

**U.S. Army Symposium on Strategy, Force Structure
And Defense Planning for the 21st Century
November 13, 1996**

**Role of Missile Defense in U.S. National Security Strategy
by
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Ballistic Missile Defense has a rich and long history within the Department of Defense, reaching back into the 1950's. In particular, today's BMD program has its roots in the Strategic Defense Initiative program of the 1980's and early 1990's. Both yesterday's SDI and today's BMD programs benefit from the strong foundation of over thirty years of BMD technology developments in the U.S. Army and Air Force. I am delighted that this heritage and expertise exist, for they are the firm foundation upon which today's acquisition programs are built.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the ballistic missiles that deliver them pose a major threat to the security interests of the United States, our allies and friends. While the end of the Cold War greatly reduced the threat of a global conflict or large-scale attack on the United States, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles raises new threats to U.S. security interests around the world. In the broad national security strategy context, Missile Defense is a critical element in the Nation's set of options for addressing this growing challenge. Our national strategy has three components: preventing and reducing the threat through diplomacy; deterring the threat; and defending against the threat. I refer to this as the Three "D" approach of Diplomacy, Deterrence and Defense. As the Defense Department's Acquisition Executive for Ballistic Missile Defense programs, I will focus my thoughts on the role Missile Defense plays in this critically important aspect of U.S. National Security Strategy.

Emerging Missile Proliferation Environment

Ballistic missiles have threatened civilian populations and military forces since the first German rockets rained down upon London in World War II. Today's SCUD missiles found in Third World ballistic missile arsenals are essentially derivatives of the fifty year old German V-2. Indeed, today many thousands of short-range ballistic missiles are deployed with hundreds of launchers in as many as 30 different countries. Some of these nations are potentially hostile to the United States, our friends and allies. The theater missile threat is real and growing. We saw it demonstrated vividly during Operation Desert Storm, as Iraqi SCUD missiles were launched against Israel, Saudi Arabia and coalition forces. Twenty-eight U.S. Servicemen and women were killed and roughly 100 others wounded when a SCUD missile struck their barracks. The theater missile threat is here and now; it is widely dispersed and has to be taken very seriously.

While the short-range ballistic missile is widespread, the medium-range missile threat is emerging. Some nations are developing their own medium-range missiles. North Korea's No Dong missile, which was first flight tested in May 1993, is a case in point. Other "rogue" nations, such as Iran, are buying these missiles or trying to buy them.

Ballistic missiles, armed with chemical and biological warheads -- weapons of mass destruction that are frequently referred to as the "poor man's nuclear bomb" -- today

represent a significant threat to our deployed forces, friends and allies. The Intelligence Community assesses that Iran, North Korea, and Libya all have extensive chemical weapons programs. In addition, a nuclear threat is considered to be possible in the future. We know in retrospect that Iraq was very close to an operational nuclear weapon capability at the time it started the Gulf War. Fortunately, they were not there yet. We also know that North Korea was close to developing a nuclear weapons capability last year. But their program is now stopped by the Framework Agreement. The Intelligence Community assesses that Iran is working to achieve a nuclear weapons capability, however they are considered to be many years away from completion. The Intelligence Community will continue to monitor and assess the chemical, biological and nuclear threat from rogue nations armed with theater-class ballistic missiles and other delivery means.

A recent intelligence study on the ballistic missile threat to the United States, prepared last year in response to a request from my predecessor, considered the potential for an unauthorized or accidental launch of ballistic missiles against the United States. It concluded that the current threat to North America from the unauthorized or accidental launch of Russian or Chinese strategic missiles was remote and that it had not increased significantly from that of the past decade. The study did express caution for the future, however, citing fluid political situations in both nations.

The study assessed that no country, other than the declared nuclear powers, will develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years that could threaten the contiguous 48 states. Among Third World nations hostile to the U.S., North Korea has the most advanced long-range ballistic missile program. One of its missiles in development, the Taepo Dong 2, is assessed to have a range of over 4,000 kilometers. With future improvements to a 6,000 kilometer range, this missile would be able to strike portions of Alaska and the far western portions of the Hawaiian Island chain (more than a thousand kilometers west of Honolulu). Regardless of how remote the territory potentially threatened, we cannot take lightly the emerging ballistic missile capability of a rogue nation to threaten any part of the United States.

A key area of concern is how the study dealt with the issue of "wild cards." This refers to those activities that could potentially accelerate a Third World nation's development of a long-range ballistic missile capable of striking U.S. territory. Foreign assistance was considered a key wild card in the study that could sometimes permit a country to solve difficult developmental problems relatively quickly. Such external assistance was assessed to be able to hinder the Intelligence Community's ability to predict how soon a system will become operational. Additionally, the study considered the potential sale of ICBMs to Third World nations. It assessed that countries currently possessing ICBMs will not sell them. Each of these countries is a Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) member or has agreed to abide by its terms and recognizes that transfer of an intercontinental range missile would show blatant disregard for the regime. The study assessed that countries would probably be concerned that any missiles sold might some day be turned against them. The Intelligence Community projects that MTCR and export controls will continue to serve as substantial barriers to countries interested in acquiring ballistic missiles, however, some leakage of components and critical technologies will likely continue.

In the end, when one considers the ballistic missile threat to the United States, one recognizes that we cannot be complacent. This is why the Department's

counterproliferation programs are so vital and why the role of missile defense within the broader national security strategy must be carefully integrated into U.S. defense planning. This is also why the Department's three-plus-three NMD program is designed for possible deployment as early as 2003 -- well ahead of the intelligence community estimates for a potential Third World ICBM deployment.

Counterproliferation and Missile Defense

In September 1993, President Clinton addressed the United Nations General Assembly and asserted that "one of our most urgent priorities must be attacking the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. . .and the ballistic missiles that can rain them down on populations hundreds of miles away." The proliferation of short-range ballistic missiles in the world today poses a direct and immediate threat to many of our allies and to U.S. forces deployed abroad in defense of our national interests. Over time, the proliferation of longer-range missiles will pose a greater threat to the United States itself. For these reasons, active missile defenses play a central and vital role in U.S. defense planning and will continue to do so well into the next century. For example, over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) the Department plans to expend roughly \$14 billion on BMD programs: \$9.2 billion (or 65 percent) on acquisition programs alone. The resource-constrained environment of the 1990's, together with the complex nature of the security challenges facing us, requires that we deploy the right capabilities at the right time to achieve the highest level of security for the United States. We are proceeding with an affordable and prudent program designed to field highly effective missile defenses -- both theater and national -- when they are needed.

Missile defenses alone are not the answer, but they are an essential element of the Department's broader strategy for dealing with proliferation. In one sense, these complementary elements form a layered defense strategy against weapons of mass destruction and the missiles used to deliver them: threat prevention and reduction; deterrence, and defense.

Diplomacy and Arms Control. The United States has successfully employed a series of diplomatic efforts to prevent or reduce the theater-class missile and WMD threat to our allies and forces deployed abroad. These include the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Framework Agreement with North Korea, the INF Treaty, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and export controls.

The threat to the United States has been reduced significantly through the START I Treaty, and it will be reduced even further through the START II Treaty if Russia ratifies it. Additionally, we have an extensive program for dismantling the warheads and missiles that had been directed against us in a Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program supported by Nunn-Lugar funds. *Diplomacy and arms control* represent our first line of defense against ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction by *preventing and reducing that threat*. But history has shown that when it comes to potentially hostile intentions, a country cannot rely on diplomacy alone.

Deterrence. For nearly a half-century our strategic nuclear forces have been a bulwark of deterrence against the long-range threat to the United States from either land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles or submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Our strong and dependable deterrent forces remain a pillar of our national security strategy. While our nuclear force is smaller than it was a decade ago, it remains very powerful and quite capable of carrying out the strategic deterrence mission. In the case of deterring short-range missile threats, our theater nuclear forces and very

powerful conventional forces provide some level of deterrence against limited nuclear attacks. *Deterrence* represents our second layer of defense against ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

Missile Defense. To the extent that these first two elements -- threat reduction and deterrence -- are not fully successful, we must be prepared to *defend* directly against the threat. For example, as we witnessed in the Gulf War and elsewhere, the use of ballistic missiles armed with *conventional* warheads as either a terror weapon targeted at civilians or as a weapon against military forces is a viable option to some of our adversaries. For our interests overseas and our deployed forces, we are developing and fielding multi-tiered Theater Missile Defenses (TMD) to counter regionally-oriented missile threats. In the case of the strategic ballistic missile threat to the United States from a rogue state or from accidental/unauthorized launch from a more nuclear-capable state, the National Missile Defense (NMD) program is our ultimate insurance policy.

While active missile defenses should not be considered the sole answer for countering the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, we cannot allow ourselves to remain defenseless against a potential adversary's weapon system on the battlefield. As my predecessor, LTG Malcolm O'Neill, USA, used to say: "*We cannot allow ballistic missiles a free ride into our foxholes.*" If a potential adversary develops a missile system that directly threatens the United States, we must ensure that we are effectively defended.

Priorities for Missile Defense Research & Development

During the last few years the BMD program has undergone two significant Department of Defense reviews: the 1994 Bottom-Up Review and the 1996 Program Update Review. The Congressional Defense Authorization and Appropriations processes similarly constitute significant annual "reviews" of the BMD program. Consistently, the Administration and Congress reaffirm the **urgent** priority of fielding highly effective Theater Missile Defenses. While there is some disagreement regarding when a Third World ballistic missile threat to the U.S. homeland will appear, the Congress and Administration are in agreement that it is important for us to structure our NMD program for a possible deployment early in the next decade -- before the threat materializes. Our final priority is developing a robust technology base to underlie these two programs -- both the TMD program and the NMD program -- to be able to develop and deploy more advanced missile defense systems over time as the threats they must counter become more sophisticated and advanced.

One way of assessing our priorities is measuring the resources we allocate to implement each of these programs. The total fiscal year 1997 budget request for BMD was \$2.798 billion. The Department requested \$1.799 billion for Theater Missile Defense RDT&E, and \$263 million for TMD procurement efforts for a total of \$2.062 billion. National Missile Defense RDT&E was budgeted at \$508 million and the Support Technologies budget request was \$226 million. Of the total BMD budget request for fiscal year 1997, TMD accounted for roughly 74 percent, NMD 18 percent and Technology 8 percent. In its consideration of the fiscal year 1997 Defense budget, the Congress increased funding for BMD programs by about \$850 million. Overall, Congress appropriated \$2.453 billion for TMD, \$833 million for NMD and \$366 million for Technology. Of the total BMD appropriation for fiscal year 1997, TMD accounts for 67 percent, NMD 23 percent and Technology 9 percent.

This allocation of resources by the Congress and Department obviously corresponds to the consistent direction the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization has been given during the past few years: deploy highly effective Theater Missile Defenses as soon as possible, develop for deployment an NMD system before the threat arrives, and maintain a robust technology base.

Missile Defense Deployment Options & Timelines

The Department's first priority in missile defense is to provide increasingly capable theater missile defenses to the warfighter. Working with the Services, BMDO has already begun to deploy near-term improvements to existing air and missile defense systems to enhance their capabilities against short-range tactical ballistic missiles such as the SCUD. For example, the Patriot PAC-2 Guidance Enhanced Missile (GEM) improvements increase the Patriot's defended area and improves lethality over its capabilities during Operation Desert Storm. Similarly, working with the U.S. Marine Corps, we have upgraded the HAWK system by modifying the TPS-59 radar to improve its effectiveness against short-range missiles. This program in particular delivers real military capability to the warfighter for a modest investment. The upgraded PAC-2 is fielded today. HAWK upgrades come up on an initial operational capability decision in December, 1996.

During Operation Desert Storm, we realized the importance of providing early warning information on ballistic missile launches to the in-theater commander. During the past few years, BMDO and the Services have acted on this requirement. In 1995, the U.S. Air Force activated the Attack and Launch Early Reporting to Theater (ALERT) squadron with the BMDO-developed TALON SHIELD system at Falcon Air Force Base, Colorado. The Joint Tactical Ground System (JTAGS), also developed by BMDO and the Army, is a complementary tactical mobile Defense Support Program (DSP) ground station for use in the theater. The Army has deployed two prototypical units, one in Germany and one in South Korea, to support the warfighter. Five more units will continue to be produced and fielded throughout fiscal year 1997. Early warning of ballistic missile attack, accompanied with precise tracking, allows U.S. forces to alert defensive systems and affords friends and allies the opportunity to protect their citizens through civil defense measures.

The Department has already improved our TMD capabilities since the Gulf War. However, these improvements are modest compared to the capabilities of our systems currently in the acquisition pipeline. These systems will meet the existing and emerging missile threats to our forces, friends and allies.

Theater Missile Defense Deployment Options & Timelines. Since the theater ballistic missile threat is diverse with regard to range and capability, and the targets we must protect are similarly diverse -- from military forces and assets to population centers -- no single system can perform the entire TMD mission. This leads us to a "family of systems" approach for TMD. Building on our near-term upgrades to Patriot and HAWK, we are focusing on a layered defense for the theater. We intend to deploy lower-tier -- *those systems that intercept at relatively low altitudes* -- and upper-tier systems -- *those that intercept missile targets at higher altitudes and longer ranges* -- to fully engage the theater threat and ensure highly effective defenses.

Our lower-tier systems build on existing infrastructure and prior investments in ongoing programs. The Patriot Advanced Capability-3 system builds on the Patriot air and missile defense infrastructure. PAC-3, using a hit-to-kill interceptor, will be

highly lethal against ballistic missiles including those with weapons of mass destruction. The Patriot system, including PAC-2 and PAC-3 missiles, will also have a highly effective capability against cruise missile threats. Improvements to the system will result in increased firepower (16 PAC-3 missiles per fire unit vice four in PAC-2) and lethality, increased battlespace and range, enhanced battlefield awareness, and improved discrimination performance. These enhancements will be achieved by improvements to the missile, as well as radar and communications systems. Operational improvements will also increase battlespace and range of the PAC-3 system. The PAC-3 program is structured to begin low-rate initial production (LRIP) in fiscal year 1998, with a First Unit Equipped (FUE) date planned for 1999.

The second lower-tier system, the Navy Area Defense system, consists of the Standard Missile-2 Block IVA interceptor deployed aboard Aegis cruisers and destroyers. One distinct advantage of the Navy Area Defense system is that it can be brought into a theater quickly without having to put forces on land. In addition, since naval forces are deployed worldwide, we can have a naval TMD capability within a region of conflict to provide TMD protection for land-based assets before hostilities erupt or before land-based defenses can be transported into the theater. The Nation has already invested over \$40 billion in more than 50 Aegis cruisers and destroyers that represent over 5,000 operational vertical launch system (VLS) cells. With a relatively modest additional investment, we will ensure that this important defense capability can provide defense against both tactical ballistic and cruise missiles. Our plan is to field a user operational evaluation system (UOES) capability in fiscal year 2000 and a FUE in fiscal year 2002.

The last lower-tier system is the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), formerly known as the Corps SAM program. MEADS will be a highly mobile system that is designed to provide 360 degree protection for our forward deployed and maneuver forces against short-range tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles. This system would replace the HAWK, and would ultimately replace Patriot. MEADS has the additional benefit of being a cooperative development program with several of our key European allies. We have signed an MOU on MEADS with Germany and Italy, and NATO has formed a MEADS management agency in Huntsville, Alabama. We plan to make a development decision on this program in fiscal year 1998. A single international industry team will be chosen to pursue system Design and Development (EMD in U.S. acquisition terms) with an in-service date scheduled for about 2005.

As an overlay to these lower-tier systems, the Department is working on two upper-tier systems. This layered defense approach is necessary to defeat longer-range ballistic missiles, to defend larger areas such as cities or even regions, and to increase overall effectiveness against ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

The Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) program will provide extended coverage for a greater diversity and dispersion of forces and the capability to protect population centers. THAAD is the first TMD system to be designed from the ground-up to defend against ballistic missiles. As a result, it will be able to engage the full spectrum of theater-class ballistic missiles, particularly those with longer ranges. Deployment of THAAD, in conjunction with lower-tier defenses, will reduce the number of missiles that the lower-tier will have to engage. Moreover, it provides the warfighter a shoot-look-shoot capability -- the ability to engage incoming missiles more efficiently -- with a highly lethal hit-to-kill interceptor.

The THAAD program is currently engaged in a series of flight tests at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. While we have not yet succeeded in intercepting a target, we are confident that we have identified the problems and look forward to the next intercept test. However, this is a complex missile system and the delays we have experienced indicate how significant an engineering challenge this system represents. The Department intends to deploy a THAAD UOES capability should a contingency arise. THAAD UOES would include 40 missiles and two radars, which will be used for testing, but could be deployed to a theater if needed. The UOES capability system will begin LRIP in fiscal year 2003, with a THAAD FUE in fiscal year 2006. The Department is currently considering options which could accelerate the FUE deployment to 2004.

The other key upper-tier system is the Navy Theater Wide system. Like the Navy Area Defense system, it will be based on the Aegis fleet. However, unlike the lower-tier system, Navy Theater Wide will provide wide area coverage. This system also offers ascent-phase intercept capability in cases where the Aegis cruiser or destroyer can be positioned near the launch point, and between the launch point and the intended target.

The Department has structured a program that proceeds at a prudent pace considering the technology and the need to further develop the system concept. There is an opportunity to apply technology developed for National Missile Defense to the Navy Theater Wide system. While this program does face some technology and engineering challenges, we are confident that we have identified these issues and are making progress in addressing them. In particular, since the kinetic kill vehicle is not yet mature, we need to better understand kill vehicle alternatives before committing to full-scale development of the system. An engineering review has been initiated to evolve the kill vehicle to a robust capability.

Since the TMD approach is based on a family of systems approach, interoperability in battle management/command, control and communications (BM/C3) is essential for mission success. A capable, joint, interoperable BM/C3 also underlies the three pillars of TMD, improving the effectiveness of active defense, passive defense, and attack operations. We are pursuing three avenues to ensure effective BM/C3. These are: improving early warning and dissemination; ensuring communications interoperability; and upgrading command and control capability for TMD functions. From the joint perspective, BMDO oversees the various independent weapon system developments and provides guidance, standards, equipment and system integration, and analysis to integrate the sensors, interceptors, and tactical command centers into a joint, theater-wide TMD architecture. BMDO also conducts tests and demonstrations with the warfighting Commanders-in-Chiefs to verify this architecture meets the requirements and supports the warfighters' needs.

National Missile Defense Deployment Options & Timelines. In response to the evolving ballistic missile threat, the NMD program was elevated from a technology development effort to a Deployment Readiness Program. In April 1995, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology designated the NMD program a Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) to ensure that it receives the appropriate level of management attention and oversight.

The mission of the NMD system is to defend the United States against an ICBM attack consisting of several missiles from a rogue nation or a very small, accidental launch from more nuclear capable states. System development is scheduled for

completion within three years with an integrated system test conducted by the end of 1999. The integrated system test will demonstrate the NMD system's capabilities. The decision to deploy this system will be deferred until after a successful demonstration and the validation of a threat. If a decision to deploy were made in 2000, with additional funding the system could then achieve operational capability in another three years, i.e., by the end of 2003. If a decision to deploy is not made in 2000, the program will continue to improve the NMD deployment readiness posture by advancing the technology of each element and adding new elements, while maintaining the capability to deploy the system within three years of a decision.

The Department's goal is to be in a posture that ensures we are at most three years away from a deployment, so that we can respond to the emergence of a threat. It does not make sense to make a deployment decision in advance of the threat arriving, because our investments would be premature and result in a system that would be less capable when it is really needed. In the absence of a Third World threat, it is more sensible to continue to enhance the capability of the system that could be deployed when it is needed. This approach fields the most cost effective capability that is available at the time when the threat evolves.

The initial NMD deployment is being designed to protect all 50 states from a single, central United States site. The Ground-based Interceptors (GBI) and a Ground-based Radar (GBR) would be located near Grand Forks, North Dakota, which serves as the single United States site permitted under the ABM Treaty. Since space-based sensors are not likely to be available if this architecture is deployed by 2003, the architecture includes the option to utilize forward-based radars, whose location would be contingent upon the specific Third World threat against which the system is deployed.

Space & Missile Tracking System (SMTS). The U.S. Air Force is developing SMTS as the low-earth orbit (LEO) component of the Space-based Infrared System (SBIRS). SBIRS provides a broad range of support to both TMD and NMD, as well as technical intelligence and battle-space characterization of non-ballistic missile targets. SMTS will provide a unique mid-course tracking capability of missile targets which will allow us to greatly improve cueing to interceptors, and far more accurately determine launch position and impact points than is currently possible. The SMTS program will begin flight demonstration system tests in late fiscal year 1999. The Department is currently considering whether it might be possible to accelerate the schedule for an EMD phase of SMTS. Preliminary analysis indicates we may be able to achieve a first satellite launch in fiscal year 2004. The technical, management, and programmatic aspects of a 2004 deployment are being developed for a Defense Acquisition Board review in April 1997.

BMD Technology Base Programs. As we proceed with our acquisition programs, the demands on BMD resources have increased. The result has been a reduction in resources we can allocate to technology that underlies both TMD and NMD and provides solutions to future threats and challenges. We must realize that the viability and effectiveness of today's acquisition programs are directly linked to our past investments in BMD technologies.

Today's technology investments are based on reasonable extrapolations of credible countermeasures. They help us set the pace and direction of our advanced technology programs. Our goal is to ensure that next generation TMD and NMD systems will be able to draw from a set of readily available technology solutions. The

BMD technology program is organized to provide balance across several critical variables, including TMD and NMD applications, and technology development and demonstrations. We identify the most critical technology requirements for the program and pursue them within the constraints of the funding available. Increasingly, we are working cooperatively with the three Services to identify core technology requirements and competencies in order to foster a synergistic BMD technology program that ensures maximum shared benefit given limited resources. Our goal is to fully exploit technology investments and ensure the continued flow of new solutions to meet evolving BMD requirements.

Conclusion

Ballistic missile defense plays a central role in U.S. national security strategy by supporting our defense objectives. The requirement for BMD flows from a strategy that requires the U.S. to maintain a credible overseas presence and the capability to respond to two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts despite the increasing danger posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. In a world of regional threats to our security interests, BMD affords the U.S. greater freedom of action to protect its interests and uphold its security commitments without fear of coercion. Effective missile defenses can bolster the solidarity of coalitions and alliances (as it did in Operation Desert Storm), and provide a response to crises without having to resort to offensive measures. Finally, in the realm of National Missile Defense, we are prepared to defend our homeland against the developing missile threats from rogue nations. NMD is our vital national security insurance policy to provide the capability of defending against rogue and accidental/ unauthorized threats in an increasingly uncertain world. Ultimately, an effective NMD system can reinforce diplomatic efforts to dissuade Third World nations from developing long-range ballistic missiles.

While the "layered" national strategy of threat reduction, deterrence and defense is an effective approach to dealing with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles used to deliver them, once a ballistic missile is launched in anger or by accident, only an effective missile defense system can protect our friends, allies, deployed forces or homeland. Ballistic missiles cannot be recalled to their bases. They cannot be voluntarily stopped once they have been launched.

As the Defense Department's Ballistic Missile Defense Acquisition Executive, my charter is to ensure that we make effective and affordable missile defenses a reality in a timely manner. The BMD program today is a focused, prudent response to the real world. The BMD community is aggressively working to meet existing and emerging ballistic missile threats -- both to our forces and interests overseas and to the United States itself. The Government-industry team is dedicated to fielding the best missile defense systems possible and we have already made substantial progress in our near-term improvements to TMD systems. But we cannot stop here because the threat is not limited. We will field those systems -- such as PAC-3, Navy Area Defense, THAAD and Navy Theater-wide -- that catch up with the existing and emerging missile threat.

The strong progress in TMD results from the solid, enduring Executive-Legislative consensus on TMD. This consensus is directly responsible for ensuring consistent program direction and the stable allocation of resources to get the job done. This support must continue if we are to deliver on our collective promise to give the warfighter the protection he needs in a world with proliferating missile threats. Given the uncertainty of the emerging ballistic missile threat to the United States, the

Department's three plus three program is a prudent approach. However, for the NMD program to succeed, it too will require stable resources and program direction. The success of NMD depends on our ability to reach a consensus similar to the one that theater missile defense programs enjoy.