does not have good relations with many of Alaska's people.

I listened in the Anchorage public meeting to two state legislators claim this will be good for Alaska. The two biggest reasons they gave were the $10.5 billion will be spent and how that would bring jobs and that it would increase Alaska's security. I couldn't disagree more. First, the majority of the $10.5 billion will be spent by those who are specialists in building such a missile site. The few Alaskans that may be employed will be out of jobs soon after construction is complete. In other words, it is a short-term boom at the most. Second, this will increase, not decrease Alaska's security by making us more of a target. The most interesting
Exhibit 9.1.2-1: Reproductions of E-Mail Comment Documents (Continued)

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<th>COMMENT NUMBER</th>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Korea, which has of these three by far the most advanced capability, recently agreed to halt its missile flight test program while negotiating with the United States. It has not tested a missile capable of hitting the United States with a nuclear warhead.</td>
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<td>On Iran, experts are divided on whether it will be able to field a missile that could threaten the U.S. within the next decade. Iran is under severe international sanctions that effectively hinder it from developing any new missiles. Neither country would be able to field an intercontinental missile if the decision to deploy is delayed until the missile defense technology is shown to be effective.</td>
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<td>In conclusion, I urge that this proposed missile defense system be forgotten. Worldwide there are enough in the collective nuclear arsenals to destroy our planet many times over. There is no winner in an arms race. Our only hope is in arms reduction and treaties with other countries. Our position as a world leader demands forward thinking. It is time to test peace, not additional weapons of war.</td>
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<td>Thank you for considering my comments.</td>
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<td>Karen L. Button</td>
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Point to note with these two legislators though was that the one from Southeast Alaska said the site should be located in Anchorage (at Ft. Richardson, a Superfund site), while the one from Anchorage said the site should be located in Delta Junction (at Ft. Greely, a site with a leaking reactor) Neither wanted it in their own community. This says a lot, I believe.

If there is to be $10.5 billion spent on military issues in Alaska, it should be used to clean up all the currently contaminated sites, then compensate those who health has suffered from exposure to these toxins.

I will address issues from the DEIS: Effect on Arms Control; Technology Readiness; Cost Effectiveness; and The Perceived Threat, below:

1) Effect on Arms Control: This missile defense system is a clear breach of the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty. Without modifications to the ABM Treaty by Russia, the program will remain in violation. Russia has opposed all changes to the Treaty and they, along with President Clinton have stated that the Treaty is the "cornerstone of strategic stability." By withdrawing from this Treaty, the U.S. may jeopardize the START process with Russia, which is intended to reduce strategic nuclear arsenals.

This would clearly send the wrong message to Russia, as well as other nuclear capable countries, thereby increasing threat to our national security.

2) Technology Readiness: The technology is unproven and will not be proven by next summer. By next June, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization will have conducted only three intercept tests of the proposed national missile defense system. Nineteen such tests are scheduled before the first limited system is scheduled to go online, in late 2005. The first intercept attempt, on October 2, hit its target. However, this was only a test of the "kill vehicle," the last component that destroys the incoming warhead. The booster rocket, the radars, and the integrated management system were not tested. In fact, only one of the first three tests will involve the complete system, and all three will use surrogate parts, not the actual components.

3) Cost Effectiveness: In January 1999, the Clinton Administration added $6.6 billion for procurement to its five year plans for national missile defense, creating a $10.5 billion total budget. However, most estimates expect even the small initial system envisioned in that budget would cost far more. The General Accounting Office estimated that it would cost $18 to $28 billion to deploy a small system. This merely adds to the over $60 billion spent since President Ronald Reagan launched his Strategic Defense Initiative in 1982. Money that has not lead to the deployment of a single effective system. It will take far more testing, and substantially increased budgets, to deploy a system that can be shown to be reliable and effective.

4) The Perceived Threat: The proposed national missile defense system is being developed in an attempt to respond to the potential threat from so-called rogue states, specifically North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. North
Exhibit 9.1.2-1: Reproductions of E-Mail Comment Documents (Continued)

November 15, 1999

SMDC-EN-V,
Ms. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
PO Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801
email: wncdes@smdc.army.mil

RE: Comments on BMDO's DEIS for NMD

Ms. Hudson:

Thank you for offering the opportunity to comment on your proposal to bring a "National Missile Defense" system to Alaska. The environmental consequences such a project would have, and on your public process efforts.

We respectfully offer the following comments on this study:

Public process

* Insufficient public notice. The poor turnout at the Nov. 4 Anchorage meeting (approximately 25 non-military people) did not indicate a lack of interest in the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization's plan, rather it showed that the public (at least in Anchorage) was not properly notified of the National Missile Defense Draft Environmental Impact Statement proposal. Many of our members complained they missed the meeting and would have like to learn more about the plan and to provide comment on the DEIS.

* No DEIS available. The Alaska Action Center finds it extraordinarily irresponsible that the BMDO failed to have even a single Draft EIS on hand at a meeting held "to learn about and comment on the findings in the Draft EIS . . ." Those who showed up were told to "look it up on our web site." Unfortunately many people, including many AAC members, do not have access to the internet. The AAC completed a card requesting a copy of the Draft EIS, but to date has not received the documents.

* Poor location. Public meetings in Anchorage are rarely held at hotels, much less one that is as difficult to find as the West Coast International Inn.

* Inadequate time to provide comment. Considering your meeting was held at an obscure location, with little public notice, allowing only 11 days to examine a document only available through the internet, and that you failed to have even one Draft EIS on hand, for time the public to comment on the plan is inadequate.

Recommendations

* Extend your comment period deadline by no less than six (6) months to provide adequate in put from Alaskans concerning this $10 billion project.

* Organize at least two (2) additional Anchorage meetings. One meeting would be held to obtain additional, more comprehensive, and informed comments regarding the environmental impacts of the NMD. A second meeting should be held to discuss the broader implications of the NMD, those issues beyond the scope of the Draft EIS. Both meetings should be heavily advertised. Considering BMDO's budget, this shouldn't be a problem.

Advertised media sources should include: display ads in Anchorage Daily News, the Anchorage Press, Alaska Newspapers, television ads on all networks; mailings to all Alaska residents. Ads for meetings and comments should be reviewed in advance by independent researchers and polisters to verify their objectivity.

* Hold a debate, separate from the two public meetings, in which Alaskans will have the opportunity to hear opposing arguments concern your proposal.

Environment

Due to lack of accessibility to a Draft EIS and the inordinately short amount of time to provide comments, our questions/comments on environmental impacts are limited to responding to the brief information provided at the public hearing:

* What would be long term economic costs to community from increased military infrastructure, boom-bust cycle, military waste left behind, loss of income from visitors, etc.?

* What would be the electromagnetic hazard from missile tests and deployment?

* What are impacts to air quality from testing and deployment?

* Due to the military's record in Alaska, we do not trust that any mitigation planned for in the DEIS would be carried out. How much will be allocated for mitigation?

Other concerns

Though the public was informed that any impacts outside environmental concerns are "beyond the scope" of the Draft EIS, we feel it is requisite the BMDO allow the public to ask questions on those features of the NMD that are not specific to environmental impacts. Alaskans should have the opportunity to have complete information on the NMD.

In Alaska, there are at least 648 military waste sites spread across the state-some of which are Environmental Protection Agency "Superfund" sites. With a budget this year of $267.7 billion, we expect the Department of Defense to clean up its mess before adding more military structures. The NMD could set a dangerous nuclear arms race precedent by violated the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, called by the Clinton Administration a "cornerstone of strategic stability." As the National Academy of Sciences warned in its 1997 report "The Future of US Nuclear Weapons Policy," by "locking in place thousands of warheads capable of being aimed at the United States," NMD "would be a very poor investment" (p. 46). Besides the NAS report, other studies have criticised NMD, including a report from an panel of former Pentagon and defense contractor officials headed by retired Air Force chief of staff Larry Welch. The Welch panel concluded the BMDO's program remain at "high risk" of failure ("Missile Plans Take a Hit," Anchorage Daily News, Nov. 14, 1999).
Thank you for considering our comments.

Respectfully,

S. ren Wuerth
Alaska Action Center

cc
Gov. Tony Knowles
Sen. Ted Stevens
Sen. Frank Murkowski
President Bill Clinton
Vice-president Al Gore

Dear Sirs,

We are writing to you to share our belief that the National Missile Defense program in not needed, as a realistic threat to the United States of America does not now exist. We must stop bankrupting our country’s budget over a desire to “control and dominate” space. This makes no sense in the current world situation when we need to achieve “win-win” solutions to the differences between nations.

We do not wish the United States of America to violate any international treaties. For the sake of our children, grandchildren and great grand children, we wish for you to create a safe world for our future.

Mr. and Mrs. Emmanuel Karr

Exhibit 9.1.2-1: Reproductions of E-Mail Comment Documents (Continued)
To Whom It May Concern:

With this letter, I am formally submitting the comments of Alaska Community Action on Toxics (ACAT), a program of the Alaska Conservation Foundation, on the Draft EIS for the National Missile Defense Program. The mission of ACAT is to protect human health and the environment from the toxic effects of contaminants. While being committed to achieving environmental justice, ACAT works to ensure responsible cleanup of contaminated sites while empowering community involvement in cleanup decisions. In addition, ACAT strives to stop the production, proliferation, and release of toxic chemicals. ACAT Program Director Pamela Miller prepared the comments presented at the public hearing in Anchorage. She holds a masters degree in environmental science and has over 20 years experience in biological and environmental research, education, and advocacy.

Alaska Community Action remains opposed to the proposed National Missile Defense deployment in Alaska or North Dakota on the grounds that it will be ineffective in achieving its purported purpose and is too costly. As stated in the hearing, Alaska has been used as a testing grounds for the military's biological, chemical, "conventional," and nuclear weapons. Much of the testing and deployment have resulted in severe contamination problems. As the technologies have become obsolete, the DoD has left its debris and contamination without accountability or responsibility to Alaska's people and environment. We are skeptical that the proposed missile defense system, if deployed in Alaska, would be any different.

The DoD has regarded Alaska as a prime strategic location for military operations from World War II through the Cold War and into present times. Military reservations in Alaska are some of the most polluted in the country. More than 648 military installations, both active and abandoned, are polluting the land, groundwater, wetlands, streams and air with extensive fuel spills, solvents, PCBs, dioxins, munitions, chemical weapons and radioactive materials. Fort Greely, one of the sites considered for the NMD deployment has a decommissioned nuclear reactor on site with a history of deliberate radioactive leakages and a series of "accidents." The reactor contains significant quantities of radioactive materials and has never been properly contained. The military has always been a powerful and influential presence in Alaska, but much of the information concerning the location, nature and extent of the military's contamination problems remains shrouded in secrecy or buried in government files and databases. Important documents are frequently misplaced, classified as secret or incomplete. The DoD should not expand its operations in Alaska without being accountable and responsible for the massive pollution problems it has created and continues to create. The DEIS minimizes environmental impacts from the proposed program, including those from the undersized cable and XBR facility. While some people in Alaska might welcome this program as a way of increasing jobs, we believe that it ultimately too great a risk to environmental health and security.

Alaska Community Action on Toxics has signed on to the comments submitted by the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers and other groups. The comments are as follows:

President Clinton has announced he will decide whether to deploy a national missile defense in June or July 2000. According to the President, that decision will be based on four factors: the readiness of the technology, the impact on arms control and relations with Russia, the cost effectiveness, and the threat. On each of these counts, the case for deployment is weak at best.

1. The technology is unproven, and cannot be shown to be reliable or effective by next summer's scheduled decision.

2. Unless Russia agrees to modify it, deployment would violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, a move that could unravel the entire nuclear non-proliferation regime and substantially increase the nuclear threat to the United States.

3. The cost of the system is unclear and likely to spiral upwards far beyond the $10.5 billion the Clinton Administration has budgeted over the next five years. The system cannot be shown to be effective and reliable under the current budget and deployment schedule.

4. The low threat cited as justification for deployment, particularly North Korea's small and untested long-range missile arsenal, does not warrant the damage U.S. missile defense deployment would wreak on relations with Russia and China.

Each of these factors is reviewed below in more detail.

1. The readiness of the technology: Unproven by next summer, and by 2005 By next June, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization will have conducted only three intercept tests of the proposed national missile defense system. Nineteen such tests are scheduled before the first limited system is scheduled to go online, in late 2005. The first intercept attempt, on October 2, hit its target. However, this was only a test of the "kill vehicle," the last component that destroys the incoming warhead. The booster rocket, the radars, and the integrated management system were not tested. In fact, only one of the first three tests will involve the complete system, and all three will use surrogate parts, not the actual components.

So few tests cannot show the system to be reliable and effective by next summer's scheduled deployment decision. Even by 2005, when the system is scheduled to finish its initial deployment, the additional tests cannot prove this highly complex system to be reliable against real-world threats. For example, the Patriot, adopted from an anti-aircraft missile system, achieved a perfect test record, hitting its target in all 17 of its intercept attempts. However, when used in the field during the Gulf War, it failed dramatically.

2. The effect on arms control: Increasing nuclear dangers The Clinton Administration is currently discussing with Russia modifications to the ABM Treaty that would allow the U.S. to deploy a "limited" national missile defense. Both Clinton Administration and Russian officials have repeatedly stated that the ABM Treaty remains the "cornerstone of strategic stability." To date, Russia has opposed all changes to the ABM Treaty and declared that U.S. withdrawal from it or
insistence on changes would end the START process that is reducing strategic nuclear arsenals. This would leave Russia with 6,000 warheads that could hit the United States, many ready for launch within 15 minutes of a decision to attack. China already perceives that U.S. efforts to build a missile defense are intended to weaken its deterrent. China’s current arsenal is around 20 long-range, single warhead missiles. However, it is in a slow modernization program to build longer-range missiles with multiple warheads. China would likely react to U.S. deployment of a missile defense by increasing the both the size of its arsenal and the pace of its improvements. Evidence of China’s response to U.S. talk of abrogating the ABM Treaty is already developing, with Reuters reporting on October 25 that China recently added $9.7 billion to its defense budget to improve its nuclear arsenal.

3. Cost Effectiveness: Unsubstantiated
In January 1999, the Clinton Administration added $8.6 billion for procurement to its five year plans for national missile defense, creating a $10.5 billion total budget. However, most estimates expect even the small initial system envisioned in that budget would cost far more. The General Accounting Office estimated that it would cost $18 to $28 billion to deploy a small system. This merely adds to the over $60 billion spent since President Ronald Reagan launched his Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983, money that has not lead to the deployment of a single effective system. It will take far more testing, and substantially increased budgets, to deploy a system that can be shown to be reliable and effective.

4. The Threat: Does not warrant rushed early deployment
The proposed national missile defense system is being developed in an attempt to respond to the potential threat from so-called rogue states, specifically North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. North Korea, which has of these three by far the most advanced capability, recently agreed to halt its missile flight test program while negotiating with the United States. It has not tested a missile capable of hitting the United States with a nuclear warhead.

On Iran, experts are divided on whether it will be able to field a missile that could threaten the U.S. within the next decade. Iraq is under severe international sanctions that effectively hinder it from developing any new missiles. Neither country would be able to field an intercontinental missile if the decision to deploy is delayed until the missile defense technology is shown to be effective.

Conclusion
Postponing the decision to deploy a national missile defense is an extremely low-risk course of action. Put simply, deploying a national missile defense MAY slightly reduce the low risk of a catastrophic attack on the U.S. carried out by a very few nuclear-armed missiles. That is true IF it proves capable of effectively intercepting incoming warheads. However, it WILL increase the risk of massive attack carried out with hundreds or thousands of such missiles that will destroy the United States entirely, along with much of the globe.

Please give careful consideration to our comments. Thank you.

Sincerely,
Pamela Miller
Pamela K. Miller
Program Director
Alaska Community Action on Toxics

Exhibit 9.1.2-1: Reproductions of E-Mail Comment Documents (Continued)
I am providing these additional comments from Alaska Community Action on Toxics.

This public process was a sham, with inadequate notification and incomplete information. The Draft ES was premature given that the system has not been fully tested. With the U.S. Senate’s failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the National Missile Defense Program a violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, this program would further provoke international mistrust, misunderstanding and further nuclear proliferation. It is time for the U.S. to take leadership in disarmament and promote peace.

Pamela Miller
Pamela K. Miller
Program Director
Alaska Community Action on Toxics

Dear Military,

As a lifelong Alaskan speaking only for myself, I object to the proposed missile defense project whole heartedly and without exception. As a First Nation person my rights and the rights of other Alaska Natives have been compromised time and time again, and although we were incorporated illegally, we are becoming educated about our rights under international law as indigenous people.

First of all the scoping only addresses the limited questions concerning the environmental issues one might have with the project. As many people know, there are numerous problems with this type of project that go beyond just the ramifications for its “footprint” or disturbance of the environment at the actual site.

The four reasons I would give President Clinton to just say no when making his decision on whether or not to construct and deploy a system to defend against a “single missile attack by a rogue nation”, are as follows:

1. The technology is unproven and cannot be shown to be safe or effective by next summer’s scheduled decision. A one time test that was a success is not enough guarantee that it will be in the future.

2. Deployment of this system would violate the Anti-Ballistic missile treaty, a treaty that Russia feels, if broken, could start the arms race all over again, when we still haven’t figured out what to do with all of the spent plutonium and nuclear waste existing on the planet today. This treaty if broken and the increased proliferation of nuclear devices that would accompany would increase the nuclear threat to the US and Alaska.

Our time and energy would be better spent trying to work on foreign relations with other countries rather than being militant and bickering with arms waiting for some country to attack us.

3. The cost of this project is uncertain and is likely to be much more than the 10.5 billion dollars that the Administration has budgeted over the next five years. Why not spend that money to clean up the land and water that the military has left polluted in Alaska, before starting new and uncertain projects that come from Pork Barrel spending. I’d like to see Alaskans put to work with DOD money, to clean up the mess that the military has left here. There are over 2,000 toxic sites in South Central Alaska alone. One of the proposed sites in Alaska, Fort Greely, has radioactive waste leaking into the permafrost from a damaged nuclear reactor there.

4. The low risk threat posed by North Korea and other “rogue nations”, and their untested long-range missile arsenal do not justify the damage to negotiations between the US and Russia or China that have slowed off a nuclear threat for now. I do not want to live under the oppressive cloud of imminent nuclear war as my parent did.

In addition to increasing Alaska’s vulnerability to attack by making it a target, this system includes the EXPAND radar system - a holdover from Reagans Star Wars agenda. The military has said that they would never point it at the Earth, but once again our lack of trust in the military is due to the fact that they have never once kept a promise here in Alaska.
Native people have been horribly experimented on with radioactive materials without their consent. Military toxic dumps have poisoned whole villages. Native voices have been quelled from the beginning of the US takeover in Alaska. Now you expect us to welcome a military project that has little or no basis in science, common sense, or ethics, and which makes us a target for the rest of the world to shoot at.

I don't think so, at least not this Native.

Thank you for accepting these comments.

citizen number 574-90-5793

Ron Schmidt

Alaska Center for the Environment
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

Comment on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the National Missile Defense (NMD) program.

Written by Rachel Julian November 1999

CND is extremely concerned that if the US deploys a NMD system it will cause global destabilisation that will impact upon the whole world including the UK. Russia is clearly angry that the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 1972 is being threatened by the US NMD plan, they have new missiles they intend to deploy against a NMD system. India and China, amongst others have said they will build new offensive systems if the US goes ahead with NMD plans.

In the UK we have at least two military bases that will be involved in the NMD system, Menwith Hill with the Space Based Infra-red System soon to be online and Fylingdales is an early warning tracking station. These bases are implicating the UK in the US NMD plan and making them targets in the event of a global conflict.

The NMD system is portrayed as defensive, but we believe it to be an 'offensive' system designed to allow the deployment of weapons in space. The US Space Command, in their Vision 2020, clearly spells out the US intention to 'control and dominate' space.

We believe that the deployment of NMD will be the first step towards a new global arms race that can only be damaging to all of us. This month the United Nations passed a resolution calling for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, we have seen so much warfare on earth, we do not need to transport it into space.

Any attack on the US is as likely to come from terrorist attack on earth as an intercontinental missile. There are so many ways for an attacker to counter a NMD that it cannot be worth the huge cost of creating a system so easily by-passed at a time when resources are so scarce.

We do not believe that NMD is needed and if deployed will be damaging to global peace and security. We will join with those across the world that want a peaceful future and will oppose any deployment by the US of NMD.

CND calls for a halt on all NMD tests and developments to prevent the fragile global situation we are in from falling into conflict and war.
I urge the president to stop measures to deploy Ballistic Missile Defense system and to stop the arms buildup. Let's work together to deploy peaceful measures such as talking and negotiating. When BMD’s are made there is a terrible compulsion to use them, such as a new toy. However, there is a terrible price to pay, such as the mass destruction in Yugoslavia last spring. Let's stop the madness now. Also, there is massive harm to the environment with such weapons. W E DON'T NEED BMD’s!”
Thank you.

O’reilly

November 15, 1999
Ms. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space & Missile Defense Command
Attn: SMDC-EN-V
PO Box 1900
Huntsville, AL 35807

Dear Ms. Hudson:

Our organization is writing in order to comment on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the National Missile Defense (NMD) Program. It is our understanding that the Pentagon will be making a recommendation to the president prior to June 2000 on the early deployment question.

We have the following comments:

1) The NMD system is not needed. There is no realistic threat. The attempt to create fear and hysteria about "rogue" states attacking the U.S. is an empty effort to sell the program to the public. No nation like North Korea or Iraq would attack the U.S. with nuclear weapons knowing full well that the U.S. would overwhelmingly retaliate against their nation.

2) NMD is not about defense. In fact, NMD is a Trojan horse, a way for the Pentagon and aerospace industry to get permission to put weapons into space while making it look like they are “defending” the American people. The U.S. Space Command, in their Vision for 2020, clearly spells out the U.S. intention to "control and dominate" space. At this very moment TRW, Boeing and Lockheed Martin are working on the space-based laser which will be a follow-on technology to NMD giving the U.S. “offensive” weapons in space.

NMD is the foot in the door for a return to Star Wars.

3) NMD is a waste of money. The Pentagon has already wasted over $120 billion on Star Wars development and the NMD program will only be more welfare for the aerospace corporations. These hard earned tax dollars of ours need to be used for other human and environmental needs.

4) NMD won’t work. Anyone that truly wanted to attack the U.S. would find much cheaper and more effective means of delivering ways of doing it. Suicide car bombs, cruise missiles and the like would not be deterred by NMD. Decoys on missiles or other counter measures would make NMD useless.

5) NMD will violate international treaties. Russia is already strongly reacting to NMD by rightly claiming that deployment of the system will violate the 1972 ABM Treaty. The United Nations passed a resolution on November 1, 1999 calling for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. By a vote of 138-0 (with the U.S. and Israel abstaining) the U.N. clearly showed that international concern is mounting to keep space protected from warfare. The U.N. Outer Space Treaty of 1967 outlaws the movement of war into space.

6) NMD will help to increase space pollution. Just days ago NASA was forced

Exhibit 9.1.2-1: Reproductions of E-Mail Comment Documents (Continued)
to move the international space station to a higher orbit in order to avoid being hit by a piece of space junk. If we allow the testing and deployment of space weapons systems we will create massive amounts of space junk that will, in the words of Apollo astronaut Edgar Mitchell, “Make it impossible for us to get off the planet”. Space must be viewed as an environment that needs to be protected from excessive contamination. The Pentagon is polluting the rest.

7) NMD is destabilizing. In recent days Russia has tested new missiles that they say they will deploy if NMD is approved. India, China and other powers have said they will respond with new offensive systems if the U.S. moves forward with NMD. Thus, we will be creating a new arms race. We wonder if the U.S. is intentionally trying to create this new instability as a rational for deployment of NMD. Either way, NMD deployment is dangerous and insane.

I can assure you that our organization will be working with groups and people all over the world to ensure that we do not put weapons into space. NMD is just the first step in a colossally evil plan to move the arms race into space. This must be resisted. We’ve seen enough warfare on this earth. We do not need to extend this bad seed into space.

Sincerely,

June Rusden

November 15, 1999

Ms Julie Hudson
U.S. Army Space & Missile Defense Command
Attn: SMDC-EN-V
PO Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807

Dear Ms Hudson:

- Our organization is writing in order to comment on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the National Missile Defense (NMD) program. It is our understanding that the Pentagon will be making a recommendation to the president prior to June 2000 on the early deployment question.

We have the following comments:

1) The NMD system is not needed. There is no realistic threat. The attempt to create fear and hysteria about “rogue” states attacking the U.S. is an empty effort to sell the program to the public. No nation like North Korea or Iraq would attack the U.S. with nuclear weapons knowing full well that the U.S. would overwhelmingly retaliate against their nation.

2) NMD is not about defense. In fact, NMD is a Trojan horse, a way for the Pentagon and aerospace industry to get permission to put weapons into space while making it look like they are “defending” the American people. The U.S. Space Command, in their Vision for 2020, clearly spells out the U.S. intention to “control and dominate” space. At this very moment TRW, Boeing and Lockheed Martin are working on the space-based laser which will be a follow-on technology to NMD giving the U.S. “offensive” weapons in space.

NMD is the foot in the door for a return to Star Wars.

3) NMD is a waste of money. The Pentagon has already wasted over $120 billion on Star Wars development and the NMD program will only be more welfare for the aerospace corporations. These hard earned tax dollars of ours need to be used for other human and environmental needs.

4) NMD won’t work. Anyone that truly wanted to attack the U.S. would find much cheaper and more effective means of delivering ways of doing it. Suitcase or car bombs, cruise missiles and the like would not be deterred by NMD. Decays on missiles or other counter measures would make NMD useless.

5) NMD will violate international treaties. Russia is already strongly reacting to NMD by rightly claiming that deployment of the system will violate the 1972 ABM Treaty. The United Nations passed a resolution on November 1, 1999 calling for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. By a vote of 138-0 (with the U.S. and Israel abstaining) the U.N. clearly showed that international concern is mounting to keep space protected from warfare. The U.N. Outer Space Treaty of 1967 outlaws the movement of war into space.

6) NMD will help to increase space pollution. Just days ago NASA was forced

Exhibit 9.1.2-1: Reproductions of E-Mail Comment Documents (Continued)
to move the international space station to a higher orbit in order to avoid having to decommission it if the United States is unable to afford its maintenance costs. Some experts believe that this will prevent the station from being used by potential adversaries. However, others argue that the station's primary function is to facilitate scientific research and cannot be easily decommissioned.

7) NMD is destabilizing. Russia has tested new missiles in recent months, and China is reportedly planning to develop its own NMD system. The deployment of NMD in the United States could be perceived as a threat by other countries and could escalate tensions in the region. We believe that a comprehensive approach to arms control is necessary to address these concerns.

I can assure you that our organization will continue to work towards a peaceful resolution of these issues. We believe that a diplomatic solution is possible and that it is in the best interests of all parties involved.

In peace,
Fern Katz, President
Women's Action for New Directions, Metro Detroit

Dear Ms. Hudson:
I am in full agreement with the below letter and echo the sentiments. I strongly oppose the NMD program.

KAY STONER

November 10, 1999
Ms Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
Attn: SMDC-EN-V
P.O. Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807

Dear Ms. Hudson:

Our organization is writing in order to comment on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the National Missile Defense (NMD) program. It is our understanding that the Pentagon will be making a recommendation to the president prior to June 2000 on the early deployment question.

We have the following comments:

1) The NMD system is not needed. There is no realistic threat. The attempt to create fear and hysteria about “rogue” states attacking the U.S. is an empty effort to sell the program to the public. No nation like North Korea or Iraq would attack the U.S. with nuclear weapons knowing full well that the U.S. would overwhelmingly retaliate against their nation.

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4) NMD won’t work. Anyone that truly wanted to attack the U.S. would find much cheaper and more effective means of delivering weapons of mass destruction. Decoys, or counter measures would make NMD useless.

5) NMD will violate international treaties. Russia is already strongly reacting to NMD by rightly claiming that deployment of the system will violate the 1972 ABM Treaty. The United Nations passed a resolution on November 1, 1999 calling for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. By a vote of 138-0 (with the U.S. and Israel abstaining) the U.N. clearly showed that international concern is mounting to keep space protected from
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I can assure you that our organization will be working with groups and people all over the world to ensure that we do not put weapons into space. NMD is just the first step in a colossal evil plan to move the arms race into space. This must be resisted. We’ve seen enough warfare on this earth. We do not need to extend this bad seed into space.

In peace,
Bruce K. Gagnon
Coordinator
Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space

My comment on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the National Missile Defense program:

PLEASE DO NOT IMPLEMENT THE NMD PROGRAM!

Let our future generations have a chance to build their lives in peace.
We have an overabundance of weapons of destruction as it is now.

If we continue to direct our dollars and other valuable resources (time, talent, ingenuity, etc.) towards negative pursuits such as NMD, we will have sealed the fate of the world for massive annihilation.

I implore you to let common sense and humanness prevail in this, please, no space missile program.

Thank you for your consideration in this matter.

Sincerely,
Tamara Wolske
Mother, Concerned citizen, Tax-payer

Exhibit 9.1.2-1: Reproductions of E-Mail Comment Documents (Continued)
Dear Sir or Madam:

I am writing to protest the latest US scheme to put more money in the pockets of the defense industry—namely the proposal to abrogate the ABM treaty by creating an anti-missile defense system. I strongly protest this proposed move. It would greatly destabilize our tenuous relations with Russia and China, very likely stimulating them to a renewed arms race. It would not protect the US from rogue states, who would have at their disposal much less costly delivery systems, against which an extravagant space-based system would be irrelevant. It would pollute and weaponize space, something which we have signed treaties not to do. The more treaties we abrogate, the more we will ourselves be regarded as a rogue state, not to be trusted, and our potential adversaries will be much more reluctant to enter into any such further agreements with us. The enormous amounts of money such a system would cost all comes courtesy of taxpayers who themselves have needs that are increasingly being disregarded in favor of greedy defense contractors. Please channel these funds toward human needs, rather than into the insatiable gutlet of the evil military industrial complex, now grown far out of proportion to even the warnings of President Eisenhower.

Sincerely,
Marilyn Gayle Hof

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Dear Sir/Madam:

I understand that you are holding hearings on the missile defense idea. The following points represent my views. I hope they will be considered. Thank you:

1. The NMD system is not needed. There is no realistic threat. The attempt to create fear and hysteria about "rogue" states attacking the US is an empty effort to sell the program to the public. No nation like North Korea or Iraq would attack the US with nuclear weapons knowing full well that the US would overwhelmingly retaliate against their nation.

2. NMD is not about defense. In fact, NMD is a Trojan horse, a way for the Pentagon and aerospace industry to get permission to put weapons into space while making it look like they are "defending" the American people. The U.S. Space Command, in their Vision for 2020, clearly spells out the U.S. intention to "control and dominate" space. At this very moment TRW, Boeing and Lockheed Martin are working on the space-based laser which will be a follow-on technology to NMD giving the U.S. offensive weapons in space. NMD is the foot in the door for a return to the Star Wars plan envisioned by Reagan.

3. NMD is a waste of money. The Pentagon has already spent over $120 billion on Star Wars development and the NMD program will only be more welfare for the aerospace corporations. These hard earned tax dollars of ours need to be used for other human and environmental needs.

4. NMD won’t work. Anyone that truly wanted to attack the US would find much cheaper and more effective means of doing it. Suitcase or car bombs, biological attacks, cruise missiles and the like would not be deterred by NMD. Decays on missiles or other counter measures would make NMD useless.

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6. NMD will help to increase space pollution. Just days ago NASA was forced to move the international space station to a higher orbit in order to avoid being hit by a piece of space junk. If we allow the testing and deployment of space weapons systems we will create massive amounts of space junk that will, in the words of Apollo astronaut Edgar Mitchell, "Make it impossible for us to get off the planet". Space must be viewed as an environment that needs to be protected from excessive contamination.

7. NMD is destabilizing. In recent days Russia has tested new missiles that they say they will deploy if NMD is approved. India, China and other powers have said they will respond with new offensive systems if the U.S. moves forward with NMD. Thus, we will be creating a new arms race.

Exhibit 9.1.2-1: Reproductions of E-Mail Comment Documents (Continued)
Please do not proceed further down this dangerous path!

Sincerely,

Dr. Sara F. Luther

I attempted to send my comments via the website but was not sure they were sent. I think Alaskan’s should look closely at what they are supporting. The Alaskan military track record for cleaning up their training areas is not good. This includes previous missile sites. For example the two Nike sites on Ft. Wainwright. Instead of properly being cleaned up they were blown up which spread asbestos throughout the local landscape. The army has no money to clean up the sites. Unfortunately this pattern is repeated throughout Alaska esp. in remote areas where the sites are more or less out of the public eye. Many of these sites were built as defense against the Russians. Once the problem has disappeared the missile sites unfortunately are left in place except for the missiles. If these areas were cleaned up, the military wouldn’t constantly be destroying pristine habitat for other silly projects. New Commanders arriving in Alaska think they can do whatever they like since Alaska is huge and remote. They fail to think about the future. This is changing but what with this missile project, I wonder. Yes Ft Grewley and Delta Jct are in support. After all much of the Post is being closed down. If you wonder if I have my facts right, let me assure you I worked as an Army biologist for six years.

Thank you for this opportunity to make comments.

Pam Bruce
Exhibit 9.1.2-1: Reproductions of E-Mail Comment Documents (Continued)

I think this missile program needs more clear thinking. You have Ft Greely and Delta Junction saying hoorah but I think we have to remind ourselves that we have been here before. One example are the Nike sites on Ft Wainwright. Everyone in the military thinks there is a Russian threat they rush out and build a missile site or sites like the White Alice sites. What bothers me most of all is the military is very tardy in getting these old sites cleaned up. The two Nike sites on Wainwright are full of asbestos and there is no money to clean the areas up so other training can be done on those sites. The sites on the North Slope have taken forever to clean up and they still aren’t done. Now the Air force wants to bury the asbestos from the Ft Yukon site in the village’s dump. And you want to build another site up here. What’s going to happen to the site after the threat goes away? Don’t tell me the Army or some other military organization will whip in there and clean the site. I know better because I just completed working for Ft Wainwright as a biologist for six years. The Nike sites are death traps for wildlife and soldiers are forever getting in there for their battles. Then there’s the impact areas that are no longer used but are closed to the public. Then there’s the MOUT site built in an alpine area that isn’t used. The list is quite long. Ft Greely will never be thoroughly cleaned and now you want to add something else. Alaska is no longer a State where Wash. DC can say “well it’s out of sight so it doesn’t matter.” It does matter. This same attitude comes up with new Commanders. They think they can do anything they please to the land. Let’s protect our resources and clean up what has already been mistreated. Thank you.

Pam Bruce

I oppose the deployment of the National Missile Defense (NMD) system for three reasons: It would undoubtedly increase nuclear tensions worldwide (the Chinese have already announced an intention to re-start the nuclear arms race in response to the US’ failure to pass the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty); the technology is still totally unproven against real-world threats; it undermines the ABM treaty and hampers our efforts to rein in both rogue states and potential nuclear powers. There could be no worse environmental impact than that which actually increases the nuclear arms race and the potential for nuclear war.

Barbara Green
Dear Ms. Hudson,

I am a physician in Los Angeles and father of two. I want to urge you to abandon NMD. It is a waste of time, money and national honor. This project sends a message to the rest of the world that there is security in more weapons. How can we achieve worldwide nuclear disarmament if we keep adding more weapons to arsenals swollen with instruments of genocide.

If we keep adding to our weapons, other nations will do the same. These weapons of mass destruction will be used, perhaps not us at first. Millions will die and you and I and our families will be increasing threatened. I urge you to abandon NMD.

Sincerely,

Joseph Burkes MD

--

US Army Space and Missile Defense Command
Attention: SMDC-EN-V (Ms. Julia Hudson)
PO Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807-3801

To Whom It May Concern:

The letter is to officially comment on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for the National Missile Defense Deployment (September 1999).

I'll be brief. There are unexplained elevated rates of cancers on Cape Cod. There is ample evidence in peer-reviewed press that electromagnetic radiation is associated with changes in human tissue at the cellular level, which are not measured by the IEEE thermally-based standard employed to characterize hazard to human or animal health. The precautionary principle is being urged in all industrial facilities of Cape Cod where hazardous emissions are potentially viable, and upgrades and additions are proposed.

The EIS prepared for the Cape Cod PAVE PAWS facility more than twenty years ago foretold of all sorts of problems, yet by the time it was written, the facility was virtually in place. To date, Cape Codders have not had ample time to assess PAVE PAWS' contribution to the regional cancer dilemma. An extension of the comment period for the EIS is warranted. Public hearings ought to be held to hear from and educate the public.

Additionally, I call for the preparation of a full site-specific EIS to be prepared for the Cape Cod PAVE PAWS site and the proposed computer facility upgrade proposed.

I moved my family here 7 years ago. At that time, my wife asked me whether we were safe from the emissions of the PAVE PAWS radar facility, not more than a mile due west of my house. I put a lot of effort into trying to find out the answer. I visited the site. I researched the literature to the best of my ability, I found the old EIS and read it, and I've attended a talk given by the PAVE PAWS public affairs attaché. I tried to assure her fears, but to date, I cannot tell her for sure whether the fears of the old EIS were unfounded. Indeed, I cannot find anyone in the military or civilian community who really knows whether the facility is safe. A full EIS should be mandated for this site's upgrade to its computing facilities and indeed any extension to its purported 20-year mission, which by my calculation is over.

I look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

Peter Schlesinger

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Exhibit 9.1.2-1: Reproductions of E-Mail Comment Documents (Continued)
November 14, 1999
Richard and Sharon Judge

U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
Attn: SMDC-EN-V (Ms. Julia Hudson)
P.O. Box 1500
Huntsville, Alabama 35807-3401

RE: COMMENTS ON THE NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE DEPLOYMENT DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (EIS)

Dear U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command:

Please include the following written comments and attached letters in the Final Environmental Impact Statement for the National Missile Defense Deployment, in addition to our oral testimony given at the NMD public hearing at the Days Inn, Arlington, Virginia on November 9, 1999.

REQUEST FOR 30-DAY EXTENSION OF PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD

We are formally requesting a 30-day extension of the public comment period for the Draft EIS for the National Missile Defense Deployment. The public on Cape Cod was never notified of the release of the DEIS. Although the DEIS focuses primarily on sites in N. Dakota and Alaska, there are some sections specific to the PAVE PAWS Early Warning Radar on Cape Cod. A press release was sent out from the Joint Program Office (JPO) on the Massachusetts Military Reservation (MMR), on November 8, 1999, to the selectmen representatives of the Senior Management Board only (see attached press release).

We were given the wrong internet address by the BMDO public affairs representative at PAVE PAWS. When we finally got the correct internet address for the BMDO, we had great difficulty navigating to the Draft EIS screen. When calling the U.S. Space and Missile Defense Command, it was difficult for Cape Cod citizens to get a live person in order to request a copy of the DEIS.

THE EIS PROCESS IS DEFICIENT

We believe the EIS process is deficient in regards to the proposed upgrades to the PAVE PAWS Early Warning Radar on Cape Cod as the public cannot fully participate in the EIS process. Section ES.1.3 regarding the scoping process states that, "A total of seven public scoping meetings in December 1998 were held in communities perceived to be affected by the NMD program." It is unacceptable that no formal scoping meetings, on the public record, were held for the Cape Cod community.

The Air Force and BMDO were well aware of the opposition to the continued operation of the PAVE PAWS on Cape Cod. The meeting on February 16, 1999 at the Sandwich High School, hosted by the Massachusetts Department of Public Health, was heavily attended by representatives of the Air Force and JPO on MMR. It is important to note that all were monitors and none represented the PAVE PAWS facility. We are aware of at least one conference call and one meeting this summer where officials from the JPO on MMR met up at the Pentagon to discuss PAVE PAWS and community issues.

Despite the fact that Cape Cod citizens are calling for PAVE PAWS to be decommissioned and moved to an unpopulated site, (as was the case with the PAVE PAWS in Texas this past year), BMDO representatives from the Pentagon chose to announce the proposed upgrades to PAVE PAWS at an

Exhibit 9.1.2-1: Reproductions of E-Mail Comment Documents (Continued)
“invitation only” meeting on September 21, 1999, at the JPO on MMR. It is unacceptable that the public is being left out of the process.

Although we have been told that a supplement to the DEIS is being prepared for the proposed upgrade to PAVE PAWS on MMR, this falls far short of what the people of Cape Cod expect and deserve. A supplement is not adequate. Last week, the Sandwich Board of Selectmen and Board of Health, at their regularly scheduled meetings, voted unanimously to send a letter to Secretary of the Air Force, F. Whitman Peters, requesting that a full, site-specific Environmental Impact Statement be prepared for the existing PAVE PAWS facility on Cape Cod, including, but not limited to upgrades proposed by both the Air Force and the BMDO. No changes should be made to the existing PAVE PAWS facility, or the approximately 57 acre PAVE PAWS site on MMR until a full site-specific EIS, as described above, is completed. This will ensure that the public can fully participate in the decision making process in a legal and meaningful way. Ultimately, it must be up to the citizens of Cape Cod to decide what level of risk is acceptable to the population and environment.

BRIEF HISTORY
Twenty years ago when PAVE PAWS went online, the Cape Cod community was told it would be a “short term use of the environment” and would operate for 10-20 years. Residents did not find out about PAVE PAWS until construction was underway. Residents filed a lawsuit forcing the Air Force to prepare an EIS. This document is outdated, is incomplete and unconvincing. The Air Force conceded that the long term chronic effects of exposure to pulse modulated microwave radiation were unknown at that time. Several urgent regulations were documented in the EIS:
1. That there be continuous Cape-wide monitoring of radiation levels;
2. That an epidemiological study begin from the moment the power was turned on at PAVE PAWS;
3. That the public be notified if there was ever an upgrade at PAVE PAWS.
Twenty years later, none of these things have been done despite the fact that Cape Cod has some of the highest rates of cancer in the state and other potentially related health issues that remain unexplained. Any future “study” of PAVE PAWS must be retrospective.

THE DRAFT EIS IS DEFICIENT:
The DEIS did not evaluate all community and environmental issues involved with the existing Early Warning Radar on Cape Cod or the upgrades proposed by the BMDO. Both the No-Action and the Proposed Action Alternatives would result in the continued operation of the PAVE PAWS on Cape Cod. ES 1.3 states, “If the initial decision made is not to deploy, the NMD program would use the time to enhance the existing technologies of the various system elements. The NMD program would also have the option to add new elements if and as they are developed. For the potential sites. For the potential sites being considered for NMD deployment, the No-Action Alternative would be a continuation of activities currently occurring or planned at those locations.”

The fact that the footprint and maximum power output will not change does not adequately address all community and environmental concerns. There are not enough details regarding the hardware and software modifications (which would effect the beam/radation characteristics) and certain interior changes that are proposed. Section 2.2.5 states, “The specific modifications to the radars are still under development. Once the details of the radar upgrades are defined, separate site-specific environmental analysis, as required, would be performed.” What type of environmental analysis would be done, and required by who? The facility has been upgraded in the past without adequate environmental review. There are not enough details about proposed power plant modifications, fiber optic cable modifications and the role PAVE PAWS would play in the NMD Testing, Training and Exercise Capability. The PAVE PAWS on Cape Cod should go through its own full site-specific EIS process discussed above, so that the public can participate fully in the decision making process in a legal and meaningful way.

The DEIS is vague about supplemental site-specific environmental analysis for NMD elements whose sites have not been identified yet (i.e. IFICS, X-Band, FIBER OPTIC CABLE LINE). ES 1.5 states, “In addition, as the operational requirements are refined, other regions may be identified. Since specific sites have not been identified, a general programmatic description of the types of impacts that could be expected from deployment are included within this EIS. Once specific sites are identified, supplemental site-specific environmental analysis, as required, would be performed based on the initial analysis in this EIS.” Our question is, What type of environmental analysis and required by who? The public cannot fully participate in the EIS because the programmatic information is not adequate to the public process. A supplemental DEIS should be prepared for the IFICS data terminals, the X-Band Radar (s) and Fiber Optic Cable Line when locations are determined.

ES 1.6.1 states, “Under the No-Action Alternative, only the locations and environmental resources listed below were anticipated to have environmental impacts from continued ongoing operations. No impacts would be expected to the remaining locations and environmental resources.” Cumulative effects in regard to the continued operation of the PAVE PAWS located in a densely populated area on Cape Cod, are not addressed in this DEIS.

ES 1.6.2.4 states, “Deployment of the X-Band Radar would not result in any risk to human health. Electromagnetic radiation levels would be below prescribed health based standards at the 150 meter controlled boundary for the site.” “The exposure limits established by ANSI/IEEE C95.1 are used to ensure that the public will not be impacted by EMR created by the X-Band Radar.” This rationale will not hold up for the PAVE PAWS radar located in a densely populated area on Cape Cod. The ANSI/IEEE C95.1 standard does not adequately address the long term effects of chronic exposure to PAVE PAWS-type emissions. Recent peer-reviewed scientific studies have shown adverse effects at levels well below the current safety standard.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment.

Sincerely,

Sharon Judge
Spokesperson
Cape Cod Coalition to Decommission PAVE PAWS

Richard Judge
Selectman, Town of Sandwich, Massachusetts
Senior Management Board, Massachusetts Military Reservation
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To Ms. Julia Hudson:

- The NMD system is not needed. There is no realistic threat. The attempt to create fear and hysteria about “rogue” states attacking the U.S. is an empty effort to sell the program to the public. No nation like North Korea or Iran would attack the U.S. with nuclear weapons knowing full well that the U.S. would overwhelmingly retaliate against their nation.

- NMD is not about defense. In fact, NMD is a Trojan horse, a way for the Pentagon and aerospace industry to get permission to put weapons into space while making it look like they are “defending” the American people. The U.S. Space Command, in their Vision for 2020, clearly spells out the U.S. intention to “control and dominate” space. At this very moment, TRW, Boeing and Lockheed Martin are working on the space-based laser which will be a follow-on technology to NMD giving the U.S. “offensive” weapons in space. NMD is the foot in the door for a return to the Star Wars plan envisioned by Reagan.

- NMD is a waste of money. The Pentagon has already wasted over $120 billion on Star Wars development and the NMD program will only be more welfare for the aerospace corporations. These hard earned tax dollars of ours need to be used for other human and environmental needs.

- NMD won’t work. Anyone that truly wanted to attack the U.S. would find much cheaper and more effective means of delivering and ways of doing it. Suitscase or car bombs, biological attacks, cruise missiles and the like would not be deterred by NMD. Decays on missiles or other counter measures would make NMD useless.

- NMD will violate international treaties. Russia is already strongly reacting to NMD by rightly claiming that deployment of the system will violate the 1972 ABM Treaty. The United Nations passed a resolution on November 1, 1999 calling for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. By a vote of 138-0 (with the U.S. and Israel abstaining) the U.N. clearly showed that international concern is mounting to keep space protected from warfare. The U.N. Outer Space Treaty of 1967 outlawed the movement of war into space.

- NMD will help to increase space pollution. Just days ago NASA was forced to move the international space station to a higher orbit in order to avoid being hit by a piece of space junk. If we allow the testing and deployment of space weapons systems we will create massive amounts of space junk that will, in the words of Apollo astronaut Edgar Mitchell, “Make it impossible for us to get off the planet”. Space must be viewed as an environment that needs to be protected from excessive contamination. The Pentagon is soiling the nest.

- NMD is destabilizing. In recent days Russia has tested new missiles that they say they will deploy if NMD is approved. India, China and other powers have said they will respond with new offensive systems if the U.S. moves forward with NMD. Thus, we will be creating a new arms race. We wonder if the U.S. is intentionally trying to create this new instability as a rational for deployment of NMD. Either way, NMD deployment is dangerous and insane.

Sincerely,
Leah Penniman

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November 14, 1999
Ms. Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space & Missile Defense Command
Attn: SMDC-EN-V

I am responding to your request for public comments on the National Missile Defense Draft Environmental Impact statement. It is difficult if not impossible to find any positive environmental impacts from a missile defense system. If used, missiles will devastate the human and natural environments far beyond the point of contact, and for an indeterminate number of years. Development and manufacture of missiles will inevitably have a negative impact on worker safety, water, power, land-use and traffic around the manufacturing site to say nothing of contributing to air pollution. Testing of missiles, even if never used militarily, will contribute to space pollution -- NASA is already having to adjust orbiting patterns to avoid damage from space junk. Finally, a national missile defense program flies in the face of our national interest in an environment of peace. The U.S. and Israel were the only nations which did not support the November 1, United Nations “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space” resolution calling for the protection of outer space from warfare.

From what would missiles defend? Countries which wish to attack the U.S. have such horrors as suitcase bombs and poison gases at their disposal. Why should they utilize nuclear weapons since to do so guarantees overwhelming nuclear response from the U.S.? Creating a missile defense system violates the ABM Treaty of which the U.S. is a signatory (event President Clinton agrees) and totally undermines U.S. credibility when trying to negotiate arms reductions with such nuclear or potentially nuclear countries as Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and Iran.

Apparently there only two forces which would benefit from a national missile defense system. One is the U.S. Space Command with its Vision for 2020 to “control and dominate” space. The other are Pentagon contractors such as Lockheed Martin, TRW and Boeing and the superfly trained scientists and technicians whose jobs are threatened by peaceful conversions.

We have seen enough warfare on this earth and are working too hard to resolve conflicts peacefully to extend weapons into space.

Thank you for your attention.

Patricia Wulp

Exhibit 9.1.2-1: Reproductions of E-Mail Comment Documents (Continued)
Mr. Julie Hudson  
US Army Space & Missile Defense Command  
Attn: SMDC - EN-U

I am writing from England regarding the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the National Missile Defense program.

My objections to this project are as follows:

1. I fail to understand why the US which, as the world’s last remaining superpower, now wishes to dominate space. No other power is likely to challenge the US with its present military and navy arsenals.

2. I am concerned at the potential follow-on to this program which may mean offensive weapons in space such as the laser weapons currently under development.

3. The cost of such a program would be enormous; the US as a wealthy power should be addressing the issues of poverty which are overall worse within its own borders than elsewhere in Europe.

4. There is already far too much pollution both on and above this planet; the NMD program will merely exacerbate this.

5. The deployment of NMD would be in violation of the ABM Treaty of 1972 and also the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. Other powers would accelerate their own research which would threaten an already precarious world peace.

6. As a UK national I object strongly to the presence of a US base not 20 miles from here. This is Menwith Hill and it will be the European ground relay station for SBIRS, part of BMD, Ballistic Missile Defense of which I understand NMD is a first stage. This station is an ugly sore on our beautiful landscape and appears to be accountable only to the US government.

Yours sincerely

Patricia Bracey

--

brian crowther

Ms. Julie Hudson  
U.S. Army Space & Missile Defense Command  
Attn: SMDC-EN-V  
PO Box 1500  
Huntsville, AL 35807

Dear Ms Hudson:

I am writing in order to comment on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the National Missile Defense (NMD) program. It is our understanding that the Pentagon will be making a recommendation to the president prior to June 2000 on the early deployment question.

I have the following comments:

1) The NMD system is not needed. There is no realistic threat. The attempt to create fear and hysteria about “rogue” states attacking the U.S. is an empty effort to sell the program to the public. No nation like North Korea or Iraq would attack the U.S. with nuclear weapons knowing full well that the U.S. would overwhelmingly retaliate against their nation.

2) NMD is not about defense. In fact, NMD is a Trojan horse, a way for the Pentagon and aerospace industry to get permission to put weapons into space while making it look like they are “defending” the American people. The U.S. Space Command, in their Vision for 2020, clearly spells out the U.S. intention to “control and dominate” space. At this very moment TRW, Boeing and Lockheed Martin are working on the space-based laser which will be a follow-on technology to NMD giving the U.S. “offensive” weapons in space. NMD is the foot in the door for a return to Star Wars.

3) NMD is a waste of money. The Pentagon has already wasted over $120 billion on Star Wars development and the NMD program will only be more welfare for the aerospace corporations. These hard earned tax dollars of ours need to be used for other human and environmental needs.

4) NMD won’t work. Anyone that truly wanted to attack the U.S. would find much cheaper and more effective means of delivering ways of doing it. Surface to air missiles, cruise missiles and the like would not be deterred by NMD. Decays on missiles or other counter measures would make NMD useless.

5) NMD will violate international treaties. Russia is already strongly reacting to NMD by rightly claiming that deployment of the system will violate the 1972 ABM Treaty. The United Nations passed a resolution on November 1, 1999 calling for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. By a vote of 138-0 (with the U.S. and Israel abstaining) the U.N. clearly showed that international concern is mounting to keep space protected from warfare. The U.N. Outer Space Treaty of 1967 outlaws the movement of war into space.

6) NMD will help to increase space pollution. Just days ago NASA was forced to move the International space station to a higher orbit in order to avoid being hit by a piece of space junk. If we allow the testing and deployment of space weapons systems we will create massive amounts of space junk that will, in the words of Apollo astronaut Edgar Mitchell, “Make it impossible for us to get off the planet”. Space must be viewed as an environment that needs to be protected from excessive contamination. The Pentagon is soiling the next.

7) NMD is destabilizing. In recent days Russia has tested new missiles that they say they will deploy if NMD is approved. India, China and other powers have said they will respond

Exhibit 9.1.2-1: Reproductions of E-Mail Comment Documents (Continued)
with new offensive systems if the U.S. moves forward with NMD. Thus, we will be creating a new arms race. We wonder if the U.S. is intentionally trying to create this new instability as a rational for deployment of NMD. Either way, NMD deployment is dangerous and insane.

I can assure you that many organizations will be working with groups and people all over the world to ensure that we do not put weapons into space. NMD is just the first step in a colossally evil plan to move the arms race into space. This must be resisted. We’ve seen enough warfare on this earth. We do not need to extend this bad seed into space.

In peace,

Audrey Jordan Barnard, Citizen

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November 13, 1999

Ms. Julia Huddon  
U.S. Army Space & Missile Defense Command  
Attn: SMDC-EN-V  
PO Box 1500  
Huntsville, AL 35807

Dear Ms. Huddon:

I am writing in order to comment on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the National Missile Defense (NMD) program. It is my understanding that the Pentagon will be making a recommendation to the president prior to June 2000 on the early deployment question.

I have the following comments which coincide with the position taken by the Global Network Against Nuclear Weapons and Missiles in Space.

1) The NMD system is not needed. There is no realistic threat. The attempt to create fear and hysteria about “rogue” states attacking the U.S. is an empty effort to sell the program to the public. No nation like North Korea or Iraq would attack the U.S. with nuclear weapons knowing full well that the U.S. would overwhelmingly retaliate against their nation.

2) NMD is not about defense. In fact, NMD is a Trojan horse, a way for the Pentagon and aerospace industry to get permission to put weapons into space while making it look like they are “defending” the American people. The U.S. Space Command, in their Vision for 2020, clearly spells out the U.S. intention to “control and dominate” space. At this very moment TRW, Boeing and Lockheed Martin are working on the space based laser which will be a follow-on technology to NMD giving the U.S. “offensive” weapons in space. NMD is the foot in the door for a return to Star Wars.

3) NMD is a waste of money. The Pentagon has already wasted over $120 billion on space systems development and the NMD program will only be more welfare for the aerospace corporations. These hard earned tax dollars of ours need to be used for other human and environmental needs.

4) NMD won’t work. Anyone that truly wanted to attack the U.S. would find much cheaper and more effective means of delivering ways of doing it. Suitcase or car bombs, cruise missiles and the like would not be deterred by NMD. Decoys on missiles or other counter measures would make NMD useless.

5) NMD will violate international treaties. Russia is already strongly reacting to NMD by rightly claiming that deployment of the system will violate the 1972 ABM Treaty. The United Nations passed a resolution on November 1, 1999 calling for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. By a vote of 138-0 (with the U.S. and Israel abstaining) the U.N. clearly showed that international concern is mounting to keep space protected from warfare. The U.N. Outer Space Treaty of 1967 outlaws the movement of war into space.

Exhibit 9.1.2-1: Reproductions of E-Mail Comment Documents (Continued)
6) NMD will help to increase space pollution. Just days ago NASA was forced to move the international space station to a higher orbit in order to avoid being hit by a piece of space junk. If we allow the testing and deployment of space weapons systems we will create massive amounts of space junk that will, in the words of Apollo astronaut Edgar Mitchell, “Make it impossible for us to get off the planet”. Space must be viewed as an environment that needs to be protected from excessive contamination. The Pentagon is soiling the nest.

7) NMD is destabilizing. In recent days Russia has tested new missiles that they say they will deploy if NMD is approved. India, China and other powers have said they will respond with new offensive systems if the U.S. moves forward with NMD. Thus, we will be creating a new arms race. We wonder if the U.S. is intentionally trying to create this new instability as a rational for deployment of NMD. Either way, NMD deployment is dangerous and insane.

I can assure you that I will be working with groups and people all over the world to ensure that we do not put weapons into space. NMD is just the first step in a colossally evil plan to move the arms race into space. This must be resisted. We’ve seen enough warfare on this earth. We do not need to extend this bad seed into space.

Sincerely,

Tanja Winter

---

Dear Friends

I urge you not to deploy a Missile Defense System. There is no data to suggest the system would work and it is too expensive. I urge you to spend the money saved on education, health care, establishing ties with other countries.

Thank you,

Stanley Jacobs

Exhibit 9.1.2-1: Reproductions of E-Mail Comment Documents (Continued)
Dear Ms. Nelson,

I am writing to express my views about the National Missile Defense system. First I would like to say that it is totally refreshing to have the military ask for public comment. Thanks. First, I believe recent terrorist attacks show just how easy it is for another nation to attack America without using missile force. I find it ridiculous to think that a "rogue" nation would attack America using missiles when our huge amount of firepower is well-known. This attempt to strike fear and hysteria into the hearts of the American populace is an effort to sell us NMD for other reasons, I think. And these reasons are the continued attempt to control the people of the world through fear and to line the wallets of Lockheed-Martin and Boeing, as well as to pave the way for U.S. control and dominance in space. This goal was clearly outlined by the U.S. Space Command in their "Vision for 2020". In my mind, I feel really embarrassed to be an American sometimes—why would we even consider such an outlandish, expensive plan when there are children fed and undereducated and when we have failed to clean up prior messes made by the U.S. military in places such as Vietnam and El Salvador? Furthermore, NMD violates the 1972 ABM treaty and the U.N. resolution of 11/1/99, as well as the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. How can we expect to be respected by other countries when we so flagrantly ignore any attempts made to pave the way for peace? America is not God—we cannot control everything and must behave in an ethical manner if we wish to guide the world to a more peaceful way of being. Einstein said it best, "One cannot simultaneously prevent and prepare for war."

Lastly, we have already soiled our nest here on Earth and instead of getting it cleaned up, we seem to be heading toward messsing up space with our pollution as well. Not learning from one's mistakes is a sign of immaturity (and, I have heard it said, of insanity).

Please, no NMD. It escalates the costs of war too highly, both from the food it would take from the world's hungry and, in the event of war, Goddess forbid, would escalate the numbers of war dead too highly. One war dead is one too many, billions are unconscionable. Please be trying to open your heart to a way of peace, for children and animals, trees and mountains, old people and clouds, frogs and rivers. Blessings to you; I will continue to pray for the transformation of America to a peace-based society. In the words of Lennon, peace begins with me. Thank you.

For peace,
Terri Middleton

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Exhibit 9.1.2-1: Reproductions of E-Mail Comment Documents (Continued)

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Dear Ms Hudson,

I support the letter sent to you by Bruce K. Gagnon of Globalnet on November 10, 1999, below.

Sincerely,
Ann Heidenreich

Ms Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space & Missile Defense Command
Attn: SMDC-EV C
PO Box 1903
Huntsville, AL 35807

Dear Ms Hudson:

Our organization is writing in order to comment on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the National Missile Defense (NMD) program. It is our understanding that the Pentagon will be making a recommendation to the president prior to June 2000 on the early deployment question.

We have the following comments:

1) The NMD system is not needed. There is no realistic threat. The attempt to create fear and hysteria about "rogue" states attacking the U.S. is an emnony effort to sell the program to the public. No nation like North Korea or Iraq would attack the U.S. with nuclear weapons knowing full well that the U.S. would overwhelmingly retaliate against their nation.

2) NMD is not about defense. In fact, NMD is a Trojan horse, a way for the Pentagon and aerospace industry to get permission to put weapons into space while making it look like they are "defending" the American people. The U.S. Space Command, in their Vision for 2020, clearly spells out the U.S. intention to "control and dominate" space. At this very moment TRW, Boeing and Lockheed Martin are working on the space-based laser which will be a follow-on technology to NMD giving the U.S. "offensive" weapons in space. NMD is the foot in the door for a return to Star Wars.

3) NMD is a waste of money. The Pentagon has already wasted over $120 billion on Star Wars development and the NMD program will only be more welfare for the aerospace corporations. These hard earned tax dollars of ours need to be used for other human and environmental needs.

4) NMD won't work. Anyone that truly wanted to attack the U.S. would find much easier and more effective ways of doing it. Surface-to-air missiles, cruise missiles and the like would not be deterred by NMD. Decoys on missiles or other counter measures would make NMD useless.

5) NMD will violate international treaties. Russia is already strongly reacting to NMD by rightly claiming that deployment of the system will violate the 1972 ABM Treaty. The United Nations passed a resolution on November 1, 1999 calling for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. By a vote of 138-0 (with the U.S. and Israel abstaining) the U.N. clearly showed that international concern is mounting to keep space protected from warfare. The U.N. Outer Space Treaty of 1967 outlaws the movement of war into space.

6) NMD will help to increase space pollution. Just days ago NASA was forced to move the international space station to a higher orbit in order to avoid being hit by pieces of junk. If we allow the testing and deployment of space weapons systems we will create massive amounts of space junk that will, in the words of Apollo astronaut Edgar Mitchell, "Make it impossible for us to get off the planet". Space must be viewed as an environment that needs to be protected from excessive contamination. The Pentagon is soiling the nest.

7) NMD is destabilizing. In recent days Russia has tested new missiles that they say they will deploy if NMD is approved. India, China and other powers have said they will respond with new offensive systems if the U.S. moves forward with NMD. Thus, we will be creating a new arms race. We wonder if the U.S. is intentionally trying to create this new instability as a rational for deployment of NMD. Either way, NMD deployment is dangerous and insane.

I can assure you that our organization will be working with groups and people all over the world to ensure that we do not put weapons into space. NMD is just the first step in a colossally evil plan to move the arms race into space. This must be resisted. We've seen enough warfare on this earth. We do not need to extend this bad seed into space.

In peace,
Bruce K. Gagnon
Coordinator
Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space
NMD won't work. Anyone that truly wanted to attack the U.S. would find much cheaper and more effective means of delivering and ways of doing it. Suitcase or car bombs, biological attacks, cruise missiles and the like would not be deterred by NMD. Decoys on missiles or other counter measures would make NMD useless.

Unless it there to protect us from Aliens I can see no reason for such a waste of money that could be spent much more wisely.

Yours most sincerely

Justin Mason

In this modern world, the danger to the US from missile attack is relatively minor compared to what it was during the height of the cold war when I grew up. This is due to one reason: improved relations with Russia and China.

I do not fear a missile attack from North Korea or Iran or Iraq. They are as likely to launch an attack of biological warfare. The possible danger they represent through missiles does not warrant the assurance of worse relations with China and Russia who already have missiles. Rather than concentrating on when the bomb drops we need to improve our relations with other countries so that the bomb never does drop.

Hatton Greer

The large print giveth and the small print taketh away.

Tom Waits

Exhibit 9.1.2-1: Reproductions of E-Mail Comment Documents (Continued)
My family and I are strongly opposed to the proposed missile defense system being built anywhere, let alone Alaska, our home. This system promotes war, not peace and is part of the Star Wars agenda. In addition, there are about 650 contaminated military sites in Alaska. The Dept. of Defense must clean these up prior to building any new sites. The proposed site, Ft. Greely, is currently leaking radiation from an old nuclear reactor. And, the military has been no friend to Alaska's indigenous Peoples, with a horrific history of experimenting on them and their lands. Thank you for your time and consideration of our comments.

Sandra and Steve Arnold-Ganey

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I am writing to say that I oppose the proposal by the Dept. of Defense to deploy a national missile defense system, particularly in Alaska. I am a resident of Anchorage, Alaska, and want to preserve the pristine beauty of this land. Furthermore, I believe the government has the responsibility to clean up the approximately 650 contaminated military sites in Alaska to date (both active and inactive) prior to building new sites.

I also want to address four points which may be important to this issue:

1. The technology is unproven, and cannot be shown to be reliable or effective by next summer's scheduled decision.

2. Unless Russia agrees to modify it, deployment would violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, a move that could unravel the entire nuclear non-proliferation regime and substantially increase the nuclear threat to the United States.

3. The cost of the system is unclear and likely to spiral upwards far beyond the $10.5 billion the Clinton Administration has budgeted over the next five years. The system cannot be shown to be effective and reliable under the current budget and deployment schedule. I do not want this much of our government's money to go towards this unproven system.

4. The low-risk threat cited as justification for deployment, particularly North Korea's small and untested long-range missile arsenal, does not warrant the damage U.S. missile defense deployment would wreak on relations with Russia and China.

5. I am also concerned about the impact on the environment and Alaska's indigenous peoples by the deployment of such a system.

All of these issues must be addressed adequately before such a deployment should happen.

Thank you for accepting my comments.

Trang Duong
Anchorage, Alaska
Thank you for this opportunity to comment to those who make National Defense decisions.

I believe the NMD system concept is a good and necessary one. However, with NASA's recent multi-billion dollar errors, the project should not be put in their hands now.

Kim O'Connor

These are my official public comments on the proposed NMD defense system:

I attended the EIS public hearing for the NMD here in Anchorage, Alaska as a concerned citizen. I do not want to see this implemented in Alaska, the Dakotas, or anywhere else for that matter. I would like to say first and foremost that the military has been a terrible presence in Alaska and has left a large amount of toxic wastes all over Alaska, including around 650 active and inactive sites. Sites which were promised would be cleaned up have not been, and those which have been attempted are often not very well done. The military cannot propose any sites without taking care of all existing toxic wastes sites, and proving that it has the ability to clean up its own mess.

I also believe that starting work on the NMD would be a trigger to bad international relations, and would start up another arms race. If we are going to build defense, why not prove that we want other nations to be safe also, and help them to build such a defense system also. After all, it is we who hold the ability to show such a gesture of peace. We cannot propose a nuclear test ban treaty and then turn around and show such severe distrust. I have no wish for America to be an impenetrable fortress capable of destroying the rest of the world while itself being uninjured.

Also, the natives of the Aleutian islands are having a hard enough time presently living their subsistence lifestyles. It is hard to find enough food to eat in that area, and the wildlife and fish are not doing very well. This is in part due to severe contamination of the surrounding oceans, in part due to military contamination. This area could not handle a base there, and the extra persons and hunters that that would create. It does not need extra military waste, nor for its culture to be ruined in the presence of such a base site. The arctic natives already have POP's (persistent organic pollutants) in their breastmilk, due to the polar distillation of environmental pollutants. We should not contaminate this area any further.

Alaska does not wish to be a target for the world's missiles. We do not wish to provide any more jobs to the military. We should strive for peace as a powerful nation. We do not wish to give any more of our land to the military. We do not wish for the military to contaminate our health any further. We wish the military would make amends for the huge amount of toxic waste we have already been poisoned with. We do not want the NMD system anywhere near Alaska, or anywhere else for that matter. A proposed site, Fort Greely, is currently leaking nuclear waste from an old reactor. I do not wish for America to violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

The low-risk threat cited as justification for deployment, particularly North Korea's small and untested long-range missile arsenal, does not warrant the damage U.S. missile defense deployment would wreak on relations with Russia and China.

Thank You,

Joanna L. Reichhold

Exhibit 9.1.2-1: Reproductions of E-Mail Comment Documents (Continued)
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The idea of building a missile defense system in Alaska or anywhere else in the world is a total waste of money. The technology doesn’t work, 10.5 million dollars could better be used to fund education, the so-called threat of a missile strike is way over blown.

This would be a violation of the ABM treaty and it would only add to the treat of nuclear the government has a dismal record for polluting the planet. Alaska and the people of this country. This will only push China to expand their nuclear weapons program and destabilize the START treaty.

Practice Peace! Scrap this waste of time and money and do something good for humanity.

Cammisa Ray

I am opposed to development of the NMD. It is clearly unnecessary from a defensive point of view, since there is no credible missile threat to the US. It will have a destabilizing influence, since Russia has already indicated that they will deploy a system of their own. It won’t stop terrorists, who will be using smaller, undetectable methods. It will put yet more debris into orbit, making it that much less safe for future manned and unmanned space flights. And it will put more launch vehicle exhaust gases into the upper atmosphere for no useful reason.

In short, this project serves only useless or deleterious ends and damages the environment in the process. This project should be abandoned immediately.

David R. Katz

Exhibit 9.1.2-1: Reproductions of E-Mail Comment Documents (Continued)
Dear Friends,

I'm sending you an urgent request to respond by Nov 15 (Monday) to a proposal by the Dept. of Defense to deploy a national missile defense system. There is info below that you can use to decide for yourself what is important to say. A website address is also listed below (sorry I haven't figured out how to hyperlink it). Also, I recently learned about this comment period, so sorry also about the quick turn around.

Although I'm quite concerned overall about this proposal, I'm even more concerned that Senator Stevens is pushing hard to locate one of these sites in Alaska. First, in addition to increasing Alaska's vulnerability to attack by making it a target, this system includes the EXPAND radar system-a holdover from Reagan's StarWars agenda. Second, there are about 650 contaminated military sites in Alaska, to date (both active and inactive) that should be cleaned up prior to building new sites. The proposed site, Ft. Greely, is currently leaking radiation from an old nuclear reactor. Third, the military has been no friend to Alaska's indigenous Peoples, with a horrific history of experimenting on them and their lands.

Thanks and peace to you all. Karen Button

>> >Let's Test Peace Not More Weapons of War<<<<

* * *

The Pentagon recently finished a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on the proposed national missile defense. They are accepting public comments on the EIS until November 15, 1999.

Below is the text of a written comment from the Disarmament Clearinghouse on the Draft EIS recently released on the proposed deployment of a national missile defense.

You can provide comments over the internet at:
or via email: nmsdis@amdco.army.mil

Written Comment on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement on National Missile Defense Deployment

The following organizations are strongly opposed to the proposed Deployment of a national missile defense.

President Clinton has announced he will decide whether to deploy a national missile defense in June or July 2000. According to the President, that decision will be based on four factors: the readiness of the technology, the impact on arms control and relations with Russia, the cost effectiveness, and the threat. On each of these counts, the case for deployment is weak at best.

1. The technology is unproven, and cannot be shown to be reliable or effective by next summer's scheduled decision.

2. Unless Russia agrees to modify it, deployment would violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, a move that could unravel the entire nuclear non-proliferation regime and substantially increase the nuclear threat to the United States.

3. The cost of the system is unclear and likely to spiral upwards far beyond the $10.5 billion the Clinton Administration has budgeted over the next five years. The system cannot be shown to be effective and reliable under the current budget and deployment schedule.

4. The low-risk threat cited as justification for deployment, particularly North Korea's small and untested long-range missile arsenals, does not warrant the damage U.S. missile defense deployment would wreak on relations with Russia and China.

Each of these factors is reviewed below in more detail.

1. The readiness of the technology: Unproven by next summer, and by 2005. By next June, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization will have conducted only three intercept tests of the proposed national missile defense system. Nineteen such tests are scheduled before the first limited system is scheduled to go online, in late 2005. The first intercept attempt, on October 2, hit its target. However, this was only a test of the "kill vehicle," the last component that destroys the incoming warhead. The booster rocket, the radars, and the integrated management system were not tested. In fact, only one of the first three tests will involve the complete system, and all three will use surrogate parts, not the actual components.

So few tests cannot show the system to be reliable and effective by next summer's scheduled deployment decision. Even by 2005, when the system is scheduled to finish its initial deployment, the additional tests cannot prove this highly complex system to be reliable against real-world threats. For example, the Patriot, adopted from an anti-aircraft missile system, achieved a perfect test record, hitting its target in all 17 of its intercept attempts. However, when used in the field during the Gulf War, it failed dramatically.

2. The effect on arms control: Increasing nuclear dangers

The Clinton Administration is currently discussing with Russia modifications to the ABM Treaty that would allow the U.S. to deploy a "limited" national missile defense. Both Clinton Administration and Russian officials have repeatedly stated that the ABM Treaty remains the "cornerstone of strategic stability." To date, Russia has opposed all changes to the ABM Treaty and declared that U.S. withdrawal from it or insistence on changes would end the START process that is reducing strategic nuclear arsenals. This would leave Russia with 6,000 warheads that could hit the United States, many ready for launch within 15 minutes...
of a decision to attack. China already perceives that U.S. efforts to build a missile defense are intended to weaken the Chinese deterrent. China's current arsenal is around 20 long-range, single warhead missiles. However, it is in a slow modernization program to build longer-range missiles with multiple warheads. China would likely react to U.S. deployment of a missile defense by increasing the both the size of its arsenal and the pace of its improvements. Evidence of China's response to U.S. talk of abrogating the ABM Treaty is already developing, with Reuters reporting on October 25 that China recently added $9.7 billion to its defense budget to improve its nuclear arsenal.

3. Cost Effectiveness: Unsubstantiated
In January 1989, the Clinton Administration added $6.6 billion for procurement to its five year plans for national missile defense, creating a $10.5 billion total budget. However, most estimates expect even the small initial system envisioned in that budget would cost far more. The General Accounting Office estimated that it would cost $18 to $28 billion to deploy a small system. This merely adds to the over $60 billion spent since President Ronald Reagan launched his Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983, money that has not lead to the deployment of a single effective system. It will take far more testing, and substantially increased budgets, to deploy a system that can be shown to be reliable and effective.

4. The Threat: Does not warrant rushed early deployment
The proposed national missile defense system is being developed in an attempt to respond to the potential threat from so-called rogue states, specifically North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. North Korea, which has of these three by far the most advanced capability, recently agreed to halt its missile flight test program while negotiating with the United States. It has not tested a missile capable of hitting the United States with a nuclear warhead.

On Iran, experts are divided on whether it will be able to field a missile that could threaten the U.S. within the next decade. Iraq is under severe international sanctions that effectively hinder it from developing any new missiles. Neither country would be able to field an intercontinental missile if the decision to deploy is delayed until the missile defense technology is shown to be effective.

Conclusion
Postponing the decision to deploy a national missile defense is an extremely low-risk course of action. Put simply, deploying a national missile defense MAY slightly reduce the low risk of a catastrophic attack on the U.S. carried out by a very few nuclear-armed missiles. That is true if it proves capable of effectively intercepting incoming warheads. However, it WILL increase the risk of massive attack carried out with hundreds or thousands of such missiles that will destroy the United States entirely, along with much of the globe.
Do not place a missile defense system in Alaska. Its unproven, obscenely expensive, and will INCREASE, not decrease, our vulnerability. The Department of Defense turned its Alaska bases into toxic landfills, it has avoided responsibility for cleanup and unethically tested on indigenous Alaskans. Because of these reasons, there is not a neutron of expectation that the Dept of Defense will do the right thing. This proposal launches America firmly forward to 1955. Let's try peace this time. Let's not sell weapons to any stray beanbag country with an open wallet. Let's not invite retaliation. Nancy Reagan's unforgettable antidrug slogan applies to this brainchild of paranoia.

Mark Luttrell  
Box 511  
Seward AK 99664

Mark Luttrell  
Eastern Kenai Peninsula Environmental Action Association

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Please. Citizens all over the country are noticing the effects of the military's increased presence in the air. The Navy has done enough dirty to the oceans to create significant environmental impacts to our global waters. Now NASA and a new arms race want to do the same to our air.

It's clear to anyone not in the military and many who are in it: those who invest in war care very little about the world.

Water and air are essentials to life on earth. Does the military hope to emigrate to the stars? Please seriously consider the arguments advanced by Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space and pull back from this ultimate brinkmanship. Yours in peace --

Margaret Weitzmann  
R. Bruce Beebe

Exhibit 9.1.2-1: Reproductions of E-Mail Comment Documents (Continued)
Dear comment receiver:
I am a college student at Hawaii Pacific University and I've received a message that the military plans to start up another nuclear buildup. For what????
The USA has had peaceful relations with other nations for 10 years!
Why do you want to start something? Are you all getting bored? Do you crave war, or is it another greedy excuse to get more military funding?
Anyway, as you can tell, I am strongly opposed to this deployment of a national missile defense. It's extremely costly, destructive, and unnecessary.
Do you want to continue on with your life and your precious family? Well so do I !!
Thanks for your consideration,
Shaunti Kiehl

NMD is not about defense. In fact, NMD is a Trojan horse, a way for the Pentagon and aerospace industry to get permission to put weapons into space while making it look like they are "defending" the American people. The U.S.
Space Command, in their Vision for 2020, clearly spells out the U.S. intention to "control and dominate" space. At this very moment TRW, Boeing and Lockheed Martin are working on the space-based laser which will be a follow-on technology to NMD giving the U.S. "offensive" weapons in space. NMD is the foot in the door for a return to the Star Wars plan envisioned by Reagan.

No Name included
November 11, 1999
Ms Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space & Missile Defense Command
Attn: SMDC-EN-V
PO Box 1900
Huntsville, Al 35807

Dear Ms Hudson:

Our organization is writing to endorse the letter written by Bruce K. Gagnon Coordinator Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space which comments on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the National Missile Defense (NMD) program and which we repeat below:

It is our understanding that the Pentagon will be making a recommendation to the US President prior to June 2000 on the early deployment question.

We have the following comments:

1) The NMD system is not needed. There is no realistic threat. The attempt to create fear and hysteria about “rogue” states attacking the U.S. is an empty effort to sell the program to the public. No nation like North Korea or Iraq would attack the U.S. with nuclear weapons knowing full well that the U.S. would overwhelmingly retaliate against their nation.

2) NMD is not about defense. In fact, NMD is a Trojan horse, a way for the Pentagon and aerospace industry to get permission to put weapons into space while making it look like they are “defending” the American people. The U.S. Space Command, in their Vision for 2020, clearly spells out the U.S. intention to “control and dominate” space. At this very moment TRW, Boeing and Lockheed Martin are working on the space-based laser which will be a follow-on technology to NMD giving the U.S. “offensive” weapons in space. NMD is the foot in the door for a return to Star Wars.

3) NMD is a waste of money. The Pentagon has already wasted over $120 billion on Star Wars development and the NMD program will only be more welfare for the aerospace corporations. These hard earned tax dollars of ours need to be used for other human and environmental needs.

4) NMD won’t work. Anyone that truly wanted to attack the U.S. would find much cheaper and more effective means of delivering ways of doing it. Suitcase or car bombs, cruise missiles and the like would not be deterred by NMD. Decoys on missiles or other counter measures would make NMD useless.

5) NMD will violate international treaties. Russia is already strongly reacting to NMD by rightly claiming that deployment of the system will violate the 1972 ABM Treaty. The United Nations passed a resolution on November 1, 1999 calling for the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

By a vote of 138-0 (with the U.S. and Israel abstaining) the U.N. clearly showed that international concern is mounting to keep space protected from warfare. The U.N. Outer Space Treaty of 1967 outlaws the movement of war into space.

6) NMD will help to increase space pollution. Just days ago NASA was forced to move the international space station to a higher orbit in order to avoid being hit by a piece of space junk. If we allow the testing and deployment of space weapons systems we will create massive amounts of space junk that will, in the words of Apollo astronaut Edgar Mitchell, “Make it impossible for us to get off the planet”. Space must be viewed as an environment that needs to be protected from excessive contamination. The Pentagon is sowing the nest.

7) NMD is destabilizing. In recent days Russia has tested new missiles that they say they will deploy if NMD is approved. India, China and other powers have said they will respond with new offensive systems if the U.S. moves forward with NMD. Thus, we will be creating a new arms race. We wonder if the U.S. is intentionally trying to create this new instability as a rational for deployment of NMD. Either way, NMD deployment is dangerous and insane.

I can assure you that our organization will be working with groups and people all over the world to ensure that we do not put weapons into space. NMD is just the first step in a colossally evil plan to move the arms race into space. This must be resisted. We’ve seen enough warfare on this earth. We do not need to extend this bad seed into space.

In Peace,
Geoff Holland, Director
Institute for Global Futures Research (IGFR).

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Exhibit 9.1.2-1: Reproductions of E-Mail Comment Documents (Continued)
Comments of Dr. David R. Klein, Professor Emeritus on the proposed National Ballistic Missile Defense System:

Deployment of a ballistic missile defense system, particularly in Alaska at the doorstep of the Russian Far East and within ready range of most of China, would create an unwanted provocation at a time when the United States is attempting to play down the need for arms buildup in these two countries. Clearly, deploying a ballistic missile defense system that is claimed to be directed toward North Korea, which lies between the second and third major world powers, can only be viewed by these powers and their people as an unwarranted aggressive action. Alaska’s geographic location necessitates that our future well-being lies in expanded cooperation, exchange, and trade with the Russian Far East and other Pacific rim countries. We cannot afford to return to the Cold War brinksmanship mentality when the United States was viewed by the Soviet Union as a potential aggressor and we reacted in kind. Borders were closed in both directions. Currently, Alaska is developing joint venture industrial relations with the Russian Far East involving Alaskan expertise in oil exploration and development, commercial fisheries processing, and tourism, which is of benefit to the Alaskan economy, as well as assisting development of the Russian freemarket economy and survival of their fledgling democracy.

If North Korea continues as a rogue nation, it will not play by conventional rules of missile system against missile system. Experience tells us that, in desperation its leaders may employ acts of terrorism which are comparable to terrorism of domestic origin within this country and must be dealt with accordingly.

Alaska has played a large role in our national defense for many years. Interior Alaska is the logical location for National Missile Defense deployment, with it’s rich history of military and construction use. We are the hub for transportation throughout our state and this project blends well with the other existing activities (Military & Civilian) in our region.

----Deputy Chief James Welch-Fairbanks Police.
There is no real reason for nuclear weapons in space. If our government was not so power hungry this would not be an issue. You already have complete control of the people of the U.S. Is that not enough. With any funding allotted for your tests etc. Are you as well allowing the same amount of money for healthcare for the many problems you have already caused and will continue to cause. Let's take a look at the cancer increase over the last 10-15 years, especially lung cancer. A lot of that increase has a lot to do with the military's weapons tests. You don't admit it until they do to millions are infected, but the facts still remain. Why don't all of you who want to take part in the defense missile defense system and nuclearization of space all get on a rocket and blast yourselves into space, you want to be there so bad anyway.

I have a five year old daughter that I feel I have a duty to protect, as well as her future. Please stop this madness.

Nancy Booth

Ms Julia Hudson
U.S. Army Space & Missile Defense Command
Attn: SMDG-SM-V
PO Box 1500
Huntsville, AL 35807

Dear Ms Hudson:
I am writing in order to comment on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the National Missile Defense (NMD) program. It is my understanding that the Pentagon will be making a recommendation to the president prior to June 2000 on the early deployment question.

I have the following comments:

1) The NMD system is not needed. There is no realistic threat. The attempt to create fear and hysteria about "rogue" states attacking the U.S. is an empty effort to sell the program to the public. No nation like North Korea or Iraq would attack the U.S. with nuclear weapons knowing full well that the U.S. would overwhelmingly retaliate against their nation.

2) NMD is not about defense. In fact, NMD is a Trojan horse, a way for the Pentagon and aerospace industry to get permission to put weapons into space while making it look like they are "defending" the American people. The U.S. Space Command, in their Vision for 2020, clearly spells out the U.S. intention to "control and dominate" space. At this very moment TRW, Boeing and Lockheed Martin are working on the space-based laser which will be a follow-on technology to NMD giving the U.S. "offensive" weapons in space. NMD is the foot in the door for a return to Star Wars.

3) NMD is a waste of money. The Pentagon has already wasted over $120 billion on Star Wars development and the NMD program will only be more welfare for the aerospace corporations. These hard earned tax dollars of ours need to be used for other human and environmental needs.

4) NMD won't work. Anyone that truly wanted to attack the U.S. would find much cheaper and more effective means of delivering ways of doing it. Suitcase or car bombs, cruise missiles and the like would not be deterred by NMD. Decoys on missiles or other counter measures would make NMD useless.

5) NMD will violate international treaties. Russia is already strongly reacting to NMD by rightly claiming that deployment of the system will violate the 1972 ABM Treaty. The United Nations passed a resolution on November 1, 1999 calling for the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

By a vote of 138-0 (with the U.S. and Israel abstaining) the U.N. clearly showed that international concern is mounting to keep space protected from warfar... The U.N. Outer Space Treaty of 1967 outlaws the movement of war into space.

6) NMD will help to increase space pollution. Just days ago NASA was forced to move the international space station to a higher orbit in order to avoid being hit by a piece of space junk. If we allow the testing and deployment of space weapons systems we will create massive amounts of space junk that
will, in the words of Apollo astronaut Edgar Mitchell, “Make it impossible for us to get off the planet”. Space must be viewed as an environment that needs to be protected from excessive contamination. The Pentagon is rolling the dice.

7) NMD is destabilizing. In recent days Russia has tested new missiles that they say they will deploy if NMD is approved. India, China and other powers have said they will respond with new offensive systems if the U.S. moves forward with NMD. Thus, we will be creating a new arms race. We wonder if the U.S. is intentionally trying to create this new instability as a rational for deploying NMD. Either way, NMD deployment is dangerous and insane.

I can assure you that the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space, myself and others will be working with groups and people all over the world to ensure that we do not put weapons into space. NMD is just the first step in a colossal arms race into space. This must be resisted. We’ve seen enough war on this earth. We do not need to extend this bad seed into space.

I urge that this money be spent on space travel research rather than weapons.

In peace,

Paul Kirsch
Paul Kirsch

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<td>November 11, 1999</td>
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<td>Ms Julia Hudson</td>
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<td>Dear Ms Hudson:</td>
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<td>On behalf of the Dominican Sisters of Hope and the Ursuline Sisters of</td>
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<td>Tidworth-US Province, I am offering comments on the Draft Environmental</td>
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<td>Impact Statement for the National Missile Defense (NMD) program. I am doing</td>
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<td>1) The NMD system is not needed. The threat is contrived in order to set</td>
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<td>the stage for public approval of further weapons buildup. No nation is an</td>
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<td>evil empire and it beggars the mind to imagine that leaders of nations, such</td>
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<td>full well that the U.S. would retaliate against their nation.</td>
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<td>2) NMD is not about defense of the most powerful nation on earth. It is</td>
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<td>simply a way for the Pentagon and aerospace industry to forge the way toward</td>
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Exhibit 9.1.2-1: Reproductions of E-Mail Comment Documents (Continued)
6. NMD will increase space pollution. Just days ago NASA was forced to move the international space station to a higher orbit to avoid being hit by a piece of space junk. If we allow the testing and deployment of space weapons systems, we will create massive amounts of space junk that will, in the words of Apollo astronaut Edgar Mitchell, “Make it impossible for us to get off the planet.” Space must be viewed as an environment that needs to be protected from excessive contamination.

7. NMD is destabilizing. In recent days Russia has tested new missiles that they say they will deploy if NMD is approved. India, China and other powers have said they will respond with new offensive systems if the U.S. moves forward with NMD. Is the U.S. is intentionally trying to create this new instability as a rational for deployment of NMD? Either way, NMD deployment is dangerous and insane.

We do not believe that further armaments and warlike policies create a just, peaceful world.

Yours truly,

Valerie Heinonen, o.s.u.
Corporate Responsibility Representative

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Exhibit 9.1.2-1: Reproductions of E-Mail Comment Documents (Continued)
Pentagon, with inestimable damage to the environment as a direct result.

I therefore object most strongly to the proposed NMD programme on the
basis of a large number of threats to local and global environments that
such a programme will make.

Thank you for your time in reading this letter.

Yours sincerely,

Nick Drake.

Please accept my grave concerns about the NMD you are considering. It is a
wasteful, dangerous, unnecessary, expensive and harmful proposition, which
we cannot afford to further nor to foster. I want to see our money spent on
earth’s problems, not creating more for us in space. The NMD program you are
considering will destabilize the earth’s populations more, with the US using
its position to command and control space and the earth from space, rather
than help the world. This warlike system is as evil and foolishly as any
thought up since the atom bomb itself. To even think of exporting this
imperfect nuclear menace into space, when it cannot be controlled or
harnessed or dealt with properly here on earth, is insanity and hubris of
the highest degree.

Add me to the list of people who oppose this NMD and any deployment thereof,
now and forever. Please, stop this madness before it is too late. I am
ashamed that of all the nations in the world who vowed to keep space
exploration safe and peaceful in intent and in conduct, the US and Israel
were the only 2 abstentions. It does not help my confidence in what the
motives of my nation are in this regard. NO NMD!

Holly Gwinn Graham
Comments on the BMD/NMD system by Carah Ong

While many people believe that the new Star Wars program, initiated under the Clinton Administration, is a means to defend the US against nuclear missile attacks, the truth is that the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Organization is costly, inefficient and destabilizing, posing the risk of increased international tensions and initiation of a new arms race. The BMD Organization is a division within the Department of Defense and is responsible for managing, directing and executing the BMD Program. These areas are currently being pursued by the BMD Program: Theater Missile Defense (TMD), National Missile Defense (NMD) and advanced ballistic missile defense technologies.

Offense or Defense? The Pentagon claims that BMD programs are defensive, but the Space Command is committed to space "control and domination." The US Space Command has released "Vision for 2020," a joint initiative that combines US Army, Navy and Air Forces in a unified command to dominate "the space dimension of military operations to protect US interests and investment, integrating Space Forces into warfighting capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict." "Control of Space," defined in the Vision 2020 as "the ability to assure access to space, freedom of operations within the space medium, and an ability to deny others the use of space, if required," is one of four operational concepts required to "achieve overall campaign objectives."

Ultimately BMD programs such as the NMD system will spur additional offensive technologies that will threaten the security of the US. Russia and China each have developed numerous countermeasures and probably will be willing to sell those technologies to so-called "rogue states." Furthermore, development of the NMD system will increase the proliferation of nuclear technology. According to the Central Intelligence Agency, countries developing ballistic missiles have the capability to develop anti-missile systems.

Legal or Illegals? The NMD system violates The Outer Space Treaty which entered into force in 1967 and reserves the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only and for scientific exploration that benefits all peoples. The Treaty also prohibits the establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications as well as the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers.

In addition, the NMD system violates the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, an agreement between the US and the USSR that entered into force in 1972. President Clinton has announced that he will make a decision in June 2000 on whether or not to deploy the NMD system. While missile defense advocates argue that the ABM Treaty has been null and void since the dissolution of the USSR, if Russia disagrees with the Presidential decision, it is likely to respond by using the same argument to no longer be bound by other international treaties. Russian officials have stated that any amendments to the ABM Treaty could undo 20 years of arms control efforts and have threatened a new arms race if the US builds the NMD system.

Protect or Endanger? The NMD system is a space and missile tracking system intended to intercept warheads launched by "rogue states" and detonate them above the atmosphere. According to the Welch Report, issued in February 1998 by an independent team of missile defense experts, the schedule and cost pressures on the NMD will most likely cause even more severe flight test failures than those experienced by other programs in the BMD Organization.

Cost Effective or Costly? Over $120 billion has already been spent to date on BMD programs. Yet, the Welch Report documented only four successes out of 17 tests conducted by the BMD. The Pentagon had originally scheduled 18 tests of the NMD system before the June 2000 Presidential decision. However, citing "costs" as the reason, the number of scheduled tests has been reduced to three. Quality standards remain a serious concern, especially when one miss could cause horrendous casualties and irreparable damage.

Success or Failure? The NMD system had its first-ever test from Vandenberg Air Force Base on October 2, 1999. Was the October 2nd success purely luck or will the system prove itself? Even if the NMD is successful, it will quickly be challenged by those countries that feel provoked by the system's seemingly offensive assertion. Consequently, those countries will likely respond to the system by developing various responses and countermeasures. Is a costly arms race, which diverts resources and funds from important social programs such as health care, social security and education, really how we want to begin the new millennium?

Instead of wasting billions testing undeveloped technology that undermines the security of the US, defense efforts should concentrate on the enforcement of treaties that reduce the nuclear threat, enhance international cooperation and fulfill existing obligations.

REASONS TO OPPOSE THE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM

* The NMD system is costly and inefficient. According to the Welch Report, issued in February 1998 by an independent team of missile defense experts, there have been only four successful interceptions out of 17 tests conducted by the BMD program. Over $120 billion has already been spent on BMD programs. In a July 29, 1999 interview with the Los Angeles Times, John Pike of the Federation of American Scientists noted that quality standards remain a serious concern, especially when one miss could cause horrendous casualties and irreparable damage.

* The NMD will threaten international relations and violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. According to the Constitution, only the President of the US has the authority to carry out, modify or terminate a treaty. President Clinton has announced that he will make a decision in June 2000 on whether or not to deploy the NMD system. If Russia disagrees with the Presidential decision, it is likely to respond by using the same argument to no longer honor other international treaties such as the Biological and Chemical Weapons Convention.

Exhibit 9.1.2-1: Reproductions of E-Mail Comment Documents (Continued)
*Development of the NMD system will increase the proliferation of nuclear technology. According to the Central Intelligence Agency, countries developing ballistic missiles have the capability to also develop anti-missile systems.

*BMD programs will spur additional offensive technologies that will threaten the security of the US. Russia and China each have developed numerous countermeasures and probably will be willing to sell those technologies.

*Corporations seem to be the only ones benefitting from BMD programs. Companies such as Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and Boeing are being awarded long-term contracts to work on a project that has almost zero possibility of success.

Carah Lynn Ong
Coordinator, Abolition 2000
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Join the Abolition-USA or Abolition-Global Caucus list serve to regularly receive updates about the Abolition movement. Both caucuses also provide a forum for conversation on nuclear-related issues as well as they are used to post important articles and information pertaining to nuclear abolition.

To subscribe to the Abolition Global Caucus, please do one of the following:
1. Send a message to the list moderator at A2000@silcom.com
3. Visit the Abolition 2000 website and submit a membership form.
4. Send an e-mail to: abolition-caucus-subscribe@epgroups.com (leave the subject line and body of the message blank).

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In the body of the message, write:
“subscribe abolition-usa” (do not include quotation marks)

To post a message to the Abolition USA list, mail your message to: abolition-usa@lists.xmission.com

Exhibit 9.1.2-1: Reproductions of E-Mail Comment Documents (Continued)
We’re restarting the arms race. The money needs to be spent elsewhere. We cannot heal the earth without peace which means trust. We are all one. We need to be big enough to start a trend toward peace so we can start gaining admiration from the rest of the world. Why are we destroying the earth?

Loilo Ryterski

Exhibit 9.1.2-1: Reproductions of E-Mail Comment Documents (Continued)
Protect or Endanger? The NMD system is a space and missile tracking system intended to intercept warheads launched by "rogue states" and detonate them above the atmosphere. According to the Welch Report, issued in February 1998 by an independent team of missile defense experts, the schedule and cost pressures on the NMD will most likely cause even more severe flight test failures than those experienced by other programs in the BMD Organization.

Cost Effective or Costly? Over $120 billion has already been spent to date on BMD programs. Yet, the Welch Report documented only four successes out of 17 tests conducted by the BMD. The Pentagon had originally scheduled 18 tests of the NMD system before the June 2000 Presidential decision. However, citing "costs" as the reason, the number of scheduled tests has been reduced to three. Quality standards remain a serious concern, especially when one miss could cause horrendous casualties and irreparable damage.

Success or Failure? The NMD system had its first ever test from Vandenberg Air Force Base on October 2, 1999. Was the October 2nd success purely luck or will the system prove itself? Even if the NMD is successful, it will quickly be challenged by those countries that feel provoked by the system's seemingly offensive assertion. Consequently, those countries will likely respond to the system by developing various new countermeasures. A costly arms race, which diverts resources and funds from important social programs such as health care, social security and education, really how we want to begin the new millennium? Instead of wasting billions testing undevolved technology that undermines the security of the US defense efforts should concentrate on the enforcement of treaties that reduce the nuclear threat, advance international cooperation and fulfill existing obligations.

"This article was published in the Santa Barbara News Press on November 2, 1999. It is available on-line at the Abolition 2000 website: http://www.abolition2000.org"

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Ballistic Missile Defense Fact Sheet*
By Carah Ong

Background on the BMD Organization

The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization is a division within the Department of Defense and is responsible for managing, directing and executing the Ballistic Missile Program. The three areas currently being pursued by the BMD Program are: Theater Missile Defense (TMD), National Missile Defense (NMD) and advanced ballistic missile defense technologies. The NMD system is a space and missile tracking system. It includes six fundamental components: a ground based interceptor; a ground based radar; ...
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4. Send an e-mail to: abolition-caucus.subscribe@agroups.com (leave the subject line and body of the message blank).

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abolition-caucus@agroups.com

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abolition-usa.request@lists.xmission.com
In the body of the message, write:
"subscribe abolition-usa" (do not include quotation marks)

To post a message to the Abolition-USA list, mail your message to:
abolition-usa@lists.xmission.com

Submitted by:
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

No, no, no, no, no. What a terrible idea. I can scarcely believe you’re serious. A political and environmental disaster. Please just forget about it.

Regards, Alan Seegert
Hi,

I am a resident of Grand Forks, ND and did attend your conferences here on the 27th.

I did talk with one of the reps, and it was stated that Grand Forks cannot cover all 50 states but that Alaska did have that capability. Why would you have to go any further in your search for the perfect site? It would seem obvious that since we could not cover what is being planned and would need to come up with a way to cover Hawaii and parts of Alaska, that would cost more.

Being from Grand Forks I would like it to be here but looking at the bigger picture as a resident and tax payer of the US it should be where it will cost the least for the greatest coverage.

My other suggestion would be that since each option would impact on Canada, have you thought to ask them their input? This could go a long way in relationships with Canada. Even if you do go a different way, they will at least have been considered.

Thank you,

Mary Saunders
I feel there are a few reasons that MND should be built at the Nekoma ND. site.

1. This is the location that gives the best coverage of the entire country.
2. From here we would have a shoot, miss and shoot again possibility.
3. We would not have to break the missile treaty with Russia to deploy here.

Stuart R. Paulson
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commentor and Affiliation</th>
<th>Comment Number</th>
<th>Resource Area</th>
<th>Section</th>
<th>RESPONSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Matthew Freeman – Federal Aviation Administration</td>
<td>P-E-001.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomic</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>A detailed description of the proposed jobs related to NMD deployment is provided in the socioeconomics section of the EIS. The geographical distribution of the potential jobs would be near the deployment site or surrounding area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-E-001.2</td>
<td>Airspace</td>
<td>4.3.4.2</td>
<td>Text has been revised to the Airport Facility section of Supplement Alaska.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-E-001.3</td>
<td>Airspace</td>
<td>4.3.4.2</td>
<td>The mitigation measure of installing an airport surveillance radar is not required to operate the XBR; however, it can be implemented to reduce any potential airspace conflicts. The implementation of this mitigation at Eareckson AS would not use the existing system but would require the installation of a new airport surveillance radar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-E-001.4</td>
<td>Proposed Action</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>Current plans for the airfield at Fort Greely may include the upgrade to the runway as analyzed in the EIS. The airfield is currently owned and operated by the U.S. Army, which has authority on the future use at this site. The NMD program could utilize the airfield as either a military or civilian use facility. The only known use of the airfield is for proposed NMD activities which is analyzed in the EIS and would not preclude future use of the runway. NMD has no plans for civilian use of the airfield or for civilian refueling facilities and civilian passenger accommodations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Meyer</td>
<td>P-E-002.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-E-002.2</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Karen Button</td>
<td>P-E-003.1</td>
<td>Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste Management</td>
<td>4.3.1.5</td>
<td>The EIS analyzes potential impacts to hazardous waste management from deployment of the NMD system including existing site contamination that may be affected by NMD deployment. Other military and private site contamination investigations and required remediation are outside the scope of this EIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-E-003.2</td>
<td>Subsistence</td>
<td>4.3.1.14, 4.3.4.15</td>
<td>Comment noted. Potential impacts to subsistence uses from NMD deployment are analyzed in the EIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-E-003.3</td>
<td>Socioeconomic</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>The employment and project expenditures for NMD deployment in the State of Alaska are analyzed in the socioeconomics section.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-E-003.4</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soren Wuerth</td>
<td>P-E-004.1</td>
<td>Public Participation</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>The Draft EIS was provided to those requesting copies during the scoping process. The initial scoping process was announced by local media (newspapers and television) as well as ads being placed in the local newspapers. The public hearings were announced similar to that of the public scoping meetings. Copies of the Draft EIS could have been requested at the public hearings and would be sent out within a few days. The Executive Summary of the Draft EIS was available upon request at the public hearings. The public hearing process for the NMD Draft EIS followed the National Environmental Policy Act guidelines. The public comment period for the EIS was extended to January 15, 2000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-E-004.2</td>
<td>Socioeconomic</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>The employment and project expenditures for NMD deployment in the State of Alaska are analyzed in the socioeconomics section.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-E-004.3</td>
<td>Health and Safety</td>
<td>4.3.1.6, 4.3.4.7</td>
<td>There are no electromagnetic issues associated with GBI deployment. Potential electromagnetic radiation from the proposed XBR is analyzed in the EIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-E-004.4</td>
<td>Air Quality</td>
<td>4.3.1.1, 4.3.4.1</td>
<td>There will be no flight testing of the GBI from the deployment site. Potential impacts to air quality from construction and operation of the NMD system at each deployment location are analyzed in the EIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentor and Affiliation</td>
<td>Comment Number</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-E-004.5</td>
<td>Mitigation</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>Mitigation measures to minimize, reduce, rectify, or compensate for environmental impacts will be selected as part of the decisionmaking process and will be included in the Record of Decision. Once the mitigation measures are selected, appropriate funding will be allocated.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-E-004.6</td>
<td>Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste Management</td>
<td>4.3.1.5</td>
<td>The EIS analyzes potential impacts to hazardous waste management from deployment of the NMD system including existing site contamination that may be affected by NMD deployment. Other military and private site contamination investigations and required remediation are outside the scope of this EIS.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. and Mrs. Emanuel Karr</td>
<td>P-E-004.7</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pamela Miller – Alaska Community Action on Toxins</td>
<td>P-E-006.1</td>
<td>Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste Management</td>
<td>4.3.1.5</td>
<td>The EIS analyzes potential impacts to hazardous waste management from deployment of the NMD system including existing site contamination that may be affected by NMD deployment. Other military and private site contamination investigations and required remediation are outside the scope of this EIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pamela Miller – Alaska Community Action on Toxins</td>
<td>P-E-006.2</td>
<td>Environmental Consequences</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pamela Miller – Alaska Community Action on Toxins</td>
<td>P-E-006.3</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rion Schmidt</td>
<td>P-E-007.1</td>
<td>Public Participation</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rion Schmidt</td>
<td>P-E-007.2</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dave Knight – Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament</td>
<td>P-E-008.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia Kilgore</td>
<td>P-E-009.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dave Knight – Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament</td>
<td>P-E-010.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Annie O’Reilly</td>
<td>P-E-011.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
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<tr>
<td>J une Rusten</td>
<td>P-E-012.1-3</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>See response to written comment P-W-067.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fern Katz</td>
<td>P-E-013.1-3</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>See response to written comment P-W-067.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentor and Affiliation</td>
<td>Comment Number</td>
<td>Resource Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kay Stoner</td>
<td>P-E-014.1-3</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>See response to written comment P-W-067.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamara Wolske</td>
<td>P-E-015.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marilyn Gayle Hoff</td>
<td>P-E-016.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Sara Luther</td>
<td>P-E-017.1-3</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>See response to written comment P-W-067.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pam Bruce</td>
<td>P-E-018.1</td>
<td>Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste Management</td>
<td>4.3.1.5</td>
<td>The EIS analyzes potential impacts to hazardous waste management from deployment of the NMD system including existing site contamination that may be affected by NMD deployment. Other military and private site contamination investigations and required remediation are outside the scope of this EIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbara Green</td>
<td>P-E-020.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Bruce</td>
<td>P-E-021.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Schlesinger</td>
<td>P-E-022.1</td>
<td>Scope of the EIS</td>
<td>1.6, Appendix H</td>
<td>A Supplement to the NMD Deployment Draft EIS analyzed the potential NMD upgrades to the PAVE PAWS radars. The Air Force has announced that they will prepare an EIS analyzing the modernization, maintenance, and sustainment of operations of the PAVE PAWS radars.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard and Sharon Judge</td>
<td>P-E-023.1</td>
<td>Public Participation</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>The public review period on the Draft EIS was extended to January 19, 2000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Selectman, Town of Sandwich and Spokesperson, Cape Cod Coalition to Decommission PAVE PAWS, respectively</td>
<td>P-E-023.2</td>
<td>Scope of the EIS</td>
<td>1.6, Appendix H</td>
<td>A Supplement to the NMD Deployment Draft EIS analyzed the potential NMD upgrades to the PAVE PAWS radars. The Air Force has announced that they will prepare an EIS analyzing the modernization, maintenance, and sustainment of operations of the PAVE PAWS radars.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-E-023.3</td>
<td>Scope of the EIS</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>The IFICS Data Terminal design and performance regions are still under study; therefore, the locations have not been finalized along with the fiber optic cable line. As stated in the Draft EIS, once the design and locations have been determined the appropriate National Environmental Policy Act documentation will be completed. The Draft EIS does provide a programmatic analysis of the potential impacts from an IFICS Data Terminal and the fiber optic cable to provide the decisionmaker with enough information on the potential impacts from deployment. Potential XBR deployment locations are analyzed in the EIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leah Penniman</td>
<td>P-E-024.1-3</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>See response to written comment P-W-067.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentor and Affiliation</td>
<td>Comment Number</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patricia Wulp</td>
<td>P-E-025.1</td>
<td>Environmental Consequences</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>The EIS analyzes potential impacts from construction and operation of a ground-based NMD system. In addition, there would be no flight testing from the deployment site. Operation of the NMD system during wartime which would cause space debris is outside the scope of this EIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-E-025.2</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patricia Bracey</td>
<td>P-E-026.1</td>
<td>Alternatives</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>The NMD system analyzed in this EIS is a defensive ground-based system and does not involve the use of space-based weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-E-026.2</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audrey J ordan Barnard</td>
<td>P-E-027.1-3</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>See response to written comment P-W-067.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanja Winter</td>
<td>P-E-028.1-3</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>See response to written comment P-W-067.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanley Jacobs</td>
<td>P-E-029.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terri Middleton</td>
<td>P-E-030.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Rueter</td>
<td>P-E-031.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>P-E-031.2</td>
<td>Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste Management</td>
<td>4.3.1.5</td>
<td>The EIS analyzes potential impacts to hazardous waste management from deployment of the NMD system including existing site contamination that may be affected by NMD deployment. Other military and private site contamination investigations and required remediation are outside the scope of this EIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ann Heidenreich</td>
<td>P-E-032.1-3</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>See response to written comment P-W-067.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justin Mason</td>
<td>P-E-033.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
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<td>Hatton Greer</td>
<td>P-E-034.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandra and Steve Arnold-Ganey</td>
<td>P-E-035.1</td>
<td>Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste Management</td>
<td>4.3.1.5</td>
<td>The EIS analyzes potential impacts to hazardous waste management from deployment of the NMD system including existing site contamination that may be affected by NMD deployment. Other military and private site contamination investigations and required remediation are outside the scope of this EIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trang Duong</td>
<td>P-E-036.1</td>
<td>Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste Management</td>
<td>4.3.1.5</td>
<td>The EIS analyzes potential impacts to hazardous waste management from deployment of the NMD system including existing site contamination that may be affected by NMD deployment. Other military and private site contamination investigations and required remediation are outside the scope of this EIS.</td>
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</tbody>
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Table 9.1.2-2: Responses to E-Mail Comments (Continued)

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<th>Commentor and Affiliation</th>
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<td>P-E-036.2 Program</td>
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<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-E-036.3 Environmental Consequences</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>The EIS analyzes potential impacts to the environment including environmental justices, subsistence, and cultural resources that look at impacts to indigenous people.</td>
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<td>Kim O'Connor P-E-037.1 Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joanna Reichhold P-E-038.1 Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste Management</td>
<td>4.3.1.5</td>
<td>The EIS analyzes potential impacts to hazardous waste management from deployment of the NMD system including existing site contamination that may be affected by NMD deployment. Other military and private site contamination investigations and required remediation are outside the scope of this EIS.</td>
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<td>P-E-038.2 Program</td>
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<td>P-E-038.3 Subsistence</td>
<td>4.3.1.14, 4.3.4.5, 4.3.5.1</td>
<td>Potential impacts to subsistence users from NMD deployment in Alaska were analyzed in the EIS.</td>
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<td>P-E-038.4 Program</td>
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<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cammisa Ray P-E-039.1 Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
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<tr>
<td>David Katz P-E-040.1 Program</td>
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<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system. Operation of the NMD system during wartime which would cause space debris is outside the scope of this EIS.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Karen Button P-E-041.1 Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste Management</td>
<td>4.3.1.5</td>
<td>The EIS analyzes potential impacts to hazardous waste management from deployment of the NMD system including existing site contamination that may be affected by NMD deployment. Other military and private site contamination investigations and required remediation are outside the scope of this EIS.</td>
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<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mark Luttrell P-E-042.1 Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste Management</td>
<td>4.3.1.5</td>
<td>The EIS analyzes potential impacts to hazardous waste management from deployment of the NMD system including existing site contamination that may be affected by NMD deployment. Other military and private site contamination investigations and required remediation are outside the scope of this EIS.</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Margaret Weitzmann P-E-043.1 Program</td>
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<td>Shaunti Kiehl P-E-044.1 Program</td>
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<td>N/A P-E-045.1 Alternatives</td>
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<td>Resource Area</td>
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<td>Geoff Holland – Director, Institute for Global Futures Research</td>
<td>P-E-046.1-3</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>See response to written comment P-W-067.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. David Klein</td>
<td>P-E-047.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
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<td>James Welch – Deputy Chief, Fairbanks Police</td>
<td>P-E-048.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
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<td>Nancy Booth</td>
<td>P-E-049.1</td>
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<td>Paul Kirsch</td>
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<td>Program</td>
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<td>See response to written comment P-W-067.</td>
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<td>Valerie Heinonen – Corporate Responsibility Representative</td>
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<td>Program</td>
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<td>See response to written comment P-W-067.</td>
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<td>Nick Drake</td>
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<td>Program</td>
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<td>See response to written comment P-W-067.</td>
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<td>Holly Gwinn Graham</td>
<td>P-E-053.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
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<td>Carah Ong – Coordinator, Abolition 2000 Nuclear Age Peace Foundation</td>
<td>P-E-054.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system. Also see written comment P-W-067.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leila Ryterski</td>
<td>P-E-055.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carah Ong – Coordinator, Abolition 2000 Nuclear Age Peace Foundation</td>
<td>P-E-056</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system. Also see written comment P-W-067.</td>
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<td>Alan Seegert</td>
<td>P-E-057.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
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<td>Comment noted.</td>
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<td>Michael-Pierre Giraud</td>
<td>P-E-058.1</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mary Saunders</td>
<td>P-E-059.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
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<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
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<td>P-E-059.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stuart Paulson</td>
<td>P-E-060.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
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<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
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9.1.3 TRANSCRIPT COMMENT DOCUMENTS—NMD DEPLOYMENT DRAFT EIS

Individuals who commented on the Draft EIS at one of the seven public hearings are listed in table 9.1.3-1 along with their respective commentor ID number. This number can be used to find the transcript document and each speaker’s comments and to locate the corresponding table on which responses to each comment are provided.

9.1.3.1 Transcript Comments

Exhibit 9.1.3-1 presents reproductions of the transcript comment documents that were received in response to the Draft EIS. Comment documents are identified by commentor ID number, and each statement or question that was categorized as addressing a separate environmental issue is designated with a sequential comment number.

9.1.3.2 Response to Transcript Comments

Table 9.1.3-2 presents the responses to substantive comments to the Draft EIS that were received in transcript form. Responses to specific comments can be found by locating the corresponding commentor ID number and sequential comment number identifiers.

Table 9.1.3-1: Public Comments on the Draft EIS (Transcript Documents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commentor and Affiliation</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Langdon, North Dakota, October 26, 1999</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shawn Ferguson</td>
<td>P-T-001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Senator Conrad’s Office</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kevin Carvell</td>
<td>P-T-002</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Senator Dorgan’s Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joan Carlson</td>
<td>P-T-003</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Congressman Pomeroy’s Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carol Goodman</td>
<td>P-T-004</td>
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<td>- Economic Development Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>R.G. Killcrece</td>
<td>P-T-005</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Forks, North Dakota, October 27, 1999</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Don Larsen</td>
<td>P-T-006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Patricia Owens</td>
<td>P-T-007</td>
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<td>- Mayor of Grand Forks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bob Gustafson</td>
<td>P-T-008</td>
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<td>- Grand Forks Chamber of Commerce</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shawn Ferguson</td>
<td>P-T-009</td>
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Table 9.1.3-1: Public Comments on the Draft EIS (Transcript Documents) (Continued)

<table>
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<td>Kevin Carvell</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joan Carlson</td>
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<td>- Congressman Pomeroy’s Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kirk Smith</td>
<td>P-T-012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich Becker</td>
<td>P-T-013</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Fairbanks, Alaska, November 1, 1999</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Harry Lord</td>
<td>P-T-014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Althea St. Martin</td>
<td>P-T-015</td>
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<td>- Senator Murkowski’s Office</td>
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<td>Tom Moyer</td>
<td>P-T-016</td>
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<td>- Governor Knowles’ Office</td>
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<td>Mayor Jim Hayes</td>
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<td>John Poirrier</td>
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<td>- Mayor of North Pole Office</td>
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<td>Pete Hallgren</td>
<td>P-T-019</td>
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<td>- Fort Greely Re-Use Authority</td>
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<td>Tim Sharp</td>
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<td>- Fairbanks Building and Construction Trades Council</td>
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<td>Jim Sampson</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rick Solie</td>
<td>P-T-022</td>
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<td>- Fairbanks Memorial Hospital and Denali Center</td>
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<td>Dean Owen</td>
<td>P-T-023</td>
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<td>- Alaska Department of Transportation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jim Romersberger</td>
<td>P-T-024</td>
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<td>Dan O’Neil</td>
<td>P-T-025</td>
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<td>Frank Biondi</td>
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<td>Cynthia Henry</td>
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<td>Don Whitmore</td>
<td>P-T-028</td>
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<tr>
<td>Roger Burggraf</td>
<td>P-T-029</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wally Powers</td>
<td>P-T-030</td>
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<td>- Fairbanks North Star Borough Economic Development Commission</td>
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Table 9.1.3–1: Public Comments on the Draft EIS (Transcript Documents) (Continued)

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<td>Frank Williams - University of Alaska, Fairbanks</td>
<td>P-T-031</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mike Stredry</td>
<td>P-T-032</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Alaska Trail Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>John S. Brown</td>
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<td>- Fairbanks Central Labor Council</td>
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<td>Rhonda Curwen-Boyles</td>
<td>P-T-034</td>
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<td>- Greater Fairbanks Chamber of Commerce</td>
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<td>Randy Griffin</td>
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<td>Bill Brophy</td>
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<td>Hank Bartos</td>
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<td>Gabriel Scott</td>
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<td>- Cascadia Wildlands Project</td>
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<td>Steven Haagenson</td>
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<td>Frank Chapados</td>
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<td>Dave Williams</td>
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<td>James Messer</td>
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<td>Mark A. Ames</td>
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<td>John Binkley</td>
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<td>Bill Connor</td>
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<td>Chick Wallace</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bert Bell</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sean McGuire</td>
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<td>Anita Rose</td>
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<td>Rudy Vetter</td>
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<td>David Carlstrom</td>
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<td>Margaret Durst</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sid Michaels</td>
<td>P-T-054</td>
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### Table 9.1.3-1: Public Comments on the Draft EIS (Transcript Documents) (Continued)

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<td><strong>Anderson, Alaska, November 2, 1999</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bob Murray</td>
<td>P-T-055</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mayor Bob Knight</td>
<td>P-T-056</td>
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<tr>
<td>– City of Nenana</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jean Murray</td>
<td>P-T-057</td>
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<tr>
<td>Milton Haken</td>
<td>P-T-058</td>
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<tr>
<td>– City of Nenana Police Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frank Hollis</td>
<td>P-T-059</td>
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<td>Steve Denton</td>
<td>P-T-060</td>
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<tr>
<td>– Usibelli Coal Mine, Inc.</td>
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**Delta Junction, Alaska, November 3, 1999**

| Pete Hallgren              | P-T-061   |
| – Fort Greely Re-Use Authority |         |
| Susan C. Kemp              | P-T-062   |
| – Delta Junction City Council |         |
| Rick J ohnson              | P-T-063   |
| – Delta Junction City Council |        |
| Dan Beck                   | P-T-064   |
| – Delta/Greely School System |         |
| K. Kirk                    | P-T-065   |
| Claire Wingfield           | P-T-066   |
| – Delta Chamber of Commerce |         |
| Nat Good                   | P-T-067   |
| – Delta Junction City Council |         |
| David Duham                | P-T-068   |
| – National Bank of Alaska, Big Valley Community Corporation | |
| Paul Knopp                 | P-T-069   |
| – Deltana Community Corporation |      |
| Patrick C. Saylor          | P-T-070   |
| Dwight D. Nissen           | P-T-071   |
| – Golden Valley Electric Association |   |
| Matt Freeman               | P-T-072   |
| – Federal Aviation Administration |       |
| Donna Gardino              | P-T-073   |

**Anchorage, Alaska, November 4, 1999**

| Senator Robin Taylor       | P-T-074   |
| Pamela Miller              | P-T-075   |
| – Alaska Community Action on Toxics | |
| Karen Button               | P-T-076   |
### Table 9.1.3-1: Public Comments on the Draft EIS (Transcript Documents) (Continued)

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Senator Loren Leman</td>
<td>P-T-077</td>
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<tr>
<td>Don Whitmore</td>
<td>P-T-078</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mike O’Callaghan</td>
<td>P-T-079</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rion Schmidt</td>
<td>P-T-080</td>
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<tr>
<td>Soren Wuerth</td>
<td>P-T-081</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carl Wassilie</td>
<td>P-T-082</td>
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<tr>
<td>Todd Brown</td>
<td>P-T-083</td>
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**Arlington, Virginia, November, 9, 1999**

<table>
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<th>Commentor and Affiliation</th>
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<td>Thomas Maher</td>
<td>P-T-084</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stephen Young</td>
<td>P-T-085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharon J udge</td>
<td>P-T-086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard J udge</td>
<td>P-T-087</td>
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</table>
Good evening ladies and gentleman. Thank you for coming tonight. This is the public hearing on the draft environmental impact statement, or EIS, for the deployment of the National Missile Defense, or NMD system. I am Lewis Michaelson, and I will be the hearing moderator for tonight's meeting. This hearing is being held in accordance with the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act and regulations. This act requires federal agencies to analyze the potential environmental impacts of certain proposed actions and alternatives, and to consider the findings of those analyses in deciding how to proceed.

The purpose of tonight's hearing is to receive your comments and suggestions on the Draft EIS. Those of you who have not had an opportunity to review the Draft EIS may want to read the summary of the major findings available in the handout at the door. Those findings will also be addressed by panel members.
members in their presentations.

Let's look at the agenda for tonight. Hopefully you all had the opportunity to talk to the many knowledgeable experts and program officials who were staffing the exhibits during the past hour.

After I finish this introduction Colonel Larry Bramlitt will describe the proposed action for NMD deployment. Colonel Bramlitt is assistant to the program director for the NMD program, and he is representing the NMD program office.

Next Mr. David Hasley will brief you on the environmental impact analysis process and summarize the results reported in the Draft EIS. Mr. Hasley is the program’s EIS team leader for the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command. The last item on the agenda, though, is the most important. The comment period is your opportunity to provide information and make statements for the record. This input ensures that the decision makers can benefit from your knowledge of the local area, and any adverse environmental effects that you think may result from the proposed action or alternatives.

Keep in mind that the EIS is intended to ensure that future decision makers will be fully informed about the environmental impacts associated with the various alternatives, before they decide on a course of action. Consequently, comments tonight on issues unrelated to the EIS are beyond the scope of this hearing.

To comment verbally tonight, please fill out a verbal comment card available at the registration table, and turn it in. After the presentations we will take a short recess to collect any remaining cards, and then I will start calling on speakers in the following order: I will recognize the elected officials first, and then I will call members of the public in the order in which the cards were handed in. If you don’t feel comfortable standing up here and making a comment, you have until November 15th of this year to submit a written statement for consideration in the Final EIS. The address shown on the
1 slide is also available on the handout and on
the written comment sheets you received when
you entered the hall. Keep in mind that
written comments are given the same
consideration as verbal comments are given
tonight.
7 We want to make sure that all those
8 who wish to speak have a fair chance to be
9 heard. For that reason we have a stenographer
here to my left, who will be making a verbatim
record of everything that is said tonight.
12 The verbatim record will become part of the
Final EIS. We will also be videotaping the
public hearing to document your input.
14 To ensure that we get an accurate
record of what is said, please help me enforce
the following ground rules:
18 First, please speak only after I
19 recognize you, and please address your remarks
to me. If you have a written statement, you
21 may turn it in at the registration table, or
22 you may read it out loud, or do both.
23 Second, please speak clearly and
24 slowly into the microphone, starting with your
name and any organization that you represent.
Each person will be recognized for
four minutes. And this time limited includes
public officials, spokespersons, and private
individuals.
5 Please honor any requests that I
6 make for you to stop speaking if you reach the
four minute time limit.
8 Please do not talk when someone else
9 is speaking so we can make sure that we can
10 hear them.
11 Kindly refrain from smoking in this
12 room.
13 And that's the dos and don'ts. With
that, it's my pleasure to introduce Colonel
Bramlitt, who will describe the NMD program.
17 COLONEL LARRY BRAMLITT: Good
evening. I'm Colonel Larry Bramlitt. I'm
with the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
out of Washington D.C., and it's a pleasure to
be out of Washington to talk to real people
for a change. I am also the assistant to the
program manager for the NMD program.
24 The Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization is the agency responsible for

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developing and deploying the National Defense System. In the following charts I will review the threat that is driving the development of the NMD system, and provide an overview of the program and how it works, and address the decisions to be made.

The National Missile Defense System is being developed to protect the United States from ballistic missile attacks. The emerging threats, as depicted on this chart, are driving a Congressional desire that a viable National Missile Defense System be prepared for deployment as soon as technologically feasible. The current program guidance is to develop, demonstrate and deploy a system to defend the United States against a limited strategic ballistic missile threat by a rogue nation.

The reason we need such a system is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and technology of long-range ballistic missiles is increasing the threat to our national security. The NMD system would be a land-based, nonnuclear missile defense system, capable of responding to limited ballistic missile threats to the United States. The development and testing effort for the NMD program is to be consistent with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; however, deployment of this system may require treaty modifications.

The NMD system would consist of the elements shown on these slides. These elements are the Ground-Based Interceptor, which is the weapon of the system; the Battle Management Command and Control, which is the central communication and control point, and the brains of the system; and the In-Flight Interceptor Communications System Data Terminal, which transmits in-flight commands to the Ground-Based Interceptors while in flight; the X-Band Radar, which assists with tracking the incoming missile; and finally our existing early warning system to assist in early warning of radars and satellites.

In a simplified form, this is how the system works: when a ballistic missile is launched, satellites in space would detect the launch and provide information to the system. We have a launch, the satellites...
1 have picked up, the satellites in space would
2 detect the launch and provide information to
3 the system. On the ground the existing early
4 warning radars, and the X-Band Radar, would
5 detect and track the incoming ballistic
6 missile and provide specific locations to the
7 Battle Management Command and Control. This
8 information gives the people controlling the
9 system the ability to launch the Ground-Based
10 Interceptor to destroy the incoming ballistic
11 missile in outer space.
12 And now I will provide a little more
13 detail on each of these Elements.
14 The weapon of the system is the
15 Ground-Based Interceptor, which would remain
16 in an underground silo until launch. It is
17 important to note that launches from these
18 sites would occur only in defense of the
19 United States from a ballistic missile
20 attack. There would be no flight testing of
21 the missiles from the NMD deployment site.
22 The Ground-Based Interceptor is a
23 long range, high velocity missile consisting
24 of three solid propellant boosters and a kill
25 vehicle. The kill vehicle is the payload on

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An IFICS Data terminal site would consist of a radio transmitter/receiver and would require about one acre of land, including the perimeter fence. Approximately 14 IFICS data terminals could be required for the NMD system. At this time I would like to note that we're still developing the operational requirements for the IFICS Data Terminal. As such, the specific locations where it could be deployed have not yet been determined, and are currently under study. The regions under study include Alaska and North Dakota. In addition, as the operational requirements are refined, other regions may be identified. When possible the IFICS Data Terminal would be located on or near existing Department of Defense installations. The types of environmental impacts associated with the IFICS Data Terminal, therefore, are addressed in general terms rather than a site-specific manner within the Draft EIS.

The X-Band Radar is a ground-based radar that is capable of long-range detection and tracking of incoming ballistic missiles. The X-Band Radar site would include a radar and associated support facilities. At this time it is anticipated that only one X-Band Radar in Alaska or North Dakota would be deployed for the initial NMD system. The United States has an existing early warning system that can detect incoming ballistic missiles. This program consists of early warning radars and satellites. The NMD program would make use of this system to assist in the detection of tracking incoming ballistic missiles. The early warning system is in the process of being upgraded by adding new software and hardware modifications to the existing early warning radars. And new satellites. The upgrades to the early warning radars in the United States would occur at Beale Air Force Base, California; Cape Cod Air Station, Massachusetts; and Clear Air Station, Alaska. Modifications to these radars would not increase the current power levels. These

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Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
modifications are being addressed in a supplement to the NMD Deployment Draft EIS. The new early warning detection satellites are part of an Air Force upgrade to the existing system and would occur regardless of whether NMD is deployed. Any deployment of the NMD system may require the use of existing fiber optic lines, power lines, or other utilities. Some of these lines require modifications. Furthermore, the deployment of elements to some locations may require the acquisition of new right-of-ways, and installation of new utility and fiber optic cable. Potential fiber optic cable locations include North Dakota, the interior of Alaska, and the oceanic fiber optic cable along the Aleutian Islands. At this time the exact alignment of the fiber optic cables are under study and have not been identified for every site. Therefore, this element a addressed programmatically within the Draft EIS. For the EIS two alternatives were considered. The No-action Alternative and the

Proposed Action. For the No-action Alternative, the decision would be made not to deploy, in which case the NMD program would continue to develop and test the system. For the potential sites being considered for the NMD deployment, the No-action Alternative would be a continuation of the activities currently occurring or planned at those locations. Under the Proposed Action alternative, NMD elements, and element locations would be selected from the range of locations studied in the EIS. The potential deployment locations for the NMD system are being considered in both Alaska and North Dakota. The North Dakota sites are those that fall within the existing deployment area under the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The Alaska sites fall within the geographical area that maximizes NMD system performance. For the Ground-Based Interceptor and Battle Management Command and Control, one site could be selected in Alaska or North Dakota; or one site could be selected in

Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
Alaska, and one site in North Dakota. For the X-Band Radar, one site would be selected from the alternatives identified in Alaska and North Dakota. Please note, as discussed earlier, that we are still in the process of identifying sites for the IFICS Data Terminal. Once those sites have been identified, we will conduct additional environmental analysis, as appropriate.

This side shows the potential deployment locations in Alaska. These sites include Clear Air Station, Fort Greely, and the Fort Wainwright Yukon Training Area, along with Eielson Air Force Base, as potential deployment alternatives for the Ground-Based Interceptor and Battle Management Command and Control. Eareckson Air Station in the Western Aleutian Islands is the only potential location for an X-Band Radar in Alaska.

This slide shows the potential deployment locations under consideration in North Dakota. These sites include Grand Forks Air Force Base and the Missile Site Radar in Nekoma as potential deployment alternatives.

The NMD decision remains whether to deploy the system or not. A decision to deploy the NMD system would include the selections of deployment sites from among the alternative locations considered in the EIS and discussed earlier. The program is scheduled for a deployment rating next summer.

We have conducted three successful flight tests, which have demonstrated the vehicle’s ability to detect and destroy an incoming warhead. During the next six months, two system tests are scheduled to help assess the system’s technical maturity and design. A decision to deploy will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical readiness of the NMD system for deployment, and projected cost to build and operate the NMD.
system, arms control objectives, and other factors including potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system. The EIS will provide the United States government with the information necessary to properly account for the environmental impacts. At this time a deployment decision is not anticipated before June of 2000.

This concludes my part of the presentation. And I will turn the meeting over to David Hasley, who will discuss the environmental impact analysis process and the potential environmental impacts that could occur from the NMD deployment.

DAVID HASLEY: Thank you, Colonel Bramlett.

Good evening. I am David Hasley from the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command. We are located in Huntsville, Alabama. And our organization is responsible for conducting the environmental impact analysis process for deployment of NMD system, on behalf of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization.

Tonight I will present the schedule for the environmental impact analysis process, and show how you, the public, can follow in this process. I will also discuss the scope of the study and present the results of the environmental impact study.

The National Environmental Policy Act, or NEPA, as it’s known, requires that the federal agencies consider the environmental consequences of their proposed action in their decision making process. The deployment of the NMD system is an action that does fall under NEPA; and therefore, we have prepared a Draft Environmental Impact Study, or EIS, as it’s known, to analyze the potential environmental consequences of this action.

NEPA also requires that the public be included in this decision making process. Therefore, we held scoping meetings back in December of last year, to present you the NMD program, and also to receive your input on the scope of issues to be addressed in the EIS, and to identify other alternatives and issues related to deploying the NMD.
In accordance with NEPA, your input helped guide us in the preparation of the Draft EIS. The Draft EIS was then made available to the public on 1 October of this year, for public and agency review, and comment to everyone included on the mailing list which is located in Volume 2 of the Draft EIS. The public hearing this evening is a formal meeting where we present to you the results contained in the Draft EIS, and most importantly, to receive your comments on the document.

In addition to tonight’s hearing, written comments on the Draft EIS will continue to be accepted at the address shown on this slide, until November 15th. After the comment period is over we will consider all comments, both written and verbal, and perform additional analysis or revise the EIS where necessary. Again, as in the scoping process, equal consideration will be given to all comments, whether they are presented here tonight or mailed to us.

Once the public review process is complete we will prepare the Final EIS, which is scheduled for completion in May of next year, and we will mail it to all of those on the original distribution list for the Draft EIS. If you are not already on our mailing list you can request a copy by writing to the address given in the handout, or by filling out a card at the registration desk, or by the e-mail address provided in the handout. The Final EIS will include all comments received during this public review period and also response to those comments. If appropriate we will have to group those comments into categories, and we will respond accordingly. All comments received will be printed in their entirety in the Final EIS. The EIS will then serve as input for the Record of Decision. The Record of Decision which will document the decision which is made. And as you just heard from Colonel Bramlett, consideration of issues besides those addressed in the EIS will also enter into the final decision of whether to deploy the NMD system.
Chapter 4 of the Draft EIS is where we describe the potential environmental impacts that may occur to the affected environment as a result of proposed actions and their alternatives. Chapter 4 also includes suggested mitigations where potential impacts have been identified. Mitigation measures are methods for reducing or minimizing potential impacts. For the Draft EIS the environment was analyzed in terms of 15 resource areas, as shown on this slide. For the environmental resources at each location we developed a region of influence that defined the area under study. Each resource area was addressed at each location, unless it was determined, through initial analysis, that the proposed activities would not result in environmental impact to that resource. To summarize the results of the Draft EIS I will now provide an overview of the potential impacts that may result from the deployment of the NMD system.

The Draft EIS evaluated potential impacts during both the construction as well as the operational phases of the NMD program. The environmental areas we identified with the potential for impacts were airspace associated with electromagnetic interference from the X-Band Radar, wetlands at sites in both Alaska as well as North Dakota, health and safety related to electromagnetic radiation from the X-Band Radar, and socioeconomic benefits at all sites from NMD deployment activities. This slide shows the results of our analysis of the airspace and biological resource areas. For the airspace resource area we have been coordinating with the Federal Aviation Administration regarding the airspace requirements for the X-Band Radar. Our analysis shows that there is the potential to impact aircraft with electronic avionics out to approximately 4.2 mile area from the radar site. A high energy radiation area notice will be published on the appropriate aeronautical charts to inform pilots of the potential electromagnetic interference to certain types of aircraft. Deployment of the

Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
X-Band Radar would not require, however, any restricted airspace near the radar. At sites shown in this slide show, there is the potential to impact wetlands during the construction period. At both Clear Air Station and Yukon Training Area in Alaska, these wetlands do not contain critical habitat for vegetation or wildlife according to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Standard construction techniques, such as avoidance and soil stabilization would be used to reduce the potential impacts to all wetlands areas. Consultation will be conducted with regulatory agencies and appropriate permits will be obtained prior to the construction affecting any of the wetlands. Under the Proposed Action no adverse impact would be expected to vegetation, wildlife, or threaten or endangered species at any of the deployment alternatives. For the health and safety resource area, first we analyzed the potential risk from electromagnetic radiation from the X-Band Radar on human health and safety. The results of our analysis have shown that exposure levels outside of the boundary of the site would be below the established public exposure guidelines; therefore, there would be no impact to human health from operation of the X-Band Radar. This analysis was based on studies that we performed and data also collected from a similar existing prototype X-Band Radar, which is currently in operation at an Army Range in the Pacific Ocean. Second, publishing of the high energy radiation area notice on the appropriate aeronautical chart would inform pilots of the electromagnetic interference hazard to certain types of aircraft. In addition, no commercial airline routes would be impacted by operation of the X-Band Radar. Overall, no impacts to the public would occur due to electromagnetic radiation exposure. Next, potential socioeconomic impacts would occur to the region surrounding the Ground-Based Interceptor deployment alternatives, during both the construction as well as operational phases of deployment. As shown on this slide, it is expected that construction would take approximately 5 years.
1 to complete, and generate between 150 to 310 2 million dollars in local expenditures during 3 that time. In addition, construction of the 4 system would employ between 250 and 325 5 personnel, depending upon the site selected. 6 After construction operation of the 7 site would require between 250 to 360 8 personnel. The operational personnel would 9 generate approximately 7 to 10 million dollars 10 of direct income per year. 11 As with the Ground-Base Interceptor 12 site, it is expected that deployment of the 13 X-Band Radar would also provide an economic 14 benefit to the area around the deployment 15 site, except for at Eareckson Air Station in 16 Alaska. Since Eareckson Air Station is a 17 self-contained island in the Aleutian Islands 18 operated by the Air Force, construction and 19 operation at this site would not provide a 20 direct economic benefit to the surrounding 21 area. 22 However, at the North Dakota 23 deployment alternatives it is expected that 24 construction of the X-Band Radar would take 25 approximately 3 years to complete, and

Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
associate with biological resources and
subsistence uses. Most impacts, to biological
resources would be short-term during the cable
laying process. No long-term impacts would be
expected. Once the cable is placed on the
ocean floor no further impact should occur.
Laying the fiber optic cable may also result
in some short-term subsistence impacts by
displacing resources. This may cause
subsistence harvesters to travel greater
distances, thereby increasing their costs.
However, once the cable is laid there should
be no long-term impacts to these cables.
Other NMD elements which are
currently under development include the
In-Flight Interceptor Communications system,
or IFICS, the overland fiber optic cable
required to connect the NMD elements, and also
upgrade existing early warning radars used to
assist in tracking incoming ballistic
missiles.
As previously discussed, the
operational requirements for the IFICS Data
Terminals are still being identified, so the

specific deployment locations have not yet
been determined. Regions that are currently
under study include Alaska and North Dakota.
And in addition, as the operational
requirements are refined, other regions may be
identified. Overall, however, it is not expected
that deployment of an IFICS Data Terminal
would result in any significant impacts to the
environment. A general programmatic
environmental analysis is provided within the
Draft EIS to cover this. Once the final sites
have been selected, appropriate environmental
analysis will be conducted at that time.
The NMD system would also require
the installation of some new fiber optic cable
over land. Currently the location of the
fiber optic cable line are still under study,
but locations, once again, are being
considered in interior Alaska and North
Dakota.
The cable would be laid similar to
any other commercial fiber optic cable and
would follow existing utility corridors where
provided. In addition, existing commercial
29 fiber optic cable lines would be used where possible. The main environmental impacts of installing the fiber optic cable line in interior Alaska and North Dakota would be the biological resources, cultural resources, geology and soils, as well as the water resources. Once the specific fiber optic cable alignments are identified, appropriate site specific environmental analysis would be conducted.

And finally, for the Upgraded Early Warning Radar, we have just developed the initial proposed hardware and software upgrades to these existing sites. As a result, we are in the process of preparing a supplement to our Draft Deployment EIS, which is analyzing the potential effects of the proposed upgrades. We will release this supplement in the affected communities and hold public hearings there also to go over the results of our analysis. This supplement, along with the public comments received at those hearings will be included within the Final Deployment EIS.

In closing, I would like you to keep in mind that the study is in a draft stage, and that our goal is to provide decision makers with accurate information on the environmental consequences of this proposed action. And to do this, that's why we are here tonight asking for your comments on the Draft document. And those comments, along with other input, will be used throughout the decision making process.

Thank you. And I'll now turn it back to Lewis.

LEWIS MICHAELSON: Thank you, Mr. Hasley.

We need just five minutes to collect all the remaining speaker registration cards. If you have not yet filed one out, they are available at the registration table. We are going to arrange the podium for you to be able to speak, so if you'll just bear with us for five minutes we'll be ready to start.

(Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.)

LEWIS MICHAELSON: Okay, we're ready to start. You can take your seats.

Thank you.
1 Before we proceed, may I remind you of a couple of points. Again, please limit your comments to four minutes, so that everyone can be heard. And also, please state your name clearly, so that we can get the statement on the record, as well.
2 And please remember that no decision is being made tonight. The main purpose for the government representatives being here tonight is to learn of your concerns and suggestions firsthand.
3 To help you know when your four minutes is up, I have a very simple way of doing that, which is when there is one minute left I'll put up my index finger, like that (indicating) which will allow you to find a nice comfortable place to end your comments.
4 At the end of four minutes I will put up a closed hand, meaning it's time to wrap up.
5 Our first five speakers, -- I'll also mention to you that again written comments are given the same consideration as the oral comments, so if you are one of those people that does not feel comfortable speaking in public, please don't let that keep you from writing your comments on a written form.
6 The order in which I will be calling people, just so you will be ready to come up to the microphone, is Shawn Ferguson, Kevin Carvell, Joan Carlson, Carol Goodman, and --
7 you'll have to excuse me if I mispronounce this gentleman's name, R.G. Killcrece.
8 And just so you know, so you don't have the same problem that Colonel Bramlift had, it's the black microphone that you will be talking into. I don't want to confuse people.
9 Mr. Ferguson, Shawn Ferguson. P-T-001
10 SHAWN FERGUSON: My name is Shawn Ferguson with Senator Kent Conrad's office.
11 Pardon me, I have a cold, so --
12 From Senator Conrad: I regret that the Senate's schedule does not permit me to attend this evening's hearing in person. I have asked my staff to read this statement expressing my strong support for deployment of National Missile Defense, NMD, in North Dakota.
13 Earlier today in Washington I met

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with the director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, BMDO, Lieutenant General Ron Kadish, to communicate again my belief that we need to be prepared before we are surprised by the rogue state ICBM threat, such as from North Korea, Iran and Iraq. I have been pleased to organize visits to Washington by North Dakota community leaders in recent weeks, and would like to thank each of you here this evening for taking the time to inform the BMDO representatives of your support for NMD. Community support is an important part of the equation. North Dakota also brings vital assets to the table. We are the only treaty compliant deployment site under the current ABM Treaty. Here in northeastern North Dakota we have existing infrastructure and active Air Force installations that can help support the NMD system. North Dakota also offers excellent over-the-pole protection against missile attack, which is why our state hosted the Safeguard ABM system in the 1970s. North Dakota has experience with missile defense and would welcome NMD deployment. Finally the Draft Environmental Impact Statement has found no major concerns with deploying NMD in the flickertail state. Despite these assets, North Dakota faces an uphill fight for NMD. The ABM Treaty is under fire. And because a North Dakota site cannot reliably defend the western ends of the Aleutian and Hawaiian Island chains against attack from nearby North Korea, the Administration has proposed a single site in Alaska. The State Department has said that negotiations with Moscow regarding a second site will be left to a later date. As I recently told the President and his National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger, a single site in Alaska is simply not adequate to meet our nation’s NMD needs. We need sites in both Alaska and North Dakota. We should be talking with the Russians at the outset about the changes to the treaty necessary for two sites. Based on briefings I received, it is reasonable to expect that the ICBM threat will evolve during the coming decade to render a single site in Alaska incapable of providing...
A single site in Alaska also could not provide the shoot-look-shoot capability provided by a North Dakota site, in the event of a strike against Washington D.C. from the Middle East. Unfortunately in this growing -- this is a growing danger. The National Intelligence Estimate released about the CIA on September 9th indicated that it was entirely possible that Iran or Iraq can have ICBMs capable of hitting the United States by the end of the coming decade.

LEWIS MICHAELSON: Again, it’s a very detailed comment, and we’ll appreciate those comments.

SHAWN FERGUSON: We’ll just turn those in to you.

LEWIS MICHAELSON: Thank you very much.

KEVIN CARVELL: I’m Kevin Carvell, district director for Senator Byron Dorgan. And the Senator asked me to read this statement on his behalf this evening.

As the Department of Defense conducts the final phase of its Environmental Impact Statement to support the construction of a limited National Missile Defense system, I want to point out the advantages there are to locating the system in North Dakota. First, North Dakota is the only site currently under consideration that is allowed under the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The Russian government has steadfastly refused to consider major changes to that treaty. Building an NMD system in Alaska in violation of the treaty could destroy the framework of arms control and underpins our security relationship with Russia. Russia would almost certainly reject further reductions in its
strategic forces and might well decide to expand its nuclear arsenal. The slight advantage that an Alaskan site might offer in defending remote parts of Alaska and Hawaii against a primitive North Korean missile is far outweighed by the danger of reigniting a nuclear arms race, with the only nation that can still threaten us with thousands of warheads.

Secondly, while a North Dakota site may not address a North Korean threat as well as an Alaskan site, a North Dakota site is better situated to meet other threats such as the threat from Iran or Iraq. A limited National Missile Defense system should be situated to provide the best protection for the entire country from a wide range of rogue threats, not just from North Korea, a country that many believe is on the verge of collapse.

Third, by building in North Dakota the Department of Defense can save hundreds of millions of dollars that it can use for other high priority requirements. The Draft Environmental Impact Statement clearly shows that a North Dakota site offers considerable construction savings. For example, construction of the Ground Base Interceptor site in Alaska would cost more than 600 million dollars, while construction in North Dakota would cost only 312 million dollars. A savings of about half.

Most importantly, the people of North Dakota have a long tradition of supporting this nation's military. No state has better community-military relations. North Dakota communities helped win the cold war. Now North Dakotans are willing and capable of helping to preserve the peace.

LEWIS MICHAELSON: Joan Carlson?

JOAN CARLSON: I'm Joan Carlson, eastern field director for Congressman Earl Pomeroy. He's asked me to give this statement.

Colonel Bramlett and distinguished officers from the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, welcome to North Dakota. We appreciate your being here today to hear our testimony on the draft environmental impact statement, in preparation for the deployment.
of a National Missile Defense system. You have an incredibly important task, and we thank you for this opportunity to participate in the process.

Before I discuss the environmental impacts of NMD deployment in North Dakota, I would like to say a word about the level of support in this community for the United States military. Northeastern North Dakota has a proud history of hosting missions that are essential to our nation’s security. From the air refueling wing and the former Minuteman missiles at Grand Forks Air Force Base, to the Cavalier Air Station, to the ABM site at Nekoma, northeastern North Dakota has always welcomed the military with open arms. We are here this evening to say that we want to be your host for a National Missile Defense system.

With respect to the environmental analysis, the draft environmental impact statement rightly concludes that there are no significant hurdles to overcome with respect to the deployment in North Dakota. As the report states, NMD deployment in North Dakota would have no impact on threatened or endangered species. Likewise, once construction of the NMD system is complete there should be little soil erosion from operation of the site. Regarding health and safety, the report notes that in the unlikely event of a mishap, the danger to health and safety is greater in North Dakota than Alaska, because the North Dakota site, although sparsely populated, is more densely populated than Alaska. It should be noted, however, that the absolute threat of health and safety to NMD deployment in North Dakota is extremely low.

As you further evaluate where to deploy a National Missile Defense system, the question of coverage must be considered. A single-site NMD system deployed in North Dakota provides coverage of all 50 states against a North Korean missile attack, with the exception of the westernmost uninhabited islands of Hawaii, and the far western reaches of the Aleutian Islands of Alaska. Importantly a North Dakota site provides enhanced shoot-look-shoot capability.
for the entire continental United States, with
the possible exception of the Pacific
Northwest. Meaning that we can fire an
interceptor, see if it hits the target, and
then fire another interceptor, if necessary.
Alaska, on the other hand, provides
shoot-look-shoot capability only against U.S.
territory west of the Mississippi River,
leaving salvo coverage of the densely
populated eastern United States.
In sum, if only one site is chosen
the level of coverage favors North Dakota. In
the alternative, a two-site architecture of
North Dakota and Alaska would provide far
better coverage than either site alone.
In summary I want to thank you
again for taking the time to come to North
Dakota.

LEWIS MICHAELSON: Carol Goodman?

CAROL GOODMAN: Once again, the
communities of northeastern North Dakota
welcome the opportunity to participate in the
Environmental Impact Study process currently
being conducted by the Ballistic Missile

Defense Organization. Consideration of a
National Missile Defense proposal is a very
serious undertaking for the United States.
In addition, providing community
support for an NMD system is an awesome
responsibility. However, we all know that the
North Dakota citizens have always been
supportive of efforts to guard and protect our
country, and the return of a missile defense
system to this area would be no exception.
The communities of northeastern
North Dakota have followed the development of
National Missile Defense from a very unique
historical perspective, having been the site
of the safeguard anti-ballistic missiles
system in the early '70s. The Stanley R.
Mikkelsen complex remains the only site
allowed under the ABM Treaty between the
United States and the former Soviet Union.
In the process leading up to a
readiness review and perhaps subsequent
decisions next summer whether or not to deploy
NMD, we urge that careful consideration be
given to the following points:

Number one, the support for National
1 Missile Defense that exists on a regional and
2 state level, as well in the leadership of our
3 elected delegation in Washington D.C.
4 
5 Number two, the developed community
6 infrastructure found throughout the region.
7 
8 Number three, the national
9 atmosphere and debate that is concerned about
10 the United States’ ability to defend itself
11 against rogue aggressive nations.
12 
13 Number four, North Dakota’s
14 strategic location that allows adequate
15 defense of our nation’s capitol and the more
16 populated regions of our country.
17 
18 And number five, the amendment
19 brought forward by North Dakota Senator Kent
20 Conrad that directs Congress to study the
21 advantages of deploying two sites for National
22 Missile Defense, and the congressional support
23 that exists for that amendment.
24 
25 Throughout the EIS process,
26 including data collection and the public
27 hearing meetings held last December and
28 tonight, we trust that we have significantly
29 demonstrated that our communities, our
30 position, is to support National Missile

LEWIS MICHAELSON: R. G. Killcrece?

R. G. KILLCRECE: My name is Russell

George Killcrece. I live here in Langdon.

I’m honored to be living in the state. I

think it’s a great state, and I love it with

all my heart.

But I must bring to the attention of

the good people of this town, I served as a

Marine. I was aboard a battleship. We were

headed for Japan. We were 68 miles off that

cost when the captain of our ship said:

boys, take a look off the wake of the stern.

And then we did a 180. And when we made that

180 we could look over the stern, and we saw

that mushroom 38,000 feet in the air. And I

said: my God, they must have blew all the

islands apart over there.

We arrived in Hawaii. We were

treated well by the people. I thought about

that bomb. How devastating. It’s a machine

of war. It does terrible things. And I also

found out, in my mind and heart, it would be a

deterrent to any more wars that are fought.
And over the years past, and what have you, where all of the sudden, Ronald Reagan was president, Richard Alan was one of his cabinet members. I heard Reagan announce he was going to pull the troops out of Europe. He was going to bring the missiles home. And that scared me.

I wrote Richard Alan a letter, and I said: when you talk to the good president, will you remind him to keep those missiles remaining. Keep our troops there. Because a thousand tanks can blow $100 billion. And through that, Mr. Reagan left them there, because I expressed to him very deeply about that, through Mr. Richard Alan.

Well, you know, a few months later Margaret Thatcher, then prime minister of England, got on the BBC and announced we would have another 40 years of peace. It's been 55 years now. There has been rumors of wars, many wars, but a lot in countries, small ones. But only one thing, we wouldn't drop an atomic bomb, trying to overthrow the government. But as along as we keep those missiles, the SBIs that I asked Reagan to fight for, get the money to build, we can destroy them.

My children had a cartoon showing Mr. Reagan shining like a batman in the sky and an atomic bomb coming over. And when it saw Mr. Reagan's face in the sky, that bomb, it said: Oh no, Mr. President, we didn't come here to murder. And all of a sudden it drops into the Atlantic, and says kill, kill dead, dead. And through that my son and my two daughters and I got a beautiful letter from Mr. Reagan thanking us for their interest and...
47

1. love for their country.
2. But anyhow, we must have that to
3. defend ourselves, this missile, and protect
4. our good citizens of the United States. We
5. are not here to kill our citizens, we are here
6. to protect them.
7. LEWIS MICHAELSON: That actually
8. exhausts all of the cards that were turned
9. in for people who wanted to speak tonight. If
10. anyone else has anything that they wanted to
11. say tonight, this is your chance.
12. Is there anyone else that would like
13. to take this opportunity to speak tonight? If
14. so please, approach the microphone.
15. This is the first time I've been to
16. a public hearing with all of the, correct me
17. if I'm wrong, congressional representatives
18. had someone come to speak, so --
19. If not, we thank you very much for
20. coming tonight. I do want to remind you,
21. again, that written comments are very much
22. appreciated. If you want to take the time to
23. please take one home, you can always mail it
24. in by November 15th.
25. Colonel Bramlitt, is there anything

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1. that you would like to say?
2. If not, just thanks, thanks to
3. everyone for coming tonight. We're
4. adjourned.
5. (Whereupon, the meeting was
6. adjourned at 8:00 o'clock p.m.)
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Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I, Julie K. Kohler, a general shorthand (stenograph) reporter, 100 North Third Street, Suite 270, Grand Forks, North Dakota, do hereby certify that the foregoing 48 pages of typewritten material constitutes a full, true and correct transcript of my original stenograph notes, as they purport to contain, of the transcript of the proceedings reported by me at the time and place hereinbefore mentioned.

Julie K. Kohler

Dated this day of , 1999.

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Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
COMMENTS MADE PRIOR TO START OF PUBLIC HEARING

DONALD LARSEN, GRAND FORKS, NORTH DAKOTA

My name is Don Larsen. I'm a resident of Grand Forks. I've been an active supporter of the Grand Forks Air Force Base and military in this community for 40 years. I just came back last evening from briefings in Washington D.C. on the missile defense program that is being considered. We have some concerns. Those concerns came out of the briefings.

Our major concern is the consideration of Alaska for a site. We believe that the missile, the ABM Treaty would be violated in that process.

One of the briefings that we were in told us that they have been to Russia, which we were aware of, and have proposed substituting Alaska for Grand Forks. And that's of a major concern to us.

We believe that Grand Forks should be retained as the site, as it was in the ABM
Treaty. If there is a second site necessary, then they should negotiate for a second site, with Alaska being the second site. The community of Grand Forks is very receptive to the military, works well together with them. The concerns that the military has right now with retention and recruitment, we believe quality of life is a major issue. And I believe that Grand Forks offers a quality of life for the spouses and dependents of the military people assigned here. Let me see, should I add more to that?

Our understanding is that the National Security Council is in negotiations with Russia right now, looking for amendments to the ABM Treaty, in order to facilitate Alaska as a site. We would like, and we understand also that at this point that's the only negotiations, and that they intend to go back later to negotiate a possible second site. We would hope that if it's determined that Alaska needs to be the site, that they would do negotiations for both sites at the same time, feeling that a second round would be very difficult.

We are also concerned about, or I'm concerned about the coverage that Alaska provides. We understand that North Dakota excludes a peninsula in Hawaii and a peninsula in Alaska, that is uninhabited, for coverage from North Dakota. We also understand that if the site is put in Alaska it's going to remove the shoot-look-shoot capability of the whole East Coast. And we believe the population of the East Coast versus the unpopulated areas of Hawaii and Alaska need to be considered. So we would hope that when the decisions are being made that those things are taken into consideration.
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REVIEW

The Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) concisely defines the environmental impacts and the mitigation steps associated with a National Missile Defense System. The DEIS shows the environmental impacts are neutral when it comes to choosing a site in North Dakota or a site in Alaska. Neither site is environmentally superior in relationship to each other.

CITY OF GRAND FORKS PREFERRED SINGLE SITE

NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM LOCATION

The City of Grand Forks recommends the selection of Grand Forks Air Force Base (Grand Forks AFB) as the location for a single site National Missile Defense System.

Grand Forks AFB is the only Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) compliant site. Selection of Grand Forks AFB avoids a time consuming negotiation with the government of Russia to amend the ABM Treaty.

Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
1 shoot-look-shoot coverage to states located
2 east of the Mississippi River for rogue state
3 missile(s) launched from Africa or the Middle
4 East. A Grand Forks AFB National Missile
5 Defense System site does provide
6 shoot-look-shoot coverage for the states east
7 of the Mississippi River, as well as the
8 western states of the continental United
9 States.
10
11 The City of Grand Forks recommends the
12 Government of the United States adopt, as
13 national policy, a shoot-look-shoot National
14 Missile Defense System which provides coverage
15 for all fifty states.
16
17 The City of Grand Forks further
18 recommends the Government of the United
19 States, if it elects to deploy a National
20 Missile Defense System, build sites in Alaska
21 and at Grand Forks AFB simultaneously.
22
23
24
25

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Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
WHEREAS, nations of the former Soviet Union have experienced continuous political upheaval in the past decade, possess large numbers of nuclear equipped missiles, the threat of unauthorized or accidental attack against the population of the nation's contiguous 48 states exists and Grand Forks Air Force Base is excellently located to defend the preponderance of this nation's population, and WHEREAS, as a result of recent technology thefts by China and technology advances by North Korea and Iran, the nation needs to be prepared before we are surprised by the threat of a rogue state, and WHEREAS, an attack involving more than a half-dozen warheads, or use of moderately sophisticated re-entry vehicle technology the U.S. could adequately defend itself with two sites, including Grand Forks, and WHEREAS, a second site greatly enhances system effectiveness and survivability and a North Dakota installation, situated in a geologically stable region at the center of the continent, would be less vulnerable to attack or earthquake and would provide valuable economies of scale and growth potential to meet what is becoming a rapidly evolving ICBM threat to our country, and WHEREAS, this organization has submitted correspondence to the NMD Joint Program Office of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, as part of its scoping meeting on December 2, 1998 in Grand Forks for the Environmental Impact Statement for deployment of an NMD system at Grand Forks Air Force Base.

WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the Grand Forks Chamber of Commerce lends its full support to the National Missile Defense program and urges the Congress to give full consideration to the region of northeastern North Dakota, including Grand Forks Air Force Base, as a second site to ensure defensive coverage, survivability, and economies of scale for the nation in deterring the threat.
of an ICBM strike from a foreign nation.

Signed Robert Peabody, Chair Elect, Grand Forks Chamber of Commerce; and Mark Krauseneck, President, Grand Forks Regional Economic Development Corporation.

PUBLIC HEARING

LEWIS MICHAELSON: Good evening ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for coming tonight. This is the public hearing on the draft Environmental Impact Statement, or EIS, for the deployment of the National Missile Defense, or NMD system. I am Lewis Michaelson, and I will be the hearing moderator for tonight's meeting.

This hearing is being held in accordance with the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act and implementing regulations. The act requires federal agencies to analyze the potential environmental impacts of certain proposed actions and alternatives, and to consider the findings of those analyses in how to proceed. The purpose of tonight's hearing is to receive your comments and suggestions on the Draft EIS. Those of who you have not had an opportunity to review the Draft EIS may want to read the summary of the major findings in the handout available at the door. Those findings will also be addressed by panel members.
13

1 members in their presentations tonight.
2 Let's look at the agenda for
3 tonight. Hopefully you all had the
4 opportunity to listen, like most of you did,
5 and talk to the many knowledgeable experts and
6 program officials who were staffing the
7 exhibits during the past hour.
8 After I finish my introduction
9 Colonel Larry Bramlitt will describe the
10 proposed action for NMD deployment. Colonel
11 Bramlitt is the assistant to the Program
12 Director for the NMD program, and he is
13 representing the NMD program office.
14 Next, Mr. David Hasley will brief
15 you on the environmental impact analysis
16 process and summarize the results reported in
17 the Draft EIS. Mr. Hasley is the program's
18 EIS team leader for the U.S. Army Space and
19 Missile Defense Command.
20 The last item on the agenda,
21 however, is the most important. The comment
22 period is your opportunity to provide
23 information and to make statements for the
24 record. This input ensures that the decision
25 makers can benefit from your knowledge of the

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15

consideration in the Final EIS. The address shown on this slide is also in the handout that you received, and on the written comment sheets. Keep in mind that written comments are given the same consideration as verbal comments offered here tonight.

We want to make sure that all who wish to speak have a fair chance to be heard. We have a stenographer seated to my right who will be making a verbatim record of everything that is said, and that record will become a part of the Final EIS. We will also be videotaping the public hearing tonight to document your input.

To ensure that we get an accurate record of what is said, please help me enforce the following ground rules:

First, please speak only after I recognize you, and address your remarks to me. If you have a written statement you may turn it in at the registration table, read it out loud, or both, within the time limit.

Second, please speak clearly and slowly into the microphone, starting with your name and the organization that you represent.

Third, each person will be recognized for four minutes. This time limit includes public officials, spokespersons, and private individuals.

Please honor any requests that I make for you to stop speaking after you reach the four minute time limit.

Of course do not speak when another person is speaking.

And finally, kindly refrain from smoking in this room.

It is now my pleasure to introduce Colonel Bramlitt, who will describe the NMD program.

And finally, kindly refrain from smoking in this room.

It is now my pleasure to introduce Colonel Bramlitt, who will describe the NMD program.

I'm from the Ballistic Missile

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Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
Defense Organization, and that is the agency responsible for the development and deploying this system. In the following charts I will review the threat that is driving the development of the system, provide an overview of the program, and address the decision to be made.

The National Missile Defense System is being developed to protect the United States from ballistic missile attacks. The events depicted on these charts are driving a congressional desire for a viable National Missile Defense deployment as soon as technologically feasible.

The reason that we need such a system is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missile technology has increased a threat to our national security. Our current program guidance is to develop, demonstrate, and if directed, deploy a system to defend the United States against a limited strategic ballistic missile threat. The NMD system would be a land based, nonnuclear missile defense system. The development and testing effort for the program

Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
Ground-Based Interceptor to destroy the incoming target in outer space. Now I will provide a little more detail on each of the elements. The weapon of the system is the Ground-Based Interceptor, which would remain in an underground silo until launch. It is important to note that launches from these sites would occur only in defense of the United States. There would be no flight testing of the missiles from their deployment site. The Ground-Based Interceptor is a long range, high velocity missile consisting of three solid propellant boosters and a kill vehicle. The kill vehicle is the payload on the missile. When the Ground-Based Interceptor is launched it sends the kill vehicle into outer space, where it will find, maneuver, and collide with the incoming re-entry level. 100 Ground-Based Interceptors could be located at one deployment base in Alaska or in North Dakota. Or 100 silos could be located at one site in Alaska and one site in North Dakota, for a total of 200 silos.

The Battle Management Command and Control is the brains behind the system. In the event of a launch against the United States the NMD system would be controlled through the Battle Management Command Control elements. The Battle Management Command Control facility would likely be located at the Ground-Base Interceptor site. The In-Flight Interceptor Communications System, or IFICS Data Terminal, would be a ground station that provides communications links between the In-Flight and Ground-Base Interceptor and the Battle Management Command and Control. The IFICS Data Terminal would consist of a radio transmitter/receiver, and would require about one acre of land, including the perimeter fence. Approximately 14 IFICS Data Terminals could be required for the program. At this time I would like to note that we are still developing the operational requirements for the IFICS Data Terminal. As such, the specific locations where they could be deployed have not yet been determined and are currently under study. The regions under
1 study include Alaska and North Dakota.
2 However, the operational requirements, as they
3 are refined, may require other regions to be
4 identified. The types of environmental
5 impacts associated with the IFICS Data
6 Terminal, therefore, are addressed in general
7 terms, rather than a specific site manner
8 within the Draft EIS.
9 The X-Band Radar is a ground-base
10 radar that is capable of long-range detection
11 and tracking incoming ballistic missiles. The
12 X-Band Radar site would include a radar in
13 associated support facilities. At this time
14 it is anticipated that only one X-Band Radar
15 in Alaska or North Dakota would be deployed
16 for the initial NMD system.
17 The United States has an existing
18 early warning system that can detect incoming
19 missiles. This system consists of early
20 warning radars, as well as satellites. The
21 NMD system plans to make use of this system
22 to assist in the detection of the incoming
23 missiles.
24 The early warning system is in the
25 process of being upgraded by adding new

Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
along the Aleutian Islands. At this time the
exact alignment of the fiber optic cable lines
are under study and have not been identified
for every site. Therefore, this element is
addressed programmatically within the Draft
EIS.

For the EIS two alternatives were
considered. The No-action Alternative and the
Proposed Action. For the No-action
Alternative, the decision would be not to
deploy, in which case we would continue to
develop and test the system.

For the potential sites being
considered for deployment, the No-action
Alternative would be a continuation of
activities currently ongoing or planned for
those locations. Under the Proposed Action
alternative, NMD elements and element
locations would be selected from the range of
locations studied in the EIS.

Potential deployment locations are
being consideration in both Alaska and North
Dakota. The North Dakota sites are those that
fall within the existing deployment are under
the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The

Alaska sites fall within the geographical area
that maximizes the NMD system performance.
This slide shows the potential
deployment locations for Alaska. These sites
include Clear Air Station, Fort Greely, and
the Fort Wainwright Yukon Training Area, along
with Eielson Air Force Base, as potential
deployment alternatives for the Ground-Based
Interceptor and Battle Management Command and
Control. Eareckson Air Station in the Western
Aleutians is the only potential location for
an X-Band Radar in Alaska.

This slide shows the potential
deployment locations under consideration in
North Dakota. These sites include the Grand
Forks Air Force Base and the Missile Site
Radar in Nekoma as potential deployment
alternatives for the Ground-Base Interceptor
and the Battle Management Command and Control
facility. For the X-Band Radar, the
deployment alternatives include the Cavalier
Air Station, the Missile Site Radar, and
Remote Sprint Launch Sites 1, 2 and 4, in
northeast North Dakota.

The NMD program decision to be made

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Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
1 is whether to deploy a system. A decision to
deploy an NMD system would include the
3 selection of deployment sites from among the
4 alternative locations considered in this EIS
5 and which we discussed. The program is
6 scheduled for a deployment readiness review
7 next summer.
8 We have conducted three successful
9 flight tests, which have demonstrated the kill
10 vehicle's ability to detect and destroy an
11 incoming warhead. During the next six months
12 two system tests are scheduled to help assess
13 the system's technical maturity and design.
14 A decision to deploy will be based
15 on the analysis of the ballistic missile
16 threat, the technical readiness of the system
17 for deployment, the projected cost, arms
18 control objectives, and other factors,
19 including potential environmental impacts of
20 deploying and operating the NMD.
21 The EIS will provide the U.S.
22 government with the information necessary to
23 properly account for the environmental
24 impact. At this time a deployment decision is
25 not anticipated before June of 2000.

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| 26            | 1 This concludes my part of the
|               | presentation. I will now turn the meeting
|               | over to Mr. David Hasley, who will discuss the
|               | environmental impact analysis process, and the
|               | potential environmental impacts that could
|               | occur from the NMD deployment.
|               | DAVID HASLEY: Thank you, Colonel
|               | Bramlett.
|               | Good evening, I am David Hasley with
|               | the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense
|               | Command. We're in Huntsville, Alabama. And
|               | our organization is conducting environmental
|               | impact analysis process for deployment of the
|               | NMD system, on behalf of the Ballistic Missile
|               | Defense Organization.
|               | Tonight I will present a schedule
|               | for this environmental impact analysis
|               | process, and show you how the public is
|               | involved in the process. I will also discuss
|               | the scope of the study and present the results
|               | of the environmental analysis.
|               | The National Environmental Policy
|               | Act, or NEPA as it's known, requires that
|               | federal agencies consider the environmental

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Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
consequences of their proposed actions in their decision making process. The deployment of the NMD system is an action that falls under NEPA, and we have therefore prepared a Draft Environmental Impact Statement, or EIS, to analyze the potential environmental consequences of this action. NEPA also requires that the public be included in the decision making process. Therefore, we held scoping meetings back in December of last year to present to you the NMD program, and receive your input on the scope of issues to be addressed in the EIS. In accordance with NEPA, your input helped guide us in the preparation of the Draft EIS. The Draft EIS was then made available on 1 October of this year for public review and comment. This public hearing this evening is a formal meeting where we present the results contained in the Draft EIS, and most importantly, receive your comments on the document. In addition to tonight’s hearing, written comments on the Draft EIS will continue to be accepted at the address shown on this slide until 15 November of this year. After the comment period is over we will consider all comments, both written as well as verbal, and perform additional analysis or revise the EIS where necessary. Again, as in the scoping process, equal consideration will be given to all comments, whether they are presented here tonight or mailed to us. Once the public review process is complete we will prepare the Final EIS, which is currently scheduled for completion in May of next year. The Final EIS will include all comments received during the public review period and also our response to those comments. The EIS will serve as input for the Record of Decision, which will document the decision made on this proposal. And as you heard from Colonel Bramlitt, consideration of issues, besides those addressed in the EIS, will also enter into the final decision of whether to deploy the NMD system. Chapter 4 of the Draft EIS is where we describe the potential environmental impacts that may occur to the affected...
2 environment as a result of implementing the
3 Proposed Action, or alternatives which were
4 described earlier. The affects of each
5 alternative are compared to the existing
6 conditions at each location.
7 Chapter 4 also includes suggested
8 mitigations where potential impacts have been
9 identified. Mitigation measures are methods
10 for reducing and minimizing potential
11 Impacts.
12 For the Draft EIS the environment
13 was analyzed in terms of 15 different resource
14 areas, as shown on this slide. Each resource
15 area was addressed at each location, unless it
16 was determined through initial analysis that
17 the proposed activities would not result in an
18 environmental impact to that resource.
19 To summarize the results of the
20 Draft EIS, I will now provide an overview of
21 the potential impacts that may result from the
22 deployment of the NMD system.
23 The Draft EIS evaluated potential
24 Impacts during both the construction, as well
25 as the operation phases of the NMD program.

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1 for impacts, including airspace, wetlands,
2 health and safety, and socioeconomic benefits,
3 at all sites from the NMD employment
4 activities.
5 This slide shows the results of our
6 analysis of the airspace and biological
7 resource areas. Our analysis shows that there
8 is the potential to impact aircraft with
9 certain electric avionics. However,
10 Deployment of the X-Band Radar would not
11 require any restricted airspace around the
12 radar. Instead a high energy radiation area
13 notice would be published on the appropriate
14 aeronautical charts.
15 At sites shown in this slide there
16 is a potential to impact wetlands during the
17 construction period. However, standard
18 construction techniques such as avoidance and
19 soil stabilization would be used to reduced
20 potential impacts to all wetland areas.
21 Consultation will be conducted with regulatory
22 agencies, and appropriate permits will be
23 obtained prior to construction affecting the
24 wetlands. Under the Proposed Action no
25 adverse impacts would be expected to

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Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
vegetation, wildlife, or threatened or endangered species at any of the deployment alternatives. For the health and safety resource area, first we analyzed the potential risk of an electromagnetic radiation from the X-Band Radar on human health and safety. The results of our analysis have shown that exposure levels outside of the boundary of the site would be below established public exposure guidelines. Second, publishing of the high energy radiation area notice on the appropriate aeronautical charts would inform pilots of the potential interference hazard to certain types of aircraft. Overall, no impacts to the public would occur due to electromagnetic radiation exposure. Potential beneficial socioeconomic impacts would occur to the regions surrounding the Ground-Base Interceptor deployment as well as operational phases of deployment. As shown on this slide, it is expected that construction would take approximately 5 years to complete, and generate between 150 to 310 million dollars in local expenditures during that time. In addition, construction of the system would employ between 250 and 325 personnel, depending on the site selected. After construction, operation of the site would require between 250 to 360 personnel. These operational personnel would generate approximately 7 to 10 million dollars in direct income per year. As with the Ground-Base Interceptor site, it is expected that deployment of the X-Band Radar would also provide an economic benefit to the area around the deployment site, except for Eareckson Air Station in Alaska. Since Eareckson Air Station is a self-contained island in the Aleutian Islands operated by the Air Force, construction and operation at this site would not provide an economic benefit to the surrounding area. However, at the North Dakota deployment alternatives, it is expected that construction of the X-Band Radar would take approximately 3 years to complete and generate between 24 to 36 million dollars in local
1 expenditures during that time. In addition,
2 construction of the system would employ
3 approximately 125 personnel.
4 After construction, operation of the
5 site would require approximately 105
6 personnel. The operational personnel would
7 generate approximately 2.7 million dollars in
8 direct income per year.
9 To support the proposed X-Band Radar
10 at Eareckson a fiber optic cable would be
11 required along the Aleutian Islands. Within
12 our Draft EIS we studied a potential fiber
13 optic cable route from Whittier or Seward to
14 Eareckson Air Station. Our initial analysis
15 has shown that most impacts would be
16 associated with biological resources and
17 subsistence uses. While there would be short
18 term impacts to these resources, once the
19 cable is laid there should be no long term
20 impacts involved.
21 Other NMD elements under development
22 include the In-Flight Interceptor
23 Communications System Data Terminals, which we
24 mentioned earlier, the overland fiber optic
25 capable required to connect the various NMD

Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
the affected communities and hold public hearings to go over the results of our analysis. This supplement, along with the public comments received at the hearings, will be included within this Final Deployment EIS. In closing, please keep in mind that the study is in the draft stage. And our goal is to provide the decision makers with accurate information, such that the environmental consequences of this proposal can be considered. To do this, we're here tonight asking for your comments on the proposed -- on the Draft EIS. And this information will be used to support the overall decision-making process.

I would like to turn now back to Lewis for continuation of the hearing.

LEWIS MICHAELSON: Thank you, Mr. Hasley. We are going to take a short five-minute recess now, to collect any remaining speaker cards and position the podium for you to speak. So if you will be patient with us for five minutes, we will be ready to go then.

If you have not already filled out a card, and intend to speak, if you will fill one of those out, and then we'll put you on the list of people to speak tonight. Thank you.

(Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.)

LEWIS MICHAELSON: Okay, we're ready to get started again. Thank you for your patience.

Before we proceed, let me remind of a couple of points. Again, if you would please limit your comments to four minutes. And also, please state your name clearly, before you make a statement for the record. And again, written comments are given the same consideration as oral comments. So if you are not inclined to speak in a public setting, please provide your written comments to us instead.

And please remember that no decision is being made tonight. The main purpose for the governmental representatives being here is to learn of your concerns and suggestions firsthand.
We will now begin the comment period. To indicate when your four minutes is up, I have a very simple way of indicating times, to make it easier for you. When you have one minute left I'll put my index finger up like this (indicating), and you can find a comfortable place to wrap up your comments. When your four minutes is up I'll put up my closed hand, like this (indicating).

Our first five speakers, in order, actually six now, will be Shawn Ferguson, Kevin Carvell, Joan Carlson, Kirk Smith, Rich Becker and Jerry Waletzko. Would you please come up one at a time.

Mr. Ferguson, good to see you again.

SHAWN FERGUSON: Good evening. My name is Shawn Ferguson. I'm with Senator Conrad's office. In case I don't finish with all of this tonight, I will be submitting this into the record, so it will make it.

From Senator Conrad, I regret that the senate schedule does not permit me to attend this evening's hearing in person. I have asked my staff to read this statement.

expressing my strong support for deployment of National Missile Defense, NMD, in North Dakota.

Yesterday in Washington, the North Dakota Congressional delegation, and community leaders from Grand Forks, met with Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, or BMDO, Lieutenant General Ron Kadish, and the former BMDO director, General Lester Lyles, now Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

During this meeting I communicated again my belief that we need to be prepared before we are surprised by the rogue state ICBM threat, such as from North Korea, Iran and Iraq.

I have been pleased to organize visits to Washington by several groups of North Dakota community leaders, and I would like to thank each of you here this evening for taking the time to inform the BMDO representatives of your support for NMD.

Community support is an important part of the equation.

North Dakota also brings other vital assets to the table. We are the only treaty compliant deployment site under the ABM

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Treaty. Here in northeastern North Dakota we have existing infrastructure and active Air Force installations, including Grand Forks Air Force Base, that can help support the NMD system. Despite these assets, North Dakota faces an uphill fight on NMD. The ABM Treaty is under fire. And because a North Dakota site cannot reliably defend the western ends of the Aleutian and Hawaiian Island chains against attack from nearby North Korea, the Administration has proposed a single site in Alaska. As I recently told the President, and his National Security Adviser, a single site in Alaska is simply not adequate to meet our nation’s NMD needs. For three reasons, defensive coverage, survivability, in economies of scale, I believe it would be in our nation’s best interest to pursue an initial NMD development at two sites. North Dakota and Alaska. At the very least, ABM Treaty negotiations ought to be delayed until the advantages of two sites have been carefully studied in accordance with my amendment to the fiscal year 2000 defense authorization bill. This amendment was recently signed into law. Deploying NMD in Alaska may well be necessary to counter the emerging North Korean Missile threat to that state. However, having studied this issue in depth throughout my career in the Senate, it is my conviction that a single site in Alaska is simply not adequate to defend our country against the full range of threats it likely will face in the coming decade. I would again like to thank all of those in attendance for being here tonight, and BMD personnel for visiting our state again. I will continue to fight for NMD and for North Dakota, and our nation in the Senate, and would urge community members to contact me with their comments and suggestions on this important matter. Again, thank you for allowing me to share with you my support for NMD. Kent Conrad.

LEWIS MICHAELSON: Thank you very much.

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Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
Kevin Carvell?

KEVIN CARVELL: Good evening. I'm Kevin Carvell. I'm district director for Senator Byron Dorgan. And the Senator asked me to read this statement for him this evening.

As the Department of Defense conducts the final phase of its Environmental Impact Statement to support the construction of a limited National Missile Defense system, I want to point out the advantages there are to locating the system in North Dakota.

First, North Dakota has the only site currently under consideration that is allowed under had 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The Russian government has steadfastly refused to consider major changes to the ABM Treaty. Building an NMD system in Alaska in violation of the treaty could destroy the framework of arms control that underpins our security relationship with Russia. Russia would almost certainly reject further reductions in its strategic forces and might well decide to expand its nuclear arsenal. The slight advantage that an Alaskan site might offer in defending remote parts of Alaska and Hawaii against a primitive North Korean missile is far outweighed by the danger of reigniting a nuclear arms race with the only nation that can still threaten us with thousands of nuclear warheads.

Secondly, while a North Dakota site may not address a North Korean threat as well as an Alaskan site, a North Dakota site is better situated to meet other threats, such as the threat from Iran or Iraq. A limited National Missile Defense system should be situated to provide the best protection for the entire country from a wide range of rogue threats, not just from North Korea, a country that many believe is on the verge of collapse.

Third, by building in North Dakota the Department of Defense can save hundreds of millions of dollars that it can use for other high priority requirements. The Draft Environmental Impact Statement clearly shows that a North Dakota site offers considerable construction savings.

For example, construction of the
ground-based interceptor site in Alaska would cost more than 600 million, while construction at a site in North Dakota would cost only 312 million. A savings of about half.

Most importantly, the people of North Dakota have a long tradition of supporting this nation’s military. No state has better community-military relations. North Dakota communities helped win the cold war. Now North Dakotans are willing and capable of helping to preserve the peace.

LEWIS MICHAELSON: Joan Carlson?

P-T-011

JOAN CARLSON: My name is Joan Carlson. I’m the eastern field director for Congressman Pomeroy. He asked me to read this statement tonight.

Colonel Bramlit and distinguished officers from the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, welcome to North Dakota. We appreciate your being here today to hear our testimony on the Draft Environmental Impact statement in preparation for the development of a National Missile Defense system. You have an incredibly important task, and we thank you for this opportunity to participate in the process.

Before I discuss the environmental impacts of NMD deployment in North Dakota, I would like to say a word about the level of support in this community for the United States military. Northeastern North Dakota has a proud history of hosting missions that are essential to our national security. From the air refueling wing and the former Minuteman missiles at Grand Forks Air Force Base, to the Cavalier Air Station, to the ABM site at Nekoma, northeastern North Dakota has always welcomed the military with open arms. We are here this evening to say that we want to be your host for a National Missile Defense system.

With respect to the environmental analysis, the Draft Environmental Impact Statement rightly concludes that there are no significant hurdles to overcome with respect to the deployment in North Dakota. As the report states, NMD deployment in North Dakota would have no impact on threatened or endanger species. Likewise, once construction of the
NMD system is complete there should be little soil erosion from operation of the site. Regarding health and safety, the report notes that in the unlikely event of a mishap, the danger to health and safety is greater in North Dakota than Alaska, because the North Dakota site, although sparsely populated, is more densely populated than Alaska. It should be noted, however, that the absolute threat to health and safety of NMD deployment in North Dakota is extremely low. As you further evaluate where to deploy a National Missile Defense system, the question of coverage must be considered. A single-site NMD system deployed in North Dakota provides coverage of all 50 states against a North Korean missile attack with the exception of the western most uninhabited islands of Hawaii, and the far western reaches of the Aleutian Islands of Alaska. Importantly a North Dakota site provides enhanced shoot-look-shoot capability for the entire continental United States, with the possible exception of the Pacific Northwest. Meaning that we can fire an interceptor, see if it hits the target, and then fire another interceptor, if necessary. Alaska, on the other hand, provides shoot-look-shoot capability only against U.S. territories west of the Mississippi River, leaving salvo coverage of the densely populated eastern United States.

In sum, if only one site is chosen the level of coverage favors North Dakota. In the alternative, a two-site architecture of North Dakota and Alaska would provide a far better coverage than either site alone. In summary I want to thank you again to taking the time to come to North Dakota. LEWIS MICHAELSON: Thank you very much.

Kirk Smith?

KIRK SMITH: Thanks for coming here tonight General Bramlit and your staff. My name is Kirk Smith, and I'm a North Dakota district judge. My comments are personal, rather than official however, and represent my recommendations regarding deployment of the NMD system. Well, I ought to mention I'm also
1 a veteran of military service during the
2 Korean War, and a long-term resident of North
3 Dakota.
4 I believe that the first deployment
5 of the system should be in North Dakota,
6 because that deployment would provide initial
7 protection contemplated by congress, and would
8 be within the terms of the ABM Treaty existing
9 with Russia. The deployment within the treaty
10 limits would provide needed national defense
11 protection.
12 And two, avoid Russian
13 countermeasures, either diplomatic or
14 military.
15 And three, would provide time to
16 develop diplomatic and economic support for
17 alternate expansion of the deployment of the
18 system to Alaska, as well.
19 That concludes my comments. Thank
20 you very much.
21 LEWIS MICHAELSON: Thank you.
22 Rich Becker?
23 RICH BECKER: Good evening, and
24 thank you for the opportunity to publicly

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of this opportunity, so if anyone has been
inspired in the last 20 minutes to say
something, we would appreciate it if you would
come up to the microphone and address the
panel.
Is there anyone else that would like
to do that this evening?
If not, we very much appreciate your
being here, and we look forward to sending out
the Draft EIS. That’s available to those of
you who would like one.
And this meeting is adjourned.
Thank you.
(Whereupon, the meeting was
adjourned at 7:45 o’clock p.m.)
MR. LORD: My name -- my name is Harry Lord and I'm a resident of Fairbanks, Alaska. A lifetime resident. I'm presently the Chief of Criminal Intelligence, the Universal Intelligence Agency, which is an international criminal science agency concerned -- you know, with human rights particularly. As it relates to U.S. National Security interest. And how certain assets of the U.S. National Security have deviated from honest interest in national defense opposed to U.S. security activities. My primary concern is the nuclear espionage concerning the Chinese acquisition of critical technology, or advanced delivery systems that bring us here to this hearing tonight. My primary concern in regards to the Chinese espionage is the U.S. complicity in Manchuria after conclusion of World War II in which General MacArthur had commandeered the entire Chinese chemical and biological weapons testing unit, 731. And my concern is in relation to Dr. Richard Peinberg's (ph) book, 'The Dragon Goes North,' concerning the United States Army Chemical Corps. Biological and chemical warfare testing at Fort Greely. So, the grave implications of General MacArthur's commandeering of this test facility, this infrastructure assets and intelligence in chemical and biological weapons and official complicity and cover up of Japanese war crimes atrocities committed against the Chinese and its subsequent cover-up in the interest of National
Security in the preferred approach of non-prosecution as it would undermine or otherwise cramp the ability of the United States to conduct its own CER program. As a victim of war crimes atrocities, a descendent of victims, I might add from World War II, the same period. My grandfather was a Japanese prisoner of war killed in internment because of the sub-human and inhumane standards. So, I'm concerned -- you know, as a Japanese descendent as well as a Native Alaskan Inupiat, U.S. citizen. I have a duel interest in justice through both of these heritages -- you know, although that which occurred in Manchuria is not buried. Plus a reminder that I'm Japanese, nonetheless I'd rather see that justice is served in the memory of the victims. So, the necessary legal implications under international criminal science principals requires the United States to officially acknowledge to the Chinese and apologize in an effort to strike a critical balance in the geopolitical power structure regarding the issue of nuclear deterrence. The departure from these criminal science principals have been at the impetus of the entire post Cold War. Now that we're coming to a cross roads in history into a new millennium, it's essentially (sic) international foreign relations, especially where these critical areas of concern have been concealed and otherwise criminally covered up, must be disclosed and adjudicated in the interest of justice on behalf of all humanity for we all have equal interest in justice and the...
findings will also be addressed by panel members in their presentations. Let's look at the agenda for tonight. Hopefully you all had the opportunity to talk to the many knowledgeable experts and program officials who were staffing the exhibits during the past hour. After I finish this introduction, Colonel Larry Branlitt will describe the proposed action for the NMD deployment. Colonel Branlitt is the assistant to the Program Manager for the NMD Program and he is representing the NMD program office. Next, Mr. David Hasley will brief you on the environmental impact analysis process and summarize the results reported in the Draft EIS. Mr. Hasley is the program's EIS team leader for the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command. The last item on the agenda is really the most important though. This comment period is your opportunity to provide information and make statements for the record. This input ensures that the decision makers can benefit from your knowledge of the local area and any adverse environmental effects you think may result from the proposed action or alternatives. Keep in mind that the EIS is intended to ensure that future decision makers will be fully informed about the environmental impacts associated with the various alternatives before they decide on a course of action. Consequently, comments tonight on issues unrelated to the EIS are beyond the scope of this hearing. To comment verbally tonight, please fill out a verbal comment card. We have quite a number of people who are already signed up to speak, so most of you obviously got that message. Those are available at the registration table and if you haven't already had the chance, please do turn -- fill one out and turn it in. After the presentations, we will take a short recess to collect any remaining cards. Then I will start calling on speakers in the following order. I will recognize elected officials first, then, I will call members of the public in the order the cards were handed in to us at the registration table. If you don't feel comfortable standing up here tonight and making a statement, you have until November 15th of this year to submit a written statement for consideration in the Final EIS. The address shown on the slide is also in the handout and on the comment sheets you received as you entered the meeting hall tonight. Keep in mind that written comments are given the same consideration as verbal comments offered here tonight. I want to make sure that all who wish to speak have a fair chance to be heard. So, we have a stenographer seated to my right, who will be making a verbatim record of everything that is said. The verbatim record will become a part of the Final EIS. We will also be video taping the public hearing tonight to document your input. To ensure that we get an accurate record of what is said, please help me enforce the following ground rules. First, please speak only after I recognize you, and please address your remarks to me. If you have a written
statement, you may turn it in at the registration table, or you may read it out loud, within the time limit, or you may do both. Second, please speak clearly and slowly into the microphone, starting with your name and any organization that you represent. Each person will be recognized for four minutes. This time limit includes public officials, organizational spokespersons, and private individuals. Please honor any requests that I may make for you to stop speaking if you reach the four-minute time limit. Of course, do not speak while someone else is speaking. Kindly refrain from smoking in this room. Those are the dos and don'ts for this evening and now, it's my pleasure to introduce Colonel Bramlett, who will describe the NMD program.

COLONEL BRAMLETT: I want to thank you for taking your time out of your day or night to come out and listen to us tonight. I want to thank you for the opportunity of getting me out of Washington D.C. and before I started this program, I didn't need glasses, so if you'll bear with me. My name is Larry Bramlett and I am from the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization in Washington D.C. That's the agency responsible for developing and deploying the NMD system. In the following charts I will review the threat that is driving this development, provide an overview of the program, and address the decision to be made. The National Missile Defense System is being developed to protect the United States from ballistic missile attacks. The events depicted on this chart drove a Congressional mandate for a National Missile Defense deployment as soon as technologically feasible. The reason we need such a system is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missile technology has increased the threat to our national security. The current program guidance is to develop, demonstrate, and if directed, deploy a system to defend the United States against a limited strategic ballistic missile threat. The NMD system would be a land-based, non-nuclear missile defense system. The development and testing effort of the program is to be consistent with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. However, deployment may require treaty modifications. The NMD system would consist of the elements shown on this slide. These elements are the Ground-Based Interceptor, the weapon of the system, the Battle Management Command and Control, the central communications and control point, the In-Flight Interceptor Communications System, which transmits commands to the Ground-Based Interceptor while it's in flight, the X-Band Radar, which tracks incoming missiles, and finally, our existing Early Warning System of radars and satellites. In simplified form, this is how the system works, when a ballistic missile is launched, satellites in space would detect the launch and provide warning. On the ground, the existing Early Warning Radars and X-Band Radar would detect and track the missile and provide its specific...
locations to the Battle Management Command and Control. This information gives the people controlling the system the ability to launch the Ground Based Interceptor to destroy the incoming target outside the earth's atmosphere. Now, I will provide a little more detail on these elements. The weapon of the system is the Ground-Based Interceptor, which would remain in an underground silo until launch. It is important to note that launches from these sites would occur only in defense of the United States. There would be no test firings of missiles from it's deployed location. The Ground-Based Interceptor is a long range, high velocity missile consisting of three solid propellant boosters and a kill vehicle. The kill vehicle is the payload of the missile. When the Ground-Based Interceptor is launched, it will send the kill vehicle into outer space, where it will find, maneuver and collide with the incoming reentry vehicle. Up to 100 Ground-Based Interceptor silos could be located at one deployment base in Alaska or in North Dakota or 100 silos can be located in one site in Alaska and one site in North Dakota for a total of up to 200 silos. The Battle Management Command and Control is the brains of the NMD system. In the event of a launch against the United States, the NMD system would be controlled through this element. A Battle Management Command and Control facility would likely be located at the Ground-Based Interceptor site. The In-flight Interceptor Communication System or IFICS Data Terminal would be ground stations that provide communication links between the in-flight Ground Based Interceptor and the Battle Management Command and Control. An IFICS Data Terminal site would consist of a radio transmitter/receiver and would require about one acre of land. Approximately 14 IFICS Data Terminals could be required for the NMD program. At this time I would like to note that we are still developing the operational requirements for the IFICS Data Terminal. As such, the specific locations where it could be deployed have yet to be determined. The regions under study include Alaska and North Dakota. However, as operational requirements are refined, other regions may be identified. The types of environmental impacts associated with the IFICS Data Terminal, therefore, will be addressed in general terms rather than a site-specific terms in the Draft EIS. The X-Band Radar is a ground-based radar that is capable of long-range detection and tracking of incoming ballistic missiles. The X-Band Radar site would include the radar and its associated support facilities. At this time, it is anticipated that only one X-Band Radar in Alaska or North Dakota would be deployed with the initial NMD system. The United States has an existing Early Warning System that can detect incoming ballistic missiles. This system consists of early warning radars and satellites. The NMD program would make use of this system to assist in this detection. The Early Warning System is in the process of being upgraded by adding...
new satellites and software and hardware modifications to the
existing early warning radars. Upgrades to the early warning
radars in the United States would occur at Beale Air force
Base, California, Cape Cod Air Station, Massachusetts, and
Clear Air Station, Alaska. Modifications to these radars would
not increase the current power levels and will be addressed in
a supplement to the NMD Deployment Draft EIS -- EIS rather.
The new early warning detection satellites are part of an Air
Force upgrade to the existing system and would occur regardless
of the deployment -- deploy NMD or not. Any deployment of this
system may require use of existing fiber-optic lines, power
lines, and other utilities. Some of these lines may require
modifications. Furthermore, deployment of elements to some
locations may require the acquisition of new rights-of-way and
installation of new utility and fiber optic cable. Potential
new fiber optic cable locations include North Dakota, the
interior of Alaska, and the oceanic fiber optic cable along the
Aleutian Islands. At this time the exact alignment of these
fiber optic cable lines are under study and have not been
identified at every site. Therefore, this element is addressed
programmatically within the EIS. For the EIS, two alternatives
were considered. The No-action Alternative and the Proposed
Action. For the No-action alternative, the decision would be
not to deploy in which case we would continue to develop and
test the system. For the potential sites being considered for

Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
1 is whether to deploy an NMD system. A decision to deploy an
2 NMD system would include the selection of deployment sites from
3 among the alternative locations considered in this EIS and
4 previously discussed. The program is scheduled for a
5 deployment readiness review next summer. We have conducted
6 three successful flight tests which have demonstrated the kill
7 vehicle’s ability to detect and destroy incoming warheads.
8 During the next six months, two system tests are scheduled to
9 help assess the system’s technical maturity and design. A
10 decision to deploy will be based on the analysis of the
11 ballistic missile threat, the technical readiness of the system
12 for deployment, the projected cost, arms control objectives,
13 and other factors, including potential environmental impacts of
14 deploying and operating this system. The EIS will provide the
15 U.S. Government with the fundamental information necessary to
16 properly account for the environmental impacts. At this time,
17 a deployment decision is not anticipated before June of 2000.
18 This concludes my part of the presentation. I will now turn
19 the meeting over to Dave Hasley, who will discuss the
20 environmental impact analysis process and potential
21 environmental impacts that could occur from NMD deployment.
22
23 MR. HASLEY: Okay. Thank you Colonel Brainlit.
24 Good evening. I am David Hasley from the U.S. Army Space and
25 Missile Defense Command, we’re located in Huntsville, Alabama.
26 And we’re conducting the environmental impact analysis process

for -- on behalf of the Ballistic Missile Defense
5 organization for deployment of the NMD program. Tonight I
6 will present the schedule for this environmental impact
7 analysis process, and show you, the public can be involved
8 in the process. I will also discuss the scope of the study and
9 present the results of the environmental analysis. The
10 National Environmental Policy Act, or NEPA as it’s known,
11 requires that federal agencies consider the environmental
12 consequences of their proposed actions in their decision-making
13 process. The deployment of the NMD system is an action that
14 falls under NEPA, and we have therefore prepared a Draft
15 Environmental Impact Statement, or EIS to analyze the potential
16 environmental consequences of this action. NEPA also requires
17 that the public be included in this decision-making process.
18 Therefore, we held scoping meetings back in December of last
19 year to present to you the NMD program and receive your input
20 on the scope of issues to be addressed in the EIS. In
21 accordance with NEPA, your input helped guide us and determine
22 our approach in the preparation of the Draft EIS. The Draft
23 EIS was then made available on 1 October of this year for
24 public and agency review and comment. This public hearing this
25 evening is a formal meeting where we present to you the results
26 contained in the Draft EIS and, most importantly of course, to
27 receive your comments on the document. In addition to
28 tonight’s hearing, written comments on the Draft EIS will
continue to be accepted at the address shown on this slide until November 15th. After the comment period is over, we will consider all comments, both written and verbal, and perform additional analysis or revise the EIS where necessary. Again, as in the scoping process, equal consideration will be given to all comments, whether they are presented here tonight or mailed to us. Once the public review process is complete, we will prepare the Final EIS, this is scheduled for completion in May of next year. The Final EIS will include all comments received during the public review period and also our response to those comments. The EIS will serve as input for the Record of Decision, which will document the decision to be made. As you just heard from Colonel Bramlett, consideration of issues besides those addressed in the EIS will also enter into the final decision on whether to deploy the NMD system. Chapter four of the Draft EIS is where we describe the potential environmental impacts that may occur to the affected environment as a result of implementing the Proposed Action or alternatives as described earlier. The effects of each alternative are compared to the existing conditions at each location. Chapter four also includes suggested mitigations where potential impacts have been identified. Mitigation measures are methods for reducing or minimizing the potential impacts. For the Draft EIS, the environmental -- the environment was analyzed in terms of 15 different resource areas as shown on this slide. Each resource area addressed -- was addressed at each location unless it was determined through initial analysis that the proposed activities would not result in an environmental impact to that resource. To summarize the results of the Draft EIS, I will now provide an overview of the potential impacts that may result from the deployment of the NMD system. The Draft EIS evaluated the potential impacts during both the construction as well as operational phases of the NMD program. We identified several areas with the potential for impacts including airspace, wetlands, health and safety, and socioeconomic benefits at all sites from NMD deployment activities. This slide shows the results of our analysis of the airspace and biological resource areas. Our analysis shows that there is the potential to impact aircraft with electronic avionics. However, deployment of the X-Band Radar would not require any restricted airspace around the radar. Instead a high energy radiation area notice will be published on the appropriate aeronautical charts. At sites shown in this slide there is the potential to impact wetlands during the construction period. Standard construction techniques such as avoidance and soil stabilization would be used to reduce the potential impacts to all the wetland areas. Consultation will also be conducted with regulatory agencies and appropriate permits will be obtained prior to construction affecting the wetlands. Under the Proposed Action, no adverse
impacts would be expected to vegetation, wildlife, or threatened or endangered species at any of the deployment locations. For the health and safety resource area, first we analyzed the potential risk from electromagnetic radiation from the X-Band Radar on human health and safety. The results of our analysis have shown that exposure levels outside the boundary of the site would be below established public exposure guidelines. Second, publishing of the high energy radiant area notice on the appropriate aeronautical charts would inform pilots of the electromagnetic interference hazard to certain types of aircraft. Overall, no impacts to the public would occur due to electromagnetic radiation exposure. Potential beneficial socioeconomic impacts would occur to the region surrounding the Ground-Based Interceptor deployment alternatives during both the construction as well as operational phases of deployment. As shown on this slide, it is expected that construction would take approximately five years to complete and generate between $150 to $310 million in local expenditures during that time. In addition, construction of the system would employ between 250 to 323 personnel depending on the site selected. After construction, operation of the site would require between 250 to 360 personnel. These operational personnel would generate approximately between $7 to $10 million in direct income per year. As with the Ground-Based Interceptor site, it is expected that deployment of the X-Band Radar would also provide an economic benefit to the area around the deployment site except for at Eareckson Air Station in Alaska. Since Eareckson Air Station is a self contained island in the Aleutian Islands operated by the Air Force, construction and operation at this site would not provide an economic benefit to the immediately surrounding area. At the North Dakota Deployment alternatives it is expected that construction of the X-Band Radar would take approximately three years to complete and there generate between $24 to $36 million in local expenditures during that time. In addition, construction of the system would employ approximately 125 personnel and after construction, operation of the site would require approximately 105 personnel. These operational personnel would generate approximately $2.7 million in direct income per year. To support the proposed X-Band Radar at Eareckson Air Station a fiber optic cable line could be required along the Aleutian Islands. Within our Draft EIS we studied a potential fiber optic cable route from Whittier or Seward to the Eareckson Air Station. Our initial analysis has shown that most impacts would be associated with biological resources as well as subsistence uses. While there would be short term impacts to these resources, once the cable is laid there should be no long term impacts. Other RMS elements under development include the In-Flight Interceptor Communications System Data Terminals, or IFICS, the overland fiber optic cable.
required to connect the NMD elements, and upgrades to existing
Early Warning Radars used to assist in tracking incoming
ballistic missiles. Specific deployment locations for IFICS
have not yet been determined. However, it is not expected that
deployment of the IFICS Data Terminal would result in any
significant impacts to the environment. While existing
commercial fiber optic cable lines would be used where
possible, the NMD system would require installation of some new
fiber optic cable on land. Once the specific fiber optic cable
alignment are identified, the appropriate site specific
environmental analysis will be conducted. For the upgraded
Early Warning Radar, we have just developed the initial
proposed hardware and software upgrades to these existing sites
in Massachusetts, Alaska and California. As a result, we are
in the process of preparing a supplement to our Draft EIS
analyzing the potential effects of these proposed upgrades. We
will release this supplement in the affected communities and
hold public hearings to go over the results of our analysis.
This supplement along with the public comments received at the
hearings will be included in this -- the Final Deployment EIS.
And in closing, please keep in mind that the study that we have
released is in a draft stage. And our goal is to provide the
decision makers with accurate information on the environmental
consequences of this proposal. And to do this, we are here
tonight, asking for your comments on the Draft EIS. This

Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
COMMENT NUMBER

1 representing Governor Knowles. I appreciate, Mr. Michaelson, the opportunity to comment on the NMD deployment Draft EIS.
2 State agency officials are currently reviewing the Draft EIS and like they did for the scoping document, they -- not me, will provide technical comments, not tonight, but in written form by the November 15th deadline. With the State’s scoping comments, Governor Knowles provided a cover letter on January 15th. In it he said that, we understand that the environmental footprint of the system will be minimal and primarily on existing military reservations. He went on to say that the State looks forward to providing any necessary assistance to facilitate the consideration, construction and operation of this project. I expect his cover letter accompanying our EIS comments will be along the same lines from the one I just quoted from. Thank you very much.

MR. MICHAELSON: Thank you, Jim Hayes.

MAYOR HAYES: Thank you very much. My name is Jim Hayes, and I certainly would like to welcome Colonel Bramlett, also Mr. Halley and also Mr. Michaelson to the State of Alaska and most of all to the City of Fairbanks, where we say extremely Alaska. When you come to Fairbanks, you’re in the dead heat of Alaska. We welcome you here. I certainly have enjoyed the presentation this evening and I’ve learned a lot this evening. And what I am about to say just reaffirms or just confirms what I want to say, and what I will say, is

COMMENT NUMBER

1 best interest of the United States to select Alaska as the site for the National Missile Defense System. From here we can proceed every State in the Union against attack. This Draft Environmental Impact Statement shows that there are no reasons for Alaska not to take on this responsibility should we be called on to do so. I thank everyone here for attending this hearing to listen to and express any opinions about issues of concern. The letter from Senator Ted Stevens, he’s addressed this to the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers. My staff has informed me that there will be a public hearing on the environmental impact of the proposed National Missile Defense Program in Fairbanks, this evening. I want to assure you that I strongly support the National Missile Defense Program and that I believe the administration has not made an effort to allocate sufficient resources to this effort. However, you may be interested to know that in the Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Appropriations Bill, that Congress added an additional 117 million to the program in order to keep this important defense system functional and on track. This legislation was signed into law on October 25th, 1999. I hope that this meeting is a productive one. With best wishes cordially, U.S. Senator Ted Stevens. Thank you very much.

MR. MICHAELSON: Thank you, Tom Moyer.

MR. MOYER: My name is Tom Moyer, Director of the Fairbanks Governors’ Office, and I’m here this evening
that I'm right. I appreciate the opportunity to speak on behalf of our city. And that we would hope that you would build this site in the interior. I mean we'll settle for Alaska, but we'll certainly settle for the interior. Just let me give you a little background. I grew up here. Came here real young, my Mom and I drove the Alaskan Highway. We've seen this community go through floods, earthquakes, and whatever you name it. We can do it. We have got three things here that other cities don't have. We have spirit, we have pride and we have heart. And in spirit, we have a can do spirit. We built a Trans-Alaska Pipeline that people said was environmentally unsafe, and to my knowledge it's working perfectly fine. We have a good mayor that's working on a gas line and hopefully he'll be successful, Mayor Hove. So, I think all the impact problems that have been brought up that I'm sure will continue to be brought up, we've done those things. We've past those tests, where other communities haven't. I appreciate the opportunity to come here this evening to ask you -- to ask you to consider the interior of Alaska, the can-do city. And we've done many other things that I've seen here tonight that are mentioned that are very, very important. We've already passed those tests. So, as mayor of this city, we will submit a final letter to you with other recommendations. But on behalf of the residents of this community, let's bring in the new millennium, bring it on.

Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
communities, for the interior of Alaska, for the State and for the Nation. Very sincerely, Jeffery James Jacobson, Mayor, North Pole, Alaska.

MR. MICHAELSON: Thank you very much.

(Applause) That’s fine. If you want to express yourself in between speakers, yea, nay, whichever, that’s fine. As long as you don’t interrupt people while they’re speaking, I appreciate it. So that you can be ready to come up again, I’ll announce the next set of speakers, Pete Hallgren, Tim Sharp, Jim Sampson, Rick Solie, and Dean Owen. Pete Hallgren. P-T-019

MR. HALLGREEN: My name is Pete Hallgren, I’m the Executive Director of the Fort Greely Re-Use Authority of the City of Delta Junction. The City of Delta Junction is the implementing Re-Development Authority of Fort Greely. In this dual capacity, we would like to welcome the NMD project to the interior of Alaska. As many of you know, the Delta region has had a long history of cooperation and living together with the military and we would like to continue this in the future.

With the realignment of Fort Greely, the Delta area faces severe economic trauma and the NMD would provide very necessary remedial economic benefits. Not only to Delta, but the interior as a whole. NMD is a top priority for the City of Delta Junction’s re-use of Fort Greely. Although I have been an Alaska resident for nearly 30 years, my childhood was spent at Ground Zero, unprotected in Chicago. As a compassionate and patriotic American, I don’t mind living again at Ground Zero in Delta in order, for the first time, to be able to protect the children of Los Angeles, San Francisco, Denver, Dallas, Boston, New York, Fairbanks, and Anchorage. Again, the City of Delta Junction is happy to assist NMD in any way possible. And I want to welcome you to Delta Junction on Wednesday. Thanks a lot.

MR. MICHAELSON: Thank you. Tim Sharp. And again, anyone with prepared comments who would care to hand those in as written comments, are free to do that as well, thank you.

MR. SHARP: Good evening. I’m here to speak on behalf of the Fairbanks Building and Construction Trades Council.

MR. MICHAELSON: Excuse me, would you -- yeah, pull the microphone a little closer to you.

MR. SHARP: Sure will.

MR. MICHAELSON: Thanks.

MR. SHARP: As a member of the Interior Alaskan organized labor community, I wish to speak in strong support of this project. The interior of Alaska has not only a long history of partnering with the military for national defense efforts, but beyond that, the history of this relationship has created one of the main economic pillars that is today responsible for the sustainable Interior Alaskan economy we all
enjoy today. Since the building of Ladd Field, which later became Fort Wainwright, Fort Greely, Clear Air Force Base, Eielson Air Force Base, and Galena Air Station, helped give birth and sustained through the years the union I belong to today, Laborers Local 942. These projects brought jobs, fueled apprenticeship programs, and left pensions and residual benefits in their wake. From Billy Mitchell's Cats Line, the land-leased efforts during World War II, the Distant Early Warning Systems, were all supported and benefited Alaskan skilled construction workers and their families. Organized labor, in partnership with the University of Alaska, has the training facilities, which can turn on a dime to train ahead for any special construction, fabrication or maintenance skills required for this project. Even though I feel that we have capacity at the present to move from an industry to train manpower requirements for the project of this size and scope. Weighing all the project pros and cons normally associated with community impact, I feel this project would be a positive. Not only for the workforce and residents of Alaska's interior, but the -- the support that the military would find only here in the interior of Alaska would make, and should make this project not only a concept, but a reality in creating a defensive umbrella missile system for Alaska, Hawaii and our lower forty-eight States. Thank you.

MR. MICHAELSON: Jim Sampson.

MR. SAMPSON: Hi, good evening. My name is Jim Sampson, 1000 Bennette Road, Fairbanks. I'd like to thank you for coming to Fairbanks and allowing us the opportunity to participate in this evening's program. And it's a pleasure, for me, to join other speakers here this evening in welcoming you to Interior Alaska. I'm here this evening representing Mano (ph) Fry, the Executive President of the Alaska State AFL-CIO.

An organization representing over 50,000 Alaska workers, State wide, which over 20,000 belong to building and construction trades. They are welders and ironworkers, pipefitters, laborers, carpenters, electricians, operating engineers and a dozen other trades. Alaska has a trained work force with a proven history in building military defense projects. Projects such as a Distant Early Warning System, the DEW Line, the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System at Clear and bases from Port Greely to Adak. More importantly, Alaska has the ability to train up qualified workers. With millions of dollars in existing infrastructure and capital in USDOL Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training Centers already in the State. We are prepared to work closely with the Department of Defense and with other Alaska training providers such as the University of Alaska and Interior School Districts in Fairbanks, Delta-Greely, and the Denali Borough to prepare our youth for the job opportunities associated with this project. We're interested in job opportunities in the pre-construction phase, the
construction, maintenance and operations of the National Defense Deployment Project. Senator Ted Stevens is familiar with Interior Alaska capabilities to provide quality construction facilities using Alaska contractors, suppliers, vendors and local workers. When you make your final site selections for the project, I would ask that you give full consideration to Alaska's businesses, our contractors and our work force. Thank you very much for coming to Fairbanks.

Mr. Michaelson: Thank you, Rick Solie.

Mr. Solie: Thank you, my name is Rick Solie, 4437 Stanford Drive, Fairbanks 99709. I'm here representing tonight, the Fairbanks Memorial Hospital and Denali Center. The local hospital for the northern half of Alaska and also as the presiding officer of the Fairbanks North Star Borough Assembly. First I'd like to talk to you about the hospital and how we believe we can meet the increased demand that this project might bring to the interior. The hospital has been a partner with the community for 30 years. We have grown with Fairbanks from 1972 when we first opened our doors to this year when we're opening a cancer treatment center this March and next week -- or rather later this week, we'll be opening an expanded mental health unit on our fourth floor. The hospital is a 162 licensed bed facility and we currently operate under capacity. As such we would be able to absorb the additional acute care needs, the long term care, the emergency surgery,

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Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
something that we also enjoy with the military. I currently
hunt across the Tanana Flats, in an area that is military land
and that — many citizens in the Fairbanks community do that as
well. Birch Hill, on the civilian side has a joint use
biathlon range that has had a memorandum of agreement with the
military for some time. So, I think if you spend some time to
look at our community you'll find that we are rich in our
partnership with our military friends and we would encourage
you to look at the Interior site for this. I think that our
health care facilities can clearly meet whatever needs you
might bring and I believe that Fairbanks will be good
neighbors. And thank you again, for the opportunity to come
here tonight and testify. I appreciate your coming to
Fairbanks.

MR. MICHAELSON: Thank you. The next speakers
will be Dean Owen, Jim Romersberger, Dan O'Neile, Frank Biondi
and Cynthia Henry. Dean Owen.

MR. OWEN: Thank you for the opportunity to
speak tonight. My name is Dean Owen, I'm the Aviation Manager
for the Northern Region of the Alaska Department of
Transportation, Public Facilities. While the Draft impact --
the environmental impact statement shows no negative air space
problems, we would anticipate some increased aviation activity
and I would like to assure you that we have the infrastructure
to absorb that. The civilian aviation industry has worked very

Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
has experimented with some of the most deadly chemical agents
known to man. The lethal VX, GB and mustard gas have been
packed into rockets, artillery shells and fired into the
country side around the Gerstle River. In the 1960's the
military released hundreds of liters of germ warfare organisms
in the open air. Including strains of the tularemia bacteria
which is an acute infectious disease related to the bubonic
plague. When the military decommissioned its nuclear power
plant at Fort Greely in 1972, they left behind radioactive
contamination on the order of 70,000 curies. It's encased in
now, rotting concrete. To put that number into perspective,
remember that the nation's worst nuclear accident at Three Mile
Island involved 15 curies. During the ten years of its
operation, the military pumped low level radioactive waste
directly into Jarvis Creek and into a nearby well. Today the
military continues to use thousands of square miles of Alaskan
landscape for bombing practice with live missiles, rockets, and
bombs. Tens of thousands of these weapons are shot into the
Delta River area on Fort Greely. Many do not explode and
remain year after year hidden in the brush and rendered --
rendering millions of acres, a permanent no man's land. As the
former acting Base Commander at Fort Greely acknowledged, I
would say, you can never clean up the Delta River, you can
never clean up Little Delta Creek. So, in contrast to the
previous presentations, I would say that the military has not

been a good steward of land in Alaska. It has not been a good
neighbor where the environment has been concerned. With
respect to the EIS process, the military again fails to do
right by Alaska. During the scoping process, we were assured
that comments made by the public would be published in the EIS,
they were not. I know of at least one comment, critical of the
proposal which was not even summarized in the perfunctory
summary language that was printed. The EIS did not adequately
consider the No-action Alternative, it is not simply not to
build it at a given site, but not to build it at all. In order
to rationally consider whether our Nation should build an NMD,
the EIS would logically discuss the technical feasibility,
the potential cost, the potential to start and arms race and so forth. But
the EIS and these hearings and the scoping process are as
lightly scripted as the missile test touted as successes. The
public is simply not presented with the necessary information
to make informed decisions about the NMD. Part of that
failure, incidently, will be addressed tomorrow night at the
University of Alaska forum where pros and cons will be
presented by two experts. In summary, the military has had its
way in Alaska, always relying that Alaskans would sell out
their land, their integrity for military spending, generally
short term construction jobs. I look forward to the day when
we tell the military and the politicians who waste our public
money to feed defense contractors, no thanks, no sale.
MR. MICHAELSON: The next speaker is Frank Biondi.

MR. BIONDI: I think I'll move back on the support side. I'm Frank Biondi, the General Manager with PTI Communications and I'd like to talk -- take a few minutes to talk about the infrastructure that's in place that will support the National Defense Communication System. It -- we have years of operational readiness in communications in helping the military and supporting the military. With that, we have a wide range, state of the art digital tele-communications facilities and services. Many communication companies provide everything from dial tone, cellular phone service, internet and fiber optic transport. The majority of these services are fully redundant and competitive. Of particular importance to this project is the fiber optic rings that we have in place.

Within the interior, we have redundant self healing fiber optic rings throughout the Fairbanks area and we also provide redundant fiber optic cables from -- on both -- runs down along the Parks Highway and the Richardson Highway, from Fairbanks to the lower forty-eight. Within those cables -- both of these cables run within two miles of the facilities, or the planned facilities of Greely or Clear Air Force Station. The -- the best part about these fiber cables is they're already installed and they've already met any environmental impacts that may arise from having to install new cables or to deal with new fiber optics transport. I can safely say that on behalf of all the communications providers in the interior, that we stand ready to support this project to the fullest extent. Thank you.

MR. MICHAELSON: Thank you. The next speakers will be Cynthia Henry, Don Whitmore, Roger Burggraf, Wally Powers and Dave Carlstrom.

MS. HENRY: Good evening and welcome to Fairbanks, we appreciate you being here. I am Cynthia Henry, I am President of the Fairbanks North Star Borough School Board. And I'd like to use this opportunity to tell you a little bit about our School District. The Fairbanks North Star Borough School District, is a public school district with approximately 16,000 students and we have about 31 schools. We offer a comprehensive, educational program for students in kindergarten through the 12th grade. Our special education program serves students from age three to 22 and is recognized for its high quality services. The district also offers programs for students in need of gifted education, bilingual services, remedial help in reading, vocational education, extensive extra curricular activities and alternative programs for secondary students. Our recently developed elementary reading improvement initiative has been very successful in improving reading performance for our poorer readers in the elementary
schools. And we currently serve over 4000 students from families connected with the U.S. Army and Air Force. The quality of the school buildings in our school district is a point of pride for us. Recent renovations and expansions of schools across the district provide for a sufficient student capacity over the foreseeable future in modern educational facilities. Elementary, middle and high schools across the district have sufficient capacity for anticipated growth in the school age population resulting from the deployment of a Ballistic Missile Defense System in Interior Alaska. It is the policy of the school district to accept -- accept students who live outside their attendance areas into any school in the district. And our -- our school district accepts part time and full time students and offers a home schooling option through our districts correspondence program. The quality of our district can be seen in a few statistics. Our average class size is 22 students in the elementary schools. The average student in our district scores better than 65 percent of the students in the nation on nationally standardized achievement test. And our drop out rate is only about 6 percent. College bound students score significantly higher on SAT and ACT college entrance exams than the national and the state averages. Nearly half of the teachers in our school district have masters degrees and much of the quality of our schools we attribute to the dedication and expertise of our teaching staff. We are very proud of our school district and believe that it provides an educational experience for students that exceeds many school districts in -- across the United States and we frequently hear that from our military families. The government would be wise to locate a Ballistic Missile Defense System in close proximity to Fairbanks. We're sure the families of the personnel who will operate the system will be welcomed and will appreciate the quality of our schools. Thank you.

Mr. Michaelson: Thank you. Mr. Whitmore, if you could wait just a few seconds before you start, we are changing a video tape. We certainly wouldn't want to miss your comments. Sorry, and the good news is that didn't count against your four minutes. You've got the full four minutes to go, alright.

Mr. Whitmore: Thank you. My name is Don Whitmore. I have some questions. I question whether the system design is sufficient and mature to assess environmental impact. And with respect to the deployment readiness review, that is to address the C1 threat level. The initial operational capability and it is also to demonstrate how the system would evolve for the future, to address future threats. And the system configuration for future threats is still to be determined and so therefore the environmental impact statement is unable to forecast future impacts. It cannot satisfy the
DER requirement to assess system evolution. I believe the environmental impact analysis should wait until their additional system details are available for the evolved threat, and I would point to two aspects of the threat that's evolving. This is according to the national intelligence estimate released by the National Intelligence Council, which is the consensus of all the intelligence agencies in the U.S. Government, that was released on September 9th, 1999 -- that's less than two months ago. Two aspects of that threat that should be addressed are the sea based ballistic missile launch, the cruise missile.....

MR. MICHAELSON: Could you speak just a little closer to the microphone, it's a little difficult to hear you. Thank you.

MR. WHITEMORE: Oh -- the sea based ballistic missile launch and the cruise missile launch from sea or land. Those two threats could have significant effect on the architecture and the types of surveillance systems and that ought to be addressed before the impact can be fully assessed. And I think Alaska ought to be aware that this initial system is just the down-payment on a system that's going to be growing.

MR. MICHAELSON: Okay. Thank you very much.

Roger Burggraf.

MR. BURGGRAF: I'm Roger Burggraf. I reside at

830 Sheep Creek Road, Fairbanks, Alaska. I've worked for many years, approximately 30 years in the mining industry. The industry is in support of the construction of the National Missile Defense System in Interior Alaska. The effects of the construction of the National Missile Defense System will be positive, provide jobs for Alaskans. We have a good work force here, which has been mentioned by Tim Sharp and Jim Sampson. The Fairbanks community can provide a support base for a lot of what's going -- would be going on. The construction of the National Missile Defense System will have a small footprint on the land in Alaska which is positive. Alaska is already a target whether the National Missile Defense System is constructed or not. If constructed in Alaska, it will help to shield, not only the U.S. but Canada from potential rogue nations trying to attack our country. The economic benefits for the constructions of the Missile Defense System and the maintenance of it will provide jobs, it will be money spent in the community. It might enable the Alaska Railroad to construct a line to Delta -- the Delta area and possibly further extend the line to Canada if the National Defense System is constructed in the Delta area. I see potentially many positive benefits from the construction of the defense system. At - I'm -- I'm sure there are a lot of bugs to be ironed out, but if we don't make an attempt to try to defend this country, we're apt to pay a pretty heavy price down the

Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
road. So, I recommend that the Alaska be considered and I hope that we will see a Missile Defense System up here,
sometime in the future. Thank you.

MR. MICHAELSON: Thank you, Wally Powers.

MR. POWERS: Good evening gentlemen.

MR. MICHAELSON: Could you pull the mic up towards your mouth please? Thank you. P-T-030

MR. POWERS: Thank you. Good evening. I'm Wally Powers and I'm the Economic Development Director for the
Fairbanks North Star Borough's Economic Development Commission.
And I would like to address the socioeconomic impacts of the
possible location of the National Missile Defense System in Alaska. Emphasizing the econom- -- the impact on the economic
opportunities. I wish also to address the opportunity cost of
a No-action Alternative or not locating the system in Alaska.
You've already heard, or will hear from many speakers regarding
the ability and willingness of Alaska to support the project if
it is approved and if a No-action Alternative or Alaska is not
selected, there will be an opportunity cost in terms of
economic development. I understand that the Final EIS will
address whether or not the system is -- is going to be built or
not and addresses as many of the concerns that have not yet
been addressed in full. And recognizing that, I would like to
address that if the system's not going to be built. I want to emphasize that I'm not promoting one location over another, but

I am promoting a location within Interior Alaska. However, for
obvious reasons, I think Port Greely would experience a greater
decision impact from not being selected. Port Greely's
reduction in force related to the base realignment and closure
will begin this July with the elimination of $4 civilian
positions, 55 more positions are slated for elimination in
2001. The missile defense deployment may not provide relief
for those being RIF'ed, but it would help to fill the void in
the community created by base closure. Deployment at Port
Greely would add momentum to Delta Junction's ability to
attract new industry, to utilize the surplus property
productively. The 800 bed minimum security prison would only
use a portion of existing facilities. I will -- it will take
time to utilize the rest of the facilities without economic
stimulus such as the National Missile Defense System. In the
interim Delta Junction and the businesses and infrastructure
that supported Port Greely will be adversely affected. The
slack time in economic development will adversely affect the
entire length of the economic food chain that once supported
Port Greely. However a decision to proceed with the Proposed
Action and deployment of the Missile Defense System in Alaska
will offer numerous economic development opportunities
throughout the State. The University of Alaska is a Space
Grant Agency and has many advantages that it may offer the
military in terms of working cooperatively and has technology

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Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
available to partner with the military. I think that the
establishment of more high tech industry in the area is -- is
crucial and that Alaska has appreciated the military's
recognition of it being a strategic location for its -- meeting
its mission. And Alaska would like to use that leverage to
attract new industry to the State. And I think the presence of
more high technology industry would do that. We find that many
military choose to stay in Alaska after their completion and I
hope that that's an indication of your desire to come to
Alaska. Thank you and I'm sorry if I went over.

MR. MICHAELSON: Thank you Mr. Powers. The
next speakers will be Dave Carstrom, again I apologize in
advance if I mispronounce this Dennis Schlofeldt, that's as
close as I can get, sorry. Frank Williams, Mike Stedry,
Alaska Trail Association and John Brown and Rhonda Curwen-
Boyles. Mr. Carstrom. (Pause) Is Mr. Dave Carstrom here?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Mr. Lewis, may I request
that you ask people to -- when you call their name, to kind of
line up so we can expedite our testimony? We've been waiting
for people to get up to the podium -- this is not just
impatience.

MR. MICHAELSON: I -- I read the names ahead of
time and I assume that people will position themselves so that
they can get up to the microphone as quickly as they can.
We're trying to expedite this for your sake, but I think the

reason that it's taken so long for Mr. Carstrom to get here is
because he's not here, would be my guess. Dennis -- and again,
I'm having trouble reading this, Alaska Workers Association.
Schlofeldt, thank you, is he here? (Pause) Frank Williams?

MR. WILLIAMS: Good evening. I'm Frank P-T-031
Williams, I'm the Vice-Chancellor at the University of Alaska
Fairbanks and also the Director of the Arctic Region Super
Computing Center. First of all I'd like to say that the
University of Alaska is enthusiastically supportive of the
National Missile Defense program. Specifically we think that
utilization of our strategic location is a compelling reason to
locate this system in the interior of Alaska. Furthermore we
believe that the University and the expertise at the University
can be brought to bear on the task at hand before all of us.
First of all we think that design and building of this kind of
structure in the north is really a unique thing, it's often
disclosed. But it's a real difference that we have to address.
We have experts in that area as well as experts in
environmental issues and wildlife issues that would help us all
minimize the impact of this project. We do also have
significant expertise in signal processing, remote sensing,
data collection, atmospheric and ionospheric science, all aspects
of computer science, logistics and on and on. And we think
that those kinds of expertises can be used as we develop the
systems once they're initially built in the Interior. We at
Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
MR. BROWN: My name's John Brown. I'm the president of the Fairbanks Central Labor Council. The Council is made up of 15 affiliated unions representing close to 10,000 union members here in the community -- in the surrounding community. I'm here to speak in favor of the project. I don't believe that you have to look around the world very hard to see the need for a Missile Defense System. It's a defensive system, this isn't a -- a system of aggression, this is one of defense that I think will deter, in my mind, an arms build up based on -- if -- if the missile aren't going to do them any good, why would they build them? I don't -- I think that if you look at the ability to defend the entire United States from Alaska makes the reasoning for putting it in Alaska easy to see. I think the availability of a trained, skilled work force, that's demonstrated it's ability to build complex military facilities, is another good reason to look at Alaska. At long -- also because of the minimal impact lands. I mean we have a lot of land here in the interior of Alaska that's already militarily reserved, so the impact by building in those lands will be minimal. And for those reasons, I would strongly urge the deployment of the Missile Defense System here in the interior of Alaska. Thank you.

MR. MICHAELSON: The next speakers in order will be Rhonda Curwen-Boyles, Randy Griffin, Bill Brophy, Hank.

MS. CURWEN-BOYLES: Good evening gentlemen. My name is Rhonda Curwen-Boyles and I am the chair of the Greater Fairbanks Chamber of Commerce. We represent over 800 members to include surrounding communities that the Chamber members are actually reciprocal members with our Chamber with specific agreements. We pledge our support, which will become a priority during my term as Chair and for those Chairs that will follow. Understanding that it's not just a one year project. Our mission is commerce and economic development and this project falls within our objectives very clearly and we welcome it into our area. Our area is already military, as you have heard and we sincerely appreciate them. And many of our business members hire those family members as workers. Many of our current members are also pipeline workers from the mid '70s. They stayed here in Fairbanks and made it their home and are now the community leaders which you are hearing tonight. We are avidly aware of the challenges that a project of this magnitude could bring, specifically regarding socioeconomic impacts. As the representative of the Board of Directors, I assure you we are prepared to be pro-active in addressing any of those challenging needs or all of them. As the owner of Wendy's I promise you that if you bring the National Defense Missile System to Delta, I'll meet you there with a new Wendy's restaurant. (General laughter. Applause.)
MR. MICHAELSON: Randy Griffin, P-T-035

MR. GRIFFIN: Hello, I'm in favor of the
missile defense and as far as the environmental thing, I see no
harm in it as far as my little bit of knowledge on that
subject goes. Excuse me if I go a little field -- far afield
here, but I just wanted to discuss what I consider some of the
threats to this country. Just looking -- just one country,
Communist China, as you know of course they would like to take
over Taiwan and have stated so in very belligerent fashion on
numerous occasions and have conducted military exercises and in
an offhand way have threatened Taiwan with a neutron bomb and
have threatened Los Angeles with an atomic attack. Which I
think is very rude of them. But I can understand how Taiwan
seems like a threat to the Communist leadership in China
because, according to my 1997 World Almanac, the gross national
product per person of Taiwan is $12,070 whereas in China it's
just $2,500. So it's almost five times as much in Taiwan.
Which shows the superiority of the free enterprise system and
it is a slap in the face. I imagine to the Communist Chinese
leadership. And I certainly don't think that China wants at
all to tangle with the United States. But, I do think that
they can use their missiles as a threatening tool as they've
already done so. And, I do believe that China has the right to
have missiles, just like we have the right to have the
missiles, they have a right to aim their missiles at us as we
have a right to aim ours at them. And they have a right to
even threaten to use those missiles in an act of self defense
just as we have that same right. But, they of course, do not
have the right, the moral right anyway, to smuggle bombs in
just like we don't have the moral right to have bombs buried
for ten years under Peking that we could fire off at any time
with remote control. If it ever got out that we did that, we'd
never live it down. We'd be villains forever and the same
thing would go for them and therefore, I don't think that they
can use a smuggled weapon as a threatening tool. But they can
use a missile that's ready to launch as a threatening tool.
And I do think -- you know, they claim that Taiwan is their
providence and it's an internal matter and they have history to
back them up. I consider Taiwan a sovereign country and a
valuable ally. Now, what I'm about to say is a complete wild
speculation. I mean, I'm no military strategist. I've never
even been in the military, never served my country or anything
like that but -- I mean. Speculate, if China attacked Taiwan
and knocked out Taiwanese efforts to defend themselves, even
though Taiwan is a rich country, they could do that with their
capability and then the U.S. might move to defend them and
might knock out one of their ships and China would then say, we
demand an apology, we demand payment for that ship lost and
they would bluster and carry on like that. Then they would
announce, what I am kind of making this up, but a one missile
policy in which they say they will launch -- they have -- they
reserve the right to launch just one missile -- just one
missile, one missile doctrine against the United States
Military or the military bases that are supporting us. And --
and if we launched another -- an attack on them, they might
just carry that out. But I believe that they would state
repeatedly and over and over that they will have a one missile
policy and the reason for this is because they don't want a
large military exchange. And they would announce that they
would not sent multiple nuclear warheads over here unless they
had indication that the United States was sending nuclear
warheads over here. In other words they would -- they -- to
contain a tit for tat one nuclear salvo exchange. And --
and they could carry out that threat if they had multiple --
rather mobile launchers so that they could even avoid a massive
nuclear strike if we tried to wipe out their missiles, they
could still -- and so in other words -- in other words the
United -- if -- so -- if the United States then hit another one
of their ships they just could launch a missile against some
nuclear -- some military facilities that we have over here,
including Eielson Air Force Base and if we did the United
States would have to think hard how we would respond. But,
I'll leave. Thank you.

MR. MICHAELSON: Thank you very much. Bill
Brosey.

MR. BROSEY: Good evening and welcome to the
great land. I'm Bill Brosey, I am one of those proud military
officers that has served here in Alaska. I am currently the
Executive Director of the Fairbanks Industrial Development
Corporation. There has been a long history of military
presence in Alaska. From the patrolling of the territory to
building of the highway to PTSD Line sites to Ladd Field and
the World War II operations to the defense of the Pipeline.
American citizens expect and deserve the umbrella of coverage
of the National Military Defense resources. Obvious exposure
of Alaska and Hawaii to missile attacks is unacceptable. There
are many uncertainties in the world today. The information
age, advanced technologies and the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction abound. There is a threat and the potential
for deployment of missiles will never go away. Rogue states
are likely to have the ever increasing capability to attack the
United States with missiles. We must put in place systems now
to protect ourselves in the future. The opportunities for
economic growth and industrial development abound in the
interior of Alaska. Interior Alaska is the right place, at the
correct time for deployment of the National Military's Missile
System. Thank you.

MR. MICHAELSON: Hank Bartos. P-T-037

MR. BARTOS: I'm Hank Bartos, member of the
Greater Fairbanks Board of Realtors and Real Estate Broker here

Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
in the interior of Alaska. And on behalf of that industry, I would like to wholeheartedly welcome you to our fine State. We have the ability as Alaskan citizens to do a lot of things. We endure hard weather and we can respond to contingencies; we can respond to housing needs, we have the builders, the lenders, the appraisers, the entire industry stands ready to welcome the National Missile Defense System to the State of Alaska. And to the interior of Alaska. I came up to Alaska as a member of the United States Air Force. And it was proud that we served as top cover for America. The military in Alaska has been a good citizen. There's a lot of us that are retired and stayed here. And by providing the defense for the nation, we were happy and proud to do so and still continue to stand proud to do so. We realize that freedom isn't free and that there is a cost associated and we're proud to pay that price. Thank you.

MR. MICHAELSON: Gabriel Scott will be followed by Steven Haagenson, Frank Chapados, Dave Williams and Jeff Gregory.

MR. SCOTT: My name is Gabriel Scott. I'm the Alaskan Representative for the Cascade and Wildlands Project. And I'd like to first of all congratulate the Department of Defense Ballistic Missile Defense Organization for preparation of a pretty impressive environmental impact statement. There's a lot of pretty pictures. There are some impressive charts, there's a lot of mysterious scientific terminology. That is...
other concerns, I’m worried about this fiber optic cable. You’re going to run two of them from Seward or Whittier all the way to the tip of the Aleutians Islands. In the EIS it says there’s going to be no impact. Now if I went to DNR and said I want to dig a ditch from Seward to the end of the Aleutian Islands, but I assure you there is not going to be any environmental impact, there’d be some eyebrows raised. You must take us for dumb to tell us that there’s not going to be any impact to benthic or intertidal organisms plowing two ditches all the way out the Aleutian chain. I just don’t believe that. There’s the ground disturbance itself, the Ground Base Interceptor unit is the most obvious. 600 acres of hugh 100 silos sitting in the middle of what now is wilderness. I don’t think that’s acceptable, especially if it’s in Delta like other people have mentioned, that’s an important migratory bird route. I’m worried about the impact on subsistence users. That’s just one more place that’s going to be off limits for hunters and people using -- using the real economy that people have here in Alaska which is subsistence. Hunting and taking care of yourself. Care for the land and it’ll care for you. You don’t need pork if you do that. I’m worried about hazardous waste. Obviously the military doesn’t have a good record on how you’ve dealt with that in the past and I don’t trust that you’ll do any better in the future. I don’t see any assurances in the EIS that lead me to think anything different.

My main complaint, however, is with the way that the environmental review has been done. I -- on the way in, I heard somebody -- somebody was greeting someone else coming in, said, you know -- what’s going on. They said oh, well they’ve got a lot of propaganda laid out for us now, we’ll give comments in a hour or so. And I think that’s the appropriate word, this is propaganda. This is not a well meaning effort to evaluate the environmental impacts. It’s a PR effort. You’re treating this like a formality. A lot of attention’s been give this treaty with Russia, like to -- and the fact that if we built it here it would violate that treaty, there are two other laws that you should also consider. That’s the National Environmental Policy Act and the Administrative Procedures Act. Those laws, you may be able to negotiate a treaty with Russia but representative democracy is not a negotiable thing. This process needed to be undertaken in a good -- with a good faith effort to involve in the public. That can’t happen with this environmental impact statement because critical information is absent. You give these assurances that there’s going to be no impact from this. You go to great lengths about what the effects of the bathroom facilities at the -- at the project are but there’s no discussion of what hazardous chemicals there are going to be and what you’re going to do with them. One last statement, I think that the Department of Defense has the worst environmental record of any agency in Alaska. I don’t trust
Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
that the -- that they have really done a good job of presenting
the facts and the conditions that exist in the areas that are
under consideration. Particularly for Fairbanks and the sites
that are located in the -- this general area. So anyway. I --
I feel that we're on the right track. I'm a friend of the
military. I've been associated with the military for a good
portion of the time I've lived in Fairbanks and have served on
some of the civilian committees and that sort of thing. And
I'm -- I really feel that we have, in the military and the
people that are associated with the military and in the
military, have a respect -- time up?

MR. MICHAELSON: One minute left.

MR. CHAPADO: Okay, well then I'll just wind
up by saying thank you for the opportunity to be here and
hopefully it will see this -- this thing bear fruit and someday
we'll have an opportunity to participate in the activities that
might be associated with the construction or whatever takes
place. Thank you very much.

MR. MICHAELSON: Thank you. For those of you
who may not have been here when I gave my instructions earlier.
Just a reminder, there's a four minute time limit. When
there's one minute left, I put up an index finder, like that
and when your four minutes are up, a closed hand, such as that.
Thank you. After -- I'm assuming this is Dave Williams, after
him, there will be Jeff Gregory, James Messer, Mark Ames and

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Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
as a matter of concern and I would ask that it be investigated. I will leave with the point that the City of Fairbanks, the Fairbanks North Star Borough and the City of North Pole have all passed resolutions blocking acquiescence of this provision after 34 years. And this is regardless (sic) of any unconstitutional aggression -- judicial aggression against the State and Nation to cease it's economic revenue resource base provisions. In ending I'd like to point out the first eight words of Alaska's Constitution, is, we the people of Alaska, grateful unto God. And I want to point out that there is also a spiritual environment.....

MR. MICHAELSON: Mr. Ames, I'm sorry your time is up.

MR. AMES: And nations are aggressive and they're being whipped up and I would address the Joint Chiefs of Staff to investigate these matters with detail, thank you.

MR. MICHAELSON: Thank you Mr. Ames. The next speakers in order are John Binkley, Nadine, Mr. Warwick and Bill Connor.

MR. BINKLEY: Good evening, my name is John Binkley. I'm Chairman of the Board for the Alaska Railroad Corporation. The Alaska Railroad Corporation is owned by the State of Alaska and operates independently with a Board of Directors of seven members. We have a long history of working with the military in the State of Alaska. Over 500 miles of

Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
continental connection of the railroad through Canada to the
lower 48 which would enhance the mission of the military here
in Alaska. We feel that we've been proud, as I mentioned to
support the military through their missions through many, many
years in Alaska. And would look forward to working with you as
well on this project and we will be submitting written comments
prior to November 15th. Thank you.

MR. MICHAELSON: Thank you. I'm going to take
a chance on this Nadine Hargesheimer.

MS. HARGESHEIMER: That's close, that's very
close.

MR. MICHAELSON: Thank you. P-T-045

MS. HARGESHEIMER: You do very good. My name
is Nadine Hargesheimer. I'm here representing Borough Mayor.

Hank Hove who's out of town this evening. We support the
project being built in the interior. I think you've heard from
a number of entities this evening that -- from education, from
labor, from business, transportation, I think that not everyone
in the community feels this way, but I think in general that
we're ready willing and able to support the project. Our
infrastructure will support it, our businesses will support it
and obviously we have a work force that we're quite proud of.
In looking at the Draft EIS, the environmental impacts for the
Alaska sites indicate that there are no adverse impacts or
minimal impacts to the environment. The Alaska sites are on

exiting military reservations. Conversely the socioeconomic
impacts are positive and far reaching and the environmental
impacts are minimal. I'd like to, with no disrespect to prior
speakers, I would like to say that in the stock market they say
that past performance is not an indicator of future gains or
losses as the public's expectation and respect to the
environment have changed, so have national -- national
environmental laws. Discussions surrounding the building of
the National Missile Defense System are happening in an
entirely different set of circumstances than those in the past.
Current law simply will not allow hazardous waste to be buried
and forgotten to then become our children's problems. Finally,
it is our understanding that should the National Missile
Defense System be built in Alaska -- be built, the Alaska sites
fall within the geographic area that maximizes the systems
performance. In other words we will be protected as well as
North Dakota. As well as North Dakota -- please build it in
the interior of Alaska. Thank you very much.

MR. MICHAELSON: Thank you. Mr. Warwick.

(Pause) Bill Connor. P-T-046

MR. CONNOR: My name is Doctor Bill Connor.

I'm a licensed psychologist in the State of Alaska and I thank
you for the opportunity to speak with you tonight. I'd like to
speak against, or in opposition to what I would call the,
Fairbanks as a bulls eye program. And there are about five
points I'd like to make. The first one is I don't see anything in the negative impact statement or in the impact statement about affects on our economy and social structure in terms of impact on families and -- both of employees who are part of the construction phase or the operation phase. Many of our social service structures are already over taxed. Systems -- social service systems, police, shelters, substance abuse prevention and treatment, mental health treatment, family services, domestic violence and education all have been shown at various times to be overtaxed and I see nothing addressing those issues. And I would see the employees that we brought to Fairbanks, and they will be brought to Fairbanks to work on this, and their families as needing these -- these sorts of services. The second point I'd like to make is I agree with some of the other speakers, I don't see the military as having a good record in terms of compliance and clean up of environmental or toxic sites. I don't see how this can not have an impact on water, soil, wildlife and I'm not sure for what reason. I'm not sure to what benefit we will have these impacts. The environment impact statement seems to address best case scenario and as we all know there are many worse case scenarios. I woke up this morning to a news report of an oil spill off the Alaska Railroad this morning. And these are the types of things I don't think the environmental impact statement addresses, what happens if, sort of thing. The forth
site which it continues to function in that capacity today.

2. Eielson Air Force Base was originally an Army Air Corp
3. alternate site for Ladd Field which was originally -- the
4. original name of Fort Wainwright and that -- it became an
5. operational base on its own in 1947. And all during this time,
6. the Fairbanks community has had a warm relationship with all
7. the military that have either been hosted or stationed at these
8. facilities in Interior Alaska. And we have opened our
9. community to the military and we've found them to be very good
10. neighbors and we have tried to be good neighbors with them.
11. And I think you can find that when you look at the people who
12. retire here. At a recent retirement ceremony that I attended
13. at Fort Wainwright, three out of the four people retiring
14. choose to remain in Alaska, really remain in the Fairbanks area
15. and already had jobs lined up and became -- you know, our local
16. citizens. And I think you'd find that there's the ones that
17. want to come to Alaska, the ones that have been here and have
18. been posted somewhere else and want to come back and those that
19. have chosen to get out and remain here. And they all love

MR. MICHAELSON: Bert Bell. P-T-048

MR. BELL: Hello and welcome to Fairbanks. My
22. name is Bert Bell. I'm in a construction company called GHEM
23. Company. I'm president and general manager of it. The company
24. has been in existence for roughly, almost 50 years now. The

Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
that has worked for the Corp of Engineers, I have witnessed and have spent a great deal of money meeting demands I didn't even expect as far as safeguards that they take now. The environmental concerns, and yes there's perhaps - I don't think anybody isn't without blemish in the environmental protection, and I think the military is probably the leader in the clean up effort and the leader in making sure it isn't repeated. And as the contracting community, I speak that we have learned from them and we are willing to come out and do it and this area here can build your facility.

MR. MICHAELSON: Thank you, Sean McGuire.

MR. MCGUIRE: Thank you, my name is Sean P-T-049 McGuire, I appreciate the opportunity to speak. I hope you guys realize, well that you take this whole parade of politicians and officials from Chamber of Commerce and Unions with a grain of salt. About 30 years ago, well 40 years now, there was a project up here, project Chariot. I don't know if you're familiar with that, it was a proposal by the AEC, Atomic Energy Commission to blast a deep water harbor up in northwest Alaska at Point Hope with nuclear weapons. And you had this same stream of politicians coming up and saying what -- the University President and all these people, the same kind of people who are here tonight, saying what a great thing this is going to be. We know now that -- and it came very close to happening. A small band of Eskimos and other environmentalist...
I think that would be a very negative consequence for all of us. And I appreciate your -- your time tonight.

MR. MICHAELSON: Thank you very much. I've had an additional card brought up to me. Anita Rose. I'm going to ask you to wait about 30 seconds before you start, while we change tapes again. See, we were just going to make it. Okay, thank you.

MS. ROSE: Good evening. My name is Anita Rose and I'm also a major in the U.S. Army Reserves and in the process of transferring to the Alaska Army National Guard. I am also an employee of a local business firm here in Alaska --
in Fairbanks that is very interested in bringing the National Missile Defense System to the interior of Alaska. In 1991, I went from Desert Shield, Desert Storm in Saudi Arabia to Fairbanks, Alaska to teach the Army ROTC program at the University of Alaska, Fairbanks. While there, I had the privilege of preparing and presenting an entire course on the military history of Alaska. I won't go into all the details, but I guarantee you, the military has proudly served in Alaska since the very first day that we received Alaska from the Russians and the military continues to serve proudly in Alaska and will do so. I'm sure into the future. In 1994 and 1995, I served as a major in -- on my second tour in Korea with the U.S. Forces Korea, United Nations Command Headquarters in Seoul, Korea. I know very well, the very real threat that North Korea poses to the United States and the world as well as to Alaska. It is time for a National Missile Defense System, now. Alaska is the only strategic location to deploy the National Missile Defense System. Therefore I fully support the deployment here in the interior of Alaska. I would like to request that a couple of things be considered. First of all, our transportation system between Fairbanks and Clear Air Station as well as the transportation system between Fairbanks and the Fort Greely area could use a little bit of improvement. The roads have a tendency to be a little bit on the windy side and two lane. Therefore, I'd like to suggest that additional federal highway funds be added so that proper safety improvements and proper road construction can be conducted. Also, I firmly support the legislation that Senator Murkowski has, you might say initiated regarding the extension of the Alaska Railroad into -- from Eielson Air Force Base into the Fort Greely, Delta Junction area. And also, I would like to mention that I fully support the additional upgrades that are being considered for the Allen Army Field at Fort Greely.

Thank you.

MR. MICHAELSON: Thank you. We've started a trend here. I'm getting more cards. Rudy Vetter followed by Dave Carlstrom.

MR. VETTER: Good evening everyone. I'm a 49 year resident of the State of Alaska. I've been in
Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)

1. earlier.
2. MR. CARSTROM: When I got back, I couldn't say anything. (Laughter)
3. MR. MICHAELSON: Okay.
4. MR. CARSTROM: My name is Dave Carstrom, I'm perhaps last, but most certainly least... .
5. MR. MICHAELSON: Could you pull the mic up towards you and start over please. P-T-052
6. MR. CARSTROM: My name is Dave Carstrom, perhaps the last, probably the least of your speakers. I work for the Fairbanks Industrial Development Corporation as the Director of Marketing at Fairbanks International Airport. I would very briefly like to put to rest any concerns you may have about transportation access, particularly by air, to Interior Alaska. Despite being perched here on the edge of the Arctic, we enjoy remarkable air transportation services, both for passengers and freight. As you may have experienced first hand, if you arrived at Fairbanks International, we have a great airfield and airport. A beautiful passenger terminal. World class, 24 hour, all weather operation. Our air carrier runway is over two miles long with the associated ramp and other infrastructure capable of handling all military and civilian aircraft flying today. On the passenger side, we enjoy service from -- to and from the lower 48 U.S. of -- provided by Alaska, Delta and seasonally Northwest Airlines.

7. construction, worked on the pipeline for about seven years. I'm engaged in mining at the present time. I believe the last, one of the last speakers who referred to the Placer blowouts, or the attempt at atomic harbor up in the north, gave a very good presentation in regard to that. And I would suggest that you people read a book called the _Firecracker Boys_. It's a very good thing and really describes what could happen under these circumstances where everything is not taken into consideration. We do have a possible attack by a number of people. I don't know whether we can really produce a Missile Defense System that will work. I must say I'm surprised to see that there isn't a couple hundred billion dollars projected here for this thing. Someone has tried to hold the cost down or they couldn't find a way to spend it. I don't know which. The military clean up, so far as their record, it's been a very poor record. And we should insist that they do a lot more in regard to the geology and the soils. I hope that they've taken in the fact that the actual location of the missile, takes care and considers this unique factor we call permafrost. That it better be considered and it be considered real well. Because if you -- I would think that if you have a missile that's not properly oriented and is not kept in the proper position for launch, gets off a degree or two, your missile may not take off as it's scheduled to. Thank you.

8. MR. MICHAELSON: Dave Carstrom. I called you
Depending on the season, eight to fourteen direct, or in the summertime, non-stop flights to primarily Seattle and to Minneapolis as well. On the freight side, we are served here by the major express courier services. FedEx, UPS, DHL all provide overnight service from -- to and from the lower 48 and also access to their worldwide networks. Internationally the Fairbanks' strategic location, probably the same geography that makes our area attractive for your installation has also attracted a variety of international operators here in the cargo side. In fact Fairbanks has over the last several years grown to become the United States' 9th largest international airfreight gateway, with over 20,747 freighter services a week provided by AirFrance, Cargolux and Laconse. So, the bottom -- bottom line and I have a postcard as a small reminder of our fine field for you take home with you. The bottom line is that you can -- you can get your people and their material here from there, wherever that there may be. And we look forward to serving your air transportation needs in the years to come. Thank you.

MR. MICHAELSON: Thank you. Margaret Durst.

MS. DURST: I want to thank you for allowing me and all these others an opportunity to speak. I don't have a prepared statement, but coming here tonight and listening to people, in terms of the environment, I'm looking -- or thinking about the earth as whole, as an environment. And my major concern is breaking the treaty that is currently in existence that we spent many hours, years working on these treaties to try and keep down the amount of nuclear weapons that exist in this world. And my concern is that by placing this in Alaska that the treaty will be broken and there will be encouragement in other countries to build more nuclear weapons because they feel that they can do what they want because the treaty is no longer valid. And so, in terms of the environment, I'm seeing that as the big picture. Thank you.

MR. MICHAELSON: Thank you. That exhausts the list of speaker cards that I have. I'd like to invite Colonel Bramlitt, if there's any closing remarks that you'd like to make. You've got to get close to the microphone though.

COLONEL BRAMLITT: First of all, I want to thank each and every one of you. I was sitting here and this is my second generation of these types of hearings and I want to thank Alaska and Fairbanks and the Fairbanks community for great comments. I appreciate your hospitality, I appreciate your time, I appreciate your comments. We will take these comments, they will be incorporated in the final EIS. And someone I believe made the comment, I hope the decision makers will consider these things. I do have that each and that's our goal. Thank you.

MR. MICHAELSON: With that we will adjourn for the evening. Thank you.
CERTIFICATE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

STATE OF ALASKA

I, Joyce A. Harris, Notary Public in and for the State of Alaska, and Reporter for R & R Court Reporters, do hereby certify:

That the foregoing Transcript of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization Public Hearing was taken before Joyce A. Harris, Court Reporter, on the 1st day of November 1999 commencing at the hour of 6:00 o’clock p.m. at the Carlson Community Activity Center, 2010 2nd Avenue, Fairbanks, Alaska.

That the Transcript was transcribed by myself to the best of my knowledge and ability.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my seal this 15th day of November, 1999.

Notary Public in and for Alaska
My Commission Expires: 09/02/03

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Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
OPEN PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD:

MR. MICHAELSON: My name is Sid Michaelson, I’m representing the -- well, I’m an Assembly Member on the Denali Borough and I live in the Clear area. Actually at mile 280 Parks Highway is the physical address. And I would just like to say a few words about the fact that I’ve worked here at Clear for 31 years now, long time. And over the years since I’ve been here, I’ve noticed that the number of contract personnel, the number of personnel being employed at the Clear Air Force Station has diminished over the years. In fact, now I’m working in an area where there use to be nine people, I’m doing -- I’m the only one there. So it’s been quite a drop in personnel here. And, it’s been evident by the depressed property values in our area and also the number of school kids we have now is much less than in the past. So we actually have some capacity to have new people come in. And, anyway right now we have a lot of construction going on with the upgrade of the dorms on the Base and also the new Clear Radar upgrade that’s going on. So we do have the capacity to have construction workers in our area, we’ve demonstrated that. And when this missile defense construction period starts, by then the Clear Radar upgrade will be over. The barracks upgrade will probably be over and so we will have plenty of room for missile defense construction. And also we would have plenty of room for contractor personnel concerned with operating and
maintaining the missile defense. And I was reading the EIS and
in there one of the points was made was the economic effect on
the communities and I didn’t really see this addressed in that
manner in the EIS. And I would just like to go on record that
our economy has diminished somewhat here due to the reduction
of personnel being employed at Clear. And that it would be
mighty nice to have a few more employed at Clear for the
missile defense. Also I’d like to note that we’ve been
involved with the military with the Air Force Defense
Department since 1959. I think it was, 1958-59 when the
construction started here at Clear. And I believe we’ve always
had a good relationship with the military and we’ve always
welcomed them here at Clear. So I would like to encourage the
powers that be, that they consider putting the missile defense
here. The missiles on the command post. Thank you.

PUBLIC HEARING:

MR. MICHAELSON: This is a public hearing on
the Draft Environmental Impact Statement, or EIS as it is
known, for the deployment of the National Missile Defense or
NMD system. I am Lewis Michaelson, and I will be the hearing
moderator for tonight’s meeting. This hearing is being held in
accordance with provisions of the National Environmental Policy
Act and implementing regulations. This act requires federal
agencies to analyze the potential environmental impacts of
proposed actions and alternatives, and to consider the findings

of those analyses in deciding how to proceed. The purpose of
tonight’s hearing is to receive your comments and suggestions
on the Draft EIS. Those of you who have not had an opportunity
to review the Draft EIS may want to read the summary of the
major findings in the handout available at the door. Those
findings will also be addressed by the panel members in their
presentations. Let’s look at the agenda for tonight.
Hopefully you all had the opportunity, and I noticed I think,
all of you did, to talk to the many knowledgeable experts and
program officials who were staffing the exhibits during the
past hour. After I finish this introduction, Colonel Larry
Bramlett will describe the proposed action for NMD deployment.
Colonel Bramlett is the assistant to the Program Manager for
the NMD Program and he is representing the NMD program office
tonight. Then, Mr. David Hasley will brief you on the
environmental impact analysis process and summarize the results
reported in the Draft EIS. Mr. Hasley is the program’s EIS
team leader for the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense
Command. The last item on the agenda, however, is really the
most important. The comment period is your opportunity to
provide information and make statements on the record. This
input ensures that the decision makers can benefit from your
knowledge of the local area and any adverse environmental
impacts that you think may result from the proposed action or
alternatives. Keep in mind that the EIS is intended to ensure
that future decision makers will be fully informed about the
environmental impacts associated with the various alternatives
before they decide on a course of action. Consequently,
comments tonight on issues unrelated to the EIS are beyond the
scope of this hearing. To comment verbally tonight, please
fill out a verbal comment card available at the registration
table and turn it in. After the presentations, we will take a
short recess to collect any remaining cards. Then I will start
calling on speakers in the following order: first I will
recognize elected officials and their representatives. And
then, I will call members of the public in the order the cards
are handed in. If you don’t feel comfortable standing up here
tonight and making a statement, you will have until November
15th of this year to submit a written statement for
consideration in the Final EIS. The address shown on the slide
is also in the handout and on the comment sheets you received
as you entered the hall. Keep in mind that written comments
are given the same consideration as verbal comments offered
here tonight. I want to make sure that all those who wish to
speak have a fair chance to be heard. As a part of that we
have a stenographer here, seated to my left, she is here to
make a verbatim record of everything that is said. The
verbatim record will then become a part of the Final EIS. We
will also be video taping the public hearing tonight to
document your input. To ensure that we get an accurate record

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Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
Communication System or IFICS Data Terminal would be ground stations that provide communication links between the in-flight Ground Based Interceptor and the Battle Management Command and Control. An IFICS site would consist of a radio transmitter/receiver and would require about one acre of land. Approximately 14 IFICS sites could be required for this program. At this time I would like to note that we are still developing the operational requirements for the IFICS. And as such, the specific locations where it could be deployed have not yet been determined. The regions under study include areas in Alaska and North Dakota. However, once we understand the operational more fully, other regions may be identified. The types of environmental impacts associated with this element, therefore are addressed in general terms rather than a site-specific manner in the Draft EIS. The X-Band Radar is a ground-based radar that is capable of long-range detection and tracking of incoming ballistic missiles. The X-Band Radar site would include the radar and its associated support facilities. At this time, it is anticipated that only one X-Band Radar in Alaska or North Dakota would be deployed with the initial NMD system. The United States has an existing early warning system that can detect incoming ballistic missiles. This system consists of early warning radars and satellites. The NMD program would make use of this system which is currently under the process of being upgraded by adding new satellites as well.

Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
be the continuation of activities currently occurring or
planned at these locations. Under the Proposed Action
alternative, NMD elements and element locations would be
selected from the range of locations studied in the EIS.
Potential deployment locations are being considered both in
Alaska and North Dakota. The North Dakota sites are those that
fall within the existing deployment area under the 1972 Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty. The Alaska sites fall within the
geographic areas that maximizes NMD system performance. This
slide shows the potential deployment locations in Alaska.
These sites include Clear Air Station, Fort Greely, and the
Forth Wainwright Yukon Training Area along with the Eielson Air
Force Base as potential deployment alternatives for the Ground-
Based Interceptor and Battle Management Command and Control.
The Kackakam Air Station in the western Aleutians is the only
potential location for the X-band radar in Alaska. This slide
shows the potential deployment locations under consideration in
North Dakota. These sites include Grand Forks Air Force Base
and the Missile Site Radar in Mokoma as potential deployment
alternatives for the Ground-Based Interceptor and the Battle
Management Command and Control facility. For the X-band Radar,
the deployment alternatives include Cavalier Air Station, the
Missile Radar Site, and Remote Sprint Launch Sites one, two and
four. The NMD program decision to be made is whether to deploy
an NMD system. A decision to deploy the system would include
the selection of deployment sites from among the alternative
locations considered in this EIS and previously discussed. The
program is scheduled for a deployment readiness review next
summer. We have conducted three successful flight tests which
have demonstrated the kill vehicle's ability to detect and
destroy an incoming warhead. During the next six months, two
system tests are scheduled to help assess the system's
technical maturity and design. A decision to deploy will be
based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to this
country, the technical readiness of the system for deployment,
its projected cost, area control objectives, and other factors,
including potential environmental impacts of deploying and
operating the system. The EIS will provide the U.S. Government
with the information necessary to properly account for the
environmental impacts. At this time, a deployment decision is
not anticipated before June of 2000. This concludes my part of
the presentation. I will now turn the meeting over to Mr. Dave
Hasley, who will discuss the environmental impact analysis
process and the potential environmental impacts that could
occur with the deployment of this system. Thank you.

MR. HASLEY: Thank you, Colonel Bramlitt. Good
evening, I am David Hasley from the U.S. Army Space and Missile
Defense Command, we're located in Huntsville, Alabama. Our
organization is preparing the environmental impact analysis
process on behalf of the Ballistic Missile Defense
Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)

Organization. Tonight I will present the schedule for this environmental impact analysis process, and show you, the public, its involvement. I will also discuss the scope of the study and present the results of the environmental analysis. The National Environmental Policy Act, or NEPA, requires that federal agencies consider the environmental consequences of their proposed actions in their decision-making process. The deployment of the NMD system is an action that falls under NEPA, and we have therefore prepared a Draft Environmental Impact Statement, or EIS, to analyze the potential environmental consequences of this action. NEPA also requires that the public be included in the decision-making process. Therefore, we held scoping meetings in December of last year to present to you the NMD Program and receive your input on the scope of issues to be addressed in this Draft EIS. In accordance with NEPA, your input helped guide us in the preparation of the Draft EIS. The Draft EIS was then made available on 1 October of this year for public and agency review and comment. This public hearing this evening is a formal meeting where we present to you, the results contained in the Draft EIS and, most importantly, receive your comments on the document. In addition to tonight's hearing, written comments on the Draft EIS will continue to be accepted at the address shown on this slide until November the 15th. After the comment period is over, we will consider all comments, both written and verbal.

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and perform additional analysis or revise the EIS where necessary. Again, as in the scoping process, equal consideration will be given to all comments, whether they are presented here tonight or mailed to us. Once the public review process is complete, we will prepare the Final EIS, which is scheduled for completion in May of next year. The Final EIS will include all comments received during this public review period and also, our response to these comments. The EIS will then serve as input for the Record of Decision, which will document the decision to be made. And as you just heard from Colonel Bramlett, consideration of issues besides those addressed in the EIS will enter into the final decision of whether to deploy the NMD system. Chapter four of the Draft EIS is where we describe the potential environmental impacts that may occur to the affected environment as a result of implementing the Proposed Action or alternatives as described earlier. The effects of each alternative are compared to the existing conditions at each location. Chapter four also includes suggested mitigation where potential impacts have been identified. Mitigation measures are methods for reducing or minimizing potential impacts. For the Draft EIS, the environment was analyzed in terms of 15 different resource areas as shown on this slide. Each resource area was addressed at each location unless it was determined that the proposed activities would not result in an environmental impact to that
Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
in the Aleutian Islands operated by the Air Force, construction
and operation at this site would not provide an economic
benefit to the surrounding area. At the North Dakota
Deployment alternatives it is expected that construction of the
X-Band Radar would take approximately three years to complete
and generate between $24 to $36 million in local expenditures
during that time. In addition, construction of the system
would employ approximately 125 personnel. After construction,
operation of the site would require approximately 105
personnel. And those operational personnel would generate
approximately $2.6 million in direct income per year. To
support the proposed X-Band Radar at Eareckson Air Station a
fiber optic cable line could be required along the Aleutian
Islands. Within our Draft EIS we studied a potential fiber
optic cable route from Whittier or Seward to Eareckson Air
Station. Our initial analysis has shown that most impacts
would be associated with biological resources and subsistence
uses. While there would be short term impacts to these
resources, once the cable is laid there should be no long term
impacts. Other NMD elements under development include the In-
Flight Interceptor Communications System data terminals, or
IFICS, the overland fiber optic cable required to connect the
NMD elements, and upgrades to existing Early Warning Radars
that are currently used in assisting in tracking incoming
ballistic missiles. Specific deployment locations for IFICS

have not yet been determined. However, it is not expected that
deployment of an IFICS data terminals would result in any
significant impacts to the environment. While existing
commercial fiber optic cable lines would be used where
possible, the NMD system would require installation of some new
fiber optic cable over land. Once the specific fiber optic
cable alignments are identified, appropriate site specific
environmental analysis will be conducted. For the Upgraded
Early Warning Radar, we just developed the initial proposed
hardware and software upgrades to these existing sites in
Massachusetts, Alaska and California. As a result, we are in
the process of preparing a supplement to our current Draft
Deployment EIS analyzing the potential effects of the proposed
upgrades. We will release this supplement in the affected
communities and hold public hearings to go over the results of
our analysis. This supplement along with the public comments
received at the hearings will be -- will then included in the
Final Deployment EIS. In closing, please keep in mind that the
study is in the draft stage. And our goal is to provide the
decision makers with accurate information on the environmental
consequences of this proposal. And to do so, we're here to ask
for your comments on the Draft EIS, which we're brought to you.
This information as well as other information will be used to
support the overall decision making process. I would like to
turn it back over to Mr. Michaelson for the continuation of the

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Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
MR. MICHAELSON: Before we proceed, may I remind you of a couple of points. Which are, please limit your comments to four minutes so that everyone can be heard. We use this at all of our meetings to give everyone a fair and equal chance to participate. And of course also if you would, please state your name clearly before you make your statement on the record. Please remember that no decision is being made tonight. The main purpose for the representatives from the government who are here tonight is to learn of your concerns and suggestions first hand. We will now begin the comment period. To indicate to you when your four minutes are up, I have a simple way of indicating times. When you have one minute left, I will put up an index finger like this, indicating -- giving you an opportunity to wrap up your comments comfortably. And if you are still going at four minutes, I will put my hand like this, indicating it is time to wrap up. And I will also read ahead so you'll know when your turn is coming up, so you can be ready to come up and we can do this as expeditiously as possible. In order the first names that I have, and I will apologize in advance for mispronouncing anyone's name or if I can't read your handwriting, I'll do my best. Bob Murray, Mayor Bob Knight, James R. Nicholls, and I believe this says Jean Murray, Milton -- it looks like Haken, Frank Hollis, and then Steven Denton. So first we'll have Bob Murray representing the Mayor of Anderson.

MR. MURRAY: Thank you.

MR. MICHAELSON: I'm sorry, I didn't make it clear, we're using the end. The way we're doing this is, you've got to come in on the other side. The purpose here is to make comments to the panel.

MR. MURRAY: Is it on?

MR. MICHAELSON: It's on. (Laughter) Thanks.

MR. MURRAY: Colonel Branlit, as a representative of the Mayor of our town, Richard Napoleon, he couldn't be here tonight and he wanted me to say to you and your team, thank you for coming. We're interested in the project. We've got a lot going for us. As a matter of fact, we just came out with a new flyer today on -- we've had a long history of working with the military. We've got the railroad, we've got interties, we've got fiber optics, we've got three power plants and we'd like to have you come.
brochure. Thank you and Richard couldn’t come and wanted to say he’s sorry, but we’re glad you’re here. P-T-056

MR. MICHAELSON: Thank you. Bob Knight.

MR. KNIGHT: I never speak for the -- all the people of Nome, but for the majority, I do. And if this brings jobs to the community, I’m for it and the people of Nome are for it. Thank you.

MR. MICHAELSON: Thanks very much. James Nichols.

MR. NICHOLLS: I’d like to pass my time on.

MR. MICHAELSON: Okay.

MR. NICHOLLS: During the presentation, my questions have been answered.

MR. MICHAELSON: Okay, thanks very much. Jean Murray.

MS. MURRAY: Thank you for this opportunity.

MR. MICHAELSON: Do you mind pulling that microphone down just a little bit? There you go, thanks.

MS. MURRAY: Thanks. This I think is very brief and it’s a picayune. And it’s a reaction to a newspaper report which appeared in the News Miner today. As I was reading it, I wanted to make sure that you understood that -- from the economic considerations where the comment was related to -- that this -- Delta really needed this because of the effect of the close down of Greely. And I wanted to remind you that they’re not the only ones who have been affected by military cut backs, military budgets, etc. The difference is that Delta’s occurred all at once by closing down the military base. Where as here it’s been a progressive thing over 10, 15 years of first federal cutbacks related to the budget and the contractor and this kind of thing. Changes in technology are going to influence how many people are here. So that it’s affected -- we’re most concerned because of the sociological impact as far as school is concerned, I suppose. And property values and that kind of thing. But in addition to the technology, there are also -- the union contract changed things in such a way that there are fewer people choosing to live here. And -- which is alright, people need to choose where they are, but we still are affected by all of these things. And it has no less impact on us as well as Nome because there are a lot of people who work at the base who also live in Nome. I just wanted to make sure you understood that so that we weren’t unequally considered from that angle. As far as economics are concerned.

MR. MICHAELSON: Thank you very much. Milton.

MR. HAKEN: Gentlemen, I want to thank you for coming and giving the opportunity to speak to you. My name is Milton Haken. I’m currently employed by the City of Nome as the Chief of Police. But more importantly, I’m the father of three sons, husband of one wife, and this was humor. And --
you know, we really support the concept of the missile sites coming to Alaska. It'll be good for our State. And further, I think talking with my boss, Mayor Knight and those around the area, we really support you bringing those missiles into Clear Air Station. And part of it is selfishly because we want the ability to have the social and economic impact that you guys demonstrated up on the screen. But also part of it is because we think it is also the best way to spend federal money. We have the infrastructure here in place to best support that site. The railroad's here, the highway out front, the Parks Highway, we have the fiber optics already laid in place. And we have a better highway system out front than the other sites have. I think we're also located strategically outside a major metropolitan area, so we have the safety of distance between us and the major metropolitan areas. I think the economic development for our area would be very good for the State of Alaska and for the military personnel who are stationed here. I've been here 16 months and I have enjoyed a great working relationship with the people out of Clear Air Station. The Security Forces as well as the Space Command people. We share resources. They come to our back yard to play and we go to their back yard to play. Literally and figuratively. With the hunting and fishing and the softball in the summers and the basketball in the winters. And we bring a family home atmosphere with our environment -- with our communities here.

MR. MICHAELSON: Thank you very much. The next speaker is Frank Hollis.

MR. HOLLIS: I just want to state that I'm very glad that you gentlemen did come out to listen to what we have to say in the community. I reviewed your Draft Environmental Impact Statements and I felt like there wasn't enough weight given to the fact that the railroad is available here at Clear. Also that the -- you talked about commercial power which is fine and good, but there's also the base power plant, which there again, it goes back to the infrastructure that I really feel that this area has got the infrastructure that is needed for this project and feel this would be the best way of spending the federal dollars for this area. And just for the nation in general. Thank you very much.

MR. MICHAELSON: Thank you, Steve Denton.

MR. DENTON: Good evening and thanks for the opportunity to comment tonight. I'm going to wear two hats for a moment. First as a resident of the Denali Borough and citizen of the United States. As a resident of the Denali Borough, obviously the socioeconomic impacts, the jobs, the
construction income and that kind of thing is very attractive. I cannot see anything in the proposal that would suggest to me that there is any significant risk of any environmental damage. Therefore I would conclude that the benefits far outweigh the risk and -- and wholly support the program. As a citizen of the United States, I think I'd be -- we should be truly honored and privileged to have this kind of facility in our area. Now the second hat that I want to wear is as Vice-President of Usibelli Coal Mine. And we have enjoyed a very long -- 50 years -- over 50 years partnership with the U.S. Military. And I think that in your deliberations about which site to pick you'll take -- I hope you'll take into consideration that we have a huge resource down there of energy that's certainly going to be needed for this site. I hope you'll give that positive consideration in your selection. Thank you.

MR. MICHAELSON: Thank you. That exhaust the list of speaker cards that were turned in. But we're here and we really do want to hear from you. If anyone else has been inspired to take a minute or two to share any thoughts that you have with us, please do now. This is your big chance. I saw somebody over there trying to get somebody else to speak, encouraging them. I see some elbows going, but if not Colonel, would you have something you'd like to say?

COLONEL BRAMLITT: I guess I'd like to end it on, once again thanks for the opportunity for us to come here.

We encourage and hope we got other comments that we will attach to these comments and be sure that they do get incorporated in the Final EIS. And I guess without further ado, thanks for your hospitality and who knows we may see you in the future.

MR. MICHAELSON: I want to remind you of course that for those of you who don't like public speaking, that's most people. There is another way to participate and that is by filling out and either handing in written comments tonight or sending -- mailing them in. And we encourage all of you to take advantage of that. With that, this meeting's adjourned.

Thank you very much.
CERTIFICATE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

STATE OF ALASKA

I, Joyce A. Harris, Notary Public in and for the State of Alaska, and Reporter for R & R Court Reporters, do hereby certify:

That the foregoing Transcript of Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, Public Hearing was taken before myself, on the 2nd day of November, 1999 commencing at the hour of 7:00 o'clock p.m. at the Anderson School, 116 West 1st Street, Anderson, Alaska.

That the Transcript was transcribed by myself to the best of my knowledge and ability.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my seal this 15th day of November, 1999

Notary Public in and for Alaska
My Commission Expires: 09/32/03

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Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
by the panel members seated here to my left, in their
presentations. Let's go ahead and look at the agenda for
tonight. Hopefully you all had an opportunity to talk to the
many knowledgeable experts and program officials who were
staffing the exhibits during the past hour. It looks to me
like most of you did take advantage of that. After I finish
this introduction, Colonel Larry Bramlitt will describe the
proposed action for NMD deployment. Colonel Bramlitt, is the
assistant to the Program Manager for the NMD Program and he is
representing the NMD program office tonight. Then, Mr. David
Hasley will brief you on the environmental impact analysis
process and summarize the results that are reported in the
Draft EIS. Mr. Hasley is the program's EIS team leader for the
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command. The last item on
the agenda is really the most important though. The comment
period is your opportunity to provide information and make
statements for the record. This input ensures that the
decision makers can benefit from your knowledge of the local
area and any adverse environmental effects you think may result
from the proposed action or alternatives. Keep in mind that
the EIS is intended to ensure that future decision makers will
be fully informed about the environmental impacts associated
with the various alternatives before they decide on a course of
action. Consequently, comments tonight on issues unrelated to
the EIS are beyond the scope of this hearing. To comment

Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
slowly into the microphone, starting with your name and any
organization you represent. Third, each person will be
recognized for four minutes. This time limit includes public
officials, organizational spokespersons, and the private
individuals. Fourth, please honor any requests that I make for
you to stop speaking if you reach the four-minute limit.
Please don’t speak when another person is speaking at the
podium. Kindly refrain from smoking. Those are all the dos
and don’ts. And before I introduce Colonel Bramlitt, I hear
some of you did not hear my initial announcement which is, if
you managed to make it in this room through another door or
without having an opportunity to sign in at the registration
table, please do so before you leave so we can get an accurate
record of who was here tonight. With that, it’s my pleasure to
introduce Colonel Bramlitt, who will describe the NMD program.
There is something that is making a lot of noise, it’s -- do
you know where that’s coming from? If there’s a way to turn
that down so the people can hear the presentation, I’d
appreciate it, thank you.

COLONEL BRAMLITT: Well, good afternoon, first
of all I’d like to thank each one of you for taking your time
to come here. Can you all hear me?

MR. MICHAELSON: You’ve got to get a lot closer
to that microphone.

COLONEL BRAMLITT: Can you hear me now?

MR. MICHAELSON: Not yet. Really close.

COLONEL BRAMLITT: Can you hear me now?

MR. MICHAELSON: Not yet, really close.

COLONEL BRAMLITT: Can you hear me now?

MR. MICHAELSON: There you go.

COLONEL BRAMLITT: If you all have trouble
hearing me or understanding my Boston accent, (general
laughter), just raise your hand. The NMD is bad on your
health. I didn’t need glasses until I started this program
(general laughter). But I should caveat that my age has
nothing to do with it, so excuse my glasses. My name is
Colonel Larry Bramlitt and I am from the Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization in Washington D.C. And it is good to be
cut of Washington D.C. and in Delta Junction. The BMDO is the
agency responsible for the development and deployment of the
NMD system. And in the following charts I will review the
threat that is driving the development of the system, provide
an overview of the program, and address the decision to be
made.

The National Missile Defense System is being developed to
protect the United States from ballistic missile attacks. The
events depicted on this chart drove a Congressional mandate to
deploy an NMD System as soon as technologically feasible. The
reason we need such a system is the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and long-range missile technology has
increased the threat to our national security. Our current
program guidance is to develop, demonstrate, and if directed,
deploy a system to defend the United States against a limited
ballistic missile attack. The NMD system would be a land-
based, non-nuclear missile defense system. The development and
testing effort is to be consistent with the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty, however deployment of this system may require
modifications to that treaty. The NMD system would consist of
the elements shown on this slide. They are the Ground-Based
Interceptor, which is the weapon of the system, the Battle
Management Command and Control, the central communication and
control point, the In-Flight Interceptor Communications System,
which transmits commands to the Ground-Based Interceptor while
it's in flight, the X-Band Radar, which tracks the incoming
missile, and finally, our existing early warning system of
radars and satellites. In simplified form, this is how the
system works, when a ballistic missile is launched, satellites
in space would detect that launch and provide warning. On the
ground, the existing warning radars and the X-Band Radar would
acquire and track the missile and provide its exact locations
to the Battle Management Command and Control. This information
gives the people controlling the system the ability to launch
the ground-based interceptor to destroy the incoming target
outside the Earth's atmosphere. I will now provide a little
more detail on each of the elements. The weapon of the system

Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
sites could be required for this program. At this time I would
like to note that we are still developing the operational
requirements for the IFICS. And as such, the specific
locations where it could be deployed have not yet been
determined. The regions under study include Alaska and North
Dakota. However, as the operational requirements are better
defined, other regions may be identified. Therefore, the types
of environmental impacts associated with this element, are
addressed in general terms rather than a site-specific manner
in the Draft EIS. The X-Band Radar is a ground-based radar
that is capable of long-range detection and tracking of
incoming ballistic missiles. The X-Band Radar site would
include the radar and its associated support facilities. At
this time, it is anticipated that only one X-Band Radar in
Alaska or North Dakota would be deployed with the initial NMD
system. The United States has an existing early warning system
that detects the incoming ballistic missiles. This system
consists of early warning radars and satellites. The NMD
program would make use of this system which is in the process
of being upgraded by adding new satellites in addition to new
software and hardware modification to the existing radars.
Upgrades to the early warning radars in the United States would
occur at Beale Air Force Base, California, Cape Cod Air
Station, Massachusetts, and Clear Air Station, Alaska.
Modifications to the radars would not increase the current

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power levels and will be addressed in a supplement to the NMD
Draft EIS. The new early warning detection satellites are part
of an Air Force upgrade to the existing system and would occur
regardless of whether NMD is deployed or not. Any deployment
of this system may require use of existing fiber-optic lines,
power lines, and other utilities. Some of these lines may
require modification. Furthermore, deployment of elements to
some locations may require the acquisition of new rights-of-way
and the installation of new utility and fiber optic cable.
Potential fiber optic cable routes include North Dakota, the
interior of Alaska, and an oceanic fiber optic cable along the
Aleutian Islands. At this time the exact alignment of the
fiber optic cable lines are under study and have not been
determined for each site. Therefore, this element is addressed
programmatically in the Draft EIS. For the EIS, two
alternatives were considered. The No-action Alternative and
the Proposed Action. For the No-action alternative, the
decision would be not to deploy in which case we would continue
to develop and test the system. For the potential sites being
considered for deployment, the No-action Alternative would be
the continuation of activities currently occurring or planned
or ongoing at those sites. Under the Proposed Action
alternative, NMD elements and element locations would be
selected from the range of locations studied in the EIS.
Potential deployment locations are considered both in Alaska

Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
and North Dakota. The North Dakota sites are those that fall within the existing deployment area under the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The Alaska sites fall within the geographic areas that maximizes NMD system performance. This slide shows the potential deployment locations in Alaska. These sites include Clear Air Station, Fort Greely, and the Fort Wainwright Yukon Training Area along with the Eielson Air Force Base as potential deployment alternatives for the Ground-Based Interceptor and Battle Management Command and Control. Eareckson Air Station in the western Aleutian Islands is the only potential location in Alaska considered for the X-Band radar. This slide shows the potential deployment locations under consideration in North Dakota. These sites include Grand Forks Air Force Base and the Missile Site Radar in Nokoma as potential deployment alternatives for the Ground-Based Interceptor and the Battle Management Command and Control facility. For the X-Band Radar, the deployment alternatives include Cavalier Air Station, the Missile Site Radar, and Remote Sprint Launch Sites one, two and four. The NMD program decision to be made is whether to deploy an NMD system. A decision to deploy the system would include the selection of deployment sites from among the alternative locations considered in this EIS and previously discussed. The program is scheduled for a deployment readiness review next summer. We have conducted three successful flight tests which have demonstrated the kill vehicle’s ability to detect and destroy an incoming warhead. During the next six months, two system tests are scheduled to help assess the system’s technical maturity and design. The decision to deploy will be based on the following. an analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, the technical readiness of the system for deployment, its projected cost, arms control objectives, and other factors, including potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the system. The EIS will provide the U.S. Government with the information necessary to properly account for the environmental impacts. At this time, a deployment decision is not anticipated before June of 2000. This concludes my part of the presentation. At this time I would like to turn the meeting over to Mr. Dave Hasley, who will discuss the environmental impact process and the potential environmental impacts that could occur with the deployment of this system. Thank you.

MR. MICHAELSON: Before Mr. Hasley starts, I just want to let you know there’s at least 30 empty chairs, probably more, so if those of you who are standing in the back really want to sit down, there’s a place for you.

MR. HASLEY: Thank you, Colonel Bramlett. I am David Hasley and I’m with the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, we’re located in Huntsville, Alabama. Our organization is conducting the environmental impact analysis

Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
process for deployment of NMD system on behalf the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. Tonight I would like to present the schedule for this environmental impact analysis process, and show how the public is involved in this process. I would also like to discuss the scope of the study and present the results of the environmental analysis. The National Environmental Policy Act, or NEPA as it's called, requires that federal agencies consider the environmental consequences of their proposed actions in their decision-making process. The deployment of the NMD system is an action that falls under NEPA, and therefore we have prepared a Draft Environmental Impact Statement, or EIS as it's known, to analyze the potential environmental consequences of this action. NEPA also requires that the public be included in this decision-making process. Therefore, we held scoping meetings back in December of last year to present to you the NMD Program and receive your input on the scope of issues to be addressed in this Draft EIS. In accordance with NEPA, your input helped guide us in the preparation of the Draft EIS. The Draft EIS was then made available to the public on 1 October of this year for public and agency review and comment. This public hearing tonight is a formal meeting where we present to you, the results contained in the Draft EIS and, most importantly, ask for your comments on the document. In addition to tonight's hearing, written comments on the Draft EIS will continue to be accepted at the address shown on this slide until the 15th of November. After the comment period is over, we will consider all comments received, both written as well as verbal, and perform additional analysis or revise the EIS where necessary. Again, as in the scoping process, equal consideration will be given to all comments, whether they are presented here tonight or mailed to us. Once the public review process is complete, we will prepare the Final EIS, which is scheduled for completion in May of next year. The Final EIS will include all comments received during this public review period as well as our response to those comments. The EIS will then serve as input for the Record of Decision, which will document the decision made. As you just heard from Colonel Bramlett, consideration of issues besides those addressed in the EIS will enter into the final decision on whether to deploy the NMD system. Chapter four of the Draft EIS is where we describe the potential environmental impacts that may occur to the affected environment as a result of implementing the Proposed Action or alternatives as described earlier. The effects of each alternative are compared to the existing conditions at each location. Chapter four also includes suggested mitigations where potential impacts have been identified. Mitigation measures are methods for reducing or minimizing potential impacts. For the Final EIS, the environment was analyzed in terms of 15 different resource areas as shown on this slide. Each resource area was...
addressed at each location unless it was determined that the proposed activities would not result in an environmental impact to that resource. To summarize the results of the Draft EIS, I will now provide an overview of the potential impacts that may result from the deployment of the NMD system. The Draft EIS evaluated the potential impacts during both the construction as and the operational phases of the NMD program. We identified several areas with the potential for impacts including airspace, wetlands, health and safety, and socioeconomic benefits at all sites from the NMD deployment activities. This slide shows the results of our analysis of the airspace and biological resource areas. Our analysis shows that there is a potential to impact certain aircraft with electronic avionics. However, deployment of the X-Band Radar would not require any restricted airspace around the radar site. Instead, a high energy radiation area notice will be published on the appropriate aeronautical charts. At sites shown in this slide, there is the potential to impact wetlands during the construction period. Standard construction techniques such as avoidance and soil stabilization would be used to reduce the potential impacts to all wetland areas. Consultation will be conducted with the appropriate regulatory agencies and appropriate permits will also be obtained prior to construction affecting any of the wetland areas. Under the Proposed Action, no adverse impacts would be expected to vegetation.

wildlife, or threatened or endangered species at any of the deployment locations. For health and safety resource area, first we analyzed the potential risk from electromagnetic radiation from the X-Band Radar on human health and safety. The results of our analysis has shown that exposure levels outside the boundary of the site would be below established public exposure guidelines. Second, publishing of the high energy radiation area notice on the appropriate aeronautical charts would inform pilots of the electromagnetic interference hazard to certain types of aircraft. Overall, no impacts to the public would occur due to electromagnetic radiation exposure. Potential beneficial socioeconomic impacts would occur to the region surrounding the Ground-Based Interceptor deployment alternatives during both the construction as well as operational phases. As shown on this slide, it is expected that construction would take approximately five years to complete and generate between $150 to $210 million in local expenditures during that time. In addition, construction of the system would employ between 250 to 323 personnel depending on the site selected. After construction, operation of the site would require between 250 to 360 personnel. And these operational personnel would generate approximately $7 to $10 million in direct income per year. As with the Ground-Based Interceptor site, it is expected that deployment of the X-Band Radar would also provide an economic benefit to the area around
the deployment site except for the Eareckson Air Station in Alaska. Since the Eareckson Air Station is a self contained island in the Aleutian Islands operated by the Air Force, construction and operation at this site would not provide the same economic benefit to the surrounding area. At the North Dakota Deployment alternatives it is expected that construction of the X-Band Radar would take approximately three years to complete and generate between approximately $24 to $36 million in local expenditures during that time. In addition, construction of the system would employ approximately 125 personnel. After construction, operation of the site would require approximately 105 personnel which would generate approximately $2.7 million in direct income per year. To support the proposed X-Band Radar at Eareckson Air Station a fiber optic cable line could be required along the Aleutian Islands. Within our Draft EIS we studied a potential fiber optic cable route from Whittier or Seward to the Eareckson Air Station. Our initial analysis has shown that most impacts would be associated with biological resources as well as subsistence issues. While there would be short term impacts to these resources, once the cable is laid there should be no long term impacts. Other NMD elements under development include the In-Flight Interceptor Communications System Data Terminals, or IFICS, the overland fiber optic cable required to connect the NMD elements, and upgrades to existing Early Warning Radars.
process for this program. I would like to now turn the meeting back over the Lewis Michaelson.

MR. MICHAELSON: Thank you very much for your attention to those presentations. We need just a couple of minutes to collect all of the speaker cards. If you haven't already filled one out and you've been inspired to do so, please go to the registration table. It's certainly not too late and then we also need to get the podium in place. We're going to take about a three minute recess while we get everything in place, so just sit tight, thanks.

(Off the record)

MR. MICHAELSON: Before we proceed, may I remind you of a couple of points. And one is, you may have noticed, you have to get really close to the microphone in order to be heard, so, please adjust it however you need to to make sure that everyone can hear your comments. Please limit those comments to four minutes so that everyone can be heard. Also, please state your name clearly before you make a statement for the record. Please remember that no decision is being made tonight. The main purpose for the government representatives being here tonight is to listen to your concerns and suggestions first hand. To begin the comment period I have a way of indicating times which will make it really easy for you. When you have one minute of your four...
1  MR. MICHAELSON: Thank you very much. P-T-062
2
3  MS. KEMP: I'm Susan Kemp and I'm a member of
4  the City Council and I too want to personally express my
5  appreciation for you coming here and to encourage you to pick
6  Delta Junction as the site of the Ballistic Missile Defense
7  System. We have had a long history of working with the
8  military and it's been a very successful history. We have had
9  many different types of testing and things go on here. I can't
10  imagine that anything that the Ballistic Missile System brings
11  is going to be any more environmentally impacting to our
12  community than some of the things we've already had here and
13  we're anxious to have you and we really appreciate you coming
14  and giving us this opportunity to speak. Thank you (Applause).
15  MR. MICHAELSON: Rick Johnson. P-T-063
16
17  MR. JOHNSON: Good evening, for the record, my
18  name is Rick Johnson and I'm a City Council Member and I'd like
19  to read a prepared statement. As an elected official I would
20  like to express our communities' gratitude for your
21  consideration of Fort Greely as a potential site for our
22  Nation's Ballistic Missile Defense System. Your visit to our
23  community is not by mistake. Your mission in seeking the best
24  possible site for the system is not without historical
25  precedence. Since the dawn of modern warfare, Alaska has
26  played a strategic role in the defense of the North American
27  Continent and it will forever continue to do so. The Fort

Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
have a railroad coming to Fort Greely. What I brought out to
the people at that time and I want to emphasize to you is that
the plans are there, I have seen the plans for the railroad to
come from Eielson Air Force Base to Fort Greely and to go from
there to the Border and connect up with the Canadians in their
portion of expanding the railroad and going all the way down to
the lower 48, the mid-west. We have a community who is
composed of people who have worked at Fort Greely for a long
time, but we also have many retired people who live in the Fort
Greely, Delta Junction area. They have stayed here because
it's a tremendous community. It's the only place I know that
you don't have to lock your doors at night and you can walk
away and leave your doors unlocked, you can go to the grocery
store and leave your car running. This is why I selected this
as the location for me to retire and raise my five boys. And I
assume you that it's a great place. And the people here will
be a great asset to helping to build and complete a Missile
Defense System. Thank you. (Applause)

MR. MICHAELSON: Claire Wingfield.

MS. WINGFIELD: Claire Wingfield. I'm president
of the Delta Chamber of Commerce. And I'd like to read a
resolution that we passed awhile back. It's resolution 98-10,
a resolution of support for the location of the Strategic
Missile Defense System at Fort Greely, Alaska. Whereas the
Delta Junction Chamber of Commerce is concerned with the

Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)

overall economic well being of the Delta area community and
whereas the Delta Chamber of Commerce wishes to assist with the
economic recovery and the development of the Delta area, such
recovery efforts being necessary as a result of the Bract
Realignment of Fort Greely and whereas Fort Greely is one of
three sites being considered to establish a Strategic Missile
Defense Base, and whereas the Strategic Missile Defense System
would be a major support to the economy of Delta Junction due
to the Bract Realignment of Fort Greely, therefore be it
resolved that the Delta Chamber of Commerce support the
Strategic Missile Defense Base at Fort Greely. Passed and
approved by a duly constituted quorum of the Delta Chamber of
Commerce Board of Directors, this 9th day of December, 1998.
So, the Delta Chamber of Commerce has been backing the plan for
the Missile Defense Site to be chosen here. And I do believe
that as business people we do see this as being part of an
economic base for Delta. Not the entire economic base, but
considerably a good part of it. Something that we do welcome.
Thank you. (Applause)

MR. MICHAELSON: Not good.

MR. GOOD: My name is Nat Good. I am a member of
the Delta City Council. I'll be very brief. The environmental
impact statement was sterile and very complete although it is
rather cumbersome and bulky. It is appreciated all the effort
that did go into it. Thanks to Bract, you certainly have

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every thing you need here. And if you think anything else is
lacking in Delta as a site, I would encourage you to call us
and we'll find it for you. (General laughter, applause).

MR. MICHAELSON: Mr. Good, I did not notice the
councilman on here. I'm sorry for not letting you go with the
first speakers. Mr. Durham.

MR. DURHAM: Hi, my name is David Durham. I am
the Branch Manager of National Bank of Alaska and the Treasurer
of the Big Valley Community Corporation. The Big Valley
Community Corporation was put together by a group of
individuals in this town to explore implementing an oil
refinery out at Fort Greely for re-use and we feel that this
would be a very good project to go along with the Ballistic
Missile Defense System as being a way of -- to be able to
provide a source of fuel for you as well as for the community
and other concerns. As the banker in town, I am concerned with
the economics. As the outlook, although I think our future is
bright, I do believe that the Ballistic Missile Defense System
would be the cherry on top for all that we have going on. This
community is very patriotic. We have been -- had a very good
mutual relationship with the Army here. We have, as the many
bases that I've grown up around, there is a unique situation
out here and I believe that each and every one of the citizens
of this community will fully support this project. Will
support having the ballistic missiles here and would help out
in anyway we could. And we thank you for being here. It's a
cold night and for those of you that haven't experienced any
below zero temperatures, welcome and we hope you come back.

MR. MICHAELSON: That exhausts the list of
speaker cards that I have. Many of the people here have come a
long way to listen to you and hear what you have to say, so if
there's anyone else who's been motivated or inspired to say
anything, we would please welcome you to taking this
opportunity before we adjourn. Anyone else who has anything
they'd like to say, please go ahead and approach the podium.

Great, just give us your name and then if you could fill out
one of our cards before you leave, I'd appreciate it, thanks.

MR. KNOCK: Paul Knock with the Delta.

Community Corporation and we'd like to thank you for coming and
keeping us as informed as you have through the meetings that
you've provided for us. After much discussion in our board
meetings, we expressed unanimous support through resolution to
invite the NMD to our community and provide economic stability
to our area. We feel it would be a very good location for the
system.

MR. MICHAELSON: Thank you very much.

MR. SAYLER: My name is Pat Sayler. I'm from

MR. MICHAELSON: Could you speak up just a
little bit so we can hear you? Thanks.

MR. SAYLER: My name is Pat Sayler from Healy
Lake, the nearest Village to Delta, here. We do most of our
shopping and all that kind of thing here. What we're concerned
about is you're going to have 300 extra personnel here and
that's going to create hunting pressure on the local area.
Because as soon as hunting season comes around, these guys are
going to be wherever they can get a truck, plane, boat. That's
going to make things harder for us because we don't get cheaper
gas, cheaper food, and so on like you guys would on Base. You
know, we pay it exactly as everybody else up here does -- you
know. And I'm not knocking -- I think it would be good for
the economy here, if some of our people in the Village qualify
to get some of the jobs here, great. But we -- our resources,
especially our moose, caribou and ducks, we need those to carry
us through the winter and so forth. It's -- it means something
for the future of our Village and that's my concern and we'll
follow up with the written comments from our Village. I'm for
it, in general but that's the concern we have from our
community. Thank you.

MR. MICHAELSON: Thank you very much.

MR. NISSEN: I'm Dwight Nissen, I'm the

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representative for the Golden Valley Electric Association out
in Fairbanks, for the District. For this District here, and I
know last night -- Monday night, in Fairbanks, Golden Valley
presented their side of the views down there. Mike Kelly
called me, the manager and said that they were there. And I
just want to reinforce it, that Golden Valley is up on speed on
this here and we are in the fiber optic with the Alaska Connect
thing and we do have the power and we are willing to work with
you. And we appreciate you coming here tonight and thank you
very much.

MR. MICHAELSON: Thank you. (Applause) Anyone
else? Just hand in the card when you're done.  P-T-072

MR. FREEMAN: Long ways up. I'm Matt Freeman,
I'm representing the FAA, Air Force Division and I'm looking at
the proposal as far as airport and development. And I know
we've discussed in the past that certainly an interest in
opening up Allen Army Air Field as a public use airport. The
airport the community has right now does not meet the design
standards for the aircraft that are using it right now. I
believe it doesn't -- also does not meet the needs of the
community. And I'm hoping that the -- in the long run whether
the missiles are deployed here, when they're carried here by
aircraft or trucked down, that the -- Allen Army Air Field is
opened to the public so that they can provide safer aviation
facilities to the community and also for the workers and the

people that are maintaining the Missile Defense System. And I
welcome you to Delta Junction.

MR. MICHAELSON: Thank you. (Applause) P-T-073

MS. GARDINO: Hello, my name is Donna Gardino
and I'd like to thank you for keeping us informed. I believe
that an NMD program is very compatible with Delta's future.
There are many mutual benefits to be realized by deploying a
program here. Shared use of the airfield as Matt just
mentioned, utilities and quality of life infrastructure that we
could share. It would benefit both the community and the NMD
program. And I believe overall the program would be one that
would be mutually beneficial to both the military and the
community. Thanks for coming to our party.

MR. MICHAELSON: Thank you. (Applause) Anyone
else care to make comments tonight? Colonel Bramlitt, do you
have some comments?

COLONEL BRAMLITT: I'd like to close by
thanking you for inviting us to the party. It is impressive
that this many people would come out on such a cold night just
to talk to us. We appreciate your comments and we'll see you
later.

MR. MICHAELSON: Before we adjourn, again, if
you did speak and I didn't get a card from you, if I could
please get one before you leave, I'd appreciate it. On that,
we thank you very much for coming and we are adjourned.
PUBLIC HEARING
FOR THE DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR
DEPLOYMENT OF A NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM
Held by The National Missile Defense Joint
Program Office of the Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization at the WestCoast International Inn
3333 West International Airport Road
Anchorage, Alaska
November 4, 1999
6:00 P.M. - 9:00 P.M.

Panel Members:
Lewis Michaelson, Hearing Moderator
Colonel Larry Bramlett
David Hasley

Court Reporter
Gail Ruth Peckham, RPR
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Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
addressed by panel members in their presentations.

(Slide # 2 - Hearing Agenda)

HEARING MODERATOR: Let’s look at the agenda for tonight. Hopefully you all had the opportunity to talk to the many knowledgeable experts and program officials who were staffing the exhibits during the past hour.

After I finish this introduction, Colonel Larry Bramlett will describe the proposed action for NMD deployment. Colonel Bramlett is the assistant to the Program Manager for the NMD Program and he is representing the NMD program office.

Next, Mr. David Hasley will brief you on the environmental impact analysis process and summarize the results reported in the Draft EIS.

Mr. Hasley is the program’s EIS team leader for the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command.

The last item on the agenda, though, is really the most important. This comment period is your opportunity to provide information and make statements for the record. This input ensures that the decision makers can benefit from your knowledge of the local area and any adverse environmental effects you think may result from the proposed action or alternatives.

Keep in mind that the EIS is intended to ensure that future decision makers will be fully informed about the environmental impacts associated with the various alternatives before they decide on a course of action. Consequently, comments tonight on issues unrelated to the EIS are beyond the scope of this hearing.

To comment verbally tonight, please fill out a verbal comment card available at the registration table and turn it in. After the presentations, we will take a short recess to collect any remaining cards and then I’ll start calling on speakers in the following order: I will recognize elected officials first, and then I will call on members of the public in the order in which cards were handed in.

(Slide # 3 - Address)

HEARING MODERATOR: If you don’t feel comfortable standing up here tonight and making a statement, you have until November 15th of this year to submit a written statement for consideration in the Final EIS. The address shown on the slide is also in the handout and on the comment sheets you received as you entered the hall next door. Keep in mind that written comments are given the same
Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
for the development and deployment of this system.

I want to take this opportunity to express
my appreciation for your showing up tonight.

This is our fourth stop in Alaska this
week, where we have been warmly received. We have
gotten comments of support as well as comments of
concern, and that's the reason we went on this trip
in the first place.

So thank you for showing up tonight.

I would like to use tonight as an
opportunity to tell you about the threat that's
driving the development of this system, provide a
quick overview of the program, and address the
decision to be made.

(Slide # 5 - The New Strategic Environment)

COLONEL BRAMLITT: The National Missile
Defense System is being developed to protect the
United States from ballistic missile attacks. The
events depicted on this chart drove a congressional
mandate for a deployment of a viable National Missile
Defense System as soon as technologically feasible.
The reason we need such a system is that the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
long-range missile technology has increased the
threat to our national security. Our current program

...
and provide warning. On the ground, the existing early warning radars and the X-Band Radar acquires and tracks the target and provides its specific location to the Battle Management Command and Control. This information gives the people controlling the system the ability to launch the Ground-Based Interceptor to destroy the incoming target outside the earth's atmosphere.

I will provide some more detail of these elements.

(Slide # 8 - Ground-Based Interceptor)

COLONEL BRAMLITT: The weapon of the system is the Ground-Based Interceptor, which would remain in an underground silo until launched.

It is important to note that launches from these sites would occur only in defense of the United States. There would be no flight testing of these missiles from the deploy sites.

The Ground-Based Interceptor is a long-range, high-velocity missile consisting of three solid propellant boosters and a kill vehicle. The kill vehicle is the payload. When the Ground-Based Interceptor is launched, it sends the kill vehicle into outer space, where it will find, maneuver and collide with the incoming target.

(Slide # 10 - In-Flight Interceptor Communications System)

COLONEL BRAMLITT: The In-Flight Interceptor Communication System, or IFICS, Data Terminal would be ground stations to provide communication links between the In-Flight Ground-Based Interceptor and the Battle Management Command and Control. An IFICS site would consist of a radio transmitter/receiver and would require about one acre of land. Approximately 14 IFICS sites could be required for this program.

At this time I would like to note that

Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
we’re still developing the operational requirements for IFICS. As such, specific locations where they could be deployed have not yet been determined. The regions under study include both Alaska and North Dakota. However, as the operational requirements are refined, additional regions could be identified. Therefore, the types of environmental impacts associated with this element are addressed in general terms rather than site-specific within the EIS.

(Slide # 11 - X-Band Radar)

COLONEL BRAMLIT: The X-Band Radar is a Ground-Based Radar capable of long-range detection and tracking of incoming ballistic missiles. The X-Band Radar site would consist of the radar and its associated support facilities. At this time it is anticipated that only one X-Band Radar in Alaska or North Dakota would be deployed with the initial system.

(Slide # 12 - Early Warning System)

COLONEL BRAMLIT: The United States already has existing early warning systems that consist of early warning radars and satellites. The NMD program would make use of this system, which is in the process of being upgraded by adding new satellites and modifying the software and hardware of the existing early warning radars. Upgrades to the early warning radars in the United States would occur at Beale Air Force Base, California, Cape Cod Air Station, Massachusetts, and Clear Air Station, Alaska. These modifications would not increase the power levels -- or the current power levels of these radars. They will be addressed in the supplement to the NMD Draft EIS. The new early warning detection satellites are part of the Air Force upgrades of the existing system and would occur whether the NMD was deployed or not.

(Slide # 13 - Fiber Optic Cable)

COLONEL BRAMLIT: Any deployment of this system may require the use of existing fiber optic lines, power lines, and other utilities. Some of these lines may require modification. Furthermore, deployment of the elements to some locations may require acquisition of new rights-of-way and new utility and fiber optic cable. Potential new fiber optic cable routes include North Dakota, the interior of Alaska, and an oceanic fiber optic cable along the Aleutian Islands. At this time the exact alignment of the fiber optic cable has not been identified for every site. Therefore, the element is addressed
programmatically in the Draft EIS.

(Slide # 14 - NMD Alternatives)

COLONEL BRAMLITT: For this EIS, two alternatives were considered: The No-action Alternative and the Proposed Action.

For the No-action Alternative, the decision would be not to deploy the system, in which case we would continue to develop and test the system. For the potential sites being considered for NMD deployment, the No-action Alternative would be a continuation of planned activities.

Under the Proposed Action Alternative, the NMD elements and their locations would be selected from the range of locations studied in the EIS.

Potential deployment locations are considered in both Alaska and North Dakota. The North Dakota sites are those which fall within the existing deployment area of the 1972 Ballistic Missile Treaty. The Alaska sites fall within the geographic areas that maximizes NMD systems performance.

(Slide # 15 - Alaska Deployment Locations)

COLONEL BRAMLITT: This slide shows the potential deployment locations in Alaska. For the Ground-Based Interceptor and the Battle Management Command and Control facility, potential sites include Clear Air Station, Fort Greely, and the

Fort Wainwright Yakon Training Area along with Eielson Air Force Base. Eareckson Air Station in the Western Aleutians is the only potential location for an X-Band Radar in Alaska.

(Slide # 16 - North Dakota Deployment Locations)

COLONEL BRAMLITT: This slide shows the potential deployment locations under consideration in North Dakota. These sites include Grand Forks Air Force Base and the Missile Site Radar in Weyona as potential deployment alternatives for the Ground-Based Interceptor and the Battle Management Command and Control.

For the X-Band Radar, the deployment alternatives include Cavalier Air Station, the Missile Radar Site, and Remote Sprint Launch Sites 1, 2 and 4.

(Slide # 17 - Decision to be Made)

COLONEL BRAMLITT: The decision to be made is whether to deploy. A decision to deploy would include the selection of the deployment sites from among the alternative locations considered in the EIS.

The program is scheduled for a deployment

Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
readiness review next summer. We have conducted
three successful flight tests which have demonstrated
the kill vehicle's ability to detect and destroy an
incoming warhead. During the next six months two
system tests are scheduled to help assess the
system's technical maturity and design.

A decision to deploy would be based on the
assessment of the ballistic missile threat to the
United States, the technical readiness of this system
for deployment, the projected cost, arms control
objectives, and other factors, including potential
environmental impacts of deploying and operating this
system. At this time, a deployment decision is not
anticipated before June of 2000.

This concludes my part of the presentation
I will now turn the meeting over to Dave Hasley, who
will discuss the environmental impact analysis
process and the potential environmental impacts that
could occur should the NMD be deployed.

Thank you.

(Slide # 18 - Environmental Impact Analysis Process)

MR. HASLEY: Thank you, Colonel Bramlitt.
Good evening. Thank you for coming. I'm
David Hasley. I'm with the U.S. Army Space and
Missile Defense Command. We are located in

Huntsville, Alabama, and our organization is
conducting the environmental impact analysis process
for deployment of this NMD system. We are doing this
on behalf of the Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization.

Tonight I will present to you the schedule
for the environmental impact analysis process, and
show you, the public, could be involved. I'll
also discuss the scope of the study and present the
results of the environmental analysis.

(Slide # 19 - Environmental Impact Analysis Process)

MR. HASLEY: The National Environmental
Policy Act, or NEPA, as it's called, requires that
federal agencies consider the environmental
consequences of their proposed actions in their
decision making process. The deployment of the NMD
system is an action that falls under NEPA, and we
have therefore prepared a Draft EIS, or EIS, as it's
called, to analyze the potential environmental
consequences of this action.

NEPA also requires that the public be
included in the decision-making process. Therefore,
we held scoping meetings back in December of last
year to present to you the NMD program and receive
your input on the scope of issues to be addressed in
Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)

the EIS. In accordance with NEPA, your input helped
guide us in the preparation of our Draft EIS. The
Draft EIS was then made available for your review on
1 October of this year, for your review and comment.
This public hearing this evening is a
formal meeting where we present to you the results
contained in the Draft EIS and, most importantly, ask
for your comments on the document.
(Slide # 20 - Public Comment Period and Address)

MR. HASLEY: In addition to tonight's
hearing, written comments on the Draft EIS will
continue to be accepted at the address shown on this
slide until November the 15th. After the comment
period is over, we will consider all comments, both
written and verbal, and perform additional analysis
or revise the EIS where necessary. Again, as in the
scoping process, equal consideration will be given to
all comments, whether they are presented here tonight
or mailed to us.
(Slide # 21 - FEIS)

MR. HASLEY: Once the public review process
is complete, we will prepare the Final EIS, which is
scheduled for completion in May of next year. The
Final EIS will include all comments received during
this public review period as well as our responses to
those comments.

The EIS will serve as the record -- as
input for the Record of Decision, which will document
the decision made. And as you've just heard from
Colonel Bramlett, consideration of issues, besides
those addressed in the EIS, will enter into the final
decision on whether to deploy this NMD system.
(Slide # 22 - Environmental Consequences)

MR. HASLEY: Chapter 4 of the Draft EIS is
where we describe the potential environmental impacts
that may occur to the affected environment as a
result of implementing the Proposed Action or
alternatives as described earlier. The effects of
each alternative are compared to the existing
conditions at each location. Chapter 4 also includes
suggested mitigations where potential impacts have
been identified. Mitigation measures are methods for
reducing or minimizing potential impacts.
(Slide # 23 - Environmental Areas Considered)

MR. HASLEY: For the Draft EIS, we analyzed
the environment in terms of 15 different resource
areas. Each resource area was addressed at each
location unless it was determined through initial
analysis that the proposed activities would not
result in an environmental impact to that resource.
To summarize the results of the Draft EIS, I will now provide an overview of potential impacts that may result from the deployment of the NMD system.

(Slide # 24 - Potentially Impacted Environmental Areas)
MR. HASLEY: The Draft EIS evaluated potential impacts during both the construction as well as operational phases of the program. We identified several areas with a potential for impacts including airspace, wetlands, health and safety, and socioeconomic benefits at all the sites from NMD activities.

(Slide # 25 - Draft EIS Focus Areas)
MR. HASLEY: This slide shows the results of our analysis of the airspace and biological resource areas. Our analysis shows that there is the potential to impact certain aircraft with electronic avionics. However, deployment of the X-Band Radar would not require any restricted airspace around the radar. Instead, a high energy radiation area notice would be published on the appropriate aeronautical charts.

At sites shown in this slide there is the potential to impact wetlands during the construction period. However, standard construction techniques such as avoidance and soil stabilization would be used to reduce the potential impacts to all wetland areas. Consultation will also be conducted with regulatory agencies and appropriate permits will be obtained prior to construction affecting any of the wetlands.

Under the Proposed Action, no adverse impacts would be expected to vegetation, wildlife, or threatened or endangered species at any of the deployment alternatives.

(Slide # 26 - Draft EIS Focus Areas, Continued)
MR. HASLEY: For the health and safety resource area: First, we analyzed the potential risks from electromagnetic radiation from the X-Band Radar on human health and safety. The results of our analysis have shown that exposure levels outside the boundary of the site would be below established public exposure guidelines.

Second, publishing of the high energy radiation area notice on the appropriate aeronautical charts would inform pilots of the electromagnetic interference hazard to certain types of aircraft.

Overall, no impacts to the public would occur due to electromagnetic radiation exposure.
MR. GUEST: Potential beneficial socioeconomic impacts would occur to the region surrounding the Ground-Based Interceptor deployment alternatives during both the construction as well as operational phases of deployment.

As shown on this slide, it is expected that construction would take approximately five years to complete and generate between 150 to 310 million dollars in local expenditures during that time. In addition, construction of the system would employ between 250 and 325 personnel depending on the site selected.

After construction, operation of the site would require between 250 to 360 personnel, and these personnel would generate approximately 7 to 10 million dollars in direct income per year.

MR. GUEST: As with the Ground-Based Interceptor site, it is expected that deployment of the X-Band Radar would also provide an economic benefit to the area around the deployment site except with the Eareckson Air Station in Alaska. Since Eareckson Air Station is a self-contained island in the Aleutian Islands, construction and operation at this site would not provide the same economic benefit to the surrounding area.

At the North Dakota deployment alternatives, it is expected that the construction of the X-Band Radar would take approximately three years to complete and generate there between 24 and 36 million dollars in local expenditures during that time. In addition, construction of the system would employ approximately 125 personnel and, after construction, operation of the site would require approximately 105 personnel generating approximately 2.7 million dollars in direct income per year.

MR. GUEST: To support the proposed X-Band Radar at Eareckson Air Station a fiber optic cable would be required along the Aleutian Islands. Within our Draft EIS we studied a potential fiber optic cable route from Whittier or Seward to the Eareckson Air Station. Our initial analysis has shown that most impacts would be associated with the biological resources and subsistence uses. While there would be short-term impacts to these resources, once the cable was laid, there would be no long-term impacts.
MR. HASLEY: Other NMD elements under development include the In-Flight Communications System Data Terminals, or IFICS, the overland fiber optic cable required to connect the NMD elements, and upgrades to the existing Early Warning Radars currently used in tracking incoming ballistic missiles.

Specific deployment locations for the IFICS has not yet been determined. However, it is not expected that deployment of the IFICS Data Terminals would result in any significant impacts to the environment. While the existing -- while existing fiber optic cable lines would be used where possible, the NMD system would require installation of some new fiber optic cable over land. Once the specific fiber optic cable alignments are identified, the appropriate site-specific environmental analysis will be conducted.

For the upgraded Early Warning Radar, we have just developed the initial proposed hardware and software upgrades to these existing sites in Massachusetts, Alaska, and California. As a result, we are in the process of preparing a supplement to our Draft Deployment EIS analyzing the potential effects of these proposed upgrades. We will release the supplement in the affected communities and hold public hearings to go over the results of our analysis. The supplement along with the public comments received at the hearings will be included in the Final Deployment EIS.

In closing, I would like you to please keep in mind that the study is in the draft stage. Our goal here is to provide the decision makers with accurate information on the environmental consequences of this proposal. To do this, tonight, we're asking for your comments on the Draft EIS, and for you to know that this information will be used in the overall decision-making process for deployment of the NMD system.

I would like to thank everyone for coming out tonight and appreciate the attendance we have and hope to get some comments from you on the draft document.

At this time I will turn it back over to Mr. Michaelson.

HEARING MODERATOR: Yes. Thank you very much for your kind attention.

It's going to take us about three minutes to re-orient the podium and collect all of the remaining speaker cards.
If you have not already signed up to speak and would like to, you can go back to the registration table and fill one out. So we will take about a five-minute recess to set everything up. Thank you.

[A recess was taken.]

HEARING MODERATOR: We are ready to start as soon as the room is quiet. Thank you all, again, for being here. This is an opportunity for you to exercise a democracy here tonight. And a lot of people are very afraid of speaking in public. I don’t know how much more intimidating we could make it tonight with all of the cameras and microphones. So more power to you if you come up here and speak tonight. And we really encourage you to do that. This is what it’s all about.

I do want to remind you, however, that written comments are given the same consideration as oral comments. So, if you are of the ilk that you would rather have root canal surgery than come up in front of a group like this, then that’s just fine. Please submit those written comments to us.

Let me remind you of a couple of points, particularly because I know some of you weren’t here during my introduction and overview of our ground rules.

Please limit your comments to four minutes so that everyone can be heard. Please state your name clearly before you make a statement for the record. Speak clearly into the microphone. There’s more than one of them. It’s the big one. That’s the one we really need you to speak into clearly to make sure we can hear you over the PA system.

Please remember also that no decision is being made tonight. The main purpose for the government representatives being here is to learn of your concerns and suggestions firsthand.

We will now begin the comment period. To indicate when your four minutes is up, I have a very simple way of indicating times. When you have one minute left, I’ll put up an index finger like this. That should give you a comfortable place to wrap up your comments by. And, if after four minutes you’re still going, I’ll put my closed hand like this indicating it’s time to finish your comments.

And now I’m going to announce the first five speakers in order. As we mentioned before

Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
selected officials are accorded the honor of going first.

So in order we will have Senator Robin Taylor, Senator Loren Leman, Gordon Glaser, Pamela Miller, and Karen Button.

And if you would just be aware of that order so that you're ready to come up to the microphone as soon as possible, we'll do this as expeditiously as we can.

With that, Senator Robin Taylor.

SENATOR ROBIN TAYLOR: Lewis, thank you very much.

HEARING MODERATOR: Could you get that big mike close to you so we make sure we can hear you.

SENATOR ROBIN TAYLOR: (Adjusting microphone.)

HEARING MODERATOR: That's the one. Thank you.

SENATOR ROBIN TAYLOR: Thank you very much.

And it's an honor and privilege for me to be here this evening and to have an opportunity to give a few comments to you.

Let me first start off by saying that it's about four years - three and a half years - ago now that I wascontacted by people who were concerned about what our nuclear defense policy was and what coverage in fact Alaska had.

I'm the current Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee. I represent the most southerly district in the state, Senate District A, beginning at the Canadian border and coming up to Sitka, Alaska.

The reason I'm standing before you is that in that legislative session, as Judiciary Chairman, I introduced a resolution entitled "Senate Joint Resolution No. 30" which called upon the federal government to defend Alaska, and in the process, to defend the other 48 states - 49, I should say - also.

I didn't realize at the time how historic of a document that would turn out to be. It was supported unanimously by all Democrats and all Republicans in the House and in the Senate, was transmitted, and shortly thereafter, the Heritage Foundation - a wonderful gentleman by the name of Baker Spring - wrote up a very nice article on it and a background on it.

But the historic aspect is that that was the first time, in the history of the United States of America, that a state has called upon its federal government to defend it.
That’s how strongly I believe that we in Alaska feel about this subject. We are the only state in the nation to have ever been invaded and occupied by a foreign power; and as a consequence, I think we’re probably more sensitized and more concerned and — I can assure you of this — more supportive of our military than probably any other state in the union.

And as a consequence, on behalf of the entire State Senate and House, at least for this one resolution, we were united on that subject, and would only ask, again, that with all dispatch such actions as are necessary be taken to make certain that we have the finest defense system that we can have and that that system is developed and oriented and placed in the State of Alaska.

Geographically, on this globe there is no better place to put it, and I think we have more than abundant facilities and opportunities for you to do that.

I’m interested — I was interested that the two places you are currently examining — I would support either of those, of course, but I also want to indicate to you that I feel that there’s adequate facilities available today, at no cost to the federal government, right at Fort Rich.

You could have hangars; you could have a wonderful airfield. You’ve got all kinds of opportunities there. And if we’re in fact really looking at the true cost of this system, you might want to consider that as another alternative.

With that I conclude my comments. I want to thank you very much for giving me this privilege, and I’m honored that you are here this evening and I appreciate that you’re taking Alaskans’ input because I think that’s very important.

Thank you.

HEARING MODERATOR: Thank you.

And for your benefit and everyone else’s, if you have an extra copy of your written comments and can spare them for the stenographer, she would appreciate that.

HEARING MODERATOR: Senator Loren Leman.

(No response.)

HEARING MODERATOR: Oh, I’m sorry. I thought he had arrived.

He plans to be here, I understand, as soon as he can be. He’s at another meeting.

HEARING MODERATOR: Gordon Glaser.

(Videographer approaches head table.)
HEARING MODERATOR: I thought you were 
Gordon Glaser. We're 0 for 2 now.
Okay. Maybe Gordon decided he wasn't going
to speak tonight. I hope that's not the case.
But the next would be Pamela Miller. P-T-075
PAMELA MILLER: Good evening, and thank you
for hearing what we have to say this evening.
I represent  
HEARING MODERATOR: Could you pull that a
little --
PAMELA MILLER: (Adjusting microphone.)
HEARING MODERATOR: Yeah, it's still
difficult to hear you. Can you pull that a little
closer to you?
PAMELA MILLER: (Adjusting microphone.)
HEARING MODERATOR: There we go. Thank
you.
PAMELA MILLER: I represent Alaska
Community Action on Toxics, a program of the Alaska
Conservation Foundation. And the mission of Alaska
Community Action on Toxics is to protect human health
and the environment from the toxic affects of
contaminants.
We are dedicated to achieving environmental
justice through collaborative work with affected
Alaska Community Action on Toxics is
opposed to the proposed National Missile Defense
Deployment in Alaska, or North Dakota, on the basis
that it will be ineffective in achieving its purpose
and entirely too costly.
Alaska has been used as a testing ground
for the military's biological, chemical, nuclear, and
conventional weapons as well as distant early warning
systems and other tracking technologies. Much of the
testing and deployment have resulted in severe
contamination problems.
As the technologies become obsolete, the
Department of Defense has left its debris and
contamination without accountability or any response
to Alaska's people and environment. We are thus very
skeptical that the proposed missile defense system,

Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
if deployed in Alaska, would be any different.

All components of this system have not been
adequately tested, and we feel that this process is
premature, at best.

The U.S. Department of Defense has regarded
Alaska as a prime strategic location for its military
operations from World War II through the Cold War and
into present times.

Military installations in Alaska are some
of the largest and most polluted in this country.
And I would remind Mr. Robin Taylor that Fort
Richardson is one of the five military super fund
sites in Alaska.

More than 640 military installations, both
active and abandoned, are polluting the land, ground
water, wetlands, streams, and air, with extensive
fuel spills, pesticides, solvents, PCBs, dioxins,
munitions, chemical weapons, and radioactive
materials.

The military has always been a powerful and
influential presence in Alaska, but much of the
information concerning the nature, location, and
extent of the military's contaminated sites remains
shrouded in secrecy.

Important documents are frequently
misplaced, or classified, and the public does not
have access to this information.

The Department of Defense should not be
allowed to expand its operations in Alaska without
first responsibly and effectively remediating the
massive pollution problems it has already created and
continues to create.

And I would remind also that -- this
group -- that the weapons testing ranges in Alaska
encompass an area the size of the State of Kansas.

The EIS must provide full presentation and
analysis, which it did not do in the Draft
Environmental Impact Statement, of peer reviewed
scientific and medical literature concerning the
potential affects associated with electromagnetic
radiation.

Since I only have limited time, I want to
say something about the international implications of
this.

This missile defense system deployment
would violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and,
I think, create a very serious problem of instability
within the international community.

This most untimely and provocative
announcement will have a serious negative impact. It
already has, I believe, on U.S. security by further
delaying, or even killing, prospects for ratification
of START II.

This would delay further reductions in the
remaining Russian nuclear arsenal, which is, after
all, the only existing threat to the survival of the
United States, as likely as such a conflict now
appears.

And finally, I just want to conclude by
saying that the U.S. Senate failure to ratify the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and this deployment of
the National Missile Defense System --

HEARING MODERATOR: Miss Miller, I really
need you to wrap up.

I assume that's a written comment that's
all down there that can be turned in?
PAMELA MILLER: Yes.
-- will promote international mistrust,
misunderstanding, and take us a long way from nuclear
disarmament.

Thank you.

HEARING MODERATOR: Thank you very much.

The next speakers will be Karen Button, Don
Whitmore, Mike O'Callaghan and Ron Schmidt.

Karen Button.

KAREN BUTTON: Good evening. My name is
Karen Button. I'm a lifelong Alaskan and I'm
speaking here on behalf of myself.

And also, as with the previous speaker,
unlike Senator Robin Taylor, I feel that because of
Alaska's geographic location we definitely do not
need this ballistic missile site. I'm deeply
disturbed by this defense proposal because of the
position of Alaska.

I have three main points that I want to
make at this time, and I'm going to provide written
comments later.

I believe that this will decrease, not
increase, our national security and the security of
Alaska's people. By not signing the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, and then proposing this ballistic
missile site, the U.S. is jeopardizing our security.
The U.S. will be sending the wrong message. I
believe, to nuclear-capable countries. And it's also
a violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
This will have a very negative impact. I believe,
also on prospects of ratifying the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty. And it raises the risk of Alaska
being a target and putting its people at risk.

My second point, I believe that this
program will further degrade Alaska’s environment and
could jeopardize human life.
The military has a long history of using
Alaska as -- and it’s people as a testing site.
There’s quite a bit of documentation about the way
that the military has tested on its Native peoples,
and there are about 700 toxic military sites in
Alaska right now, both active and inactive, that need
to be cleaned up.
The First Chief of Galena has told me that
their people there have been advised not to harvest
foods from their soils because they are so polluted
from past military actions.
The Department of Defense is not cleaning
this mess up. Who is cleaning this mess up are the
residents who have applied for an EPA grant to do so.
This is really just one example.
If the D.O.D. wants to develop any new
military sites in Alaska, I suggest that they clean
up the messes that they’ve left behind first.
My third point is the cost. The 10.5
billion dollars that’s allocated to what I believe is
an illegal and certainly unsafe project would feed
and house millions of people.
This proposal is an instrument of death. I

Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
HEARING MODERATOR: Four minutes.

SENATOR LOREN LEMAN: Good evening. I'm Senator Loren Leman.

HEARING MODERATOR: Could you pull that mike a lot closer to you.

SENATOR LOREN LEMAN: (Adjusting microphone.)

HEARING MODERATOR: Thank you very much.

SENATOR LOREN LEMAN: Okay. I'm Senator Loren Leman, and I'm honored to represent West Anchorage, in which you are meeting tonight. And my district also includes Elmendorf Air Force Base.

I appreciate this opportunity to say a few words about Alaska's potential role in the Ballistic Missile Defense program.

As an elected official, an engineer, and an Alaska resident, this issue concerns me deeply on professional, public policy, and personal levels.

Of the many factors addressed in the Draft Environmental Impact Statement, I'll briefly mention two: That is wetlands and the potential, however unlikely, of a chemical propellant leak.

Last month I toured the Clear Air Force Station and Fort Greely sites under consideration, with some folks who are in the room tonight. As an environmental engineer I paid close attention to the wetlands and ground water issues, and my observations lead me to believe that Fort Greely is exceptionally well-suited for a Ground-Based Interceptor installation.

The water table is more than 175 feet deep. In fact, I think they told us at the time it was 200 feet, and I believe some of the water is even deeper than that. No wetlands would be disturbed. And this summer's wildfire has conveniently killed nearly every tree within miles. You might even say that nature is leading the way.

Additionally, there are no roads or buildings within the range of a potential chemical leak.

In contrast, a spill at the Grand Forks, North Dakota location could potentially endanger users of - and according to the Executive Report - "three commercial buildings, two churches, one residence and portions of U.S. Highway 2.

From a number of perspectives, I believe that Alaska, and probably Fort Greely, stands out as being the best choice for the environment and for the nation.

An important component of any public
support military installations that are critical to our first line of defense in the Pacific theater.

Both are geographically isolated and proximate to potential launch sites.

So, clearly, when the U.S. is threatened in the Pacific, it is Alaska and Hawaii that offer a potential aggressor the most tempting targets.

Leaving these states undefended from a missile attack runs counter to our traditional military strategy in the Pacific and, in my view, would call into question the mission of the entire system.

An Alaska installation is the only alternative that would truly protect our first line of defense and safeguard all Americans from terrorism.

And I thank you for listening to Alaskans.

HEARING MODERATOR: Thank you very much.

If you have an extra copy of your written comments and could provide them to the stenographer, we’d appreciate it.

Thank you.

The next speakers in order are Don Whitmore, Mike O’Callaghan, Rion Schmidt, Soren Wuerth and Carl Wassilie.
Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)

P-T-078

1. DON WHITMORE: My name is Don Whitmore, and
2. my comments have to do with the Environmental Impact
3. Statement and some ideas for the preparation of the
4. Final EIS.
5. As I understand from your presentation that
6. the EIS is to cover both the construction and the
7. operations of the system, and I don’t know what time
8. frame you considered for the operations, but normally
9. when you cost a weapon system you do it in 20-year
10. life cycle cost. So I’ll assume that you used a
11. 20-year life cycle.
12. In the Deployment Readiness Review, which
13. this Environmental Impact Statement will be an input
14. to, that Deployment Readiness Review is to take into
15. account not only the initial missile system
16. configuration but also how the system would evolve in
17. the future to accommodate the evolution of the
18. threat.
19. The National Threat Estimate, that was
20. released by the National Intelligence Council on
21. September 9th of this year, suggests a number of
22. disturbing developments: One, that Russia and China
23. would very likely sell advance countermeasures to --
24. we don’t know who their customers might be.
25. Among the things that China is on track to

P-T-079

1. do is to develop a sea-based system. They already
2. have cruise missiles.
3. So I’m saying that the Final EIS ought to
4. take into account the changes in system configuration
5. as the threat involves during the 20-year life cycle.
6. And I would like to know to what effect there will be
7. environmental impact of the new configuration to
8. accommodate cruise-launched sea-based cruise
9. missiles, sea-based -- sea-launched cruise missiles --
10. excuse me. Sea-launched cruise missiles and multiple
11. warhead ICBMs. And I hope that you will address the
12. system configuration during that 20-year life cycle
13. in the Final EIS.
14. Thank you.
15. HEARING MODERATOR: Thank you very much.
16. MIKE O’CALLAGHAN.
17. MIKE O’CALLAGHAN: Now, first, I’d like to
18. make --
19. HEARING MODERATOR: You need to pull that
20. up.
21. MIKE O’CALLAGHAN: Okay.
22. First, I’d like to make a comment that I
23. realize you’re not taking testimony on but I feel
24. like I need to make it anyway.
25. I feel that this new treaty violates ABM;
and obviously that's Congress's deal to deal with, and the President's to deal with, but I think I need to say that from the get-go.

Okay. What my position is on this, is that I would like to see a win-win here, and I would like to see the biggest bang for the buck. And, like Senator Robin Taylor said, it's expensive to go out in Alaska and build.

I'm sure that you're very aware of this, back Scatter out here, which was planned for 2.5 million dollars near Glennallen, was canceled because they forgot about the footings, doubled the cost, so Back Scatter was shut down.

It's extremely important, the logistics of building in Alaska.

Okay. I think, like Robin said, that the best place to build it is in Anchorage, okay? And, like I say, I want a win-win out of this.

And like Pam Miller said earlier, you guys have a little bit of homework to do on your back stuff. One of them is right up here on the hill.

It's the Nike Zeus site, where they had an old missile site up here. That could be remediated, cleaned up, and it would give you a significant number of acres up there, which would give you your

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Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
shifting nature of the Soviet Union into the Russian power that is now, I don't think that that gives us any cause to go back on what we had decided in trying to effectively start up a nuclear non-proliferation program. You know, this basically makes Alaska a target, and, you know, I don't want to see that happen.

So I don't agree with this project, wherever it would happen. And that's my only comment at this point.

HEARING MODERATOR: Thank you.

Sorry for mispronouncing your name.

Also, if you wouldn't mind, when you go by the registration table they didn't get your address on the card.

Thanks.

Soren Wuerth.

SOREN WUERTH: Hello, my name is Soren Wuerth, and I'm with a group called the Alaska Action Center.

And it's funny, I just finished reading a book called The Firecracker Boys, which is about the Atomic Energy Commission's plan to blow a harbor out of Northwest Alaska with nuclear bombs. And this kind of reminds me a lot of that kind of mentality, and it also -- but more, it reminds me of the mentality of the public process and how that went, and the federal government kind of tried to force this project onto Alaska Native people and Alaskans in general, and it was basically a big publish process failure. And I see many of the same things happening here tonight.

Here we are having a talk about the Draft Environmental Impact Statement but there's no Draft Environmental Impact Statement around to even look at. And the location, it's -- you know, maybe next time -- and I think you should have another public hearing -- you could have it at the Loussacc Library. It's a place that people are more familiar with.

And I know a lot of people didn't know about this. I know you tried your best to get the word out, but there's a lot of better ways you could have done that.

And, I guess, overall, I'm just wondering -- again, you know, to amplify the comments of some of the previous speakers -- why you're spending up to ten billion dollars on bringing more military infrastructure possibly to Alaska when you can't even clean up the toxic waste that's here already.
I am appalled that there are 648 military waste sites up here. I have talked to friends in the engineering field who are trying to clean the stuff up and they say it's just amazing how much toxic waste is up around -- particularly even the Fort Greely area, which has a leaking nuclear reactor, as much as Senator Leman thinks it's a clean site. And also I just -- I'm sure you already know this, but, you know, you spent about $5 billion on Star Wars since 1993, and what are the results so far? You know, failure after failure after failure, a finding that technical obstacles are insurmountable.

As far as as ICBMs, trying to stop those, decoys could be spewed out of ICBMs. And, basically, countries will just find new ways, more sophisticated ways to send missiles.

And I think Alaskans don't want to be a target for the world's nuclear warheads.

And also, the National Academy of Sciences, in the 1977 report, says that we need to cut military spending and warns against the National Missile Defense program.

And again, I guess just to conclude here, you know, this is more Star Wars, more Cold War

Hearing Moderator: Thank you.

For those of you who are interested, there’s, I believe, a copy, at least one, of the KIS as well as several Executive Summaries in the room next door, if anyone would care to review those.

Obviously, they’re very, very large documents, and that’s why they’re distributed and made available in information repositories from the mailing lists in this case a month before the meeting was held to make sure people would have time to review such a weighty document.

The next speaker is Carl Wassilie. P-T-082

CARL WASSILIE: Hello. Thank you for letting me speak here. I am speaking on behalf of myself.

I just wanted to let you --

Hearing Moderator: Would you just say your name for the stenographer, please.

CARL WASSILIE: I’m sorry?

Hearing Moderator: Just tell us your name for the stenographer.

THE WITNESS: Carl Wassilie. I’m speaking on behalf of myself.
Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)

1 I would like to thank you, again, for
   permitting me to speak.
2 I am Native Alaskan, I was born and raised
   here, and I think it is very important that you know,
   you know, you need to gain trust with the Alaska
   Native community, because a lot of them are very,
   very disappointed in what’s happened in the past, as
   we heard, with the nuclear test sites, just the toxic
   dump sites all over Alaska, as well as testing of
   radioactive nucleotides on Eskimos.
3 I also wanted to point out that, on an
   international level, that the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
   that was just put on notice -- or on -- was not
   compromised (sic) within -- with the Senate here
   lately, a few weeks ago, and really stirring up the
   international community, and I think that’s a concern
   for the United States, for all United States
   citizens, and especially Alaskans, if this site is
   built here.
4 And I wanted to comment on Fort Greely.
5 There is -- there are nuclear wastes stored in an old
   reactor there, which I’m concerned with if there is a
   site built at Fort Greely, because that would -- in
   times of defense, that would be very -- that would be
   pretty disastrous, if that was exposed, for not just
   the wildlife but the people that depend on the
   wildlife in that area.
7 And I would like to thank you, again, for
   letting me speak.
8 HEARING MODERATOR: Thank you very much.
9 I called this name earlier. I don’t know
10 whether maybe he was out of the room at the time or
11 whether he had left. Gordon Glaser.
12 If not, that exhausts the list of speaker
13 cards that I have. Were any more turned in since?
14 We came a long ways to listen to you
15 tonight, and we really want to make sure that anyone
16 who wanted to take advantage of that opportunity does
17 So, if there’s anyone else in the room who’s
18 been inspired to speak, please go ahead and come on
19 up to the microphone.
20 I don’t know whether you were here for the
21 introduction. There’s a four-minute time limit. And
22 if I could just simply ask you to fill out a
23 registration card after you speak, I’d appreciate it.
24 TODD BROWN: Sure.
25 HEARING MODERATOR: Thanks.
26 TODD BROWN: My name is Todd Brown, and I
27 have come to speak on behalf of myself.
28 And I would just simply like to say that it
Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
registration card.

TGDD BROWN: And where are they?

HEARING MODERATOR: We've got one right there. Perfect.

Thank you. Is there anyone else who would like to speak tonight?

If not, Colonel Bramlitt, do you have --

you need to flip the switch.

COLONEL BRAMLITT: (Adjusting microphone.)

Well, since we've come to the closure of our trip to Alaska, I would like to take this opportunity to thank all the places we've visited.

I thank you for your comments. That's what we were after, is the comments. And who knows, we'll let the decision makers make the decision, and we may come back and we may not.

Thank you.

HEARING MODERATOR: Again, we welcome any written comments, and they are given the same consideration.

We are adjourned.

(Hearing concluded at 8:25 P.M.)

9-359

Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
Public Hearing

on the

National Missile Defense Program

Convened at Days Inn, 2000 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, Virginia, commencing at 6:00 p.m. on Tuesday, November 9, 1999.

GOOD EVENING, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN. THANK YOU FOR COMING TONIGHT. THIS IS THE PUBLIC HEARING ON THE DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, OR EIS, FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE, OR NMD, SYSTEM.

I AM LEWIS MICHAELSON, AND I WILL BE THE HEARING MODERATOR FOR TONIGHT'S MEETING.

THIS HEARING IS BEING HELD IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT, AND ITS IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS. THIS ACT REQUIRES FEDERAL AGENCIES TO ANALYZE THE POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF CERTAIN PROPOSED ACTIONS AND THEIR ALTERNATIVES, AND TO CONSIDER THE FINDINGS OF THOSE ANALYSES IN DECIDING HOW TO PROCEED.

THE PURPOSE OF TONIGHT'S HEARING IS TO RECEIVE YOUR COMMENTS AND YOUR SUGGESTIONS ON THE DRAFT EISs. THOSE OF YOU WHO HAVE NOT HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE DRAFT EISs MAY WANT TO READ THE SUMMARY OF THE MAJOR FINDINGS AVAILABLE AS A HANDBOOK. THOSE FINDINGS WILL ALSO BE ADDRESSED BY THE PANEL MEMBERS IN THEIR PRESENTATIONS.

LET'S LOOK AT THE AGENDA FOR TONIGHT. HOPEFULLY YOU ALL HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO THE MANY...
knowledgeable experts and program officials who were staffing the exhibits during the first hour. After I finish this introduction, Colonel Larry Bramlitt will describe the proposed action for NMD deployment. Colonel Bramlitt is the assistant to the program manager for the NMD program, and he is representing the NMD program office.

Next, Mr. David Hasley will brief you on the environmental impact analysis process and summarize the results reported in the draft EIS. Mr. Hasley is the program's EIS team leader for the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command.

The last item on the agenda, though, is really the most important. This is your opportunity to provide information and make statements on the record. This input insures that the decision makers can benefit from your knowledge of the local areas involved and any adverse environmental effects you think may result from the proposed action or alternatives.

Keep in mind that the EIS is intended to insure that future decision makers will be fully informed about the environmental impacts associated with the various alternatives before they decide on a course of action. Consequently, comments tonight on issues unrelated to the EIS are beyond the scope of this hearing.

To comment verbally tonight, please fill out a verbal comment card, available at the registration table, and turn it in. After the presentations, we will take a short recess to collect any remaining cards. I'll start calling up speakers in the following order: first, elected officials; and then members of the public in the order in which those cards were handed in.

If you don't feel comfortable standing up here tonight and making a statement, you have until November 15th of this year to submit a written statement for consideration in the final EIS. The address shown on the slide is also on the handout and on the comment sheets you received as you entered the hall.

Keep in mind that written comments are given the same consideration as verbal comments offered here tonight.

I want to make sure that all of those of you who wish to speak have a fair chance to be heard. We have a stenographer here who will be making a verbatim record of everything that is said tonight. The verbatim record will become a part of the final EIS and we will also be videotaping the public hearing tonight to document your input.

To insure that we get an accurate record of what is said, please help me enforce the following ground rules. First, please speak only after I recognize you and address your remarks to me. If you have a written statement, you...
developed to protect the United States from ballistic missile attacks. The events depicted on this chart drove the Congressional mandate to deploy national missile defense as soon as technologically feasible. The reason the United States needs such a system is that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long range missile technology has increased the threat to our national security.

Our current program guidance is to develop, demonstrate, and if directed, deploy a system to defend the United States against a limited strategic ballistic missile threat. The NMD system will be a land based, non nuclear missile defense system, and the development and testing effort will be consistent with the anti-ballistic missile treaty. However, deployment may require treaty modifications.

The system will consist of the elements shown on this slide. The ground based interceptor, which is the weapon of the system, the battle management command and control, which is the central communications and control point, the in-flight interceptor communications system, which transmits in-flight commands to the interceptor while it’s in flight, the X-band radar, which tracks incoming missiles, and finally, our existing early warning system of radars and satellites.

Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
In simplified form, this is how the system works. When a ballistic missile is launched, satellites in space would detect this launch and provide warning. On the ground, the existing early warning radar and the X-band radar would then acquire and track the missile and provide its specific locations to the battle management command and control. This information gives the people controlling the system the ability to launch the ground based interceptor, to destroy the incoming target outside the Earth's atmosphere.

I'd like to describe a little more detail on the elements now. The weapon of the system is the ground based interceptor, which remains in an underground silo until launched. It is important to note that launches from these sites would occur only in defense of the United States. There will be no flight tests of these missiles from the deployed site.

The ground based interceptor is a long range, high velocity missile consisting of three solid propellants, propellant boosters and a kill vehicle. The kill vehicle is the payload on the missile, and when the ground based interceptor is launched, it sends the kill vehicle into outer space, where it will find, maneuver and collide with the incoming target.

Up to 100 ground based interceptor silos could be located at one deployment base in Alaska or North Dakota. Or up to 100 silos could be based at one site in Alaska and one site in North Dakota, for up to a total of 200 sites.

The battle management command and control is the brains of NMD. In the event of a launch against the United States, the system will be controlled through this element. A battle management command and control facility would likely be located with the ground based interceptor site.

The in-flight interceptor communications system, or IFICS, would be ground stations to provide the communication links between the in-flight ground based interceptor and the battle management command and control. An IFICS site would consist of a radio transmitter receiver, and would require approximately one acre of land. Up to 14 IFICS site could be required for this system.

At this time, I would like to note that we are still developing the operational requirements for the IFICS. As such, the specific locations where it would be deployed has yet to be determined. Regions under study include Alaska and North Dakota. However, as the operational requirements are refined further, other regions may be identified. Therefore, the types of environmental impacts associated with this element are address in general terms rather than site specific manner within the draft EIS.
The X-band radar is a ground based radar capable of long range detection and tracking of incoming ballistic missiles. The X-band radar site would include the radar and its associated support facilities. At this time, it is anticipated that only one X-band radar in Alaska or North Dakota would be deployed for the initial NMD system.

The United States already has an existing early warning system that consists of early warning radars and satellites. The NMD program will make use of this system which is currently being upgraded by adding new satellites and modifying the software and hardware for the radars. Upgrades to the early warning radars in the United States would occur at Beall Air Force Base, California, Cape Code Air Station, Massachusetts, Clear Air Station, Alaska.

The modifications to these radars would not increase the current power levels, and would be addressed in a supplement to the NMD draft EIS. The early warning detection satellites a part of an Air Force upgrade to the existing system, and would occur regardless of whether NMD was deployed or not.

Any deployment of the NMD system may require the use of existing fiber optic lines, power lines and other utilities. Some of these existing lines may require some modification. Furthermore, deployment of elements to some locations may require the acquisition of new rights of way and installation of new utility and fiber optic cable.

Potential new fiber optic cable routes include lines in North Dakota, the interior of Alaska and an oceanic cable along the Aleutian Islands.

At this time, the exact alignment of the fiber optic cables are under study and have not been identified for each side. Therefore, this element is addressed programmatically in this EIS.

For this EIS, two alternatives were considered: the no-action alternative and the proposed action. For the no-action alternative, the decision will be not to deploy. In that case, the NMD program would continue to develop and test the system. For the potential sites being considered for deployment, the no-action alternative would be a continuation of the activities currently planned for these locations.

Under the proposed action alternative, the NMD elements and their locations would be selected from the range of locations stated in the EIS. Potential deployment locations for the National Missile Defense Systems are considered in both Alaska and North Dakota. The North Dakota sites fall within the existing deployment area of the 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty. The Alaskan sites fall within the geographic area that maximizes NMD system performance.

Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
destroy an incoming warhead. During the next six months, two systems tests are scheduled to help us assess the systems technical maturity and design.

A decision to deploy will be based on the following:

an assessment of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, the technical readiness of the NMD system for deployment, the projected costs to build and operate the system, arms control objectives and other factors, including potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the system. The EIS will provide us with the information necessary to properly account for these environmental impacts.

This concludes my part of the presentation. I would now like to turn it over to Mr. Dave Hasley, who will discuss the environmental impact analysis process and the potential environmental impacts that will occur with deployment of this system. Thank you.

MR. HASLEY: Thank you, Colonel Bramlitt.

Good evening, I'm David Hasley. I'm with the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command. We're located in Huntsville, Alabama. Our organization is responsible for conducting the environmental impact analysis process for deployment of the NMD system on behalf of the ballistic missile defense organization.
Tonight, I will present to you the schedule for this environmental impact analysis process and show how you, the public, is involved. I will also discuss the scope of the study and present the results of our environmental analysis.

The National Environmental Policy Act, or NEPA, requires that Federal agencies consider the environmental consequences of their proposed actions in their decision making process. The deployment of the NMD system is an action that falls under NEPA, and we have therefore prepared a draft environmental impact statement, or EIS, to analyze the potential environmental consequences of this action.

NEPA also requires that the public be included in the decision making process. Therefore, we held scoping meetings back in December of last year, to present to you the NMD program and receive your input on the scope of issues to be addressed in the draft EIS.

In accordance with NEPA, your input helped guide us in the preparation of the draft EIS. The draft EIS was then made available on 1 October of this year for public and agency review and comment. This public hearing this evening is a formal meeting where we present the results contained in the draft EIS and more importantly, receive your comments on the document.

In addition to tonight's meeting, written comments on the draft EIS will continue to be accepted at the address shown on this slide until November 15th. After the comment period is over, we will consider all comments, both written and verbal, and perform additional analysis or revise the EIS where necessary.

Again, as in the scoping process, equal consideration will be given to all comments, whether they are presented here tonight or mailed to us. Once the public review process is complete, we will prepare the final EIS schedule for completion in May of next year. The final EIS will include comments received during the public review period, as well as our response to those comments. The EIS will serve as input for the record of decision which will document the decision to be made.

And as you just heard from Colonel Bramlitt, consideration of issues besides those addressed in the EIS will enter into the final decision on whether to deploy the NMD system.

Chapter 4 of the draft EIS is where we describe the potential environmental impacts that may occur to the affected environment as a result of implementing the proposed action or alternatives as described earlier. The effects of each alternative are compared to the existing conditions at each location. Chapter 4 also includes...
The sites shown on this slide, there is a potential to impact wetlands during the construction phase of the program. However, standard construction techniques such as avoidance and soil stabilization would be used to reduce the potential impacts to these wetland areas. Also, consultation would be conducted with the regulatory agencies and appropriate permits would be obtained prior to construction affecting any of the wetlands.

Under the proposed action, no adverse impacts would be expected to vegetation, wildlife or threatened or endangered species at any of the deployment alternatives. For the health and safety resource area, first we analyzed the potential risk from electromagnetic radiation from the X-band radar on human health and safety. The results of our analysis have shown that the exposure levels outside the boundary of the site would be below established public exposure guidelines.

Second, publishing of the high energy radiation area notice on the appropriate aeronautical charts would inform pilots of this potential electromagnetic interference hazard to certain types of aircraft. Therefore, overall, no impacts to the public would occur due to electromagnetic radiation exposure.

Potential benefits of socioeconomic impacts would
occur to the regions surrounding the ground based interceptor deployment alternatives, during both the construction as well as operational phases of deployment. As shown on this slide, it is expected that construction would take approximately five years to complete and generate between $150 million and $310 million in local expenditures during that time. In addition, construction of the system would employ between 250 and 325 personnel, depending upon the sites selected.

After construction, operation of the site would require between 250 to 360 personnel. These personnel would generate approximately $7 million to $10 million in direct income per year.

As with the ground based interceptor site, it is expected that deployment of the X-band radar would also provide an economic benefit to the area around the deployment site, except for the one located at Eareckson Air Station in Alaska. Since Eareckson Air Station is a self-contained island in the Aleutian Islands, operated by the Air Force, construction and operation at this site would not provide the same economic benefit to the area surrounding it.

At the North Dakota deployment alternatives, it's expected that construction of the X-band radar would take approximately three years to complete and generate between $24 million to $36 million in local expenditures during that time. In addition, construction of the system would employ approximately 125 personnel. After construction, operation of the site would require approximately 105 personnel and these operational personnel would generate approximately $2.7 million in direct income per year.

To support the proposed X-band radar at Eareckson Air Station, a fiber optic cable line would be required along the Aleutian Islands. Within our draft EIS, we study the potential fiber optic cable route from Whittier or Seward to Eareckson Air Station. Our initial analysis has shown that most impacts would be associated with biological resources and subsistence uses. While there would be short term impacts to these resources, once the cable is laid, there should be no long term impacts.

Other NMD elements under development include the in-flight interceptor communications systems, data terminals, or IFICS, the overland fiber optic cable required to connect the NMD elements, and upgrades to the existing early warning radars used to assist in tracking incoming ballistic missiles. Specific deployment locations for IFICS have not yet been determined. However, it is not expected that deployment of an IFICS data terminal would result in significant impacts to the environment.

While existing fiber optic cable lines would be
used where possible, the NMD system would require installation of some new fiber optic cable on land. Once the specific fiber optic cable alignments have been identified, the appropriate site specific environmental analysis would be conducted.

For the upgraded early warning radar, we have just developed the initial proposed hardware and software upgrades to these existing sites in Massachusetts, Alaska and California. As a result, we’re in the process of preparing a supplement to our draft deployment EIS, analyzing the potential effects of these proposed upgrades. We will release the supplement in the affected communities and accept comments on the results of our analysis. This supplement, along with the public comments, would be included in the final deployment EIS.

In closing, I’d like for you to keep in mind that this study is in the draft stage and our goal is to provide the decision makers with accurate information on the environmental consequences of this proposal. And to do this, we’re here tonight asking for your comments on the draft EIS. This information will then be used to support the overall decision making process.

I’d like to thank you for coming tonight, I appreciate it, and I now will turn it back over to Lewis Michaelson to accept your comments. Thank you.

MR. MICHAELSON: Thank you, Mr. Hasley.

We need just about three minutes to collect any remaining speaker cards and position the podium for the speakers who are going to comment, so we’re going to recess for three minutes. Stay with us.

[Recess.]

MR. MICHAELSON: Okay, we’re going back on the record.

Before we proceed, may I remind you of a couple of points. Again, please limit your comments to four minutes, so that everyone can be heard. And please state your name clearly, into the microphone and before you make your statement. Please remember that no decision is being made tonight. The main purpose for the Government representatives being here is to learn of your suggestions and concerns first-hand.

And we will now begin the comment period. To indicate when your four minutes is up, I have a very simple way of indicating times. When you have one minute left, I’ll put up one finger, indicating that you have one minute. That should allow you to find a comfortable place to wrap up your comments. And if you’re still going at four minutes, I’ll put up my closed hand like this, indicating that it’s time to finish your comments.

Keep in mind again that written comments are

Exhibit 9.1.3-1: Reproductions of Transcript Comment Documents (Continued)
from the investigative reporter, Bill Goetz, and the internet and other places. I think the environmental impact of the ballistic missile defense is going to happen at three different places: development, deployment and use. Development, I don't see a whole lot, there's just software development and microengineering, computer science, the mining, the water, the electricity, there's really not a whole lot of environmental impact in my opinion.

Deployment, again, not a whole lot going on there. You know, you've got a little land to use and what not. But deployment does change the strategic balance, mutually assured destruction, which I happen to take comfort in, is gone. This deployment is not about defending Americans. It's about winning nuclear war, and that's exactly what National Missile Defense will do.

I happen to think that deployment is possible, and I have no doubt that the military infrastructure of this country will build it, and it will effectively work, not on little one by ones, but the whole thing. And I think that's a very dangerous situation in light of world history that I've learned, such as the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the Gulf War, I remember seeing Dick Cheney coming around and talking to me about Saddam Hussein's last options and all that.

I fear a day when maybe George Bush or a
President, maybe in 2010, 2015, is going to get up there and say, we're running out of time, the Chinese or whoever it is that we, is a danger to our national security, and a Gulf of whatever incident could come up. And this National Missile Defense could be effectively used to kill millions of people, billions of people. I don't want that blood on my hands, and that's why I'm here today.

The use of this technology is going to, could result in a nuclear war. Nuclear war, I'll yield to Albert Einstein, when he talked about nuclear weapons, he said, "All life." When he was talking about all life, he was not talking about a few people dying from nuclear weapons or cockroaches, he was talking about all life on the entire planet.

So my upper limit for damage to the environment is 6 billion people. I think that that's the worst case scenario of deploying this thing, and I'm afraid that that's the environmental impact that we might be looking at.

I'm not going to go into alternatives today. I think that peace and arms control ideas can be effective at achieving the same thing that this proposed National Missile Defense claims to.

Thank you very much.

MR. MICHAELSON: Thank you.

Stephen Young.

MR. YOUNG: My name is Stephen Young, and I'm deputy director of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers. The Coalition is a non-partisan alliance of 17 of the Nation's leading arms control and non-proliferation organizations looking for a practical, step by step program to reduce the dangers of weapons of mass destruction.

However, the views I am expressing here today are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of every member of the Coalition.

It's appropriate we're here today 10 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall having to deal with the implications of the end of the Cold War on international and U.S. security. The proposed National Missile Defense is one answer to those challenges. But I would argue, it is a premature answer and one that at this time would reduce rather than increase U.S. security.

However, as this is an environmental impact statement review, I will restrict my comments to two critical omissions or oversights in the EIS itself. First, the EIS does not evaluate the environmental impact of nuclear conflict and how likely that conflict would be with and without a National Missile Defense. A complete EIS would incorporate an analysis of the likelihood of nuclear attack on the United States. It would examine how likely
Let me be clear: a nuclear attack of any kind, large or small, would be a catastrophe, environmentally and otherwise. The U.S. should pursue every prudent step to prevent such an outcome. However, at this time, deploying a National Missile Defense would decrease, rather than increase, U.S. security. This is true not only because of the implications of the dynamics mentioned above, but also because the technology is unproven, the second reason why the EIS is not satisfactory.

Specifically, the EIS is premature, because it evaluates an incomplete system, one that has only begun testing. The technology is unproven and cannot be shown to be reliable or effective by the next time we schedule a decision on deployment.

By next June, the BMDO will have done effectively only 3 intercept tests and only 19 before 2005, when the system is scheduled to take effect. So few tests cannot show the system to be reliable and effective by next summer’s scheduled deployment decision.

Just one example of that problem, the Patriot missile system achieved a perfect test record, hitting its target in all 17 of its intercept attempts. However, when used in the field during the Gulf War, it failed dramatically. Thus, this EIS, which evaluates the untested missile defense system, is premature. It should be
repeated once the system has been shown to be reliable and effective.

Thank you very much.

MR. MICHAELSON: Sharon Judge.

MS. JUDGE: I would like to address the decision makers. Can I just flip this around? It's very important to me.

MR. MICHAELSON: No, I would prefer that you talk to me and the decision makers are all around this room, so we can all hear you, if you'll speak from there.

MS. JUDGE: My name is Sharon Judge, and I'm from Cape Cod, Massachusetts. I have found this meeting to be very enlightening, lots of information, handouts, questionnaires, question and answers, web sites, 800 numbers, etc. We did not have this opportunity on Cape Cod. Despite the fact that the PAVE PAWS early warning radar on Cape Cod is the center of an ongoing investigation, and citizens are calling for the facility to be moved, what we're getting is an addendum to this EIS.

At an invitation only meeting September 21st, at which the press was not invited, the public was not invited, representatives of the BMDO and Air Force were courteous and professional, but they could not answer our most basic 20 year old questions. Twenty years ago, the Cape Cod community was told PAVE PAWS would be a short term use of the environment and would operate for 10 to 20 years. Twenty years has passed. Residents sued the Air Force 20 years ago to get an environmental impact statement. This document is sobering, as there's a whole section on unresolved issues.

There was a low key site assessment done, so the residents didn't find out about it until the construction was, until it was being constructed. They urged continuous monitoring, they wanted an epidemiological study to begin from the moment the power was turned on at PAVE PAWS, and they wanted to be informed of any upgrades to the facility. Twenty years later, none of these things have been done.

The entire Cape Cod region is in the spell of PAVE PAWS powerful beings, there are two powerful beings. We have some of the highest rates of cancer and other potentially health related issues on the Cape. This draft environmental impact statement is deficient and this EIS process is deficient. The Cape Cod community has been left out of the process. The draft EIS talks about the scoping process, and how scoping meetings were held in communities perceived to be affected by the NMD program. Evidently the BMDO did not perceive Cape Cod as being affected by upgrades to PAVE PAWS.

How is this, when the Air Force and Pentagon, the Joint Program Office at MMR, were well aware of the
Thank you.

MR. MICHAELSON: Richard Judge.

MR. JUDGE: My name is Richard Judge. I'm Sharon's husband, and I'm a Sandwich selectman. I'm also a member of the senior management board overseeing the Superfund cleanup on the MMR. That's as Sharon referenced, the Mass Military Reservation. The PAVE PAWS unit on the Mass Military Reservation has come under a great deal of scrutiny. Twenty years ago it started, and then it subsided simply because the people on Cape Cod were told, there's nothing we can do. We'll do studies for you and we'll give you our assurance as the Air Force that there will be no problems to your health or to the health of your children.

Well, I'm here to tell you that we have some of the highest rates of cancer in Massachusetts right now, unique to Cape Cod. Now, what else is unique to Cape Cod? Well, we have some pollution over on the Mass Military Reservation, I'm quite aware of that, being on the senior management board. But we also have a unique radar facility that scans only Cape Cod.

Well, we were told, hey, there are cancer incidences behind the unit. So that eliminates this unit from consideration.

Well, I'm here to tell you, after a great deal of
believes that an environmental impact statement will help clarify exactly how the facility operates and address the public's concerns. The board recognizes the importance of Cape Cod PAVE PAWS for national defense purposes, but wants to ensure the health and safety of its local residents are protected first.

Thank you for your consideration of this request from the Town Administrator.

Also this week, the board of health voted a similar letter, stating a full EIS for that unit. It's unacceptable, you have a challenge down on Cape Cod and a problem. The people down there now have more information about cancer statistics that they gathered on their own. The Air Force promised 20 years ago to gather these statistics, and did not fulfill its promise. Now they feel they can, the Air Force or the Ballistic Missile Command can say, well, we're planning an upgrade, and we feel that you'll be happy with what we come through with.

Well, the EIS from North Dakota is not necessarily what I'm going to be happy with. Thank you very much.

MR. MICHAELSON: If you would please, particularly in the case of the attachments and the letters, we would love to have you provide us copies.

Thank you very much. Thanks for coming all the
way down here to speak to us.

That exhausts the list of all the comment cards that I have. Is there anyone else who has been inspired to speak, listening to their fellow citizens? If so, we’re here, you’re here, please take advantage of this opportunity.

[No response.]

MR. MICHAELSON: If not, we thank you very much for coming, and we are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 7:45 p.m., the public hearing was concluded.]
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commentor and Affiliation</th>
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<td>Shawn Ferguson – Senator Conrad’s Office</td>
<td>P-T-001</td>
<td>Program 1.0</td>
<td>See responses to written comments P-W-005.</td>
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<td>Kevin Carvell – Senator Dorgan’s Office</td>
<td>P-T-002.1</td>
<td>Program 1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
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<td>P-T-004.3</td>
<td>Program 1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
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<td>P-T-004.4</td>
<td>Program 1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>P-T-004.5</td>
<td>Program 1.0</td>
<td>For planning purposes the EIS analyzes the option of NMD deployment at two GBI sites, one in Alaska and one site in North Dakota.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.G. Killcrece</td>
<td>P-T-005.1</td>
<td>Program 1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Don Larsen</td>
<td>P-T-006.1</td>
<td>Program 1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Patricia Owens – Mayor of Grand Forks</td>
<td>P-T-007.1</td>
<td>Program 1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>P-T-007.2</td>
<td>Program 1.0</td>
<td>For planning purposes the EIS analyzes the option of NMD deployment at two GBI sites, one in Alaska and one site in North Dakota.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Commentor and Affiliation</td>
<td>Comment Number</td>
<td>Resource Area</td>
<td>Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bob Gustafson – Grand Forks Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>P-T-008.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>For planning purposes the EIS analyzes the option of NMD deployment at two GBI sites, one in Alaska and one site in North Dakota.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shawn Ferguson – Senator Conrad’s Office</td>
<td>P-T-009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>See responses to written comments P-W-005.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kevin Carvell – Senator Dorgan’s Office</td>
<td>P-T-010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>See response to transcript comments P-T-002.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joan Carlson – Congressman Pomeroy’s Office</td>
<td>P-T-011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>See responses to written comments P-W-006.</td>
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<td>Kirk Smith</td>
<td>P-T-012.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich Becker</td>
<td>P-T-013.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harry Lord</td>
<td>P-T-014.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Althea St. Martin – Senator Murkowski’s Office</td>
<td>P-T-015.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
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<td>P-T-015.2</td>
<td>Environmental Consequences</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tom Moyer – Governor Knowles’ Office</td>
<td>P-T-016.1</td>
<td>Environmental Consequences</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor Jim Hayes – City of Fairbanks</td>
<td>P-T-017.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Poirrier – Mayor of North Pole Office</td>
<td>P-T-018.1</td>
<td>Environmental Consequences</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
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### Table 9.1.3-2: Responses to Transcript Comments (Continued)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commentor and Affiliation</th>
<th>Comment Number</th>
<th>Resource Area</th>
<th>Section</th>
<th>RESPONSE</th>
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<tr>
<td>Pete Hallgren – Fort Greely Re-Use Authority</td>
<td>P-T-019.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tim Sharp – Fairbanks Building and Construction Trades Council</td>
<td>P-T-020.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jim Sampson</td>
<td>P-T-021.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rick Solie – Fairbanks Memorial Hospital and Denali Center</td>
<td>P-T-022.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dean Owen – Alaska Department of Transportation</td>
<td>P-T-023.1</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>4.3.1.10</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jim Romersberger – Alaska Department of Transportation</td>
<td>P-T-024.1</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>4.3.1.10</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dan O'Neil</td>
<td>P-T-025.1</td>
<td>Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste Management</td>
<td>4.3.1.5</td>
<td>The EIS analyzes potential impacts to hazardous waste management from deployment of the NMD system including existing site contamination that may be affected by NMD deployment. Other military and private site contamination investigations and required remediation are outside the scope of this EIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-T-025.2</td>
<td>Public Participation</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>Comments provided during the scoping period are used to identify the significant environmental issues related to a proposed action to assist in focusing the EIS. The National Environmental Policy Act does not require the publication of comments made during the scoping process. Draft EISs prepared for Federal agencies do not typically include the publication of comments made during the scoping process. All comments formally submitted during the Draft EIS review process will be included in the Final EIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-T-025.3</td>
<td>Alternatives</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>The No-action Alternative analyzed in the EIS for potential environmental impacts is not to build the NMD if that alternative is selected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-T-025.4</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-T-025.5</td>
<td>Public Participation</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank Biondi – PTI Communications</td>
<td>P-T-026.1</td>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>4.3.1.11</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentor and Affiliation</td>
<td>Comment Number</td>
<td>Resource Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cynthia Henry – Fairbanks North Star Borough School Board</td>
<td>P-T-027.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Whitmore</td>
<td>P-T-028.1</td>
<td>Alternatives</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>The Proposed Action analyzed in the EIS is the system currently being planned. If the NMD system is modified or updated then additional environmental documentation will be prepared as required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-T-028.2</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roger Burggraf</td>
<td>P-T-029.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Comment noted. If Fort Greely is selected, there are currently no plans to extend the railway to Delta Junction as part of the NMD program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wally Powers – Fairbanks North Star Borough Economic Development Commission</td>
<td>P-T-030.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Comment noted. The socioeconomics section of the EIS provides the analysis of the economic benefit to the State of Alaska from the potential deployment of the NMD system. This analysis includes expenditures in the State of Alaska from both construction and operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank Williams – University of Alaska, Fairbanks</td>
<td>P-T-031.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mike Stredry – Alaska Trail Association</td>
<td>P-T-032.1</td>
<td>Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste Management</td>
<td>4.3.1.5</td>
<td>The EIS analyzes potential impacts to hazardous waste management from deployment of the NMD system including existing site contamination that may be affected by NMD deployment. Other military and private site contamination investigations and required remediation are outside the scope of this EIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-T-032.2</td>
<td>Health and Safety, Biological Resources</td>
<td>4.3.1.6, 4.3.4.7, 4.3.1.2, 4.3.4.3</td>
<td>The potential deployment location for the XBR is on Eareckson AS on Shemya Island. Potential impacts to biological resources from the XBR are analyzed in the biological resources section of this EIS. No impacts to wildlife would be expected from operation of the XBR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John S. Brown – Fairbanks Central Labor Council</td>
<td>P-T-033.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>P-T-033.2</td>
<td>Environmental Consequences</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rhonda Curwen-Boyles – Greater Fairbanks Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>P-T-034.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commentor and Affiliation</td>
<td>Comment Number</td>
<td>Resource Area</td>
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<td>RESPONSE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Randy Griffin</td>
<td>P-T-035.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bill Brophy - Fairbanks Industrial</td>
<td>P-T-036.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
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<td>Comment noted.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Development Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hank Bartos</td>
<td>P-T-037.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gabriel Scott – Cascadia Wildlands Project</td>
<td>P-T-038.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Comment noted. The socioeconomics section of the EIS provides the analysis of the economic benefit to the State of Alaska from the potential deployment of the NMD system. This analysis includes expenditures in the State of Alaska from both construction and operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bill Brophy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Fiber Optic Cable</td>
<td>4.3.5.1</td>
<td>Potential impacts from the proposed fiber optic cable to the environment are analyzed programmatically in the EIS. The National Marine Fisheries Service has provided comments to the analysis contained within the EIS (P-W-068).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-T-038.3</td>
<td>Biological Resources</td>
<td>4.3.1.2</td>
<td>Potential impacts to biological resources at Fort Greely are analyzed within the EIS. Minimal impacts to biological resources at Fort Greely were identified.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>P-T-038.4</td>
<td>Subsistence</td>
<td>4.3.1.14, 4.3.4.15, 4.3.5.1</td>
<td>Potential impacts to subsistence users are analyzed within the EIS. No significant impacts to subsistence users were identified.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>P-T-038.5</td>
<td>Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste Management</td>
<td>4.3.1.5</td>
<td>The EIS analyzes potential impacts to hazardous waste management from deployment of the NMD system including existing site contamination that may be affected by NMD deployment. Other military and private site contamination investigations and required remediation are outside the scope of this EIS.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>P-T-038.6</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-T-038.7</td>
<td>EIS Process</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The EIS was prepared in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act.</td>
<td></td>
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<td>P-T-039.1</td>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>4.3.1.11</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
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<td>P-T-040.1</td>
<td>Environmental Consequences</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dave Williams</td>
<td>P-T-041.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentor and Affiliation</td>
<td>Comment Number</td>
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<tr>
<td>James Messer – Military Affairs Committee</td>
<td>P-T-042.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mark A. Ames</td>
<td>P-T-043.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
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<tr>
<td>John Binkley – Alaska Railroad Corporation</td>
<td>P-T-044.1</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>4.3.1.10</td>
<td>The figure has been revised to include the rail connection to Eielson AFB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-T-044.2</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>4.3.1.10</td>
<td>Comment noted. If Fort Greely is selected, there are currently no plans to extend the railway as part of the NMD program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nadine Hargsheimer – Fairbanks North Star Borough Mayor’s Office</td>
<td>P-T-045.1</td>
<td>Environmental Consequences</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bill Connor</td>
<td>P-T-046.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomic</td>
<td>3.11, 4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Text has been revised to include additional information on the socioeconomic infrastructure (i.e., schools and hospitals) in the Fairbanks areas. As noted in comments P-T-022 and P-W-012, the Fairbanks Memorial Hospital is only operating at 55 percent capacity and plans to open a new mental health facility. In addition, the schools in the Fairbanks North Star Borough have sufficient capacity for anticipated future growth (P-T-027). Since the NMD program would represent less than a 1 percent increase to the population base for the borough, it is not anticipated to have an adverse impact to social services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-T-046.2</td>
<td>Environmental Consequences</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>Potential impacts from NMD deployment from both construction and operation are analyzed in the EIS. Hazardous material or hazardous waste would be handled in compliance with appropriate regulations, therefore minimizing potential impacts. Potential accident scenarios are addressed in the health and safety section.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-T-046.3</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chick Wallace</td>
<td>P-T-047.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bert Bell</td>
<td>P-T-048.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sean McGuire</td>
<td>P-T-049.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anita Rose</td>
<td>P-T-050.1</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>4.3.1.10</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-T-050.2</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>4.3.1.10</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rudy Vetter</td>
<td>P-T-051.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-T051.2</td>
<td>Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste Management</td>
<td>4.3.1.5</td>
<td>The EIS analyzes potential impacts to hazardous waste management from deployment of the NMD system including existing site contamination that may be affected by NMD deployment. Other military and private site contamination investigations and required remediation are outside the scope of this EIS.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>P-T-051.3</td>
<td>Geology and Soils</td>
<td>4.3.1.4</td>
<td>Potential impacts to geology and soils including impacts to permafrost were analyzed in the EIS.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Carlstrom – Fairbanks International Airport</td>
<td>P-T-052.1</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>4.3.1.10</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margaret Durst</td>
<td>P-T-053.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sid Michaels – Denali Borough</td>
<td>P-T-054.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Comment noted. The socioeconomics section of the EIS provides the analysis of the economic benefit to the State of Alaska from the potential deployment of the NMD system. This analysis includes expenditures in the State of Alaska from both construction and operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bob Murray</td>
<td>P-T-055.1</td>
<td>Transportation, Utilities</td>
<td>3.12, 3.13</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor Bob Knight – City of Nenana</td>
<td>P-T-056.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Comment noted. The socioeconomics section of the EIS provides the analysis of the economic benefit to the State of Alaska from the potential deployment of the NMD system. This analysis includes expenditures in the State of Alaska from both construction and operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Murray</td>
<td>P-T-057.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Comment noted. The socioeconomics section of the EIS provides the analysis of the economic benefit to the State of Alaska from the potential deployment of the NMD system. This analysis includes expenditures in the State of Alaska from both construction and operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milton Haken – City of Nenana Police Department</td>
<td>P-T-058.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics, Transportation, Utilities</td>
<td>4.3.1.9, 4.3.1.10, 4.3.1.11</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank Hollis</td>
<td>P-T-059.1</td>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>3.13, 4.3.1.11</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steve Denton – Usibelli Coal Mine, Inc.</td>
<td>P-T-060.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics, Utilities</td>
<td>4.3.1.9, 4.3.1.11</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pete Hallgren – Fort Greely Re-Use Authority</td>
<td>P-T-061.1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Susan C. Kemp – Delta Junction City Council</td>
<td>P-T-062.1</td>
<td>Environmental Consequences</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentor and Affiliation</td>
<td>Comment Number</td>
<td>Resource Area</td>
<td>Section</td>
<td>RESPONSE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rick Johnson – Delta Junction City Council</td>
<td>P-T-063.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dan Beck – Delta/Greely School System</td>
<td>P-T-064.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>3.11, 4.1.3.9</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K. Kirk</td>
<td>P-T-065.1</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>3.12, 4.3.1.10</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claire Wingfield – Delta Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>P-T-066.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat Good – Delta Junction City Council</td>
<td>P-T-067.1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David DuRham – National Bank of Alaska, Big Valley Community Corporation</td>
<td>P-T-068.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Knopp – Deltana Community Corporation</td>
<td>P-T-069.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>4.3.1.9</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick C. Saylor</td>
<td>P-T-070.1</td>
<td>Subsistence</td>
<td>3.16, 4.3.1.14</td>
<td>All subsistence sections in chapter 4 have been revised to take into account the additional hunting pressure that may result because of deployment of the NMD system at any of the proposed locations in Alaska.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dwight D. Nissen – Golden Valley Electric Association</td>
<td>P-T-071.1</td>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>4.3.1.11</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matt Freeman – Federal Aviation Administration</td>
<td>P-T-072.1</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>4.3.1.10</td>
<td>Current plans for the airfield at Fort Greely may include the upgrade to the runway as analyzed in the BIS. The airfield is currently owned and operated by the U.S. Army, which has authority on the future use at this site. The NMD program could utilize the airfield as either a military or civilian use facility. The only known use of the airfield is for proposed NMD activities, which is analyzed in the BIS and would not preclude future use of the runway. NMD has no plans for civilian use of the airfield or for civilian refueling facilities and civilian passenger accommodations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donna Gardino</td>
<td>P-T-073.1</td>
<td>Socioeconomics, Transportation, Utilities</td>
<td>4.3.1.9, 4.3.1.10, 4.3.1.11</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentor and Affiliation</td>
<td>Comment Number</td>
<td>Resource Area</td>
<td>Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senator Robin Taylor</td>
<td>P-T-074.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pamela Miller – Alaska Community Action on Toxics</td>
<td>P-T-075.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-T-075.2</td>
<td>Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste Management</td>
<td>4.3.1.5</td>
<td>The EIS analyzes potential impacts to hazardous waste management from deployment of the NMD system including existing site contamination that may be affected by NMD deployment. Other military and private site contamination investigations and required remediation are outside the scope of this EIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-T-075.3</td>
<td>Health and Safety</td>
<td>3.8, 4.3.4.6</td>
<td>The health and safety sections of the EIS present the existing electromagnetic radiation conditions at each site and provide an overview of potential effects from electromagnetic radiation. The analysis in the EIS is based on the American National Standards Institute/Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers standards. The exposure limits established by the American National Standards Institute/Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers are a consensus safety standard developed by representatives of physicians, scientific communities, industry, Government Agencies, and the public based on scientific and medical literature. Potential exposure to electromagnetic radiation from the XBR would be below the American National Standards Institute/Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers guidelines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-T-075.4</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senator Loren Leman</td>
<td>P-T-077</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>See response to written comment P-W-033.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Whitmore</td>
<td>P-T-078.1</td>
<td>Alternatives</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>The Proposed Action analyzed in the EIS is the system currently being planned. If the NMD system is modified or updated then additional environmental documentation will be prepared as required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mike O’Callaghan</td>
<td>P-T-079.1</td>
<td>Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste Management</td>
<td>4.3.1.5</td>
<td>The EIS analyzes potential impacts to hazardous waste management from deployment of the NMD system including existing site contamination that may be affected by NMD deployment. Other military and private site contamination investigations and required remediation are outside the scope of this EIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-T-079.2</td>
<td>Alternatives</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>Anchorage is outside the performance region for the GBI site.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentor and Affiliation</td>
<td>Comment Number</td>
<td>Resource Area</td>
<td>Section</td>
<td>RESPONSE</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rion Schmidt</td>
<td>P-T-080.1</td>
<td>Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste Management</td>
<td>4.3.1.5</td>
<td>The EIS analyzes potential impacts to hazardous waste management from deployment of the NMD system including existing site contamination that may be affected by NMD deployment. Other military and private site contamination investigations and required remediation are outside the scope of this EIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-T-80.2</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soren Wuerth</td>
<td>P-T-081.1</td>
<td>Public Participation</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>The Draft EIS was provided to those requesting copies during the scoping process. The initial scoping process was announced by local media (newspapers and television) as well as ads being placed in the local newspapers. The public hearings were announced similar to that of the public scoping meetings. Copies of the Draft EIS could have been requested at the public hearings and would be sent out within a few days. The Executive Summary of the Draft EIS was available upon request at the public hearings. The public hearing process for the NMD Draft EIS followed the National Environmental Policy Act guidelines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-T-081.2</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carl Wassilie</td>
<td>P-T-082.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-T-082.2</td>
<td>Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste Management</td>
<td>4.3.1.5</td>
<td>The EIS analyzes potential impacts to hazardous waste management from deployment of the NMD system including existing site contamination that may be affected by NMD deployment. Other military and private site contamination investigations and required remediation are outside the scope of this EIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Todd Brown</td>
<td>P-T-083.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Maher</td>
<td>P-T-084.1</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Comment noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephen Young</td>
<td>P-T-085.1</td>
<td>Scope of EIS</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>The decision to deploy the NMD system will be based on the analysis of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical maturity of the NMD system, operational effectiveness, affordability, strategic arms reduction objectives, and other factors including the potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharon Judge</td>
<td>P-T-086.1</td>
<td>Scope of the EIS</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>A Supplement to the NMD Deployment Draft EIS analyzed the potential NMD upgrades to the PAVE PAWS radars. The Air Force has announced that they will prepare an EIS analyzing the modernization, maintenance, and sustainment of operations of the PAVE PAWS radars.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Judge</td>
<td>P-T-087.1</td>
<td>Scope of the EIS</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>A Supplement to the NMD Deployment Draft EIS analyzed the potential NMD upgrades to the PAVE PAWS radars. The Air Force has announced that they will prepare an EIS analyzing the modernization, maintenance, and sustainment of operations of the PAVE PAWS radars.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>