Unclassified Statement of

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Good morning, Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, other distinguished members of the Committee. It is an honor to testify before you today on the impact of the New START Treaty on the U.S. missile defense program.

The Department of Defense’s recent Ballistic Missile Defense Review set our objectives for developing and fielding increasingly more capable sensors, Ground-based Midcourse Defense, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, and international missile defenses to counter the growing global proliferation of ballistic missiles. The program includes developing new space-based sensors, expanding our command and control networks, improving Ground-Based Interceptor (or GBI) reliability and testing, and giving the Aegis system a capability against future ICBMs launched from today’s regional threats, to increase the robustness of our homeland defense.

Throughout the treaty negotiations, I frequently consulted the New START team on all potential impacts to missile defense. The New START Treaty does not constrain our plans to execute the U.S. Missile Defense program. Although the new treaty prohibits the conversion of ICBM or Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) launchers to missile defense launchers while “grandfathering” the five former ICBM silos at Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) already converted for Ground Based Interceptors, MDA never had a plan to convert additional ICBM silos at VAFB. In 2002, we began converting ICBM silos to operational silos for launching GBIs because we had
not developed a silo specifically for GBIs at that time. Since then, we have developed a GBI silo that costs $20M less than converting ICBM silos and is easier to protect and maintain.

Likewise, the conversion of Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles into missile defense interceptors, or the modification of our submarines to carry missile defense interceptors, would be very expensive and impractical. Furthermore, submerged submarines are not easily integrated into our missile defense command and control network.

The New START Treaty reduces constraints on the development of the missile defense program in several areas. For example, MDA’s intermediate-range LV-2 target booster system, used in key tests to demonstrate homeland defense capabilities and components of the new European Phased Adaptive Approach, was accountable under the previous START Treaty because it employed the first stage of the now-retired Trident I SLBM. Under New START, this missile is not accountable, thus we will have greater flexibility in conducting testing with regard to launch locations, telemetry collection, and processing, thus allowing more efficient test architectures and operationally realistic intercept geometries.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to answering your questions.